The legacy of military dictatorship: Explaining violent crime in democracies

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 404-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erica Frantz

Violent crime rates have increased dramatically in many parts of the world in recent decades, with homicides now outpacing deaths due to interstate or civil wars. Considerable variations exist across democracies in their violent crime rates, however: different autocratic experiences help explain why this is the case. Democracies emerging from military rule have higher homicide rates because they typically inherit militarized police forces. This creates a dilemma after democratization: allowing the military to remain in the police leads to law enforcement personnel trained in defense rather than policing, but extricating it marginalizes individuals trained in the use of violence. The results of cross-national statistical tests are shown to be consistent with this argument.

Subject Security strategy shift. Significance On January 5, President Jimmy Morales announced plans to withdraw the military from civilian security duties by the end of 2017. The security policy shift comes amid indications that crime rates are beginning to fall. However, a reduction of the military’s presence on the streets will see the bulk of security duties fall upon the police force, which continues to struggle with allegations of corruption and may be ill prepared for the task ahead. Impacts The government’s apparent confidence in declining crime rates will be well received by potential investors. Should it be successful, the move may encourage similar policies in neighbouring countries that struggle with violent crime. The military’s renewed focus on conventional duties may be a warning to Belize in the countries’ border dispute.


2021 ◽  
pp. 105756772098162
Author(s):  
Mateus Rennó Santos ◽  
Alexander Testa ◽  
Douglas B. Weiss

Criminologists have long speculated that economic conditions play a role in driving crime trends. Emerging research finds that inflation rates are associated with crime rates both within the United States and cross-nationally. Inflation is hypothesized to increase crime by incentivizing illegal markets and organized criminal activity and by reducing the legitimacy of social institutions. Existing research on the association between inflation and homicide rates has been limited to single-country studies or multicountry studies consisting of developed countries only. Moreover, there has been limited attention to the potential complexity of this relationship, including whether it is nonlinear, as crime rates may only increase after a certain threshold of inflation is reached, and whether the criminogenic impact of inflation may be moderated by socioeconomic development, as developing countries are anticipated to be more adversely impacted by the criminogenic influence of inflation. Drawing on a sample of 65 economically diverse countries from 1965 to 2015, we find a positive direct relationship between inflation and homicide rates, although we do not find evidence that this association is nonlinear. Finally, contrary to expectation, we find that the inflation–homicide relationship is most impactful in countries with higher levels of development. We discuss these findings in the context of cross-national predictors of crime.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 792-804
Author(s):  
Adam Dobrin ◽  
Seth W Fallik ◽  
Brian P Mello

Abstract This research examines American police operations by Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units. In this study, SWAT unit proactive search warrant deployments in Maryland over a 4-year period (2010–13) were analysed to see if they were influenced by violent crime rates, property crimes rates, vice crime rates, and the number of sworn law enforcement officers across four models (two random effects and fixed effects models). The results reveal an inverse relationship between proactive vice type arrests and SWAT unit proactive search warrant deployments. The results are discussed as they inform SWAT unit policies in a democracy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Farrelly

This article reassesses notions of ‘electoral authoritarianism’ as applied to the changed political terrain in Myanmar. It examines the various mechanisms through which the lingering influences of earlier political contestation are being integrated into transitional Myanmar’s public and social life. While the evolving Myanmar system is inevitably informed by the dictatorial experience there is a new effort to embrace counter-currents in the shift away from long-term military rule. The argument is that the transitional system mobilises key elements and personnel from the dictatorial period alongside growing opportunities for those who most actively opposed the military dictatorship, including in the pivotal 1988 period. The paradox of political culture under these arrangements means that the notion of a stable electorally authoritarian model needs careful reappraisal. Such stability has been replaced by an appreciation that incremental liberalisation and gradually increasing participation can help to change an entrenched political order. The efforts of the transitional government (2011 to 2015) to implement changes to the economy, the political system and the wider social situation have ensured that creeping reform has become the new norm in a post-authoritarian system where compromise had previously been hard to find.


2001 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Barros

AbstractThe standard account of military dictatorship in Chile (1973–1990) portrays the case as a personalist regime, and uses the dynamics associated with this type of regime to explain General Pinochet's control of the presidency, the enactment of the 1980 Constitution, and the longevity of military rule. Drawing on records of the decisionmaking process within the military junta, this article presents evidence for a different characterization of the dictatorship. It shows that Pinochet never attained the supremacy commonly attributed to him, that the commanders of the other branches of the armed forces retained significant powers, and that the 1980 Constitution was not enacted to project Pinochet's personal power. More generally, this study suggests that personal power is not a necessary condition for regime longevity; collective systems can also produce cohesion and stability.


Author(s):  
Natasha Lindstaedt

Military executives often seize power because the military sees itself as the best institution to lead the country. Yet the track record of military executives paints a very different picture. This chapter explains the consequences of military rule. In doing so, this chapter justifies why military executives need to be studied as a separate category from other types of authoritarian rule, and how the evolution of the study of military rule has changed over time. Countries ruled by military executives are more likely to commit human rights abuses and become embroiled in civil wars than are civilian executives. In spite of this, military executives have been able to construct the myth that they are better at ruling than civilians. This chapter explains how military executives actually govern and what the future is for the study of military executives.


2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 545-554
Author(s):  
DAVID L. SMITH

The Cromwellian Protectorate. By Barry Coward. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. Pp. viii+248. ISBN 0-7190-4317-4. £14.99.Cromwell's major generals: godly government during the English Revolution. By Christopher Durston. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001. Pp. x+260. ISBN 0-7190-6065-6. £15.99.John Lambert, parliamentary soldier and Cromwellian major-general, 1619–1684. By David Farr. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2003. Pp. x+268. ISBN 1-84383-0043. £50.00.Oliver Cromwell, soldier: the military life of a revolutionary at war. By Alan Marshall. London: Brassey's, 2004. Pp. 320. ISBN 1-85753-343-7. £20.00.Arguably the closest that Britain has ever come to military rule was at certain times during the period from 1647 to 1660. English forces conquered Ireland and Scotland in 1649–50 and 1650–1 respectively, and the two kingdoms were then forcibly ‘settled’ and incorporated into an English commonwealth. In England, meanwhile, the army repeatedly intervened to purge or disperse parliaments: in 1647, 1648, 1653, 1654, and 1659 (twice). For about fifteen months, in 1655–7, England and Wales were governed by major-generals who exercised sweeping powers to enforce order, preserve security, and enforce a ‘reformation of manners’. All these developments raise profound questions about the nature of Cromwellian government in general, and the relationship between politics and military rule in particular. Austin Woolrych argued, some years ago, that the Cromwellian Protectorate was not a military dictatorship in any meaningful sense. He suggested that the regime possessed neither the will, nor the means, to impose military rule, that it generally respected the rule of law, and that the military presence in local government even during the time of the major-generals was limited. Yet the nature of the interaction between the military and the political – in shaping government, in influencing policies, and in forming the careers of Oliver Cromwell and other leading figures – remains complex and merits much fuller exploration. The four books under review address these and related themes from a range of different viewpoints.


2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven F. Messner ◽  
Eric P. Baumer ◽  
Richard Rosenfeld

Author(s):  
Vitaliy Voronov ◽  
Timur Slivin

В статье рассмотрена актуальная проблема перевоспитания военнослужащих в дисциплинарных частях в Российской империи как организованного и структурированного процесса. Изучено использование их потенциала для поддержания дисциплины и правопорядка среди личного состава. Определено, что к военнослужащим предусмотрено применение специальных видов уголовных наказаний, кроме того, допускается изъятие в применении отдельных наказаний к данной категории лиц. Авторами раскрывается порядок реализации наказания в виде лишения свободы в частях с воинской организацией в отношении военнослужащих, совершивших преступления. Указывается на то, что перевоспитание осужденных военнослужащих было направлено на повышение уровня их военной и строевой подготовки, принуждение их к выполнению требований военной присяги и воинских уставов. В качестве негативного момента перевоспитания осужденных военнослужащих указывается отсутствие специальной подготовки у штатных офицеров и нижних чинов дисциплинарных частей. В статье рассматривается порядок реализации наказания в виде лишения свободы в арестантских частях, а также дисциплинарных частях. Раскрыто понятие арестантских рот, их руководящий и личный состав, а также порядок содержания осужденных. Показаны особенности комплектования дисциплинарных частей как постоянным составом, так и переменным (осужденными), а также прохождения ими службы. Авторами отмечается, что в перевоспитании осужденных военнослужащих превалировала принудительная функция в ущерб нравственному воздействию. Авторы приходят к выводу о том, что дисциплинарные и штрафные части со строевой организацией в целом справляются с задачей перевоспитания осужденных военнослужащих, а опыт функционирования дисциплинарных частей царской армии был использован при создании военно-карательного аппарата Советской армии.The article deals with the actual problem of re-education of military personnel in disciplinary units in the Russian Empire as an organized and structured process. The use of their potential for maintaining discipline and law enforcement among personnel was studied. It is determined that the use of special types of criminal penalties is provided for military personnel, in addition, exceptions are allowed in the application of certain penalties to this category of persons. The author reveals the order of realization of punishment in the form of imprisonment in re-lations with the military organization in relation to the military personnel who have committed crimes. It is pointed out that the re-education of convicted servicemen was aimed at increasing the level of their military and drill training, forcing them to fulfill the requirements of the military oath and military regulations. As a negative aspect of the re-education of convicted servicemen, the lack of special training of regular officers and lower ranks of disciplinary units is indicated. The article deals with the procedure for the implementation of punishment in the form of im-prisonment in prison units, as well as disciplinary units. The concept of convict companies, their leadership and personnel, as well as the order of detention of convicts is revealed. The peculiarities of completing disciplinary units with both permanent and variable composition (convicts), as well as their service are shown. The author notes that in the re-education of convicted servicemen, forced functioning prevailed to the detriment of moral influence. The author comes to the conclusion that disciplinary and penal units with drill organization in General cope with the task of re-education of convicted servicemen, and the experience of functioning of disciplinary units of the tsarist army was used in the creation of the military punitive apparatus of the Soviet army.


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