scholarly journals Lone organizers: Opposition party-building in hostile places in Tanzania

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110410
Author(s):  
Dan Paget

I ask where African opposition parties organize. Party-building is communicative; it involves persuading people to become activists. The literature suggests that opposition parties organize where people are receptive to their messages and build outwards from there. I study Chadema’s opposition party-building through site-intensive fieldwork. Chadema organized primarily in such receptive areas, but also in four unreceptive constituencies. I use these deviant constituencies to refine the literature. Prior theory neglects the heterogeneity of party-building. I decompose party-building into three modes as follows: by touring leaders, branches and concentrating leaders. Concentrating leaders dedicate their organizing to single places. They employ small rallies which afford interactive, individualized and iterative communication. This personalized communication enables them to overcome initial unreceptiveness to their messages. I conclude that opposition parties can organize in unreceptive areas, but only through the personalized methods of these ‘lone organizers’. Altogether, I show how and through whom opposition parties organize in hostile environments.

2018 ◽  
Vol 118 (473) ◽  
pp. 692-711 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Paget

Abstract This article concerns the organizational expansion undertaken by the opposition party, Chadema, in Tanzania between 2003 and 2015. It argues that Chadema’s extensive party-building enabled it to mobilize on the ground. These organizational developments, as much as elite action, underpinned recent changes in the party system and the opposition’s improved showing in recent elections. Chadema established branches even though many of the prerequisite circumstances typically recognized in the literature were absent. This makes Chadema a deviant case and this deviance has implications for the historical institutionalist literature on party-building. This article complicates Rachel Riedl’s account of state substitution. She links the incorporation or substitution of social actors to different paths of party system institutionalization. This article demonstrates that the character and consequences of state substitution depend upon the balance of power between state and social actors. It also builds on accounts by Adrienne LeBas and others that when social actors are strong, they can endow opposition parties with resources which make branch establishment possible, and when they are weak, they can only act as surrogate party branches. This article illustrates that when social actors are absent from partisan politics, parties have no way to organize except by founding green-site branches.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 384-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Koinova

How do parties in government and opposition in a contested post-conflict state reach out to their diasporas abroad? Do their policies overlap or differ, and if so why? Scholarly accounts of sending states’ outreach towards diasporas have paid little attention to the variety of actors and processes within sending states, and have grouped states with contested sovereignty in the same cluster as states for which sovereignty is not a salient issue. This article focuses on one of these contested states, Kosovo, and on the party engagement with diasporas abroad that has emerged there. I conceptualize three types of extraterritorial party outreach – state-endorsing, state-challenging, and party-building. I argue that parties that emerge from secessionism and warfare are more likely to reach out to the diaspora through a state-endorsing or party-building approach, depending on whether they are in government or opposition. Parties that are newly institutionalized in the post-conflict polity seek to engage the diaspora through a state-endorsing or state-challenging approach.


2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-158
Author(s):  
Melanie Müller ◽  
Marcus Höreth

Government stability in the German Bundestag is traditionally tied to a parliamentary majority and an opposition minority . Nonetheless, minority governments in other Western democracies show that, despite the lack of a parliamentary majority, they govern stable and effectively together with the opposition . In this article, on the Swedish case, we examine how opposition parties in parliament are involved in the legislative process in a minority government and what patterns they follow in order to maintain governmental stability without neglecting their alternative function . The paper combines theoretical and concep­tual considerations on the adequate understanding of the opposition in the Federal Repub­lic of Germany with empirical findings on cooperation and conflicts between opposition party groups and minority governments . The results show that opposition parties strategi­cally switch between confrontational (Westminster-style) and consensual patterns of behav­ior (republican) . Through this flexible majority finding, opposition parties in parliament can alternately present themselves as policymakers or as an alternative counterpart to the government . This opposition behavior is functionally adequate under the conditions of a pluralized and fragmented party system and the resulting difficulties in forming a stable government majority .


2005 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 103-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Klesner

Abstract Mexico's former opposition parties had specific social bases that would not, on their own, have catapulted either opposition party into power. In the 1990s, specific regional bases of support developed for the parties, reflecting their efforts to develop their organizations more locally. Nationally, this led to the emergence of two parallel two-party systems, PAN-PRI competition in the north and center-west and PRD-PRI competition in the south. In parallel, a proregime-antiregime cleavage came to dominate the Mexican party system, which, combined with local-level opposition efforts to oust the PRI, created new incentives for the opposition parties to abandon past emphases on ideological differences and to act like catch-all parties instead. The regime cleavage fostered the dealignment of the Mexican electorate, a process that promoted the development of catch-all parties. Movement within the parties to behave like catch-all parties has not come without internal tensions, but electoral dynamics prove powerful inducements to catch-all behavior.


2020 ◽  
Vol 119 (477) ◽  
pp. 587-603
Author(s):  
Sarah Brierley ◽  
Eric Kramon

ABSTRACT Political parties use different methods—such as holding rallies, door-to-door canvassing, and distributing gifts—to mobilize voters during election campaigns across Africa. But how do parties choose which approach to use in each constituency? We propose that parties prefer to hold rallies in core constituencies, and to use targeted strategies—canvassing and handouts—in swing and opposition districts. However, opposition parties may not have sufficient resources to pursue such a strategy. Ruling parties have the dual advantage of being in a strong financial position, and having the ability to target core voters with state benefits between elections. Using post-election survey data from Ghana’s 2012 election, we show that the ruling party canvassed the most in districts where they were electorally weak and concentrated rallies in their home constituencies. In contrast, the opposition party focused all of its efforts in its home districts. The results highlight how incumbency status shapes parties’ campaign behaviour. They also suggest that ruling parties can combine core and swing voter targeting in different stages of the electoral cycle.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie Müller

Opposition parties in minority governments are partly responsible for government stability without being able to neglect their accountability to the electorate, a dilemma that, as this book shows, has many electoral as well as policy advantages for opposition parties. This book’s analysis of opposition behavior in the Swedish Riksdag (1991–2018) sheds light on the rationality of minority governments from an opposition perspective: receiving political influence without jeopardizing one's party profile. The author studies oppositional behavior in Swedish minority governments using quantitative and qualitative methods.


Author(s):  
Adigun Agbaje ◽  
Adeolu Akande ◽  
Jide Ojo

The People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the dominant party in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic since inauguration of the Republic in 1999, found itself out of power and in opposition following its unprecedented defeat in the 2015 presidential and other elections. This chapter examines the background, historical context, nature, and matters arising from this transition of the PDP from ruling to opposition party. It shows how the transition was signposted by a decline in party vision, structure, coherence, performance, and reputation complemented by a gradual consolidation of opposition parties and interests into a single formidable platform, the All Progressives Congress (APC), which successfully wrested power from the PDP in 2015. The chapter demonstrates that impunity embedded in antidemocratic schemes that make party and electoral rules subject to pro-power interpretations while making outcomes predictably pro-dominant power provide only a fragile basis for party rule.


Author(s):  
Adrienne LeBas

This chapter argues that the performance of Zimbabwean opposition parties in elections is chiefly determined by dynamics internal to these parties. The key determinant internal factor is opposition parties’ ability to develop and sustain effective mobilizing structures. Zimbabwe’s current main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), stands out in this regard because it has, historically, appropriated the mobilizing structures of other organizations, such as trade unions, followed (however inconsistently) inclusive internal democracy procedures and constructed a highly partisan identity that prevents defections to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. Taken together, the chapter argues that these internal factors have enabled the MDC to maintain considerable broad-based national appeal for approximately two decades, a quality that most opposition parties since independence have lacked. The chapter’s argument about the efficacy of mobilizing structures, partisan behaviours and incomplete tenets of internal democracy, is a corrective to explanations of Zimbabwean politics that overemphasize the significance of ZANU-PF’s election rigging strategies, in determining the success of opposition parties.


Significance Parliament elected a new speaker and the governor general delivered the government’s traditional throne speech, which sets out its legislative priorities. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberals have been returned to parliament by voters as a minority administration after federal elections in October. Impacts Opposition parties are likely to give Trudeau a couple of years in office before pursuing a no-confidence motion. The Trans Mountain pipeline will be built and eventually transferred to indigenous ownership and control. Additional policing, tax and pensions powers will be devolved to Alberta and Saskatchewan, given separatist sentiment there. The Conservatives, the largest opposition party, could decide to change their leader in April 2020. Should the United States enact the USMCA trade deal, Canada’s parliament would pass it speedily.


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Moury ◽  
Jorge M. Fernandes

In an age of rampant distrust and disaffection, pledge fulfilment is important for the quality of delegation between voters and elected officials. In this article, we make an empirical appraisal of pledge fulfilment in Portugal. Do Portuguese minority governments fulfil their pledges? How do they fulfil those pledges? What is the role of opposition parties? Using an original data set with over 3,000 electoral pledges for three Socialist governments, as well as interviews with former ministers and party leaders, our evidence suggests that: (1) minority governments fulfil at least as many pledges as their majority counterparts; (2) the main opposition party manages to extract the most policy benefits; and (3) economic conditions and cohabitation situations matter for pledge fulfilment.


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