scholarly journals Buddhist Revival under State Watch

2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Laliberté

The Chinese Communist Party has shown tolerance, if not direct support, for the growth of Buddhism over the last few decades. Three explanations for this lenient attitude are explored in this article. The flourishing of Buddhism is encouraged by the state less for its propaganda value in foreign affairs than for its potential to lure tourists who will, in turn, represent a source of revenue for local governments. Buddhist institutions are also establishing their track record in the management of philanthropic activities in impoverished area where local governments lack the resources to offer specific social services. Finally, the development of such activities has contributed to enhance cooperation between China and Taiwan, whose governments have a vested interest in the improvement of relations across the Strait. The article concludes that the growth of Buddhism in China results from the initiatives of Buddhists themselves, and the government supports this growth because it serves local politics well.

Author(s):  
Dwight H. Perkins

The Chinese economy during the first three decades of rule by the Chinese Communist Party was organized in a fundamentally different way from that of market economies in much of the rest of the world and from what the Chinese economy became in the 21st century after three decades of market-oriented economic reform. Beginning in the mid-1950s, China introduced a centrally planned command economy patterned on that of the Soviet Union. This economic system involved the abolition of household agriculture in favor of collectives, first called “agricultural producer cooperatives” and, later, “Rural People’s Communes.” Industrial inputs and outputs were allocated by administrative means in accordance with a plan developed by the State Planning Commission, and market forces were largely eliminated in industry and large-scale commerce. Wages were set, and skilled workers were allocated to jobs by the government rather than by a labor market. Even many consumer goods were rationed, although some were allocated to households through the market; prices paid to farmers also played a limited role in government procurement of agricultural products. This highly centralized nonmarket, Soviet-type system, however, was introduced into the very different context of a developing country that was extremely poor. From the beginning, China’s leadership and that of Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong, in particular, explored alternatives to these rigid central controls. The result of these explorations more often than not was economic disaster, leading to the 1959–1961 famine in which roughly thirty million people are believed to have died. The government and the leadership also pursued political goals, notably during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), that disrupted the economy and slowed economic growth. Economic studies during this period thus focused on how the economy was organized, how it made the transition from a market economy to a nonmarket command economy, and how the institutions and performance of this command economy performed in various periods. Describing the institutions was easier than measuring performance because, from 1958 to 1960, China published data that grossly exaggerated China’s economic performance. After 1960, given the reality of famine and a poorly performing economy more generally, the government simply stopped publishing statistical data on economic performance. Many analysts outside China thus had to piece together the data that did leak out, and much of their work managed to capture what was happening. The publication of increasing amounts of official data, beginning in 1979, filled in some of the gaps in the earlier literature. Most Chinese economists from 1949 through 1978 were expected to follow the government/party line at the time in anything they published; however, there were exceptions in which individual economists and officials stated views on economic matters that did not reflect the dominant government/party line.


Subject Communist Party control over private businesses. Significance The Chinese Communist Party sees itself as a 'vanguard party'. That is, it governs by leading other social groups, including the government and private enterprise. Reforms over the years have withdrawn the government from direct control of many industries, but the Party is reasserting control behind the scenes. Impacts In the business sector, control by the state is being replaced with control by the Party; enterprise is not an independent sector. Large private sector firms such as China's ICT giants are subject to the influence and occasional control of Party groups. Party infrastructure in foreign companies is growing, and the Party may take a closer look at business decisions.


Author(s):  
Willy Wo-Lap Lam

This chapter explores the macro-level political development in China and the possibilities of liberalization in the context of weiquan and weiwen. The government is resorting to both hard and soft measures to maintain stability and legitimacy. On the one hand, a “scorched earth policy” is used against dissidents who may be perceived to challenge the Chinese Communist Party directly, as demonstrated by the prosecution and heavy punishment of Liu Xiaobo and his comrades-in-arms. On the other, the CCP has taken a reconciliatory approach in dealing with the poor, the liberal elements within the CCP, and the Uighurs in Xinjiang. In general, however, the CCP is retreating to a conservative comfort zone ideologically and institutionally. This suggests that there are only slim chances of further political reform.


1994 ◽  
Vol 140 ◽  
pp. 1007-1024 ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. G. Goodman

The Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan or JinJiLuYu Border Region was formally proclaimed on 7 July 1941, the fourth anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Even at that early stage some level of activity by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or its allies was claimed for 148 counties in Shanxi (Jin), Hebei (Ji), Shandong (Lu) and Henan (Yu). By 1947 and the outbreak of open civil war, the government of the JinJiLuYu Border Region claimed jurisdiction over some 30 million people. In 1948 it merged with the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, immediately to the north, to form the North China People's Government, part of the process that led directly to the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC).


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 276-281
Author(s):  
Ni Komang Ayu Febriyanti ◽  
I Wayan Wesna Astara ◽  
I Wayan Arthanaya

Public welfare is an effort made by the government which aims to improve the welfare of the community through social services and has a broad scope. The outbreak of the covid-19 virus in Indonesia resulted in the central government issuing policies on efforts to prevent the spread of the covid-19 virus which must be implemented by local governments. The purpose of this research is to reveal the arrangement of local government assistance funds in order to tackle covid-19 in the Kuta Traditional Village and the implementation of the provision of social assistance funds distributed to the community in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. The method used is empirical legal research with a sociological approach. Sources of legal materials are primary, secondary and tertiary which are obtained directly through field research. The legal materials obtained then analyzed using qualitative descriptive techniques. The results of this research concluded that Kuta Traditional Village is not qualified in providing assistance considering that what was seen was the aspect of equality of indigenous peoples and agencies and the need for an organization and an implementation system so that the provision of social assistance can proceed well.


Author(s):  
Mahro A.

Every inhabitant of a village or city has the right to modern medicine and education, accessible and high-quality administrative, com-munal, social services, good roads, clean and lighted streets. To this end, decentralization is taking place in Ukraine – the transfer of pow-ers and finances from state authorities as close as possible to the people – local governments. Since 2014, Ukraine has entered a new stage of its development. The changes taking place under the influence of the reform primarily concern the structure of local budgets, as they are the key tool for the formation of newly created administrative units. Today, local budgets are a key component of the budget system of Ukraine. at the expense of local budgets are the main economic and social changes. local budget is the financial base of local government, an instrument of state regional policy, plans for the formation and use of financial resources of local communities, the main lever of financial equalization, the main source of financial resources. maintenance and development of the local economy, solving local, social problems and raising the welfare of the population of the territories. Therefore, it is very important for the local communities to follow the changes formed under the influence of the decentralization reform, to analyze its financial results, for its further development. The purpose of the article is to study the current structure of local budgets in the context of decentralization reform to assess the future actions of OTG leaders in the development of territories. The article examines and analyzes the financial results of the reform, obtained through the analysis of dynamics, structural and comparative analysis of static data. According to the results of the research, the factors of formation of the modern structure of local budgets are revealed. It is determined that the key to the development of territorial com-munities will be the relevant management decisions of the OTG leadership on the formation, rational and efficient allocation of financial resources, together with the use of powers received from the Government of Ukraine.Keywords: decentralization reform, local communities, local budgets, structure of local budgets, financial results. Із упровадженням реформи децентралізації починаючи з 2014 р. Україна стала на новий етап свого розвитку. Зміни, що відбуваються під впливом реформи, передусім стосуються структури місцевих бюджетів, адже саме вони є ключовою фінансовою основою становлення адміністративних одиниць. Метою статті є дослідження сучасної структури місцевих бюджетів в умовах проведення реформи децентралізації для оцінювання майбутніх дій керівників ОТГ у розвитку територій. У статті досліджено та проаналізова-но фінансові результати реформи, отримані за рахунок аналізування динаміки, структурного та порівняльного аналізу статичних даних. За результатами дослідження виявлено чинники формування сучасної структури місцевих бюджетів. Визначено, що запорукою розвитку територіальних громад стануть відповідні управлінські рішення керівництва ОТГ щодо формування, раціонального та ефективного розподілу фінансових ресурсів разом із використанням отриманих повноважень від уряду України.Ключові слова: реформа децентралізації, об’єднані територіальні громади, місцеві бюджети, структура місцевих бюджетів, фінансові результати.


2002 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 86-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kazuko Kojima ◽  
Ryosei Kokubun

In recent years, the community development programme called 'Shequ Construction' has been making rapid progress in China. The discussion surrounding the programme focuses on how to adjust the relationship between the street offices (which fall under the jurisdiction of the government) and the shequ residents' committees (defined as the people's self-governing entity). The programme has also led the debate over the position and role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the newly reconstructed shequ. While the party's Organization Department proposes the unification of the shequ party branches and shequ residents' committees, others maintain that the shequ party branch should be differentiated from the shequ residents' committee, which is still viewed as an agent of government. They say 'the greatest advantage of the CCP is that it is the embodiment of social power and it is not a non-socialist external force like the administrative organ'. Their proposal raises further questions: How should the party change its direction and guidance within the framework of the separation of government and society? Will this affect the party's ability to continue to provide society with effective 'guidance' and become representative of society? This paper will provide some clues to help answer these questions.


2002 ◽  
Vol 171 ◽  
pp. 724-740 ◽  
Author(s):  
Young Nam Cho

This article analyses Chinese local people's congresses' supervision of governments in order to see whether people's congresses have played a meaningful role in the reform era. The article will show that the main strategies of people's congresses have been to gain the support of the Chinese Communist Party and to co-operate with governments, rather than to use confrontation, in an effort to overcome their lower political status. But after primarily achieving these goals by the early 1990s, people's congresses have also started to employ the confrontation strategy towards governments. At the same time, people's congresses have actively pioneered new supervisory measures so that they overcome current problematic legal and legislative systems. As a result, legislative supervision began to influence governments and officials significantly in the early 1990s. So people's congresses, along with the Party and governments, have become important political actors in local politics, even though they are not as influential as the other two institutions.


2020 ◽  
pp. 172-212
Author(s):  
Silvia M. Lindtner

This chapter documents the appropriation of making by the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). This manifested in infrastructural and urban upgrades aimed at inducing desires for self-transformation in Chinese citizens. The chapter draws from ethnographic research conducted with the workers, designers, and managers in Shenzhen's manufacturing industry, documenting their ambivalent relationship to the “invention” of Shenzhen as a maker city. It shows that by positing certain urban spaces as sites of making and as the ideal training ground for happiness and self-investment, the government aimed to induce in the workers, designers, and engineers of China's manufacturing industry desires to upgrade themselves. The chapter also details the slow violence at the heart of contemporary displacements of technological promise.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document