scholarly journals Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (10) ◽  
pp. 3298-3314 ◽  
Author(s):  
David K. Levine ◽  
Andrea Mattozzi

We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters’ turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results. (JEL D72, Z13)

Res Publica ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-188
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Jagodzinski ◽  
Jürgen Friedrichs ◽  
Hermann Dülmer

During the last years immigration has aggravated the socialproblems in many disadvantaged urban districts. High proportions of foreigners are concentrating in those areas which suffer from unemployment and bad housing conditions. The accumulation of social problems has created a climate of insecurity, social prejudices, and political dissatisfaction. Since political discontent presently is not remedied by the established political parties, it results in low voting participation and increasing proportions of right wing votes. The close connection between the intensity of social problems on the one side, low voter turnout and high success of right extremist parties on the other side, is empirically established by an ecological analysis of the recent state elections in Hamburg.


Author(s):  
Rohan Dutta ◽  
David K Levine ◽  
Salvatore Modica

Abstract We study the consequences of policy interventions when social norms are endogenous but costly to change. In our environment a group faces a negative externality that it partially mitigates through incentives in the form of punishments. In this setting policy interventions can have unexpected consequences. The most striking is that when the cost of bargaining is high introducing a Pigouvian tax can increase output - yet in doing so increase welfare. An observer who saw that an increase in a Pigouvian tax raised output might wrongly conclude that this harmed welfare and that a larger tax increase would also raise output. This counter-intuitive impact on output is demonstrated theoretically for a general model and found in case studies for public goods subsidies and cartels.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Kubinec ◽  
Sharan Grewal

Is power-sharing an effective way for endangered transitional democracies to reduce political tensions and improve government performance? We provide one of the first quantitative tests of this question in Tunisia, the Arab Spring's only success story. We argue that power-sharing may reduce polarization for a limited time, but at the cost of undermining democratic institutions. To measure polarization, we examine all rollcall votes from Tunisia's first and second post-transition parliaments. We employ a time-varying ideal point model and examine whether power-sharing agreements led to convergence in political parties' ideal points. Our analysis reveals that Tunisia's national unity government in 2015 temporarily moderated political tensions and allowed for parliamentary activity to resume. However, despite a broadening of the coalition in mid-2016, polarization reemerged and crucial legislation stalled. Moreover, longitudinal survey data suggest that the failure of power-sharing in Tunisia contributed to disillusionment with political parties, parliament, and democracy.


Author(s):  
Frank Bitafir Ijon

Conducts of by-elections in recent times have been fraught with a lot of security challenges. This has been as a result of the violence that characterized the conduct of by-elections in recent times in Ghana. Violence during by-elections in Ghana plays a vital role in securing election victories for political parties. In all the by-elections characterized by violence in Ghana, they were won by parties that were accused of inciting the violence. The main tenets of election violence as identified by the paper included, actors, motives, timing, consequences, and patterns. The paper adopted the content analysis method in its investigation of the two violent by-elections in Ghana. The paper revealed that there was a correlation between violence during by-elections and victories of incumbent parties. This was because, in the two by-elections understudy, those accused of starting the violence and using national security operatives won the elections. The paper also found out that by-election violence impacted negatively on Ghana’s democratic maturity in several ways, such as; low voter turnout, weakening of democratic foundation and breeding an atmosphere of insecurity. Finally, the paper also revealed that political parties especially those in government resort to violence during by-elections in Ghana because they fear losing it will mean the government was underperforming as argued out by Feigert and Norris and also because they want to add to their tally in parliament.


2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110409
Author(s):  
Rainbow Murray ◽  
Ragnhild Muriaas ◽  
Vibeke Wang

Contesting elections is extremely expensive. The need for money excludes many prospective candidates, resulting in the over-representation of wealth within politics. The cost of contesting elections has been underestimated as a cause of women’s under-representation. Covering seven case studies in six papers, this special issue makes theoretical and empirical contributions to understanding how political financing is gendered. We look at the impact on candidates, arguing that the personal costs of running for office can be prohibitive, and that fundraising is harder for female challengers. We also explore the role of political parties, looking at when and how parties might introduce mitigating measures to support female candidates with the costs of running. We demonstrate how political institutions shape the cost of running for office, illustrate how this is gendered and consider the potential consequences of institutional reform. We also note how societal gender norms can have financial repercussions for women candidates.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 678-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
SACHA KAPOOR ◽  
ARVIND MAGESAN

We estimate the causal effect of independent candidates on voter turnout and election outcomes in India. To do this, we exploit exogenous changes in the entry deposit candidates pay for their participation in the political process, changes that disproportionately excluded candidates with no affiliation to established political parties. A one standard deviation increase in the number of independent candidates increases voter turnout by more than 6 percentage points, as some voters choose to vote rather than stay home. The vote share of independent candidates increases by more than 10 percentage points, as some existing voters switch who they vote for. Thus, independents allow winning candidates to win with less vote share, decrease the probability of electing a candidate from the governing coalition by about 31 percentage points, and ultimately increase the probability of electing an ethnic-party candidate. Altogether, the results imply that the price of participation by independents is constituency representation in government.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Bendor ◽  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
David A. Siegel ◽  
Michael M. Ting

This chapter focuses on voter participation, perhaps the most well-known anomaly for rational choice theory. The problem goes like this: in large electorates, the chance that any single voter will be pivotal is very small. Consequently, the cost of voting will outweigh the expected gains from turning out and few citizens will vote. This prediction is not consistent with some of the most easily observed facts about elections. The chapter introduces a basic model of electoral participation that focuses on voters’ turnout decisions under fixed candidate platforms. Contrary to the “paradox of turnout” raised by game-theoretic models of turnout, the model consistently generates realistically high levels of turnout. It also produces comparative statics, including those for voting cost, population size, and faction size, that are intuitive and empirically supported.


Author(s):  
Jan E. Leighley ◽  
Jonathan Nagler

This chapter considers the electoral impact the new, wider array of voter registration and election administration laws using a new data set collected on state electoral rules between 1972 and 2008. States vary tremendously as to how easy it is to register and to vote, and previous research suggests that these laws affect who votes because they change the cost of voting. However, most of these studies rely on cross-sectional data, and usually consider the influence of one reform at a time. The chapter provides aggregate (state-level) analyses of the effects of changes in these rules on voter turnout. These analyses help us address the question of whether overall voter turnout has increased as a result of these legal changes. It finds modest effects of election day registration, of absentee voting, and of moving the closing date for registration closer to the election on overall turnout. The effect of early voting is less clear.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Nový

AbstractDoes higher turnout support left-wing parties, as many previous studies assume? Theoretical discussions thus far have been relatively inconclusive. This study proposes three different explanatory mechanisms for examining an aggregate-level relationship between turnout and electoral support for political parties in the post-communist milieu. The conventional hypothesis, based on the assumptions of a successful re-stratification of society and the relevance of class voting, states that higher turnout benefits the left. The second hypothesis is derived from the Michigan model of party identification. In this case, political parties with less loyal electorates would be expected to profit from higher rates of electoral participation. However, this article makes the case for a third possible explanation, termed simply “mobilization against the left,” which reverses the conventional hypothesis. The idea is that the more people come to the polls, the stronger the post-communist right-wing parties will be. This analysis includes two Czech regions that can be said to be farthest away from each other in terms of their socioeconomic and political characteristics. Having analyzed the 2010 Czech parliamentary election results across 1444 electoral districts in two regions, Central Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, we conclude that there is certain empirical evidence that supports the proposed explanatory mechanism regarding the relationship between voter turnout and share of votes for political parties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Fortune Agbele

Using micro-level data from three constituencies in Ghana, which are cases of high, average and low turnout respectively, I assess whether voters’ perceptions of the cost of voting (resource and time) can explain such variation in voter turnout. Results suggest that in Ghana, such individual perceptions of the cost associated with voting do not help in explaining variance in voter turnout at the constituency level: Across the different levels of turnout, there is little to no variance in voters’ perceptions. I find that the high positive perceptions of the electoral processes across high, average, and low turnout constituencies are not only due to the activities of the electoral management body but among others, the adjustments by citizens to the process based on their experiences from past elections.


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