scholarly journals Crowdvoting Judgment: An Analysis of Modern Peer Review

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-222
Author(s):  
Michael R. Wagner

In this paper, we propose and analyze models of self policing in online communities, in which assessment activities, typically handled by firm employees, are shifted to the “crowd.” Our underlying objective is to maximize firm value by maintaining the quality of the online community to prevent attrition, which, given a parsimonious model of voter participation, we show can be achieved by efficiently utilizing the crowd of volunteer voters. To do so, we focus on minimizing the number of voters needed for each assessment, subject to service-level constraints, which depends on a voting aggregation rule. We focus our attention on classes of voting aggregators that are simple, interpretable, and implementable, which increases the chance of adoption in practice. We consider static and dynamic variants of simple majority-rule voting, with which each vote is treated equally. We also study static and dynamic variants of a more sophisticated voting rule that allows more accurate voters to have a larger influence in determining the aggregate decision. We consider both independent and correlated voters and show that correlation is detrimental to performance. Finally, we take a system view and characterize the limit of a costless crowdvoting system that relies solely on volunteer voters. If this limit does not satisfy target service levels, then costly firm employees are needed to supplement the crowd.

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Battaglini ◽  
Lydia Mechtenberg

AbstractWe conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group (the “yellows”) to share political power with another group (the “blues”). The yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a general election: a simple-majority rule that favors them, or a proportional rule. In two treatments, the blues can use a costly punishment option. We find that the yellows share power voluntarily only to a small extent, but they are more inclined to do so under the threat of punishment, despite the fact that punishments are not sub-game perfect. The blue group conditions punishments both on the voting rule and the electoral outcome.


1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 48-64
Author(s):  
Mike F. Van Wyk

The quality of corporate governance service in the parastatal (also called public entity) and listed industrial company sectors of the South African economy was assessed. The assessment was done using newly developed service quality assessment instruments. The reliability of the findings on the quality of corporate governance service implied a 99.5% probability that the sample mean did not differ from the population mean by more than 0.2 on a seven-point scale. In both sectors the actual corporate governance service was assessed against two levels of expectation, namely the desired service level and the lowest acceptable service level. The instruments were the same except for a few adaptations to cater for the less stringently legislated listed company sector and to provide for insights gained from the first assessment. Both assessments resulted in the same four dimensions, namely 'directing and monitoring', 'board capacity', 'assurance' and 'responsiveness and reliability'. One fundamental difference was reported, namely that the listed company directors' corporate governance was in total, in all four dimensions and on all criteria assessed as between the lowest acceptable and the desired service levels. The public entity directors' corporate governance service was in total, in all four dimensions and on all criteria assessed as below the desired as well as the lowest acceptable service levels. The standard deviations as reported were such that it has to be concluded that acceptable and unacceptable corporate governance service levels are found in public entities as well as in listed companies. The assessment results are reported below graphically. Three criteria appeared on both assessments' lists often worst-assessed criteria. They were directors 'being always properly prepared for meetings', 'doing their homework thoroughly' and 'displaying impeccable integrity and honesty, for example with their own claims'.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Brishti Guha

AbstractDoes the accuracy of verdicts improve or worsen if individual jurors on a panel are barred from deliberating prior to casting their votes? I study this question in a model where jurors can choose to exert costly effort to improve the accuracy of their individual decisions. I find that, provided the cost of effort is not too large, it is better to allow jurors to deliberate if jury size exceeds a threshold. For panels smaller than this threshold, it is more effective to instruct jurors to vote on the basis of their private information, without deliberations, and to use a simple majority rule to determine the collective decision (regardless of the voting rule used with deliberations). The smaller the cost of paying attention, the larger the threshold above which the switch to allowing deliberations becomes optimal. However, if the unanimity rule had to be maintained under the no-deliberations system, it would be better to allow deliberation. The results apply to binary decision making in any committee where the committee members incur some effort in reviewing the evidence. Examples are arbitration panels and tenure and promotion committees and some board of director meetings on issues such as whether to dismiss a CEO. As an extension I consider the case where jurors differ in their costs of effort.


2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (11) ◽  
pp. 3590-3605 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Alonso ◽  
Odilon CÂmara

In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (politician) can influence voters' choices by strategically designing a policy experiment (public signal). We characterize the politician's optimal experiment. With a nonunanimous voting rule, she exploits voters' heterogeneity by designing an experiment with realizations targeting different winning coalitions. Consequently, under a simple-majority rule, a majority of voters might be strictly worse off due to the politician's influence. We characterize voters' preferences over electoral rules and provide conditions for a majority of voters to prefer a supermajority (or unanimity) voting rule, in order to induce the politician to supply a more informative experiment. (JEL D72, D83)


2022 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 577
Author(s):  
Seulki Lee

To improve the quality of life (QOL) of the citizen, it is essential to not only to secure a quantitative stock, such as the number or extension of individual infrastructure, but to also understand the perspective of the public on service levels and the demand for infrastructure. In this study, an infrastructure service level assessment model that reflects the demands of citizens is proposed, and the importance and adequacy of infrastructure service indexes for setting priorities and goals for the investment of government funds in infrastructure are verified. The evaluation items used in this model included usability, accessibility, and recovery speed. The infrastructure service level for 12,500 Korean citizens was surveyed using the proposed assessment model, and the results reveal that the satisfaction of citizens with their residences had a significant effect on the QOL improvement, and that the level of infrastructure performance in a residential area significantly affected the satisfaction of citizens with their residences. In addition, the results revealed that the quantitative and qualitative aspects of infrastructure should be simultaneously considered. Lastly, the possible application of this model for the evaluation of the effectiveness of investment for infrastructure improvement is proposed.


2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-407
Author(s):  
Mr. R. Raju ◽  
Ms. D. Dhivya ◽  
Ms. R. Saranya ◽  
Ms. S. I. Abbinaya

The service purchaser needs to stipulate for the service. The service contributor will afford the service to the purchaser.The powerful use of services to assemble business processes in service computing pressures that the Quality of Services (QoS) convene consumers’ perspective. When  manipulating the services, a service provider must  set apart the quality of service levels that will be existing to the  customers. Programmed web-based negotiation of Service Level Agreements (SLA) can assist in describing the QoS necessities of critical service-based processes. We put forward a trusted Negotiation Organizer(NO) structure that performs adaptive and intelligent mutual bargaining of SLAs between a service contributor and a service purchaser based on each party’s elevated level business necessities. We also define an algorithm for adapting the decision functions during an continuing negotiation to match with an opponent’s offers or with simplified purchaser preferences. The NO uses intelligent agents to conduct the negotiation locally by choosing the most suitable multi criteria decision making system known as Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP).


2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
František Turnovec

In this paper we provide an analysis of the Commission's proposal of so called double simple majority rule (when to pass a decision simple majority of Member States and at the same time simple majority of total population has to be reached) for the voting in the Council of Ministers of the EU. In our evaluation we are using an a priori voting power methodology to measure an influence of the Member States before and after extension of the EU. In the closing part of the paper we shortly compare the double simple majority rule to the compromise approved by the 2000 Nice Summit of the EU.


Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Shepsle

Simple majority rule is badly behaved. This is one of the earliest lessons learned by political scientists in the positive political theory tradition. Discovered and rediscovered by theorists over the centuries (including, famously, the Majorcan Franciscan monk Raymon Llull in the thirteenth century, the Marquis de Condorcet in the eighteenth, the Reverend Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) in the eighteenth, and Duncan Black in the twentieth), the method of majority rule cannot be counted on to produce a rational collective choice. In many circumstances (made precise in the technical literature), it is very likely (a claim also made precise) that whatever choice is produced will suffer the property of not being “best” in the preferences of all majorities: for any candidate alternative, there will always exist another alternative that some majority prefers to it. This chapter suggests that while a collection of preferences often cannot provide a collectively “best” choice, institutional arrangements, which restrict comparisons of alternatives, may allow majority rule to function more smoothly. That is, where equilibrium induced by preferences alone may fail to exist, institutional structure may induce stability.


2021 ◽  
pp. 109634802098888
Author(s):  
Dan Jin ◽  
Robin B. DiPietro ◽  
Nicholas M. Watanabe

As customers’ consumption is increasingly dominated by technology-driven systems, online self-verification becomes an important aspect of customers’ online purchasing behavior and plays a significant role in shaping social interactions in the online community. Across two studies, we examine whether online self-verification with an identity versus without an identity will lead to the different quality of online reviews. Study 1 used topic modeling with actual data stripped from Facebook and TripAdvisor customer online review sites and showed no difference between customer reviews underpinned with an identity or without. Likewise, Study 2 used an experimental design and found no significant difference between customer reviews with or without an identity. However, significant mediation effects of social ties and social capital were found when measuring the relationship between online self-verification and customer reviews. The findings build on the literature of user-generated online reviews and have important implications for academics and hospitality practitioners.


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