MacIntyre’s Radical Intellectualism: The Philosopher as a Moral Ideal

2008 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Machura

AbstractThe question I address in the paper is “What is the ideal of MacIntyre’s moral philosophy? What is the telos of human nature?” Considering MacIntyre’s critique of modern culture, politics and philosophy, anti-intellectualism emerges as the main reason for his refutation of these values. So is it a reason for moral and political distortion that leads to the interpassivity of the modern self. Taking into account MacIntyre’s idea of characters I pinpoint the character of the philosopher as a moral ideal of MacIntyre’s thought. For it is not only intellectual activity within any practice that enables us to develop our distinctively human nature but also philosophy that is the highest form of that kind of activity. From this point of view, it is crucial to grasp philosophy as a required way of life and the craft that enables us to be moral and political agents.

Author(s):  
Zoe Beenstock ◽  
Zoe Beenstock

This conclusion proposes understanding Romanticism through a model of internal conflict instead of discrete distinctions of genre and political orientation, which have traditionally served as Romanticism’s defining categories. In replacing Aristotle with Rousseau modern culture moves to a socially contingent model of polity in which a newly-minted individualism contends with its own contingent social grounding. In Sartor Resartus Thomas Carlyle suggests that the Romantic era has come to an end. Sartor Resartus repeats the imagery of Frankenstein, relating monstrosity to empiricism and accusing the Scottish Enlightenment of excessive materialism. Carlyle reclaims Rousseau as an anti-empiricist who recognizes socialization as a fundamentally unhappy development that can barely contain the inherently violent forces of human nature. The post-Romantic modern self as articulated by Carlyle is defined by its exile from social totality, and by an account of human beings as inherently antisocial.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Youpa Andrew

This book offers a reading of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Specifically, it is a philosophical exposition of his masterpiece, the Ethics, that focuses on his moral philosophy. Central to the reading I defend is the view that there is a way of life that is best for human beings, and what makes it best is that it is the way of life that is in agreement with human nature. I begin this study with Spinoza’s theory of emotions, and I do so because it is one of two doctrines that fundamentally shape the structure and content of his vision of the way of life that is best. The other is his view that striving to persevere in being is the actual essence of a finite thing (3p7). Together these make up the foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy, and it is from these two doctrines that his moral philosophy emerges. In saying this I am not denying that his substance monism, the doctrines of mind-body parallelism and identity, the tripartite theory of knowledge, and his denial of libertarian free will, among others, also belong to the foundation of his moral philosophy. Each of these contributes in its way to the portrait of the best way of life, and they play important roles in the chapters that follow. But it is his theory of emotions and the theory of human nature on which it rests that are chiefly responsible for the structure and content of his moral philosophy....


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-211
Author(s):  
Dina Babushkina

AbstractI argue that, according to F. H. Bradley’s Ethical Studies, duties of our station (positional duties) are not morally obligatory unless they are required from an ideal point of view. I support my interpretation by showing that Bradley places the ideal point of view higher than the social and requires that what society demands from us is evaluated from that higher point of view. My argument relies on a detailed analysis of “my station and its duties”. The phrase must be understood as a category that (1) refers to different concepts throughout Ethical Studies (i.e. a theory that Bradley rejects, a revised thesis that he accepts, and positional duties), and (2) embraces several theses (descriptive, normative, and ideal), each involving a number of claims, only a few of which Bradley accepts. I argue that Bradley rejects the normative thesis of MSID theory that identifies moral obligation with social requirements because he finds bottom-up idealization (what ought to be must conform to what is) unsatisfactory. Bradley’s inclusion of “my station and its duties” in the moral ideal must be understood as amounting to the claim that a positional duty is morally obligatory only when it is justified by the norms governing pre-institutionalised relationships.


Author(s):  
Sylvia Berryman

The use of substantive appeals to human nature to justify slavery and the subordination of women, as well as to argue for the polis as the ideal form of political organization, are prominent features of Book One of Aristotle’s Politics. These appeals seem like evidence for an Archimedean ethical naturalism. I argue against this conclusion, however, on the grounds that the Politics is an early work, and does not exhibit a notion of nature that could be investigated from a value-neutral or descriptive point of view. The notion of phusis found in the Politics is out of step with that of the biological work, adhering closer to the sophistic nomos–phusis distinction, i.e. a stand-in for the notion that certain practices are legitimate and not arbitrary impositions. The chapter concludes that Politics Book One does not support the case for Archimedean naturalism.


Author(s):  
Youpa Andrew

This book offers a reading of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Central to the reading the author defends is the view that there is a way of life that is best for human beings, and what makes it best is that it is the way of life that is in agreement with human nature. It is important to note that Spinoza’s moral philosophy does not fit within a framework that takes accountability as an essential function of morality. An ethics of accountability is about what a person deserves. It is a system for assigning credit and debt in the economy of good and evil. The ethics of Spinoza’s Ethics is not about what a person deserves. Rather, it is about how to live joyously and lovingly, not sadly and hatefully. Instead of an ethics of accountability, Spinoza’s is an ethics of joy. It is centered on what, with respect to mental and physical wellness, deserves our attention and what, with respect to mental and physical wellness, does not deserve our attention. Spinoza’s ethics of joy belongs to a philosophical tradition that adheres to a medical model of morality. Accordingly, the purpose of morality is not to assign credit and debt in the economy of good and evil. Its purpose is to heal the sick and empower the vulnerable, which is to say that it is for each and every one of us. Furthermore, Spinoza’s moral philosophy is pluralistic in that there are as many good ways of life as there are ways of living joyously and lovingly. There is a variety of empowered ways of life, and there is a variety of disempowered ways of life.


Moreana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (Number 205- (3-4) ◽  
pp. 73-94
Author(s):  
Guillaume Navaud

Utopia as a concept points towards a world essentially alien to us. Utopia as a work describes this otherness and confronts us with a world whose strangeness might seem disturbing. Utopia and Europe differ in their relationship to what is other (Latin alienus) – that is, that which belongs to someone else, that which is foreign, that which is strange. These two worlds are at odds in regards to their foreign policy and way of life: Utopia aspires to self-sufficiency but remains open to whatever good may arrive from beyond its borders, while the Old World appears alienated by exteriority yet refuses to welcome any kind of otherness. This issue also plays a major part in the reception of More’s work. Book I invites the reader to distance himself from a European point of view in order to consider what is culturally strange not as logically absurd but merely as geographically remote. Utopia still makes room for some exoticism, but mostly in its paratexts, and this exoticism needs to be deciphered. All in all, Utopia may invite us to transcend the horizontal dialectics of worldly alterity in order to open our eyes to a more radical, metaphysical otherness.


1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ramzan Akhtar

IntroductionIslamic teachings envisage a balanced society achieved through thefunctioning of Islamic institutions. This paper visualizes three main institutions:ukhiwah, ‘adl, and ihsan. Ukhuwah (brotherhood) promotes the bonds ofbrotherhood, and ‘adl (justice) enforces a system of individual and socialobligations. Islam stresses the importance of meeting one’s obligations, becauseeach obligation has its corresponding right. Thus, an individual’s effort to meethidher obligations leads to the fulfillment of everyone’s rights. This does notmean that Islam forbids one from demanding hidher rights, even though thisdemand does pose a problem related to human nature: an individual wants his/herrights and also some part of another person’s rights. Therefore, one group’sdemand for its rights tends to encroach upon the rights of another group, whichcauses social friction and disorder. The institution of ihsan (benevolence) goesone step further: it exhorts individuals to forego their rights for the sake of others,which is considered an act of piety.This paper will study employer-employee relationships in the light of thethree institutions mentioned above. A framework for conducting employer-employeerelationships is formulated and is then used to determine, from theIslamic point of view, the proper wages. The findings of this paper show thatan economically efficient and equitable wage structure can evolve within thisframework and that such a wage structure would promote the parties’ mutualrelationships which, in turn, would lead to industrial peace.The body of the paper is organized as follows: a review of the existingliterature on the subject, the development of an Islamic framework for employer-employeerelationships, a discussion of the Islamic approach to wagecompensation, and some concluding remarks ...


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 147-170

The article provides a comparison of the concept of homo œconomicus with the core theses of René Descartes’ moral philosophy. The first section draws on the work of the contemporary Western philosopher Anselm Jappe in which Descartes’ philosophy is held to be the cornerstone of the established view and current scientific definitions of homo œconomicus as the fundamental and indispensable agent of capitalistic relations. As opposed to this “common sense” position in the modern social sciences, the second section of the article builds upon Pierre Bourdieu’s Anthropologie économique (2017) to demystify the notion of homo œconomicus. The article then examines some aspects of modern philosophical anthropology that show odd traces of Descartes’ thinking and that are regularly applied in economic science as well as in the critique of economic thinking as such. These are the concepts of mutuality, giving, exchange and generosity, and they are regarded as central to the philosopher’s moral doctrine.The author concludes that the philosophical doctrine of generosity has very little in common with the bourgeois ideology of utility which implies an instrumental relationship between subjects: in Caretesian moral philosophy the Other is neither an object of influence nor a means to achieve someone’s personal goals nor a windowless monad. Generosity certainly has its economic aspects, but these do not include accumulating wealth in the bourgeois sense. It is more in the realm of the aristocratic practice of making dispensations. All throughout his life Decartes may be viewed as exhibiting a peculiar kind of nobility in which the desire to give, endow and sacrifice outweighs any selfish interest. The vigorous pursuit of well-being gives way to a quest for the leisure required to pursue intellectual activity, and care for oneself does not preclude attending to and loving the Other, whatever form it may take.


Author(s):  
T. M. Rudavsky

Chapter 9 is concerned with social and political behavior. Even in the context of moral philosophy, Jewish philosophers discuss issues within the wider context of a rational scientific perspective. This chapter begins with specific moral codes developed by Jewish thinkers, focusing in particular upon the works of Ibn Gabirol, Baḥya ibn Paquda, Maimonides, and Crescas. Can there be ethical dictates independent of the commandments? The rabbis already worried whether there existed a domain of “right behavior” that pre-dates, or exists independently of, divine commandment. Does Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean apply to divine law? Furthermore, can all humans achieve intellectual perfection? Is the road the same, and open, to all? And is there only one road to ultimate felicity, or are there many routes? The chapter ends with a discussion of whether human felicity can be achieved in this life, and whether the prophet best represents the ideal model for such achievement.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document