Naturalizing Perspectives. On the Epistemology of Nietzsche’s Experimental Naturalizations

2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Helmut Heit

Abstract This paper argues that Nietzsche indeed pursues a philosophical project of naturalization. But that neither implies the uncritical adoption of naturalistic doctrines nor that he employs ontological or methodological naturalism in a strict sense of the word. To this end I not only dwell upon the extensive terminological difficulties for any non-empty definition of ‘naturalism’ but also on Nietzsche’s well justified reservations against clear defined doctrines. His naturalizing philosophical experiments cannot be understood without an appreciation of his critical epistemic attitude towards the sciences. A contextual reading of the naturalizing and the critical epistemological aphorisms in the first book of Beyond Good and Evil rather reveals that Nietzsche experimentally adopts naturalizing perspectives for abductive reasons without ascribing a privileged position to the natural sciences above philosophy. Nietzsche’s project of naturalization is perspectival.

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 363-371
Author(s):  
Heiko Berner

Social innovations are targeted measures that are capable to resolve social problems (Rammert 2010) and they are directed towards an improvement of the situation (Gillwald 2000). Finally, they are directed towards an amelioration of the situation (Gillwald 2000). In Austria it is argued that ethnic business represents a type of social innovation (Haberfellner 2000). The question the paper addresses is if and to what extent ethnic business goes hand in hand with social developments and possibly boosts social change. Entrepreneurs of Turkish origin in Salzburg are the focus of analysis. The paper starts with a definition of the term ‚social innovation‘ (1), the issues of ethnic vs. migrant business (2.), followed by the description of the labour market situation of Turkish migrants in Salzburg and discrimination in the labour market (3.), and, to to round up, the analysis of biographic interviews with Turkish entrepreneurs in Salzburg (4.). The preliminary results show that there exist social problems such as the lower socio-economic situation of Turkish migrants in Salzburg and discrimination in the labour market. These problems can be seen as basis for the need of social innovations. But nevertheless Turkish run ethnic businesses in a strict sense of the word are no social innovation because they do not act against the problems in an intended way; they rather work on their own account. They may overcome disadvantages on the labour market but their actions are not directed towards overcoming the problem per se. It is much rather a transintentional aspect (Schimank 2010), which goes beyond the economic interest of the actors.


Author(s):  
Ursula Renz

This chapter discusses the implications of Spinoza’s concept of individual bodies, as introduced in the definition of individuum in the physical digression. It begins by showing that this definition allows for an extremely wide application of the term; accordingly, very different sorts of physical entities can be described as Spinozistic individuals. Given the quite distinct use of the terms divisibilis and indivisibilis in his metaphysics, however, the chapter argues that the physical concept of individuality is not universally applied in the Ethics but reserved for physical or natural-philosophical considerations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the problem of collective individuals. It is argued that, while societies or states are described as individual bodies, they do not constitute individual group minds in the strict sense of the term for Spinoza. This in turn indicates that minds are not individuated in the same way as bodies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (jai2021.26(1)) ◽  
pp. 10-20
Author(s):  
Shevchenko A ◽  
◽  
Sosnitsky A ◽  

The main problem today in the research and development of AI is the lack of a scientific definition of Intelligence, since it is impossible to do something incomprehensible. This fundamentally delegitimizes all developments in this area and science as a whole as a product of exclusively intellectual activity, and any scientific use of the term «Intelligence» in its strict sense is unreasonable. In this paper, this problem is solved by transition to a more general universal paradigm of cognition, which allowed us to deduce the desired definition and universal formalism of Intelligence in its strong sense. Unlike previous publications, the ontology and properties of Intelligence are specified here as necessary components of Intelligence, which are subject to subsequent concretization and materialization in different niches of existence. The results of the work are of both fundamental and applied general scientific importance for all technical and humanitarian applications of Intelligence


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 157-169
Author(s):  
Damian Szymczak

On the threshold of the 21st century, the problem of poverty remains unresolved. Many still suffer from hunger, and many more have no access to running water, or education. This raises a fundamental question that has bothered economy researchers for centuries: What determines the wealth of some countries, and the poverty of others? One of the contemporary researchers analysing the causes of poverty and development barriers is Indian economist Amartya Kumar Sen. Referring to the socio-economic theory of Sen, the author indicates that modernity implies the need for reflection on the definition of poverty. The author attempts to justify the thesis which focuses on the discord between the evaluation concepts of good and evil with objective economic factors defining poverty. The author suggests that the definition of poverty should be grounded in considerations concerning good and evil in a specific time, as well as cultural and historical context.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (19) ◽  
pp. 52-54
Author(s):  
Serhii Shevchenko

Existential-humanistic psychology has started the tradition of the creative transformation of classical-existentialist ideas in the practice of their involvement and application in psychology and psychotherapy. The source of these qualitative changes in the psychology of the twentieth and early XXI centuries was, in particular, the multifaceted creativity and ideas of S. Kierkegaard. His religious anthropology was rooted not only in Christology, but also in psychology. But psychology does not become a means of indulgence for a little foolish person, but a way to show her what she had not known about herself before. Contrary to the natural sciences of the time, his method did not set human boundaries, because it proceeded from the fact that the horizons of her hopes are, in principle, endless and the purpose of each person is to become equal with him. "WITH. Kierkegorov's main idea is, "writes M. Biergoso," that a person should be understood as a relationship: a constant attitude towards himself, his environment, and God. This is the most successful definition of the inseparable triad of the basic existential problem ..., which defines Kierkegaard's thinking as a whole "


1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 635-643 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ibrahim F. I. Shihata

This note addresses the possible correlation between “democracy” and “development”, and the implications, if any, of such a correlation for the World Bank. This calls, first, for providing a definition of the two concepts as they are used here. To clarify the matter further, a distinction is made from the beginning between “development” in the broad sense and the concept of “economic growth” in the strict sense.


Author(s):  
Ekaterina V. Vostrikova ◽  
◽  
Petr S. Kusliy ◽  

The paper discusses the phenomenon of bullshit in the academia as an ob­stacle for progress in natural sciences and the humanities and as a problem of episte­mology and philosophy of science. The authors criticize a popular approach according to which bullshit is defined in terms of the goals or motivations of the bullshitter as a subjectivist and inadequate. Focusing on the phenomenon of bullshit in academic practices, the authors define it in terms of the relevance of the content of a corre­sponding discourse to the topical issues of a given academic discipline and the extent to which the justification proposed in the discourse meets the standard justification criteria in the given discipline. An important component of the proposed definition is the contextual parameter of the judge the perspective of which is represented by a relevant research community. The authors show how the proposed account captures the well-known cases of bullshit as well as solves some of the current problems in social epistemology, such as the nature of group bullshit. The authors argue that the problem of group bullshit arises only when bullshit is understood in terms of indi­vidual intentions or motives. In that case, it is challenging to define group bullshit in a case when no representative of a given group individually supports the bullshit argument put forward by the whole group. For an approach that defines bullshit without appeal to such subjective factors as individual intentions, this problem does not arise because bullshit is independent of the goals of the bullshitter. The authors acknowledge the importance of the motivations of the bullshiter and her strategies. However, they argue that this matter is irrelevant for the definition of bullshit.


Author(s):  
Inge Hinterwaldner

It can be shown that the different conceptions of ‘simulation’ (the one of culture critique on the one hand and the denomination of technical applications on the other) that seem to be incompatible with each other can be reconciled on a single spectrum. Its basis in models, its replacement of reality, its lack of reference and of precession of the referent are some pejorative characteristics often emphasized in media philosophy with regard to simulations, for which the sciences applying computer simulations have no use for. It helps crossing over the views that first seem opposite to each other, but that turn out to be compatible if its root in reality is recognized and thus the representational logic is accepted at least according to the intention. The chapter combines ideas of the 'simulacrum' retrieved in the natural sciences with traces of cybernetic thinking in media studies. The whole study builds on a definition of computer simulation in the technical sense as the involvement with and the act of execution f a dynamic mathematic or procedural model that projects, depicts, or recreates a system or process.


Panoptikum ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 43-55
Author(s):  
Martina Olivero

Tragedies were performed for the first time in ancient Greece between the sixth and fifth century BC. A century later, Aristotle in the Poetics gave his famous definition of tragedy, transforming it into a narrative genre. Our aim is primarily to introduce and analyse some characteristics of the tragic scheme. Three main elements will be taken into consideration. We will see that at the very heart of the tragic narration there is “something” unrepresentable, unbearable and nameless that Lacan, in the VII seminar on ethics, names Das Ding or La Chose, The Thing. After that, we will consider the representation of an ethical power which disputes the traditional and institutionalised order. Thirdly, the presence of sacred forces will be evoked to contextualise the ancien and contemporary tragic narrations in a mythical, pre-logical, pre-textual framework. However, in order to identify any forms of tragic narratives in the contemporary era, a consideration of the medium itself cannot be avoided, as tragedies were shown and affected large crowds of people and had a substantial political role. Cinema is thus revealed to be the most privileged media device to present modern tragic narrations and their typical aesthetic solutions. In this article, we will discuss three examples of tragic narratives in mainstream American cinema from the last three decades. Works by Sean Penn (The Pledge, 2001), James Grey (Little Odessa, 1995) and Clint Eastwood (Midnight in the garden of good and evil, 1997) will be investigated.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-116
Author(s):  
G. I. Savonova

The article reveals the peculiarity of S. Kierkegaard’s philosophical arguments about the essence of good and evil, the problems of ethical and psychological compression of human existence in transcendence «or-or». The ontology of good and evil is revealed by the philosopher in the problem of freedom as a given and unfreedom as a limitation, when good as God resides in freedom. God does not know unfreedom precisely for his freedom is unrecognized, and this is the greatest punishment for evil. It is noted that a Christian who is an ethical person finds himself in a situation of choice between good and evil, and the hovering of the process of choice in time leads to a choice in unfreedom, which is already sin and evil. The emphasis is placed on the concept of “sin” in the Christian definition of it by S. Kierkegaard, as well as on the problem of «blocking» the choice by fears. The article establishes the connection between sin and fear in the problem of faith and human action. The analysis of differentiation of fear as fear to be oneself and fear not to be oneself is carried out. Fear in philosophy S. Kierkegaard is defined as the psychological problem of choice and the metaphysical essence of evil that experiences fear of good. Evil is afraid of good because it defines it as something that encroaches on the essence of evil – unfreedom. People are afraid of their knowledge of lack of freedom and loss of faith. The question of Christian faith in the metaphysics of freedom of choice is a means of salvation from the demonicness of non-freedom, according to the philosophy of S. Kierkegaard. The loss of faith at any stage of life leads a person to despair. There are two types of despair in the philosophy of S. Kierkegaard: despair to be I and despair not to be I. The article focuses on the problem of sin. The problem of defining sin reveals the meaning of despondency as the beginning of any sin. Discouragement is bound to the darkness of evil, the place of permanent stay restless demoni and eternal falling into the abyss. A disappointed person does not have a point of support for the “leap of faith”, so she seeks comfort in the realization of her desires and the injection of fear. That is why the “leap of faith” from the ethical to the religious person is considered in the article as a way out of the choice between good and evil. The article also provides a brief comparative review of the philosophical arguments Of S. Kierkegaard and existentialist philosophers.


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