scholarly journals On the Dynamics of Extremist Violence

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Arzu Kıbrıs ◽  
Özgür Kıbrıs
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Expected Payoff ◽  
Military Victory ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
Armed Opposition Groups ◽  
Expected Duration

AbstractMany modern armed conflicts contain more than two fighting parties, or armed opposition groups that have factions within them. It is the moderates in an armed opposition that governments negotiate with. But the agreement’s fate depends on the approval of all other significant actors within the opposition. We construct a dynamic model of conflict in which such an actor is to decide whether to accept a peace agreement signed by the moderates or not. Using this model we analyze the behavior of our decision maker, focusing on outcomes like the optimal settlement strategy, expected duration of the conflict, and the decision maker’s expected payoff from conflict. We then determine how these outcomes are affected by changes in the conflict environment. Finally, we extend our model to analyze the implications of commitment problems, and the possibility that the conflict ends with military victory of either side.

scholarly journals Women, peace and international security: the Havana Agreement for peace in Colombia

2019 ◽  
pp. 73-90
Author(s):  
Elena DE OLIVEIRA SCHUCK ◽  
Lívia BRITO
Keyword(s):  
International Security ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civil Society Organizations ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Peace Negotiations ◽  
Peace Agreements ◽  
Specific Analysis ◽  
The Government

Armed conflicts have different impacts on women. In this regard, women’s civil society organizations are inserted in the international political arenas in order to guarantee their rights in warfare contexts. In the case of conflicts in Colombia, women are identified not only as combatants and victims, but also as members of women civil organizations for peacebuilding. These organizations played a prominent role in the elaboration of the peace agreement between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Havana, Cuba, between 2012 and 2016. This article proposes an analysis of the theoretical production on peace, international security, feminism and subalternity, to present the specific case of the conflict in Colombia and its gender perspectives. The results indicate that peace agreements can be instruments of political inclusion and reparation for women affected by armed conflicts. In highlighting the role of political minorities in the international peace negotiations in Colombia, this research contributes to the development and expansion of critical perspectives —feminist and subaltern— on international security and studies for peace. Moreover, building upon the specific analysis of the Havana Agreement, this paper aims to contribute to the inclusion of a gender perspective in future peace agreements.

Mutually Assured Distrust: Ideology and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (10) ◽  
pp. 2022-2048
Author(s):  
Eric Keels ◽  
Krista Wiegand
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Intrastate Conflicts ◽  
Ideological Polarization ◽  
Universal Feature ◽  
Ideological Differences ◽  
Key Barrier ◽  
Commitment Problems

Within the study of intrastate armed conflicts, many scholars rely on a bargaining model when explaining why some civil wars are intractable. Primarily, scholars posit that commitment problems represent a key barrier to settling conflicts through negotiations. Yet, some civil wars are more easily resolved than others. If commitment problems are a universal feature of civil wars, what explains why commitment problems are more salient in some conflicts as compared to others? We argue that ideological differences between combatants enhance commitment problems in civil wars. Assuming that ideology is used by combatants to generate support, concessions that violate the ideological goals of each side may alienate supporters. With extreme ideological polarization, concessions may be viewed as relative as opposed to absolute, making it difficult for either side to credibly commit to offer concessions. To test these claims, we quantitatively examine the duration and outcome of all intrastate conflicts from 1975 to 2011.

scholarly journals The role of international humanitarian law in the search for peace: Lessons from Colombia

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
César Rojas-Orozco
Keyword(s):  
Legal Framework ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Peace Negotiations ◽  
State Actors ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract International humanitarian law (IHL) has traditionally been seen as a legal framework regulating armed hostilities, having little to do with peace. However, recent peacemaking and peacebuilding practice has consistently relied on IHL to frame peace efforts, mainly in non-international armed conflicts. This article explores the relationship between IHL and peace, looking at practice in Colombia, where IHL has been used in a creative way as a means to build trust, facilitate peace negotiations and enforce the resulting peace agreement. Looking at this case, the article offers general insights on how IHL can facilitate the end of conflict and reintegration, frame accountability and reparation, and shield peace deals under a framework in which both State and non-State actors can find a common bargaining zone in their search for peace.

Will Biden could withdraw the US forces from Afghanistan?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanislav Mikhailovich Ivanov
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Military Presence ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Military

The article analyzes the military operation of the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan, which lasted for 20 years, and the prospects for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from this country. The author states that the new US President D. Biden does not abandon the foreign policy course pursued by his predecessors earlier to reduce the US military presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, the new president reaffirmed his commitment to the peace agreement between the United States and the opposition Taliban, reached in the Qatari capital of Doha in February 2020, which provides for the withdrawal of US troops and their NATO allies from the country. However, the author comes to the conclusion that due to a number of objective and subjective factors, the timing of the final withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan may be postponed indefinitely, and even the deadline recently declared by the White House on September 11, 2021, may be far from final and may be repeatedly subjected to revisions. The main obstacle to the implementation of this important clause of the bilateral agreement is the lack of progress in negotiations between the Taliban representatives and the central government, as well as the lack of security guarantees for the withdrawn contingent of the US Armed Forces, NATO and the remaining staff of Western foreign missions in Afghanistan. Not only the radical Taliban wing, but also a number of current ministers in Kabul are trying to sabotage the conclusion of a second peace agreement and the subsequent integration of the Taliban into power. Without a lasting agreement between the Taliban and the central authorities in Kabul and the formation of a new coalition government, the likelihood of a resumption of civil war in the country will remain. New terrorist attacks and outbursts of violence on the part of the radical wing of the Taliban movement against the central government and foreign troops are not excluded. The penetration of Islamic State gangs into Afghanistan, which can undermine the stability of the military-political situation from within and provoke new armed conflicts, also carries certain risks. Much will also depend on the position of one of the main external players in Afghan affairs — Islamabad. Time will show whether Pakistan will be ready to take on part of the functions of a peaceful settlement within the Afghan conflict. The US administration would like more participation in stabilizing the further situation in Afghanistan from other regional forces (China, Russia, India, Iran, Turkey, Uzbekistan).

HOW DO MILITARY CONFLICTS END? LESSONS FOR UKRAINE

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Consociational Democracy ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Occupied Territories ◽  
Dispersive Power ◽  
Military Victory

The main ways of ending military conflicts, both between states and within the state, are considered. Among the four main ways to end the war are: military victory, negotiated settlement, negotiated truces, peace of sorts is imposed by third parties. Researchers conclude that the best way to promote sustainable peace is a negotiated settlement. The main factor here is the text of the peace agreement, which creates the rules of the game, according to which the key actors in the conflict agree to act. The models of democracy that can be laid down in a peace agreement are analyzed. Among them are consociational democracy, power-dividing, centrifugal and corporate models. The attention is paid to the consociational model, which according to the author, is the best alternative for resolving the armed conflict in the occupied territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. The basic idea of power-sharing or consociational democracy is to accommodate the interests of the political elite, which represents each segment in a divided society. The key characteristics of power-sharing are a grand coalition, segment’s autonomy, proportional representation, and mutual veto. All these features can be applied in different categories of power-sharing. These are political, military, economic, and territorial dimensions. Besides, there are three types of power-sharing: inclusive power-sharing, constraining power-sharing, and dispersive power-sharing. The division of different types helps to understand at what stage of conflict resolution, what kind of institutions of power-sharing should be implemented. An analysis of the Minsk Agreement revealed that its text was at odds with current conflict resolution practices, which was one of the reasons why the agreement does not affect conflict resolution.

Distinction Matters: Rethinking the Protection of Civilian Objects in Non-International Armed Conflicts

2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noam Zamir
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Equal Protection ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Law And Order ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Treaty Law ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
Armed Opposition Groups

Under treaty law all civilian objects are protected in international armed conflicts (IAC) whereas it is only certain civilian objects that enjoy protection under treaty law in non-international armed conflicts (NIAC). However, it is commonly argued that all civilian objects are protected in NIAC under customary law. This article examines the reasons for the differences in the protection of civilian objects under treaty law and the argument that customary law now provides equal protection for all civilian objects under both IAC and NIAC. The article argues that this equal protection may hinder the ability of states to maintain law and order under their domestic law in NIAC in situations where they may need to destroy property which belongs to armed opposition groups. The article advances the argument that the law regarding targeting should be that all civilian objects are protected in NIAC but, unlike the protection of civilian objects in IAC, this protection does not bar a state from destroying in its territory objects which were considered to be illegal under domestic law before the commencement of the NIAC, in accordance with international human rights law as lex specialis.

scholarly journals Talks before the talks: Effects of pre-negotiation on reaching peace agreements in intrastate armed conflicts, 2005–15

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332096115
Author(s):  
Lindsey Doyle ◽  
Lukas Hegele
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Quantitative Research ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Intrastate Conflict ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Peace Agreements ◽  
The Way

Pre-negotiation is widely accepted as a means to convince intrastate conflict parties to negotiate formally; however, research has not yet established a causal link between early efforts to bring warring parties together and the outcome of any negotiated settlement. This gap begs the question: To what extent do activities during the pre-negotiation phase contribute to the signing of a peace agreement? Theory on interstate conflict suggests that pre-negotiation reduces risk, thereby convincing conflict parties that they have more to gain from negotiating than from fighting. However, in conflicts between governments and non-state armed actors, this article argues that reciprocity paves the way for reaching peace agreements. This article introduces a new dataset on pre-negotiation including nearly all intrastate armed conflicts between 2005 and 2015. Confirming previous findings, mediation is significantly and positively correlated with reaching a type of peace agreement; conflicts over government are more likely to end in a negotiated agreement than conflicts over territory or both government and territory. In contrast to existing qualitative research, this study finds little evidence that pre-negotiation increases the likelihood that conflict dyads sign peace agreements. Future quantitative research on this topic requires more nuanced measures of the conditions under which conflict parties shift from unilateral to joint decisionmaking.

scholarly journals The post-Dayton search for justice: War crimes trials in Bosnia and Herzegovina before competent courts

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 250-282
Author(s):  
Vedad Gurda ◽  
◽  
Dževad Mahmutović ◽  
Maja Iveljić ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Bosnia And Herzegovina ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Plea Bargaining ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
The Republic

The armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from 1992 to 1995, which ended with the conclusion of the so-called The Dayton Peace Agreement was marked by serious violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms and the commission of horrific war crimes. Prosecution of defendants for these crimes takes place at several levels, ie before: a) the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), b) domestic courts and c) courts of certain foreign states. The paper analyzes certain indicators related to the prosecution of these crimes, their scope and structure, as well as the ratio of convictions and acquittals for certain war crimes, the scope of application of conventional and summary forms of ending criminal cases and court policy of sanctioning perpetrators. It was learned that by the end of 2020, hundreds of criminal proceedings against approximately a thousand defendants had been completed. Most of the accused were prosecuted before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Court of B&H), followed by the ICTY, and a slightly smaller number before the courts of the former SFRY and some Western European countries. The research established that before the ICTY, out of the total number of accused for war crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as many as 90.2% were convicted of some of these crimes, while the rate of convicted in relation to accused before the Court of B&H was 67.2% , and before the courts in the Republic of Serbia 70.2%. It is interesting that before the ICTY as many as 24.3% of the accused were convicted in summary proceedings on the basis of a plea agreement, while before the Court of B&H 13,3% of the accused were convicted using a plea bargaining as a consensual model for ending criminal cases. So far, 22 people have been convicted of the crime of genocide as the most serious crime before the ICTY, the Court of B&H and German courts, and all convictions related to the activities of the Army of Republika Srpska during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Court of B&H, inherited a relatively mild policy of punishing war crimes. Finally, it was found that certain courts, especially Court of B&H, inherited a relatively mild policy of punishing war crimes.

Challenges of Regulating Non-International Armed Conflicts – an Examination of Ongoing Trends in South Sudan’s Civil War

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 414-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kuyang Harriet Logo Mulukwat
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Armed Struggle ◽  
Liberation Movement ◽  
The Government

The conflict in South Sudan became the only viable violent way of expressing underlying discontentment with the style of governance adopted by the incumbent government and unresolved issues from the 1991 split which occurred when Dr. Riak Machar, one of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (splm/a) leaders at the time, now turned rebel leader, fell out with Dr. John Garang, the chairman of the splm/a. The split, notably referred to as the “Nassir split”, led communities from both the Dinka and Nuer tribes to turn against each other. The referendum, a consequence of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (cpa) between the government in Khartoum, Sudan, and the splm/a, led to an overwhelming vote for secession, later paving way for the subsequent independence of South Sudan in 2011. The existing tension took on a violent expression. The article analyses occurrences the splm/a command pursued on a secessionist agenda in the 21 years of armed struggle and the attainment of independence on the 9 July 2011. It further denotes the insurgents’ pursuit of armed confrontation and the government’s response to the belligerents’ actions, while providing a genesis of the belligerence and laws governing non–international armed conflicts.

Addressing Armed Opposition Groups through Security Council Resolutions: A New Paradigm?

2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-67
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Heffes ◽  
Marcos D. Kotlik ◽  
Brian E. Frenkel
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Systemic Approach ◽  
International Conflicts ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Armed Opposition Groups

In the last few decades, the un Security Council has increasingly implemented enforcement measures in the context of many non-international armed conflicts. Both in those cases and in international conflicts, certain resolutions explicitly impose rights and obligations upon all the parties, without making a legal distinction between States and non-State actors, including armed opposition groups. This paper aims to explain some consequences of the approach adopted by the Security Council. Mainly, two issues are dealt with: (a) how does the Security Council address armed opposition groups and to what extent its resolutions impose rights and obligations upon them; (b) if these non-State actors are in fact bound by those resolutions and why. In order to achieve an explanation that grasps the complexity of these issues, the article adopts a systemic approach, which includes the application of the principle of equality of belligerents to Security Council resolutions.

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