scholarly journals Organizational And Legal Conditions For The Realization Of Member’s Right For Information In LLC And ALC

Author(s):  
V.V. Vasylieva

This article defines the right to information as an important component of the corporate rights of a company member, on the security of which the effective exercise of its other competencies depends. The author states that the right to information is ensured by the statutory obligation of the company to storage a certain list of documents related to the activities of the company. The Art. 43 of the LLC provides a list of documents that the company is obliged to keep such as: documents related to the foundation of the company and the founding documents and changes thereto; documents on creation of branches, representative offices of the company (in case of their creation); documents related to the issue of the securities and documents certifying the ownership of the company to the property; documents regulating the activities of the company bodies and changes thereto (regulations, instructions, etc.); documents related to the work of the bodies of the company (general meeting, executive body, supervisory board): protocols, orders, orders; documents in which the results of the company’s economic activity are directly reflected: annual financial statements, documents of annual reports submitted to the relevant state bodies, accounting documents; documents from third parties regarding the company: audit reports and results of other audit services. As a general rule, the executive body of the company is responsible for keeping the documents, and the chief accountant (if assigned) - for the accounting documents and financial statements. Due to the latest updates in the legislation of Ukraine, the participant is guaranteed with the right to receive copies of documents required by him from the company. The right to information is also ensured by establishing the responsibility of officials for not providing information or providing false information about the activities of the company. This right is protected by applying to the court for compulsory in-kind performance.

Author(s):  
Mbako Mbo ◽  
Charles Adjasi

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine empirical evidence on factors that influence performance of state owned enterprises (SOEs). With a focus on power utilities, the paper investigates how such several factors interact with each other to influence ultimate performance. Design/methodology/approach Data on the SOEs constituting the sample is predominantly obtained from the audited annual financial statements and other publicized reports of entities for a 20-year period spanning from 1994 to 2013. The audited annual financial statements provide quantitative data whilst the rest of qualitative information is available from narratives in the annual reports. The study takes liquidity, board strength, extent of stakeholder presentation on board and government’s involvement in pricing as proxy variables for resource-based agency, stakeholder and public choice theories, respectively. Using performance as the dependent variable, the study variables are modeled in a regression model. Findings The paper finds that good SOE performance could be explained in terms of the agency and resource-based theories, where the authors found strong boards and good liquidity profiles to be positively related to good performance. A wider stakeholder representation on SOE boards correlates negatively with performance. Similarly, the higher the level of government involvement in the tariff setting process the weaker the performance results. Based on the results, the paper concludes that SOEs performance is underpinned by a plethora of organizational issues: agency, public policy, stakeholder and resource-based issues. These issues must therefore inform the appointment of SOE management and also their performance contracts. Practical implications The study suggests that SOE governance structures should be centered around four main unifying themes; agency, stakeholders, resources and shareholder engagement. From an agency perspective, board appointments should first be based on merit and stakeholder representation comes in as a subset. Resources availability should be paired with objective imperatives and engagement with political leadership should be limited to matters of policy through a regulatory and legal framework. Originality/value This study provides some practical insights from both an administration and policy perspective. First, it reveals the importance of and a linkage between both adequate resources and strong boards, but also the need to find the right balance in managing stakeholder interests SOEs face. The study does not necessarily support the popular view of completely eliminating government interference in SOE affairs, but rather advances optimal political influence through regulatory and legal frameworks without giving up ownership rights.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (105 (161)) ◽  
pp. 17-30
Author(s):  
Tomasz Iwanowicz

The purpose of this paper is to determine what key audit matters (KAM) have been identified by statutory auditors from various audit firms in companies from various industries, which assertions appeared most often in the audit reports, and what the links were between the auditing company, KAM, the assertion and the market sector. The research sample consisted of 317 companies listed on the Warsaw (158 companies) and London (159 companies) stock exchanges. The analysis was divided into companies from the following ten market sectors: construction, chemicals, energy, mining, IT, media, automotive, real estate, oil & gas and food. The research was executed based on the analysis of annual financial statements (annual reports) and independent auditor reports that were published by in-scope entities for the latest twelve-month period available as at the date of the research (the twelve-month periods ended on December 31, 2017, and March 31, 2018). The auditors of the tested companies identified a total of 793 unique KAMs. Based on their detailed descriptions, they were then divided into 36 categories (including the cate-gory ‘none’), and they were finally mapped with a total of 2,094 assertions from 7 types. All analyses and developed charts were supported by the Microsoft Power BI data analysis tool.


Author(s):  
Konstantin Leonov

The state is the largest owner of corporate rights. Entities operating on the basis of state ownership only, as well as entities whosestate share in the authorized capital exceeds fifty percent or is a value that provides the state with the right to decisive influence on economicactivity are recognized as economic entities of the public sector of the economythese subjects. Instead, the subjects of economicsector of the economy are entities that operate on the basis of communal property only, as well as entities in the authorized capital ofwhich the share of communal property exceeds fifty percent or is a value that provides local governments with the right to decide impacton the economic activities of these entities.There are two main features of corporate rights of the state in the subjects of public law: 1) management of such corporate rightsis carried out in the manner prescribed by a separate law; 2) the purpose of managing the corporate rights of the state is to meet stateand public needs.In 2016, Ukraine underwent a reform that resulted in a significant strengthening of the legal regulation of the activities of supervisoryboards in companies in the authorized capital of which more than 50 percent of shares (stakes) belong to the state. In particular,an important novelty was that the majority of members of the supervisory board in such companies must be independent members ofthe supervisory board. Thus, in relation to the corporate rights of the state, the legislator has established a number of special restrictions.In particular, the corporate rights of the state are prohibited to transfer to companies for the formation of their authorized capital, exceptfor the transfer to the authorized capital of state joint stock companies and state holding companies. This restriction is aimed at preventingcovert privatization or withdrawal of corporate rights from state ownership.Significant strengthening of legal regulation of supervisory boards in companies in the authorized capital of which more than50 percent of shares (stakes) belong to the state, resulted in the introduction of the provision that the majority of members of the supervisoryboard in such companies must be independent members of the supervisory board. An independent member of the SupervisoryBoard has equal rights and responsibilities with other members and independently decides on voting on all issues on the agenda of theSupervisory Board meeting.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 160
Author(s):  
Tjahjani Murdijaningsih ◽  
Siti Muntahanah

Every company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange is required to submit financial reports periodically. The financial statements shall be submitted no later than the end of the third month from the end date of the financial year. In reality, not all companies submit the right reports on time because of the audit reports, so that the company's financial reporting is not effective. Delays in financial reporting are closely related to audit delays. This study aims to analyze the factors that affect the time spent in auditing financial statements. The sample in this study were 15 real estate and property industrial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2013-2017. Determination of the sample in this study using the purposive sapling method. The analysis used is multiple regression analysis. The results showed that company size had no significant effect on audit delay. Meanwhile, profitability has a negative effect and the size of the public accounting firm has a significant positive effect on audit delay. The size of the company cannot determine the audit of the financial statements to improve the accuracy of the submission of financial statements. What must be paid more attention is the level of profitability and the public accounting firm that will be used.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-399
Author(s):  
Ratko Brnabić

The Supervisory Board of the Sports Joint stock Companies acts as the representative organ of the shareholders between the General Meeting and the Executive Board: the General Meeting elects (or privileged person/shareholder simply names) the members of the Supervisory Board, and the Supervisory Board appoints the members of the Management. From this point of view, one could see the General Meeting as the supreme body of the company. But the Supervisory Board, in the carefully balanced interaction of the three bodies, known as a system of "checks and balances", also has considerable independence from the General Meeting. According to the organizational organization of the Joint stock Companies, the general meeting is not superior towards the two other organs. In particular, the Supervisory Board and its members are not subjects to any instructions from the General Meeting. Neither the election of a member of the Supervisory Board by the General Meeting nor the appointment of a Supervisory Board member by a shareholder (entitled to name his representative) constitutes an imperative mandate for those members. On the other hand, the option of dismissal, which is legally available at all times, as a rule ensures that the Supervisory Board members will not act against the wishes of the General Meeting. Management measures cannot be delegated to the Supervisory Board. However, it must be determined by the Articles of Association or by resolution of the Supervisory Board that certain types of transactions may only be carried out with the approval of the Supervisory Board. By this right, the Supervisory Board will not become an executive body, equal with the Management Board, even in the case of transactions requiring approval: it can neither undertake the transactions in question itself, nor can it instruct the Executive Board to carry them out. The initiative remains with the Executive Board, which, even with the approval of the Supervisory Board, can still refrain from carrying out the business if it no longer considers it to be sensible and/or reasonable. The Management also remains fully responsible for the business with regard to liability; the approval by the Supervisory Board does not exempt them from an obligation to pay compensation for damages incurred. The Supervisory Board thus has the opportunity, by refusing its consent, to prevent the conduct of business intended by the Management Board.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-62
Author(s):  
Zsolt Fegyveresi

"This study examines one of the basic rights of shareholders, the right to information in Hungarian and Romanian company law. The right to information is a non-property, organizational right originating from the shareholder’s membership right, which is related to the convening of the general meeting of the company limited by shares and the voting right that can be exercised there. The right to information is the individual right of the shareholder and the individual obligation of the company. The right to information belongs to all shareholders, regardless of the extent of their fi nancial contribution. The exercise of the right to information is a fundamental principle and serves the protection of the shareholder, but, in addition to its protective nature, it stands at the basis of the preparation of the decisions of the company’s shareholders."


2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-155
Author(s):  
Rienk Goodijk

In the highly competitive environment management builds relationships with very different kinds of stakeholders, acting more transparently, providing opportunities for dialogue and involvement and being accountable to all the stakeholders. The paper considers implementation of one of the most challenging instrument to build those relationships named "stakeholder management". Improvements on corporate governance and stakeholder-management already have been found: in the further professionalising of the Supervisory Board by updating the board-profile, setting up audit- and remuneration-committees, introducing self-assessment (internal board-evaluations) etcetera; more openness and transparency in the annual reports, making mention of board members’ remuneration; increasing the influence of shareholders by providing opportunities to certificate-holders for more actively participating and voting at the General Meeting, and intensifying the relationships with investors; developing international employee participation, based on the European Directive on information and consultation and the implementation in Dutch law; intensifying customer relationships by developing a Customer Relationship Management system world-wide, using internet-opportunities (ING Direct), converting call centres to Customer Contact Centres, introducing customer-panels, etcetera; introducing HR-plans on inspiring leadership, performance management and diversity worldwide.


2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Feeney

ABSTRACT Through 1975, the shareholder annual reports of publicly-owned U.S. railroads were exempt from the Securities and Exchange Commission's accounting regulations, audit and disclosure rules because railroads were common carriers subject to the rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Publicly-owned Class railroads voluntary began to away from ICC-type towards GAAP-type accounting and disclosures in their shareholder reports just after World War II.1 This paper reviews early industry practices with respect to internal and external audits. Using a sample of major Class I railroads from 1946 to 1975, the paper shows: the extent to which certain railroads voluntarily presented audited financial statements before being required, the extent to which particular CPA firms were involved with the railroad industry, and the types of audit reports that issued to these railroads during this period.


Author(s):  
Igor Tovkun ◽  
◽  
Hanna Dubrova ◽  

We have considered the economic and legal situation of public joint stock companies in Ukraine. The analysis of the main features of a public joint - stock company as one of the most perfect legal mechanisms for the organization of the economy on the basis of combining the property of legal entities and individuals. In the course of performance of work historical features of emergence of such legal category as public joint-stock company were established. A study of the stages of enshrining the concept of "public joint stock company" in Ukrainian legislation during the existence of independent Ukraine, which was covered in a number of regulations, such as the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Investor Protection", Law of Ukraine On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning Simplification of Doing Business and Attracting Investments by Issuers of Securities ”, Law of Ukraine“On Management of State Property”, Law of Ukraine“ On Joint Stock Companies ”, etc. We have studied the relationships that arise directly during the activities of public companies. In particular, such relations apply to its governing bodies, which include: the general meeting as the highest governing body of the company, the supervisory board, which protects the rights of shareholders and regulates the executive body, and the executive body, which manages the current activities of the company. It is argued that public joint stock companies are subjects of the public sector of the economy, which in turn is the cause of a special process of activity, property regime, more stringent requirements for existence than private joint stock companies. The generalization of conclusions and information in the doctrinal literature related to this topic is made.


Owner ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-159
Author(s):  
Robby Krisyadi ◽  
Noviyanti Noviyanti

This study aims to determine the factors that affect delay of audit report. The population of research are companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2016 – 2020. The sampling technique used purposive sampling method with 1870 annual report processed.  The data analysis technique of this research uses multiple regression and assisted by SPSS  software and Eviews software. The result of this research showed that audit opinion and profitability is significantly negative to audit delay, and firm size is significantly positive to audit delay, whereas audit effort, public accounting firm size, debt and ownership concentration have no effect to audit delay. The results of this study are expected to contribute to strengthening agency theory in safeguarding the interests of agents and principals by submitting financial statements in a transparent and timely manner to prevent information asymmetry, as well as strengthening signal theory in explaining the factors for the spread of good news and bad news of companies to investors. In addition, practical contributions for company management can be used as a source of information to find solutions to improve the timeliness of submitting financial reports, for auditors it is expected to be a guide in preparing audit procedures that are more effective in overcoming factors that cause delays in audit reports, and for service authorities. The financial statements are expected to be the basis for policies to strengthen supervision of companies listed on the IDX in submitting annual reports in a timely manner.


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