scholarly journals William James's Philosophy of Mind: Between Neutral Monism and Panpsychism

2020 ◽  
Vol IV (4) ◽  
pp. 249-265
Author(s):  
Matvey Sysoev
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
William James ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Combination Problem ◽  
Modern Development ◽  
Neutral Monism ◽  
Complete Independence ◽  
Modern Classification ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Modern Analytical

This paper is an introduction to William James' philosophy of mind and is intended to prepare the reader for his work “How Two Minds Can Know One Thing”. The views of William James on three topics in the philosophy of mind are considered: panpsychism, neutral monism, and combination problem. There is a very deep connection between the modern analytical philosophy of mind and the philosophy of this author. A variety of neutral monism, to which James adhered, is analyzed, including the problem of neutrality of substance. Neutral monism in practice does not provide complete independence of a substance from mental and physical properties, and therefore neutral monism may tend to panpsychism if we are not talking about its idealistic varieties. The author concerns the relationship between panpsychism and neutral monism as two approaches to the combination problem. James's panpsychism is analyzed in terms of modern classification. Paper selectively considers individual episodes in James's philosophy in which he adhered to such panpsychism varieties as panexperientialism and panqualityism. The following is a question of the influence of James's combination problem on his philosophy as well as on modern analytical philosophy of mind. At different periods of time, James took, at first glance, mutually exclusive viewpoints on these issues. It is shown that the analysis of James's concept, taking into account the modern development of panpsychism, allows seeing an additional internal consistency in his systematic consideration of the phenomenon of consciousness.

scholarly journals Re-Thinking the World with Neutral Monism:Removing the Boundaries Between Mind, Matter, and Spacetime

Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 551
Author(s):  
Michael Silberstein ◽  
William Stuckey
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
William James ◽  
Measurement Problem ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Fundamental Physics ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Neutral Monism ◽  
Strong Emergence ◽  
The Relationship

Herein we are not interested in merely using dynamical systems theory, graph theory, information theory, etc., to model the relationship between brain dynamics and networks, and various states and degrees of conscious processes. We are interested in the question of how phenomenal conscious experience and fundamental physics are most deeply related. Any attempt to mathematically and formally model conscious experience and its relationship to physics must begin with some metaphysical assumption in mind about the nature of conscious experience, the nature of matter and the nature of the relationship between them. These days the most prominent metaphysical fixed points are strong emergence or some variant of panpsychism. In this paper we will detail another distinct metaphysical starting point known as neutral monism. In particular, we will focus on a variant of the neutral monism of William James and Bertrand Russell. Rather than starting with physics as fundamental, as both strong emergence and panpsychism do in their own way, our goal is to suggest how one might derive fundamental physics from neutral monism. Thus, starting with two axioms grounded in our characterization of neutral monism, we will sketch out a derivation of and explanation for some key features of relativity and quantum mechanics that suggest a unity between those two theories that is generally unappreciated. Our mode of explanation throughout will be of the principle as opposed to constructive variety in something like Einstein’s sense of those terms. We will argue throughout that a bias towards property dualism and a bias toward reductive dynamical and constructive explanation lead to the hard problem and the explanatory gap in consciousness studies, and lead to serious unresolved problems in fundamental physics, such as the measurement problem and the mystery of entanglement in quantum mechanics and lack of progress in producing an empirically well-grounded theory of quantum gravity. We hope to show that given our take on neutral monism and all that follows from it, the aforementioned problems can be satisfactorily resolved leaving us with a far more intuitive and commonsense model of the relationship between conscious experience and physics.

scholarly journals Intentionality and the stream of thought: Brentano and James

2008 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-27
Author(s):  
Miroslava Andjelkovic
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
William James ◽  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Franz Brentano ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Physical Phenomena ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Philosophical Importance

Philosophers have not done much research on the connection between philosophical and psychological views of Franz Brentano and William James. This connection is of particular historical interest because their views influenced Edmund Husserl, but it also bears philosophical importance as one can show why in James' philosophy of mind there is no correlate to Brentano's notion of intentionality which designates the relationship between mental and physical phenomena. Given this, intentionality, if there is room for it in James' psychology, would be the relation which holds between the correlates of these phenomena in his analysis of consciousness. I am trying to show that there is such a correlation between mental phenomena and James' notion of transitive segments, as well as between physical phenomena and James' notion of substantive segments of consciousness. The question is whether the segments of consciousness stand in the relationship of intentionality and I argue that this is not the case.

scholarly journals Hermeneutics of Aristotle and Hermeneutics of Sophists in Terms of Dialogue Philosophy. Part 1

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 480-501
Author(s):  
Ilya Dvorkin
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Linguistic Turn ◽  
Modern Thought ◽  
Philosophy Of Dialogue ◽  
The Difference ◽  
New Formulation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Modern Analytical ◽  
Philosophical Doctrine

The article considers the logical and philosophical doctrine of sophists, which, according to some modern researchers, was more philosophical than their ancient critics recognized. A comparison of the provisions of Aristotle's hermeneutics with preserved fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias shows that the doctrine of sophists was a kind of holistic philosophy, which anticipated the philosophy of dialogue of the XX century. Despite the fact that the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle tried to overcome the relativism and anti-ontologism of the doctrine of sophists, some elements of its dialogueism were preserved in subsequent philosophy in dialectics and rhetoric. The first thing you should pay attention to is the difference between the dialogical form of the presentation of philosophy in Plato and dialogue as the fundamental basis of thinking that we find among sophists. The dialogueism preserved in the dialectic of Plato and the rhetoric of Aristotle is more a technical method of convincing the interlocutor than a hermeneutical basis, which it is in the philosophy of dialogue and in the method of Socratic discussion. The linguistic turn that occurred in the philosophy of the 20th century includes not only an increased interest in language and accuracy of expression. No less important is the new formulation of the question of the nature of the language. Is language a tool for the formulation of thought as Aristotle believed and followed by representatives of modern analytical philosophy, or does it have its own fundamental status, as representatives of the philosophy of dialogue believe? In this context, it is very important for the philosophy of dialogue to find in the thinking of the pre-Socratics those predecessors who already two and a half thousand years ago charted the paths for modern thought. The first part of the article analyzes the relationship between Aristotles hermeneutics and hermeneutics of sophists.

The Meaning of the Concept of “Spiritual Energy” in the Philosophy of William James and Henry Bergson

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 115-131
Author(s):  
Maria M. Kuznetsova
Keyword(s):  
Spiritual Development ◽  
William James ◽  
Science And Religion ◽  
Western Philosophy ◽  
Creative Evolution ◽  
Spiritual Energy ◽  
Spiritual Reality ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

The article examines the philosophy of Henri Bergson and William James as independent doctrines aimed at rational comprehension of spiritual reality. The doctrines imply the paramount importance of consciousness, the need for continuous spiritual development, the expansion of experience and perception. The study highlights the fundamental role of spiritual energy for individual and universal evolution, which likens these doctrines to the ancient Eastern teaching as well as to Platonism in Western philosophy. The term “spiritual energy” is used by Bergson and James all the way through their creative career, and therefore this concept should considered in the examination of their solution to the most important philosophical and scientific issues, such as the relationship of matter and spirit, consciousness and brain, cognition, free will, etc. The “radical empiricism” of William James and the “creative evolution” of Henry Bergson should be viewed as conceptions that based on peacemaking goals, because they are aimed at reconciling faith and facts, science and religion through the organic synthesis of sensory and spiritual levels of experience. Although there is a number of modern scientific discoveries that were foreseen by philosophical ideas of Bergson and James, both philosophers advocate for the artificial limitation of the sphere of experimental methods in science. They call not to limit ourselves to the usual intellectual schemes of reality comprehension, but attempt to touch the “living” reality, which presupposes an increase in the intensity of attention and will, but finally brings us closer to freedom.

The Fragmented Mind

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Implicit Attitudes ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship

Mental fragmentation is the thesis that the mind is fragmented, or compartmentalized. Roughly, this means that an agent’s overall belief state is divided into several sub-states—fragments. These fragments need not make for a consistent and deductively closed belief system. The thesis of mental fragmentation became popular through the work of philosophers like Christopher Cherniak, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker in the 1980s. Recently, it has attracted great attention again. This volume is the first collection of essays devoted to the topic of mental fragmentation. It features important new contributions by leading experts in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Opening with an accessible Introduction providing a systematic overview of the current debate, the fourteen essays cover a wide range of issues: foundational issues and motivations for fragmentation, the rationality or irrationality of fragmentation, fragmentation’s role in language, the relationship between fragmentation and mental files, and the implications of fragmentation for the analysis of implicit attitudes.

scholarly journals On the Return to Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy of Mind

2018 ◽  
pp. 130-142
Author(s):  
G. A. Zolotkov
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind

The article examines the change of theoretical framework in analytic philosophy of mind. It is well known fact that nowadays philosophical problems of mind are frequently seen as incredibly difficult. It is noteworthy that the first programs of analytical philosophy of mind (that is, logical positivism and philosophy of ordinary language) were skeptical about difficulty of that realm of problems. One of the most notable features of both those programs was the strong antimetaphysical stance, those programs considered philosophy of mind unproblematic in its nature. However, the consequent evolution of philosophy of mind shows evaporating of that stance and gradual recovery of the more sympathetic view toward the mind problematic. Thus, there were two main frameworks in analytical philosophy of mind: 1) the framework of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy dominated in the 1930s and the 1940s; 2) the framework that dominated since the 1950s and was featured by the critique of the first framework. Thus, the history of analytical philosophy of mind moves between two highly opposite understandings of the mind problematic. The article aims to found the causes of that move in the ideas of C. Hempel and G. Ryle, who were the most notable philosophers of mind in the 1930s and the 1940s.

Specimen Collectors

2021 ◽  
pp. 151-188
Author(s):  
Reed Gochberg
Keyword(s):  
William James ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Henry David Thoreau ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Louisa May Alcott ◽  
Research And Teaching ◽  
Comparative Zoology ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Philosophical Writings

This chapter examines the early history of Harvard’s Museum of Comparative Zoology and broader conversations about the representation of the natural world as fixed and stable. While the museum’s founder, Louis Agassiz, emphasized the value of preserved specimens to research and teaching, many collectors and writers questioned such practices. After donating turtles to the museum, Henry David Thoreau contemplated the ethical and scientific implications of freezing nature for extended study. In children’s fiction, Louisa May Alcott emphasized the relationship between collecting specimens and moral order, while highlighting the growing gendered divide between scientific practice in the museum and the parlor. And in philosophical writings, William James drew on classification to consider more flexible possibilities to fixed theories. These accounts show how writers sought to promote a deeper understanding of flux and change both within the museum and beyond.

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