scholarly journals Peculiarities of the Semantic Component of Communication Activities in Preschoolers with Developmental Delay

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 345-358
Author(s):  
Iryna Omelchenko
Keyword(s):  
Developmental Delay ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Ethical Aspects ◽  
Semantic Level ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Semantic Component ◽  
Communication Activity ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
Communicative Actions ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

The article examines the peculiarities of the semantic component of communication activity of preschoolers with developmental delay. We have determined that an emotional attitude to an interlocutor introduced into communicative actions, together with the understood meanings of created messages, means transition to the semantic level of communication. We have theoretically and experimentally substantiated that this semantic level presupposes that an interacting subject is able to express emotional attitudes towards partners, to interpret and understand their mental states, which contribute to an understanding of any event or socio-communicative situation. To study the semantic level (component) of communication activities, we examined implicit and explicit mentalization. Implicit mentalization included the respondents’ assessment of the mental properties of objects proposed as partners; recognition by them of emotions and mental causes of these emotions in socio-communicative situations. Explicit mentalization means the respondents’ ability to understand causes of behaviour based on knowledge of people’s mental states, the ability to predict other people’s behaviour based on knowledge of their own and others’ mental states, the ability to understand the moral and ethical aspects of the Other’s behaviour. We have determined experimentally that children with the mentally deficient type of communication activity are characterized by difficulties in communicative prediction, misunderstanding of the causes of behaviour, low level of implicit and explicit mentalization. Hence, these children often get into conflict situations due to misconceptions about the results of their own actions or the actions of others. The identified patterns of implicit and explicit mentalization will be the basis for the technology forming communicative activity, in particular its semantic component in preschoolers with developmental delay.

scholarly journals O moralnych obowiązkach ludzi wobec zwierząt. Etyka Gary’ego Francione

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-106
Author(s):  
Dorota Probucka
Keyword(s):  
Animal Rights ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Peter Singer ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Animal Rights Movement ◽  
Human Interest ◽  
Biological Trait ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Tom Regan

The purpose of my article is to present and analyze the ethical views of Gary Francione – the leading, contemporary representative of the Animal Rights Movement. He built his theory by criticizing the views of two other supporters of the idea of animal liberation: Peter Singer and Tom Regan. In his opinion, neither of these philosophers did not escape from the anthropocentric paradigm binding the moral obligations to animals with the primacy of human interest. Singer believed that only humans have the ability to plan their own future, and only they want to live and extend their own existence. While according to Regan, in conflict situations, respect for human interest should be dominant. Francione agrees that only people understand a deeper meaning of their own existence, but it does not follow that only they want to live and do not want to die. The need to preserve and continue life is not the result of mental states, but it is a consequence of sensitivity – the biological trait which aims to safeguard and continuation of life. According to Francione, if every sensitive creature has an interest in preserving his own life and avoiding suffering it they also have a moral right to life and not being treated in a cruel manner.

scholarly journals Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism

Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl J. Friston ◽  
Wanja Wiese ◽  
J. Allan Hobson
Keyword(s):  
Probability Distributions ◽  
Information Geometry ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Extrinsic Information ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Markov Blanket ◽  
Internal States ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
Intentional Systems ◽  
The Mind

This essay addresses Cartesian duality and how its implicit dialectic might be repaired using physics and information theory. Our agenda is to describe a key distinction in the physical sciences that may provide a foundation for the distinction between mind and matter, and between sentient and intentional systems. From this perspective, it becomes tenable to talk about the physics of sentience and ‘forces’ that underwrite our beliefs (in the sense of probability distributions represented by our internal states), which may ground our mental states and consciousness. We will refer to this view as Markovian monism, which entails two claims: (1) fundamentally, there is only one type of thing and only one type of irreducible property (hence monism). (2) All systems possessing a Markov blanket have properties that are relevant for understanding the mind and consciousness: if such systems have mental properties, then they have them partly by virtue of possessing a Markov blanket (hence Markovian). Markovian monism rests upon the information geometry of random dynamic systems. In brief, the information geometry induced in any system—whose internal states can be distinguished from external states—must acquire a dual aspect. This dual aspect concerns the (intrinsic) information geometry of the probabilistic evolution of internal states and a separate (extrinsic) information geometry of probabilistic beliefs about external states that are parameterised by internal states. We call these intrinsic (i.e., mechanical, or state-based) and extrinsic (i.e., Markovian, or belief-based) information geometries, respectively. Although these mathematical notions may sound complicated, they are fairly straightforward to handle, and may offer a means through which to frame the origins of consciousness.

Comparative research of imitational ability in atypical development in the preschool age

2020 ◽  
pp. 103-117
Author(s):  
Yana Konstantinovna Smirnova ◽  
Natal'ya Gennad'evna Yanova
Keyword(s):  
Developmental Delay ◽  
Comparative Research ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Model Analysis ◽  
Speech Development ◽  
Preschool Age ◽  
Group Differences ◽  
Typical Development ◽  
Psychological Model ◽  
Atypical Development

This article discusses deficit of the model of psychological (from standpoint of difficulties) translation of prospects of actions of another person to the prospect of own actions in the process of imitation. The goal of this research consists in the analysis of group distinctions and comparison of imitational abilities of the children with typical development and children with developmental delay, as well as determine the degree to which the changes in the level of psychological model and identification of direction of the views would related to changes in imitation. The survey 124 children of preschool age. Comparison was conducted on the development of psychological model and imitation in the three contrasting groups: children with typical development, children with developmental delay, and children with delay in speech development. The group differences of imitation in relation to the psychological model were detected. It is demonstrated that the problems associated with imitation cam manifest as the universal symptoms for explanation of deficit in the development of psychological model. Analysis of the obtained results allow concluding that for effective accomplishment of imitational patents, it is necessary to understand and distinguish the mental states of another person.

Animal minds

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristin Andrews
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Research ◽  
Animal Cognition ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Animal Minds ◽  
The Face ◽  
Physical Functions ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Communicative Signals

By examining the mind across species, we can make better progress on questions about the nature of the mind generally. While this has been acknowledged since ancient times, only recently has the philosophy of animal minds developed into a robust area of philosophical research. One wave of recent discussion focused on the nature and possibility of animal belief. Another wave of discussion focused on and the question of chimpanzee mindreading/theory of mind, or whether chimpanzees understand that other animals have mental states. A more comprehensive investigation into the philosophy of animal minds came with the publication of the book Species of Mind (1997), written by philosopher Colin Allen and biologist Marc Bekoff. Given a commitment to the evolutionary continuity of mentality, just as we study other animals to better understand physical functions like disease or digestion, we can look at other animals to better understand consciousness, communication, memory, perception, and other aspects of mind. This approach raised methodological questions about how best to study animal minds. Anthropomorphism (the attribution of perhaps uniquely human traits to animals) and the use of anecdotes as data in animal cognition research were hotly debated. In the face of evidence suggesting that vervet monkeys have different alarm calls for different predators, philosophers investigated how best to interpret animal behaviour and communicative signals. With advances in neurological and biological techniques, scientists started investigating animal consciousness, and philosophers often appealed to empirical research as part of their arguments about whether animals are conscious. Animals also started to gain more attention from ethicists, who often appealed to mental properties in their arguments for granting moral status to animals. At the same time that the philosophical interest in animal minds has grown, many more findings in animal cognition have come from research in psychology, biology, and anthropology. In many cases, the philosophical and scientific discussions are tightly intertwined. This is apparent in the numerous philosophical articles that take empirical research into account as well as in the rich discussions about animal cognitive capacities that often arise from particular empirical findings.

The Role of the Body in the Production and Perception of Solo Vocal Performance: A Case Study of Annie Lennox

2001 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane W. Davidson
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
The Body ◽  
Vocal Performance ◽  
Body Movements ◽  
Functional Movement ◽  
Present Information ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
The Relationship

The work described in this paper interprets the body movements of singers in an attempt to understand the relationships between physical control and the musical material being performed, and the performer's implicit and explicit expressive intentions. The work builds upon a previous literature which has suggested that the relationship between physical execution and the expression of mental states is a subtle and complex one. For instance, performers appear to develop a vocabulary of expressive gestures, yet these gestures – though perceptually discreet – co-exist and are even integrated to become part of the functional movement of playing. Additionally, there is the matter of how both musical and extra-musical concerns are coordinated between performer, co-performers and audience using body movements. A case study shows how, in the interaction between body style, musical expression and communication movements of both an individual and culturally-determined style are used. Many of these performance movements have clear functions and meanings: to communicate expressive intention (for instance, a sudden surge forwards to facilitate the execution of a loud musical passage, or a high curving hand gesture to link sections of the music during a pause); to communicate to the audience or co-performers a need for co-ordination or participation (for example, nodding the head to indicate “now” for the audience to join in a chorus of a song; or exchanging glances for the co-performer to take over a solo); to signal extra-musical concerns (for example, gesturing to the audience to remain quiet); and to present information about the performer's personality, with their individualized characteristics providing important cues (muted contained gestures, or large extravagant gestures, for example); to show off to the audience. From these results a theory is developed to explain how gestural elements help to make a performance meaningful.

scholarly journals COMO SER INTENCIONALISTA E DISPOSICIONALISTA

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Leclerc
Keyword(s):  
Molecular Structure ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Physical Realization ◽  
Public Language ◽  
Relational Property ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The One ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Semantic Properties

Intentionalists believe that intentionality, the relational property of being about something, is constitutive of mentality. Brentano’s thesis says: 1) the mental is intentional; 2) nothing physical exhibits that property. Dispositionalism, I believe, should be extended to include all mental properties, which are also dispositional and realized physically in the brain, like the solubility of sugar which is realized in its molecular structure. My aim is to show how we can be intentionalists (by accepting the first part of Brentano’s Thesis) and dispositionalists at the same time (by accepting that mental states, acts and events have a physical base of realization). In a nutshell: the intentional is the manifestation of mental dispositions. Dispositions in general, psychological dispositions in particular, are two-sided and presupposes, on the one hand, a physical realization, and a manifestation which is properly mental, on the other. Something has to be said about language in that context, because public representations instantiate semantic properties which also are intentional, and many of our mental states have their content specified by the use of a sentence belonging to a public language.

scholarly journals Mentalizing Bodies: Explicit Mentalizing Without Words in Psychotherapy

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Wiben Jensen ◽  
Stine Steen Høgenhaug ◽  
Morten Kjølbye ◽  
Marie Skaalum Bloch
Keyword(s):  
Interaction Analysis ◽  
Multimodal Interaction ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Video Data ◽  
Verbal Language ◽  
Cognitive Ethnography ◽  
Human Ability ◽  
Gradual Development ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

Introduction: Mentalization concerns the human ability to understand the actions of others (and oneself) in terms of intentional mental states. Theoretically, the notion has been described via the poles of automatic, non-verbal implicit mentalization as opposed to conscious and verbal explicit mentalization. In this article, we challenge this standard distinction by examining examples from psychotherapy. We argue that explicit mentalization can also be carried out via embodied non-verbal actions.Method: Four cases of real-life interaction from psychotherapy sessions are analyzed from the qualitative perspective of embodied cognition and multimodal interaction analysis. The analyses are based on video data transformed into transcriptions and anonymized drawings from a larger cognitive ethnography study conducted at a psychiatric hospital in Denmark.Results: The analyses demonstrate the gradual development from predominantly implicit mentalizing to predominantly explicit mentalizing. In the latter part of the examples, the mentalizing activity is initiated by the therapist on an embodied level but in an enlarged and complex manner indicating a higher level of awareness, imagination, and reflection. Thus, the standard assumption of explicit mentalization as contingent on verbal language is challenged, since it is demonstrated how processes of explicit mentalization can take place on an embodied level without the use of words.Conclusion: Based on real-life data, the study demonstrates that online processes of implicit and explicit mentalization are gradual and interwoven with embodied dynamics in real-life interaction. Thus, the analyses establish a window into how mentalization is carried out by psychotherapists through interaction, which testifies to the importance of embodied non-verbal behavior in psychotherapy. Further, informed by the notion of affordance-space, the study points to alternative ways of conceptualizing the intertwined nature of bodies and environment in relation to conveying more complex understandings of other people.

Dualism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Natural Order ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Property Dualism ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Mental Events

Dualism is the view that mental phenomena are, in some respect, nonphysical. The best-known version is due to Descartes (1641), and holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance. Descartes argued that, because minds have no spatial properties and physical reality is essentially extended in space, minds are wholly nonphysical. Every human being is accordingly a composite of two objects: a physical body, and a nonphysical object that is that human being’s mind. On a weaker version of dualism, which contemporary thinkers find more acceptable, human beings are physical substances but have mental properties, and those properties are not physical. This view is known as property dualism, or the dual-aspect theory. Several considerations appear to support dualism. Mental phenomena are strikingly different from all others, and the idea that they are nonphysical may explain just how they are distinctive. Moreover, physical reality conforms to laws formulated in strictly mathematical terms. But, because mental phenomena such as thinking, desiring and sensing seem intractable to being described in mathematical terms, it is tempting to conclude that these phenomena are not physical. In addition, many mental states are conscious states – states that we are aware of in a way that seems to be wholly unmediated. And many would argue that, whatever the nature of mental phenomena that are not conscious, consciousness cannot be physical. There are also, however, reasons to resist dualism. People, and other creatures with mental endowments, presumably exist wholly within the natural order, and it is generally held that all natural phenomena are built up from basic physical constituents. Dualism, however, represents the mind as uniquely standing outside this unified physical picture. There is also a difficulty about causal relations between mind and body. Mental events often cause bodily events, as when a desire causes an action, and bodily events often cause mental events, for example in perceiving. But the causal interactions into which physical events enter are governed by laws that connect physical events. So if the mental is not physical, it would be hard to understand how mental events can interact causally with bodily events. For these reasons and others, dualism is, despite various reasons advanced in its support, a theoretically uncomfortable position.

Mental Substances

2003 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 229-250
Author(s):  
Tim Crane
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Independent Entity ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Mental Events

Philosophers of mind typically conduct their discussions in terms of mental events, mental processes, mental properties, mental states—but rarely in terms of minds themselves. Sometimes this neglect is explicity acknowledged. Donald Davidson, for example, writes that ‘there are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties, which is to say that certain psychological predicates are true of them. These properties are constantly changing, and such changes are mental events’. Hilary Putnam agrees, though for somewhat different reasons:The view I have long defended is that the mind is not a thing, talk of our minds is talk of World-involving capabilities that we have and activities that we engage in. As Dewey succinctly put it, ‘Mind is primarily a verb. It denotes all the ways in which we deal consciously and expressly with the situation in which we find ourseleves. Unfortunately, an influential manner of thinking has changed modes of action into an underlying substance that performs the activities in question. It has treated mind as an independent entity which attends, purposes, cares and remembers’. But the traditional view, by treating mental states as states of the ‘underlying substance’, makes them properties of something ‘inside’, and, if one is a materialist philosopher, that means properties of our brains. So the next problem naturally seems to be: ‘Which neurological properties of our brains do these mental properties “reduce” to?’ For how could our brains have properties that aren't neurological? And this is how materialist philosphers saw the problem until the advent of such new alternatives in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language as Functionalism and Semantic Externalism.

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