scholarly journals Realisme Hukum: Peradilan Adat dalam Perspektif Keadilan Sosial

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 285
Author(s):  
Dominikus Rato

Aspects of positivism with its normative approach are often taught in various law schools as a single perspective. The study of law can be based on legal realism. Nevertheless, there is still a debate about legal realism's working pattern and contribution to juridical science. This study that introduced legal realism worked with socio-legal method based on the literature review. It aimed to elaborate on the concept of legal-realism as an epistemology of the socio-legal school, which leads to the conception of customary law and legal anthropology. With a naturalistic approach and supported by theories of customary law and legal anthropology. This study showed that legal realism as a school in philosophy and juridical studies based on empirical studies need to be developed. It referred to legal realism conceptualized in Scandinavia and America that was suitable to Indonesia's legal context, especially customary law as the law that lives in society. Therefore, the law that lives in society is strengthened through verdict and law enforcement officers as symbols of the state. It suggested that legal realism is also taught in law schools at universities, so that legal academics have diverse points of view, both in the legal discipline and as a research method. KEYWORDS: Customary Law, Socio-Legal, Social Justice, Legal Realism.

Author(s):  
S. B. Polyakov ◽  
◽  
I. A. Gilev ◽  

Introduction: we have created an information technology support program, named ‘LaserIP-GPK-2020’, designed to provide assistance in making reasoned court decisions according to the rules of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation in ordinary proceedings. With the help of this program, we demonstrate in the paper the complexity of the law enforcement process for a person and the assistance that software can provide to overcome this complexity. The paper shows the subject area of the information system created by us, outlines the ways of further enhancement of software intended to facilitate law enforcement, and challenges the myths about the robot judge. Purpose: to determine the possible types of software to be developed in accordance with the types of law enforcement operations, provided that the discretion function remains with law enforcement officers; to determine the directions of the formalization of law enforcement operations and the possibilities of gradual transfer of some of them to artificial intelligence. Methods: the universal dialectical-materialistic method, employed when converting the law enforcement process into the language of information technology; analysis and synthesis of the law enforcement process, the formal-legal method – for converting the requirements of law and legal science to law enforcement into software commands for the judge and the parties to the case; the object-oriented approach to modeling; the object-oriented programming methodology, a relational approach to database design. Results: the ‘Laser-IPGPK-2020’ computer program contains a sequence of law enforcement operations and rules for their execution, the multiplicity and complexity of which exceeds the capabilities of most law enforcement officers. This program is designed to prevent law enforcement errors resulting from the limited human capabilities with regard to retaining knowledge of the multitude of rules of law enforcement operations, and to obviate the expenditure of time required for each individual judge to solely produce a reasoned decision in a case. Conclusion: the selection and development of particular IT solutions to be applied in law enforcement practice when solving legal cases are determined by the analysis of the law enforcement process, which is the subject area of the program.


2019 ◽  
pp. 137-155
Author(s):  
Frans Reumi

The purpose of this paper describing the ethnography of the law of adat leadership in the seven indigenous territories in Tanah Papua is the perspective of legal anthropology, which is one of the ethnographic frameworks of the Papuan ethnography in particular from the cultural elements of social organizations. Ethnography of the law of traditional leadership lives in the culture and customary law of the community or ethnic group as the living law, classified into four types of ethnographic typology of customary leadership law: 1) leadership system of the man of authority/Big Man (Menagawan/Tonowi), 2) Klen Leadership System (Keondoafian/Ondofolo/Ontofro/Chaisoi, 3) Raja's leadership system (Fun / Weight), 4) Mixed leadership system (Sera/Mananwir). The nature of the four typologies is the customary government structure of the people or ethnic groups spread across seven indigenous territories: 1) La Pago, 2) Me Pago, 3) Ha Anim, 4) Tabi/Mamta, and 5) Saireri (in Papua Province), Doberay and Bomberay (in West Papua Province), as regional development capital in Papua in the future, and as a development challenge for regional governments, the world of higher education, in organizing communities or ethnic groups in Papua facing the era of globalization.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-31
Author(s):  
Charlie Melman

I argue that the “But Everyone Does That” (BEDT) defense can have significant exculpatory force in a legal sense, but not a moral sense. I consider whether legal realism is a better theory of the law than the more orthodox view of respecting the law as it is written. I next examine what the purpose of the law is, especially attending to how widespread disobedience is treated. Finally, I attempt to fit BEDT within Paul Robinson’s framework for categorizing defenses. I conclude that, first, BEDT can have significant exculpatory force; second, a BEDT plea does not comport with either Robinson’s definition of an excuse or other commonly held conceptions and so needs its own classification; and finally, BEDT does not exonerate the offender in a moral sense—only in a legal context.


FIAT JUSTISIA ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hendri Pratama

The completion of the juvenile criminal case in restorative justice can be done in a various way, one of the completion is using Megow Pak Tulang Bawang custom. The results of this research, in the completion process of juvenile criminal case using Megow Pak Tulang Bawang Lampung Custom, there are several stages and the completion of juvenile criminal case using Megow Pak Tulang Bawang Lampung Custom has been suitable with restorative justice principle because in the settlement, involving all stakeholder and using penal mediation that was form of restorative justice. There are several reason the completion of the juvenile criminal case using Megow Pak Tulang Bawang custom rarely used, that are: the society is not homogenous anymore, there are no strict rules that recognize the unity of customary law, and sometimes the authority is taken by law enforcement officers contrary to customary law of Megow Pak. Suggestions for this research is the completion of juvenile criminal case using Megow Pak Tulang Bawang Lampung custom can be taken as consideration for the law enforcement officers in Juvenile criminal case completion and also as well as consideration in formulating the new rules (Ius constituendum). Keywords: Juvenile Criminal Cases, Lampung Costum, Restorative Justice.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-104
Author(s):  
Insa Koch

Does anthropology matter to law? At first sight, this question might seem redundant: of course, anthropology matters to law, and it does so a great deal. Anthropologists have made important contributions to legal debates. Legal anthropology is a thriving sub-discipline, encompassing an ever-increasing range of topics, from long-standing concerns with customary law and legal culture to areas that have historically been left to lawyers, including corporate law and financial regulation. Anthropology’s relevance to law is also reflected in the world of legal practice. Some anthropologists act as cultural experts in, while others have challenged the workings of, particular legal regimes, including with respect to immigration law and social welfare.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 86-91
Author(s):  
Sally Engle Merry

This provocative question became the basis for a spirited discussion at the 2017 meeting of the American Anthropological Association. My first reaction, on hearing the question, was to ask, does anthropology care whether it matters to law? As a discipline, anthropology and the anthropology of law are producing excellent scholarship and have an active scholarly life. But in response to this forum’s provocation article, which clearly outlines the lack of courses on law and anthropology in law schools, I decided that the relevant question was, why doesn’t anthropology matter more to law than it does? The particular, most serious concern appears to be, why are there not more law and anthropology courses being offered in law schools? It is increasingly common for law faculty in the United States to have PhDs as well as JDs, so why are there so few anthropology/law PhD/JD faculty? Moreover, as there is growing consensus that law schools instil a certain way of thinking but lack preparation for the practice of law in reality and there is an explosion of interest in clinical legal training, why does this educational turn fail to provide a new role of legal anthropology, which focuses on the practice of law, in clinical legal training?


Author(s):  
Will Smiley

This chapter explores captives’ fates after their capture, all along the Ottoman land and maritime frontiers, arguing that this was largely determined by individuals’ value for ransom or sale. First this was a matter of localized customary law; then it became a matter of inter-imperial rules, the “Law of Ransom.” The chapter discusses the nature of slavery in the Ottoman Empire, emphasizing the role of elite households, and the varying prices for captives based on their individual characteristics. It shows that the Ottoman state participated in ransoming, buying, exploiting, and sometimes selling both female and male captives. The state particularly needed young men to row on its galleys, but this changed in the late eighteenth century as the fleet moved from oars to sails. The chapter then turns to ransom, showing that a captive’s ability to be ransomed, and value, depended on a variety of individualized factors.


Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document