Visegrad Cooperation: Search of New Forms amidst Ukrainian Crisis

Author(s):  
D. Ofitserov-Bel'skiy

The article discusses the evolution of the Visegrad partnership. It never had integrative capacity, but in recent years accumulated the integration potential in regional relations. The common position formation principles in international policy are being carried out by the Visegrad Four. Notable is the emergence of really important issues and explicit politicization of the agenda. The defense theme, the problem of energy security, coordination of positions on the EU budget etc. were included into discussions. At the same time, exacerbated contradictions exist in these areas. Key factors currently affecting the development of the Visegrad Group are: the confrontation of great powers in the region, the inert nature of relationship between the Visegrad countries and the United States, the anarchy in European policy, the prevalence of extra-regional conditions and incentives, the lack of specific regional rules and the void of its institutionalization. The Ukrainian crisis once again emphasizes the importance of the regional policy external actors – the U.S., Germany, Russia and the Brussels EU bureaucracy. It was the cause of the schism emerging in East European politics, and slowed down the process of the intra-regional incentives formation as well as of the communications concentration. It is forcing the Visegrad countries to grasp their limitrophe position. A perspective of the Visegrad partnership is unclear, but it is noteworthy that regional relations become increasingly important for their participants.

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (83) ◽  
pp. 6-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dejan Jović

Abstract This paper focuses on perceptions of the European Union (EU) and external actors (such as the United States, Russia, and Turkey) in six countries of the Western Balkans (WB) and Croatia in a comparative perspective. We present data generated by public opinion polls and surveys in all countries of that region in order to illustrate growing trends of EU indifferentism in all predominately Slavic countries of the region. In addition, there is an open rejection of pro-EU policies by significant segments of public opinion in Serbia and in the Republic of Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the contrary, there is much enthusiasm and support for the West in general and the EU in particular in predominately non-Slavic countries, Kosovo and Albania. We argue that the WB as a region defined by alleged desire of all countries to join the the EU is more of an elite concept than that shared by the general population, which remains divided over the issue of EU membership. In explaining reasons for such a gap we emphasise a role of interpretation of the recent past, especially when it comes to a role the West played in the region during the 1990s.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Koß ◽  
Astrid Séville

Existing research on the evolution of European integration has pitted economic against identity issues. In the economic sphere, governments are arguably able to pursue their preferences more independently. If, however, identity issues become politicized this is supposed to suggest that governments lose their dominant position in integration and gradually become agents of Eurosceptic parties and/or electorates. This article looks at a phenomenon neither the intergovernmentalist nor the postfunctionalist perspective can fully explain: the emergence of the Visegrád Group (V4) as a collective actor in European politics in early 2016. This emergence occurred in the wake of the refugee crisis during which the identity issue of migration was politicized. However, there was no coherent partisan composition uniting V4 governments. Based on a sequence elaboration of all press statements of meetings of the V4 Prime Ministers since their EU-accession in 2004, we show that what at first sight appears to be informed by anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic sentiments may in fact display a more ambivalent position towards regional integration. The post-refugee crisis V4 appears as a case of politicized transnationalism—that is, cooperation to achieve transnational interests under the condition of politicization. This transnational interest not only comprised opposition to a relocation of migrants, but also the maintenance of a core transnational freedom within the EU, namely free movement under the Schengen acquis. We conclude that, under the condition of increasing politicization, identity issues help to forge government alliances of governments pursuing economic preferences.


Conatus ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Liliya Leonidovna Sazonova

In the first chapter of the paper we elaborate on the attitude towards the Other in the European Union by discussing two adversative yet simultaneous processes taking place in the EU. The first tendency is a legacy from the centuries-lasting model of European unification against certain important Others. The second one refers to the aspiration of the supra-national European project to encourage in an unprecedented manner the co-existence with the otherness. We argue that this ambivalence results from the fact that the transformation of the attitude towards the otherness takes place with different tempo in the different social spheres.   In the second chapter we develop further the reflection on the EU attitude towards the Other by focusing on the East European Other. We discuss the normative and de facto application of the European values both in the West and in the East part of the continent.In the last chapter we articulate two separate discourses framing the European values. The first one refers to the essentialist approach looking for a metaphysical reasoning of their universality by developing the common culture, history and spirit rhetoric. The second reading of the European values presents them in a more postmodern and debatable way and offers a mechanism for reconciling the heterogenic East-West European society.


2022 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Duan

The recent experience with SARS-COV-2 has raised our alarm about the cross-species transmissibility of coronaviruses and the emergence of new coronaviruses. Knowledge of this family of viruses needs to be constantly updated. Porcine deltacoronavirus (PDCoV), a newly emerging member of the genus Deltacoronavirus in the family Coronaviridae, is a swine enteropathogen that causes diarrhea in pigs and may lead to death in severe cases. Since PDCoV diarrhea first broke out in the United States in early 2014, PDCoV has been detected in many countries, such as South Korea, Japan and China. More importantly, PDCoV can also infect species other than pigs, and infections have even been reported in children, highlighting its potential for cross-species transmission. A thorough and systematic knowledge of the epidemiology and pathogenesis of PDCoV will not only help us control PDCoV infection, but also enable us to discover the common cellular pathways and key factors of coronaviruses. In this review, we summarize the current knowledge on the prevalence, pathogenicity and infection dynamics, pathogenesis and immune evasion strategies of PDCoV. The existing anti-PDCoV strategies and corresponding mechanisms of PDCoV infection are also introduced, aiming to provide suggestions for the prevention and treatment of PDCoV and zoonotic diseases.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Christian Schweiger

In recent years the seemingly firm historical ties between Warsaw and Berlin have become increasingly strained. This results from a growing political asymmetry between the two countries. Germany moved into a semi-hegemonial position under the conditions of the triple crisis of banking, economy and sovereign debt in the eurozone. Consequently, German chancellor Angela Merkel was in a strong enough position to implement ordoliberal reforms of the eurozone’s governance architecture, which were promoted as an approach without alternatives. Merkel maintained her uncompromising stance during the migration crisis in the summer of 2015, when she demanded implementation of compulsory migrant distribution quotas across the EU. Poland and the Visegrád countries had initially strongly supported German leadership in resolving the eurozone crisis. The alienation from Germany’s European agenda however became significant under the conditions of the migration crisis. Here the firm opposition of Poland and the rest of the Visegrád Group towards Germany’s preferences shows a strategic mismatch between the EU’s liberal core, which is spearheaded by Germany, and the concept of the “illiberal” state, which Poland has embraced under the PiS government. The willingness to resolve these differences will be crucial in determining the future shape of Polish-German relations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-451
Author(s):  
Marianna Dudášová

Recent developments in the European Union revealed significant differences between the Visegrad countries and the remaining members of the EU. The enlargement euphoria of the first decade of the 21st century was replaced by certain enlargement fatigue, manifesting itself not only in concrete governmental policies but also in the public opinion towards the EU. As European integration and globalisation are parallel processes, declining support for European integration must not necessarily be the result of disagreement with specific policies and should be examined in the broader context of globalisation fears and anxieties. The article describes variations in globalisation scepticism between the group of Visegrad countries and the remaining countries of the EU as well as variations within the Visegrad group itself, focusing on the main drivers of economic globalisation – international trade, foreign direct investment, and immigration. The development of public opinion since the financial and economic crisis in 2009 indicates that Visegrad countries should not be treated as a uniform bloc of globalisation sceptics as there are significant differences in opinion between the more pessimistic Czechs and Slovaks and the more optimistic Poles and Hungarians. Their globalisation scepticism also varies across different dimensions of globalisation and is fuelled by different motivations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-115
Author(s):  
Karolina Gawron-Tabor

Since January 2017, when Donald Trump assumed the post of US president, there has been a visible intensification of relations between the United States and the countries from Central Europe, aimed at, for example, counteracting challenges and threats faced by the allies. The objective of the article is to analyze challenges and threats to Central Europe, identified by Donald Trump. He points to the necessity: 1) to strengthen NATO and increase the engagement of European allies; 2) to ensure energy security; 3) to counteract threats from two superpowers – Russia and China. The text addresses how important the challenges and threats identified by the American president have been for individual Visegrad states. The article begins by presenting characteristic features of the foreign policy conducted by Donald Trump’s administration which influence relations between the US and the Visegrad countries. It then analyzes the relations between the US and individual states regarding the previously presented challenges and threats. The article’s thesis is that Poland is the only Visegrad country to perceive all three challenges and threats in a way similar to the US, and thus cooperates with the US in this matter. The work is a comparative analysis based on content and narrative analysis.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 007-014
Author(s):  
Zhansaule Zharmakhanova ◽  
Saniya Nurdavletova ◽  
Leila Akhmetzhanova

As Central Asia undergoes a rapid transformation process, political, economic and security developments remain uncertain and difficult to predict. External actors will play a key role in defining the contours of transformation in Central Asia. In recent years, a number of powerful countries—mainly China, the Russian Federation and, to a lesser extent, the United States, Japan and Turkey—have sought to increase their influence in Central Asia. There was a timely initiative proposed by Germany, which presided over the European Union at the time, to launch the process of rethinking EU participation in Central Asia, culminating in the development of a Strategy for Central Asia. Thus, the European Union has reinforced its presence at a strategic moment for Central Asia. The Strategy for a New Partnership, adopted by the European Council on 21-22 June, 2007, became the main document for the significant and decisive strengthening of EU policy in Central Asia. The strategy represents the most ambitious EU project in the region and demonstrates a significant improvement in relations. The EU has the needed resources and, in line with the Strategy, it wants to do its part to transform the region into a secure and well-governed area, which is also in the interests of Central Asians. In 2019, in order to intensify cooperation, the EU updated and launched the new Strategy for Central Asia. It should be noted that security is a particularly important issue. In both the first Strategy 2007 and the updated Strategy 2019, the theme of security is reflected in various EU programs and projects. Thus, the article will provide a general analysis of EU’s security programs in Central Asia.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 38-44
Author(s):  
Viktor Nikitin ◽  

After the formation in March 2020 of a new government coalition led by Igor Matovic, the Slovak government has adopted the foreign policy concept analyzing the European agenda. The Slovak Prime Minister participates in several meetings of the EU Council and at the EU summit on July 17-21, 2020. Before his arrival in Brussels, the Slovak politician visited all the countries of the Visegrad Four. Both the meetings of the EU Council and bilateral and multilateral negotiations within the Visegrad Group had a pronounced «pandemic» component: they mainly discussed the EU instruments for overcoming the consequences of COVID-19 (EU budget, Recovery Fund and Next generation EU). The organization of a videoconference between the Prime Ministers of the Central European countries and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel on May 19, 2020, had a very positive effect on the satisfactory results for the Visegrad countries of the EU Summit. As the pandemic subsides, on the agenda of European Council appeared foreign policy issues, especially the Belarus crises.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 77-96
Author(s):  
Łukasz Kołtuniak

Po 2004 r. wydawało się, że wobec osiągnięcia wspólnego celu, jakim była inte­gracja z UE i NATO, formuła Grupy Wyszehradzkiej ulega stopniowemu wyczerpaniu. Wspólny i bezkompromisowy jakkolwiek by nie oceniać jego moralnej słuszności sprzeciw wobec tzw. kwot na migrantów stwarza dziś wrażenie istnienia wspólnej platformy interesów krajów V4. Czy jednak platforma ta jest stała i Wyszehrad może integrować się również wobec idei „pozytywnych”. Problem jedności krajów regionu rozważę w niniejszym tekście w kontekście ich postawy w czasie kryzysu ukraińskiego, a także polityki wobec Rosji i Chin. Kryzys ukraiński w 2014 r. stwarzał bowiem zda­niem wielu ekspertów ryzyko rozpadu Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Było to wynikiem braku wsparcia dla Ukrainy zwłaszcza ze strony Czech i Węgier przy tradycyjnie prometejskim stanowisku ówczesnego polskiego rządu. Czy od 2014 r. udało się odbudować wspólną agendę? Czy Rosja może skutecznie stosować w regionie zasadę divide et impera? Na te pytania będę chciał odpowiedzieć, analizując politykę krajów regionu wobec kryzysu z uwzględnieniem całego kontekstu polityki analizowanych państw. Chances for the unity of the Visegrad Group in the context of V4 countries’ policy towards Russia and China and the Ukrainian crisis After 2004, in the whole V4 region it was the conviction that Visegrad formula is exhausted. However, this situation began changed after common strong opposition against migrant quota. But is the common “positive” idea exist? The problem of regional unity will be analysed in the context of policy towards Russia, China and Ukrainian crisis. During Ukrainian crisis in 2014 it might seem that the Visegrad project may finally collapsed. Poland traditionally strongly supported Ukraine but Czech Republic and Hungary tried to avoid the clear statements. The question is if today, 3 years after Russian aggression, Visegrad states have more of common interests? And does Russia have the instruments to successfully divide our region? Each state’s policy will be analysed separately in the context of general ideas in foreign policy and attitude to Ukrainian crisis.


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