scholarly journals PANDANGAN SHĀT{IBĪ TERHADAP GAGASAN MAKNA ẒĀHIR DAN BĀT{IN

Dialogia ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
Muhammad Zainul Hakim

Abstract: Abu> Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī,  a 14th century Muslim scholar is famous of his idea of maqāṣid shari>'ah. He succeeded in formulating fundamental values in the Qur'an. He is also known to have a different view of the Qur'an compared to the other uṣūl al-fiqh scholars. This article describes the Shāṭib’s view of the Sufism idea that the Qur'an conveys ẓāhir and bāṭin’s meaning. Shāṭibī concludes that the term zāhir is an understanding of original text as apprehended by the Arabs at the time of the emerge of the Qur'an. Meanwhile, bāṭin’s meaning is the real purpose of the Qur'an that Allah intends to. Shāṭibī  believes that leading to the understanding of the meaning of bāṭin can be done through tadabbur, as written by Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj in al-Lumā'. Moreover, Shāṭib applied this idea in formulating the concept of maqāṣid shari>’ah. Although, he acknowledged the validity of interpretation by the meaning of bāṭin, Shāṭibī offers two requirements, namely, first, the meaning of bāṭin is conveyed in accordance to the ẓāhir text and it is not deviated from the rules of arabic language. Second, the conveyed meaning is supported by another verse clearly indicating the real meaning of bāṭin. Both requirements reflect the principles of the originality of Qurán and the absolute verses containing al-uṣūl al-kulliyyah. كان أبو ملخص:إسحاق الشاطبي مفكرا مسلما في القرن الرابع عشر، ويعرف حتى اليوم بفكرته عن مقاصد الشريعة. وحصل الشاطبي على صياغة القيم الأساسية في القرآن الكريم. ومن المعروف أيضا أن لديه وجهة نظر عن القرآن التي تختلف عن معظم الفقهاء الآخرين. و فى هذه المقالة شرح الشاطبي عن الفكرة الصوفية بأن القرآن له معنى باطن ومعنى ظاهر. واستنتج الشاطبي إلى أن مصطلح معنى الظاهر هو فهم النص الخالص، وهذا كما يفهمه العرب في وقت نزوله. وأما المعنى الباطن هو الهدف الحقيقي للقرآن الذي أراده الله. واستنتج الباحث أن الشاطبي وافق على هذه الفكرة. والطريقة التي يمكن أن يؤدي إلى فهم معنى الباطن هو طريقة التدبّر، وهذا كما كتبه أبو نصر السراج في اللمع. وأشار أنه وافق بهذه الطريقة لأنه قد استخدمها لصياغة مفهوم مقاصد الشريعة. وهو يقدم شرطين فى استخدام هذه الطريقة. أولا، أن يكون إنتاج المعنى الباطن وفقا لظاهر النص ولا ينحرف عن قواعد اللغة العربية. ثانيا، المعنى المنتج مناسب بآية أخرى التي تشير إلى صحة المعنى الباطن الذي تم حصوله. كل من هذه الشروط تصور عن المبادئ التي حصلها الشاطبي على أن القرآن الكريم عربي وإطلاق الآيات التي تحتوي على الأصول الكلية. Abstrak: Abu> Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī, sarjana Muslim abad ke-14 dikenal hingga kini dengan gagasan maqāṣid sharī‘ah. Ia berhasil merumuskan nilai-nilai fundamental dalam al-Qur’an. Ia juga dikenal memiliki pandangan terhadap al-Qur’an yang berbeda dengan kebanyakan ulama uṣūl fiqh lain. Dalam tulisan ini dijelaskan pandangan Shāṭibī mengenai gagasan kaum sufi bahwa al-Qur’an memiliki makna ẓāhir dan makna bāṭin. Mengenai konsep makna ẓāhir dan bāṭin, Shāṭibī menyimpulkan bahwa yang dimaksud ẓāhir adalah pemahaman terhadap teks murni sebagaimana yang dipahami orang Arab pada masa turunnya al-Qur’an. Sementara itu, yang dimaksud bāṭin adalah maksud al-Qur’an sebenarnya yang dikehendaki Allah. Setelah dilakukan penelitian, disimpulkan bahwa Shāṭibī setuju dengan gagasan ini. Adapun metode yang diakui Shāṭibī dapat mengantar menuju pemahaman makna bāṭin adalah dengan tadabbur, sebagaimana yang ditulis oleh Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj dalam al-Lumāʻ. Penerimaan Shāṭibī terhadap metode ini tidak lepas dari fakta bahwa ia juga menggunakan metode yang sama untuk merumuskan konsep maqāṣid sharīʻah. Meski mengakui keabsahan penafsiran dengan makna bāṭin, Shāṭibī mengajukan dua syarat. Pertama, makna bāṭin yang dihasilkan sesuai dengan kondisi teks secara ẓāhir dan tidak melenceng dari kaidah-kaidah bahasa arab. Kedua, makna yang dihasilkan didukung oleh ayat lain secara jelas yang menunjukkan kebenaran makna bāṭin yang diperoleh. Kedua syarat ini mencerminkan prinsip yang dibangunnya yakni kearaban al-Qur’an dan mutlaknya ayat-ayat yang berisi al-uṣūl al-kulliyyah. Keywords: Hermeneutika, Tafsir Sufi, Maqāṣid Sharīʻah, Makna ẓāhir dan bāṭin. 

1992 ◽  
Vol 13 (02) ◽  
pp. 30-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Wandschneider

When the Ideal is understood as ontologically fundamental within the framework of an idealistic system, and the Real, on the other hand, as derived, then the first and foremost task of a philosophy of this kind is to prove the claimed fundamentally of the Ideal. This is immediately followed by the further demand to also substantiate on this basis the existence of the Real and particularly of natural being. These tasks have been understood and attempts made to solve them in very different ways in German Idealism - about which I cannot go into more detail here. Let me say this much: that Fichte and Schelling, it appears to me, already fail at the first task, ie. neither Fichte nor Schelling really succeeds in substantiating their pretended ideal as an absolute principle of philosophy. Fichte believes he has such a principle in the direct evidence of the self. However, as this is of little use for the foundation of a generally binding philosophy because of its ultimately private character, Fichte already replaces it with the principle of the absolute self already in his first Wissenschaftlehre of 1794. As a construction detached from the concrete self, this of course lacks that original direct certainty from which Fichte started in the first place, in other words: because the construction of an absolute self can no longer refer to direct evidence, it must be substantiated separately, something which Fichte, I believe, nonetheless fails to do. The same criticism can, in my view, be made of Schelling, who ingeniously substitutes constructions for arguments. His early intuition of an absolute identity which simultaneously underlies spirit and nature, remains just as thetic and unproven as that eternal subject on which he based the representation of his system in, for example, the Munich lectures of 1827.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-31
Author(s):  
María José Binetti ◽  
ROMAN KRÁLIK ◽  
Hedviga Tkáčová ◽  
Marie Roubalova

Aim. In his Kierkegaardian studies Jean Wahl states that there is a fundamental convergence between Plato and Søren Kierkegaard focused on the notions of identity and difference. Wahl suggests a sort of transposition of platonic metaphysics into the sphere of personal subjectivity. This paper intends to explain this passage from the same to the other from Plato to Kierkegaard. Concept. The article explains the passage from the same to the other from Plato to Kierkegaard. In both authors, the categories of being or not being, identity and difference, unity and multiplicity, becoming and rest explain the dynamic nature of the real. Results and conclusion. In both authors, the categories mensioned above explain the dynamic nature of the real. But while Plato applies these categories to the inteligibile word, Kierkegaard applies them to individual freedom, which supports reality as a whole. Cognitive value. Both searches lead to a single speculative answer and culminate in the same metaphysical categorisation, which applies analogously to everything real. Indeed, being and non-being, identity and difference, oneness and otherness, rest and becoming, explain the dialectic, intensive and relational dynamism of entia. At the same time, they essentially determine the power of human existence, infinitely possible and forever depending on the absolute.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noza Aflisia

The translation of Arabic into Indonesian is an important process because many of the sciences are written in Arabic from Islamic history, Islamic civilization, jurisprudence, ethics, even medicine, numerology, etc., all written in Arabic. The Arabic language has the advantages so that the higher language of the other language of its characteristic is in the field of audio, tandem, derivation, expression, verbal participation, and sculpture. Which is done in the translation work say in the translator. In order to be a good translator, he should be familiar with everyday vocabulary and vocabulary in both languages (Arabic and Indonesian). He should be familiar with the tools of influence and persuasion in both languages ​​and how to use them and be familiar with the language and culture to which he translates. And that the translation should be written to the spoken language reader, even though the original text was not written for public reading, and is sincere in translating it and harnessing all its forces in it. In the structure of the Arabic sentence is often encountered sentence that makes it difficult for students to determine what is effective and the beginning and the action and the experience and the effect and complementary, in this writing parables by the translation of the actual sentence, the building of the known, and the building of the container, and, and, and, and, "What" overload. When translated, the translator needs a method, including literal translation, moral translation, and dynamic translation. In the process of translation, there are many problems including linguistic problems (vocabulary, grammar, translation, language development) and social and cultural problems.


1957 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Ackrill

My purpose is not to give a full interpretation of this difficult and important passage, but to discuss one particular problem, taking up some remarks made by F. M. Cornford (in Plato's Theory of Knowledge) and by Mr. R. Robinson (in his paper on Plato's Parmenides, Classical Philology, 1942). First it may be useful to give a very brief and unargued outline of the passage. Plato seeks to prove that concepts are related in certain definite ways, that there is a συμπλοκὴ εἰδῶν (251d–252e). Next (253) he assigns to philosophy the task of discovering what these relations are: the philosopher must try to get a clear view of the whole range of concepts and of how they are interconnected, whether in genus-species pyramids or in other ways. Plato now gives a sample of such philosophising. Choosing some concepts highly relevant to problems already broached in the Sophist he first (254–5) establishes that they are all different one from the other, and then (255e–258) elicits the relationships in which they stand to one another. The attempt to discover and state these relationships throws light on the puzzling notions ὄν and μὴ ὄν and enables Plato to set aside with contempt certain puzzles and paradoxes propounded by superficial thinkers (259). He refers finally (259e) to the absolute necessity there is for concepts to be in definite relations to one another if there is to be discourse at all: διὰ γὰρ τήν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν So the section ends with a reassertion of the point with which it began (251d–252e): that there is and must be a συμπλοκὴ εἰδῶν.The question I wish to discuss is this. Is it true to say that one of Plato's achievements in this passage is ‘the discovery of the copula’ or ‘the recognition of the ambiguity of ἔστιν’ as used on the one hand in statements of identity and on the other hand in attributive statements? The question is whether Plato made a philosophical advance which we might describe in such phrases as those just quoted, but no great stress is to be laid on these particular phrases. Thus it is no doubt odd to say that Plato (or anyone else) discovered the copula. But did he draw attention to it? Did he expound or expose the various roles of the verb ἔστιν? Many of his predecessors and contemporaries reached bizarre conclusions by confusing different usesof the word; did Plato respond by elucidating these different uses? These are the real questions.


Mediaevistik ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 431-432
Author(s):  
Albrecht Classen

Broadview Editions produces really attractive modern English translations of medieval texts, such as this one, which offers an excellent modern translation of the Quest of the Holy Grail contained in the Lancelot-Grail Cycle. Judith Shoaf is not the first, and will probably not be the last to try her hand at this complex and intriguing narrative, but she clearly stands above previous efforts by Pauline Matarasso (1969) and E. J. Burns (2010), making here available one of the greatest medieval texts for the modern classroom without some archaisms or stilted expressions in Matarasso’s version. However, it does not become clear what the real differences might be, and not having the older translation directly available, the argument that this is a better translation remains a bit obscure. On the other hand, Shoaf has taken great care to draw from the best critical editions (Albert Pauphilet, ed., 1965, H. Oskar Sommer, ed. 1913) and offers a smooth text, maybe so smooth that it removes us already a bit too much from the original. Comparing her rendering with those offered by others, Shoaf reached the conclusion that some of her decisions, which are based on an examination of some of the original manuscripts and her “personal taste” (69) should be trusted by the reader. This is somewhat speculative and maybe even biased. Here we are given only the English translation and no original text to compare with. In the footnotes, however, we find much valuable information about how she chose what version for what reason, and additional comments about sources and references.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 80
Author(s):  
Suhermanto Ja’far

<p>This paper highlights Iqbal’s epistemology which focuses on the question of metaphysic and ontology. To understand the absolute being, Iqbal starts from intuition about human beings’ ego engaged at reality of the absolute ego. Intuition can reveal the absolute reality or the real super ego. The real existence of reality is spiritual. The true reality, according to Iqbal, refers to the existence of God, man and nature. However, the real existence of reality is a manifestation of the absolute reality. It is an absolute being or an absolute ego. Intuition about self itself brings man to the intuition of ultimo reality. Iqbal’s epistemology of self (ego) is essentially talking about the philosophy of the human that focuses on self or ego. Self or ego is the starting point for Iqbal to relate between God and nature. Life in the universe, according to Iqbal, is a series of actions. All of these are for the benefit of mankind as a co-creator through the meaningful action. The meaningful action is a foundation of human existence in manifesting himself. Iqbal formulates this meaningful action as a manifestation of the way the human utilizes to face with the reality of the other. To Iqbal, meaningful action is charged with the ontological-religious content which emphasizes the fundamental spiritual aspect of Islam with the term ‘<em>amal</em> (noble conduct). To him, meaningful action will be always imprinted in people’s lives and only the meaningful action alone that can help people prepare themselves to face the destruction of their bodies.</p>


1910 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-140
Author(s):  
Louis de la Vallee Poussin

There is much to support the opinion of Rāmānuja, Dr. Thibaut, and many others, that Śaṃkara's doctrine of “illusion” is a biassed rendering of the old Vedānta, Bādarāyaṇik as well as Aupanishadic. If that be granted, it is by no means self-evident that Buddhism has been without influence on Śamkara's speculation; and the last writer on the subject, Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar, a very able pupil of Professor Jacobi, does not conceal his opinion, or his surmise, that Śaṃkara is indebted to Nāgārjuna. That may be true, but I would object that we really know little or nothing about the history of Vedānta, and that conclusions based on philosophical parallels are by no means definitive. Autonomous developments— autonomous if not absolutely independent—are admissible. Nāgārjuna (or his predecessors, the anonymous authors of the oldest Mahāyānasūtras), by the very fact that he proclaims “voidness” to be the real nature of things, was prepared to distinguish the relative truth (saṃvṛtisatya) and the absolute one (pāramārthika); and his nihilism coupled with “idealism” might lead to the Vijñānavāda: “existence of pure non-intelligent (?) intellect.” On the other hand the Aupanishadas, from their main thesis (tat tvam asi, etc.), could derive the distinction of the two brahmans, of the two vidyās. Both developments are natural enough; the conception of the universal void (o) and the intuition of the infinite (∞) are convergent, in the end; but parallel and convergent as they are, these developments do not lose their primitive tinge.


2018 ◽  
pp. 49-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. E. Mamonov

Our analysis documents that the existence of hidden “holes” in the capital of not yet failed banks - while creating intertemporal pressure on the actual level of capital - leads to changing of maturity of loans supplied rather than to contracting of their volume. Long-term loans decrease, whereas short-term loans rise - and, what is most remarkably, by approximately the same amounts. Standardly, the higher the maturity of loans the higher the credit risk and, thus, the more loan loss reserves (LLP) banks are forced to create, increasing the pressure on capital. Banks that already hide “holes” in the capital, but have not yet faced with license withdrawal, must possess strong incentives to shorten the maturity of supplied loans. On the one hand, it raises the turnovers of LLP and facilitates the flexibility of capital management; on the other hand, it allows increasing the speed of shifting of attracted deposits to loans to related parties in domestic or foreign jurisdictions. This enlarges the potential size of ex post revealed “hole” in the capital and, therefore, allows us to assume that not every loan might be viewed as a good for the economy: excessive short-term and insufficient long-term loans can produce the source for future losses.


2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kas Saghafi

In several late texts, Derrida meditated on Paul Celan's poem ‘Grosse, Glühende Wölbung’, in which the departure of the world is announced. Delving into the ‘origin’ and ‘history’ of the ‘conception’ of the world, this paper suggests that, for Derrida, the end of the world is determined by and from death—the death of the other. The death of the other marks, each and every time, the absolute end of the world.


2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-143
Author(s):  
Bernadette Collenberg-Plotnikov

›Ikonen‹ sind heute nicht mehr nur die Ikonen der christlichen Kirche, sondern vor allem die Ikonen der modernen Massenkultur. Beide Arten von Ikonen werden in der neueren Kunstreflexion aufgegriffen: Kunst gilt entweder, verstanden als Erbin der religiösen Ikone, als Phänomen, das Absolutes in singulärer Weise anschaulich er- fahrbar macht. Oder aber die Kunst gilt umgekehrt lediglich als Klasse in der Welt der säkularen Ikonen. Demgegenüber wird im Beitrag erstens die These vertretenwerden, daß die neuere Kunst sowohl Aspekte transzendenter als auch immanenter Ikonen umfaßt. Zugleich ist es aber, so die zweite These, für unser Kunstverständnis charakteristisch, ein theoretisches Kontrastverhältnis zwischen Kunst und Ikone an- zunehmen. Dieses gründet auf einer spezifischen Reflexivität der Kunst, durch die sie sich von der Ikone beiderlei Art kategorial unterscheidet. Today, the word ›icon‹ usually no longer refers to the icons of the Christian church, but to the icons of the modern mass-culture. Both sorts of icons play a key-role in the recent discussion about art: Either art is supposed to be a descendant of the religious icon, a phenomenon that gives us a singular visual experience of the Absolute. On the other hand, art is supposed to be just one class among others in the wide world of the secular icons. In contrast to these two positions this essay contends that modern art comprehends aspects of transcendent as well as of immanent icons. Furthermore, it argues that at the same time it is characteristic for our notion of art to suppose a contrast between art and icon. This contrast is based on a specific reflectivity of art, which marks a categorical difference between art and both sorts of icons.


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