scholarly journals A Critical Analysis of Canada's Sex Work Legislation

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-36
Author(s):  
Erica Mika Kunimoto

In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that three sections of the Criminal Code of Canada pertaining to sex work were unconstitutional. In response to this ruling—otherwise known as the Bedford Decision—the Conservative government introduced the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA) in 2014. In this paper, I ask: to what extent does the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act meet its stated goal of addressing the health and safety of those who “engage in prostitution”? In exploring this question, I first trace the legal terrain leading to the PCEPA’s conception. Following this, I show that the PCEPA has failed to address its stated goals in two central ways. First, by co-opting the progressive framing of the Bedford Decision in a way that obscures the situations of violence it seeks to address, and second, by making the most precarious category of sex work even more dangerous through its implementation. In order to render the actual foundations of the PCEPA visible, I draw upon critical race and feminist theory. Through this analysis, I show how gendered and racialized hierarchies regulate violence along and within the sex work spectrum. Overall, this paper argues that the PCEPA has failed to address the health and safety of “those engaged in prostitution,” and instead, has facilitated racialized patterns of gender violence against vulnerable populations.

2015 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 575-594 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamish Stewart

In Canada (A.G.) v. Bedford, the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated three prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code on grounds of overbreadth and gross disproportionality. The implications of Bedford go well beyond the particular context of sex work and even of criminal law. First, the Court held that the three constitutional norms against overbreadth, arbitrariness, and gross disproportionality are distinct from each other rather than aspects of a single norm against overbreadth. Second, the Court held that a Charter applicant could establish a violation of section 7 by showing that a law is overbroad, arbitrary, or grossly disproportionate in its impact on the life, liberty, or security of only one person and that the effectiveness of the law in achieving its policy objectives was not relevant to these norms. There are some difficulties in understanding this highly individualistic approach to section 7, and those difficulties lead to the third implication. By deferring any consideration of the effectiveness of the law to the question of whether it is a proportional limit on a section 7 right, the Court may be indicating a willingness to do something it has never done before: recognize an infringement of a section 7 right as a justified limit under section 1. The Court’s clarification of the relationship between the norms against overbreadth, arbitrariness, and gross disproportionality is welcome, but its individualistic articulation of those norms is difficult to understand and its suggestion that section 7 violations may now be easier to save under section 1 is troubling.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-82
Author(s):  
Nathan Dawthorne

In December 2014, despite the Supreme Court of Canada finding Canada's prostitution laws unconstitutional, the Conservative government passed a bill criminalizing the buying of sex and the advertisement of sex for sale. Sex work has a long history as a hot-button topic, and it continues to remain newsworthy throughout the country. This public discussion in some contexts has privileged certain lobbyists and so-called advocates, disregarding or distorting the voices of sex workers themselves. This territory is starkly heteronormative, reinforcing gendered stereotypes and naturalizing certain types of heterosexual behaviour while ignoring a spectrum of other realities. By analysizing depictions of sex work published for 2013 in the London Free Press, a politically centre-right newspaper printed in a midsized Canadian city, this paper provides analysis of articles about sex work in the local-regional context of London, Ontario (Canada). Exposing a Foucauldian rarefaction of discourse, the analysis works to unveil ideological underpinnings, fleshing out a distorted gendered discourse. 


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2001
Author(s):  
June Ross

The impact of judicial decisions is sometimes most significant and most controversial in relation to matters that were not at the forefront in the legal proceedings. The decision in R. v. Sharpe1 may be such a case. In this decision, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld, with minor qualifications, the offence of private possession of child pornography under section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.2 The case was argued and resolved largely as an issue of privacy — could the prohibition on child pornography extend to private possession, while remaining within constitutional limits?


2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janine Benedet

In its recent decision in R. v. Sharpe, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Criminal Code provisions prohibiting the possession and making of child pornography, subject to two exceptions. Despite a narrow construction of the definition of child pornography and a broad reading of the statutory defences, the majority found that prohibiting individuals from making and possessing some kinds of child pornography was an unjustifiable limit on the freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The dissent would have upheld the legislation in its entirety. This article argues that the majority of the Court erred in considering the value of freedom of expression in a detached and abstract manner. Operating in this abstract plane led the Court to approve two significant exceptions on the basis of hypothetical examples of overbreadth, without considering the reality of the exceptions as they relate to documented child pornography cases. As a result, the Court extended constitutional protection to some categories of material that are clearly harmful to children. This result should make us sceptical of the use in Charter cases of broad reading in remedies that create complex judicial amendments with unexamined consequences.


2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 751
Author(s):  
Madam Justice Patricia Rowbotham

Justice Bertha Wilson: One Woman’s Difference is a collection of 16 essays which reflect upon Wilson’s contributions as jurist, speaker, chair of the Canadian Bar Association Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession, mentor, and role model to a generation of lawyers and judges. The authors are all women; fifteen of the essays are written by academics (and a student) from law faculties across Canada, and one essay is authored by a barrister. For the most part the authors write from the perspective of their own considerable expertise in a particular area of law. Their critical analysis of several of Wilson’s judgments from both the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada caused me to reflect upon those judgments in novel ways. Some of the authors tackle the tricky issue of whether Wilson was a “feminist” judge.


2021 ◽  
pp. 18-24
Author(s):  
Igor O. Tkachev ◽  

The article provides a critical analysis of a number of provisions of the Resolution No. 48 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of November 26, 2019, “On the practice of the courts’ application of legislation on liability for tax crimes”. The author notes that the current version of the decree allows considering tax evasion as a formal crime. Thus, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation laid down the preconditions for classifying tax evasion as a continuing crime, which would significantly reduce the number of criminal cases terminated due to the expiration of the statute of limitations for criminal liability. The author also draws attention to the refusal of the Supreme Court to define the category “concealment of funds or other property” for the purposes of applying Art. 199.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. It is noted that such a refusal may lead to a broader interpretation by the courts of this criminal law norm.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2001
Author(s):  
Shannon Bell

Robin Sharpe1 was charged with possession of child pornography under section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.2 He argued that the section violated his freedom of expression under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 The Supreme Court of Canada found that the provision prohibited the possession of visual representations that a reasonable person would view as depictions of explicit sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen. The Court found that the sexual nature of the representations must be determined objectively. That is, it must be the “dominant characteristic.”4 In addition, the Court found that the section prohibited possession of written or visual materials that actively induce or encourage sexual acts with children.5


2018 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Steven Penney

In R. v. Marakah, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada decided that senders of electronic text communications maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy over their messages even after they are copied to recipients’ devices. The dissenters argued, in contrast, that any such expectation is objectively unreasonable given senders’ inability to control the messages after delivery. The Supreme Court did not settle the question, however, of whether this expectation can be defeated by a recipient’s voluntary decision to allow police to search his or her own device. Indeed, each side intimated that such a consent would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.This article argues, nonetheless, that courts can and should use consent doctrine to avoid the “zero-sum” model of section 8 adjudication that characterizes the majority and dissenting reasons in Marakah. Properly interpreted, that doctrine preserves Marakah’s core holding — that senders do not reasonably expect unfettered state access to their received text communications — while also giving effect to recipients’ autonomous decisions to assist police.However, as with oral communications, a recipient’s consent to disclose a sender’s text communications to police should only defeat the sender’s expectation of privacy over preexisting messages. Contrary to several lower court decisions, this article argues that the acquisition of future, incoming communications from recipients’ devices (with or without consent) invades senders’ reasonable expectations of privacy under section 8 of the Charter and constitutes an “interception” requiring judicial authorization under section 184.2 of the Criminal Code.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 25-29
Author(s):  
O.S. Kapinus ◽  

The article analyzes legislative initiatives of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on introduction of the criminal offense concept in the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Supporting the striving of the supreme judicial authority for humanization of criminal laws, the author notes that the proposed criminal law mechanisms and means of reaching this goal contradict the conceptual origins of Russian criminal laws, deform the basic branch institutions


1994 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 484
Author(s):  
M. Anne Stalker

The author examines the interaction between the Criminal Code and the common law in relation to two areas of law recently handled by both the Alberta Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada


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