scholarly journals Do juiz herói ao tribunal democrático

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-30
Author(s):  
Beatriz Nunes Diógenes ◽  
Diane Espíndola
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Institutional Dynamics ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Political Model ◽  
Normative Standard

RESUMO:O objetivo deste artigo foi refletir sobre o atual papel do Poder Judiciário como porta-voz do texto constitucional e ator político em constante relação conflituosa com o legislativo. Discutiu-se sobre o ativismo judicial e a atuação do Supremo Tribunal Federal como legislador moral (superego da sociedade), a ideia do juiz herói e seus desdobramentos democráticos, principalmente quanto ao sistema de freios e contrapesos. Observou-se a existência de um movimento de hiperjudicialização de questões éticas e políticas, que acarreta o desequilíbrio da dinâmica institucional do modelo democrático. Conclui-se que a atuação do Poder Judiciário não deve ser marcada pelo decisionismo disfarçado de ordem de valores, nem tampouco deve atuar como legislador moral e nem permitir a ausência de vinculação ao padrão normativo. Foi sugerido, para tanto, o aperfeiçoamento da dinâmica institucional brasileira através da interação permanente entre o judiciário e o legislativo, em busca da formação de uma teoria normativa da separação de poderes que promova um debate qualitativo consubstanciado na razão pública, que resguarde direitos e tonifique a dimensão deliberativa do modelo político em vigor. Utilizou-se, para tal reflexão, do método de pesquisa bibliográfico.ABSTRACT:The purpose of this article was to reflect on the current role of the judiciary as a spokesperson for the constitutional text and political actor in constant conflicting relationship with the legislative. It was discussed about judicial activism and the performance of the Supreme Court as moral legislator (society’s superego), the idea of the judge hero and its democratic repercussions, especially regarding the system of checks and balances. The existence of a movement of hyperjudicialization of ethical and political issues was observed, which causes the imbalance of the institutional dynamics of the democratic model. It is concluded that the performance of the judiciary should not be marked by decisionism disguised as an order of values, nor should it act as a moral legislator or allow the absence of binding to the normative standard. To this end, it was suggested that the Brazilian institutional dynamics be improved through the permanent interaction between the judiciary and the legislature, seeking the formation of a normative theory of the separation of powers that promotes a qualitative debate embodied in public reason that safeguards rights and tones the deliberative dimension of the current political model. For such reflection, the bibliographic research method was used 

scholarly journals 12. The Relationship between Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary

2019 ◽  
pp. 325-357
Author(s):  
Alison L. Young
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Traditional Understanding

When examining the recent evolution of the Constitution, it is argued that the UK has become more ‘legal’ as opposed to ‘political’. The last twenty years has seen a growth in legislation and case law, particularly that of the Supreme Court, regulating aspects of the UK constitution. This chapter investigates this claim. It argues that, whilst we can point to a growth in both legislation and case law, when we look at the case law more closely we can see that the courts balance an array of factors when determining how far to control executive actions. These factors include an analysis of the relative institutional features and constitutional role of the legislature, the executive and the courts. This evidence, in turn, questions the traditional understanding of the separation of powers as a hidden component of the UK constitution. It is not the case that courts merely balance the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty in order to determine how far to control executive actions. Rather, the courts determine how to make this balance through the lens of the separation of powers, evaluating institutional and constitutional features. In doing so, they are upholding necessary checks and balances in the UK constitution.

Separation of Powers

2018 ◽  
pp. 77-81
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Government Power ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
American Law ◽  
Role Allocation

“Separation of powers” means: - “allocation of roles,” assigning government power to appropriate officials and - “checks and balances,” creating mutually-restraining branches. As the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom recognized in 2017 in the context of Brexit, British judges from the sixteenth century onwards enforced the concept of role allocation in many legal situations, including ones invalidating royal actions. The idea passed smoothly, almost silently, into American law. Specifically, the role of the Crown was such that, as a consequence of the legal principal “the King can do no wrong,” the sovereign could not cause a person to suffer a legal hardship unless it was one affirmatively permitted by law. This meant that in habeas cases, the burden of proof was on the jailer to demonstrate a right to detain the prisoner, not on the latter to demonstrate a right to freedom. Post-Independence courts acted accordingly.

Constitutional Dissonance and the Rule of Law in the Turks and Caicos Islands

2020 ◽  
pp. 581-605
Author(s):  
Peter Clegg ◽  
Derek O’Brien
Keyword(s):  
Good Governance ◽  
Bright Light ◽  
British Government ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Turks And Caicos Islands ◽  
Political Upheaval ◽  
Detailed Assessment

The Turks and Caicos Islands, a British Overseas Territory, has witnessed a decade of constitutional and political upheaval; the consequences of which are still being felt. The locally elected government took advantage of its relative constitutional freedom to abuse its position and brought governance in the territory to almost beyond breaking point. The investigations that followed shone a bright light on how the local government operated, the checks and balances that were (or were not) in place, and the role of the British government, which is meant to uphold good governance in the territories. The chapter provides a detailed assessment of the constitutional, legal, and political issues and arguments that were used as the British government tried to correct the deep-seated structural weaknesses present in the TCI, and prosecute individual cases of venality that were uncovered. This case study is important in highlighting how tenuous constitutionality, democracy, and legality can be in small territories.

scholarly journals Separation of Powers and System of Checks and Balances: A Debate on the Functionalist and Formalist Theories in the Context of Pakistan

2020 ◽  
Vol V (III) ◽  
pp. 11-23
Author(s):  
Bakht Munir ◽  
Zaheer Iqbal Cheema ◽  
Jawwad Riaz
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Origin And Evolution ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Qualitative Research Methodology ◽  
The Military ◽  
Mechanism Of Separation ◽  
The U.S

Modern-day democracies are constructed on the constitutional mechanism of separation of powers introduced in the U.S. Constitution where Pakistan stands with no exception. With qualitative research methodology, this paper aims to investigate the following issues: origin and evolution of the concept of separation of powers with reference to formalist and functionalist theories, application of tripartite government in the context of Pakistan, why the application of this concept could not receive its due appreciation in Pakistan, the role of the military as an additional unavoidable stakeholder in the evolution of trichotomy of powers in the democratic transition and judicial response to circumscribe unbridled military regimes in Pakistan. This article also explicates how the state organs can help identify their jurisdictional bounds to avoid the potential threat of confrontation and suggests how in the transition of institutional demarcations self-realisation of constraints can play a considerable role to comprehend the spirit of constitutionalism.

scholarly journals An Inquiry into the Limits of Judicial Intervention in the Impeachment Process of Governors in Kenya

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-156
Author(s):  
Andrea Munyao
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Other ◽  
County Government ◽  
Judicial Intervention ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Problematic Issue ◽  
Duty To Protect ◽  
The One

Article 181(2) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya instructs Parliament to enact a law highlighting the process of impeachment of a county governor. This has been realised through the County Government Act, Section 33. Section 33 recognises the County Assembly and the Senate as the bodies responsible for this process. However, the County Government Act fails to address at what point the courts can intervene in the impeachment process of governors. This is often a problematic issue as the doctrine of separation of powers requires each arm of government to perform their functions independently. Nonetheless, Kenyan courts have the duty to protect aggrieved parties whenever their rights are threatened. However, the point at which they can intervene is not stated under any law and this creates confusion between the role of courts of law in the impeachment process, on the one hand, and that of the County Assembly and the Senate, on the other. It is not clear which role should be discharged first. This paper, therefore, seeks to address this confusion through a critique of the Wambora case, a case that was appealed up to the Supreme Court. The paper also suggests a complimentary system whereby the Senate, County Assembly and the courts can work in harmony, and, do away with the confusion.

Japan

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Political ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Rubber Stamp ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.

scholarly journals ENTRE O ATIVISMO E (IN) OPERÂNCIA LEGISLATIVA: DELIBERAÇÃO E LEGITIMIDADE DAS DECISÕES DO SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL EM SEDE DE CONTROLE DE CONSTITUCIONALIDADE EM UM CONTEXTO DE NOVOS ARRANJOS INSTITUCIONAIS E DE REVISÃO DA TEORIA DA SEPARAÇÃO DOS PODERES

2014 ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Bruno Denis Vale Castro ◽  
Paulo Roberto Barbosa Ramos
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Creation ◽  
New Devices

O presente artigo se propõe a analisar a deliberação interna e legitimidade das decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal em sede de Controle de Constitucionalidade, observada uma conjuntura de revisão da Teoria da Separação dos Poderes e necessidade de criação de novos arranjos institucionais. Neste aspecto, tem-se como objetivo geral repensar o papel do Supremo Tribunal Federal em um modelo de controle de constitucionalidade, bem como sua legitimidade, justificação de suas decisões e deliberação interna, superando a dicotomia ativismo judicial/ deferência ao legislativo, tendo em vista a necessidade de readequação da Teoria da Separação dos Poderes, de modo que se leve a Constituição a sério e se responda ao anseio de desenvolvimento democrático-social brasileiro.Por fim, considera-se que a necessidade de que algum órgão delibere em sede de controle de constitucionalidade não significa que esta deva ser permanente ou que não possa haver alguma espécie de diálogo entre os poderes, concebendo assim, que Supremo Tribunal Federal não detém o monopólio da guarda da Constituição, havendo a possibilidade de um papel mais protagonista do legislativo, a partir da utilização dos mecanismos já existentes ou mesmo da criação de novos dispositivos que permitam diálogos institucionais.Palavras-chave: Ativismo judicial. Diálogos institucionais. Controle de constitucionalidadeBETWEEN THE ACTIVISM AND LEGISLATIVE (IN) EFFICIENY: DELIBERATION AND LEGITIMACY OF DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN OFFICE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND REVIEW OF THE THEORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERSABSTRACT: This article aims to analyze the internal deliberation and legitimacy of decisions of the Supreme Court in place of Judicial Review, observed a conjuncture Revision Theory of Separation of Powers and the need to create new institutional arrangements. In this respect, it has the general objective to rethink the role of the Supreme Court in a model of judicial review, as well as its legitimacy, justification of their decisions and internal deliberation, overcoming the dichotomy judicial activism /deference to the legislature, with a view the need to readjust the Theory of Separation of Powers, so that light the Constitution seriously and respond to the yearning of Brazilian democratic and social de-velopment. Finally, it is considered that the need for some body deliberates on seat of judicial review does not mean that it must be permanent or may not be some sort of dialogue between the powers, conceived so that the Supreme Court does not hold monopoly of safeguarding the Constitution , with the possibility of a more protagonist role of the legislature, from the use of existing or even the creation of new devices that allow institutional dialogue mechanisms.KEYWORDS: Judicial activism. Institutional dialogues. Judicial review.ENTRE EL ACTIVISMO Y LA (IN) OPERANCIA LEGISLATIVA: DELIBERACIÓN Y LA LEGITIMIDAD DE LAS DECISIONES DE LA CORTE SUPREMA EN LA SEDE DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD, EN UN CONTEXTO DE NUEVOS ARREGLOS INSTITUCIONALES Y LA REVISIÓN DE LA TEORÍA DE LA SEPARACIÓN DE PODERESRESUMEN: El articulo intenta analizar la deliberación interna y la legitimidad de las decisiones del Supremo Tribunal Federal en sede de Control de Constitucionalidad, observada una coyuntura de revisión de la Teoría de la Separa-ción de los Poderes y la necesidad de creación de nuevas relaciones institucionales. En ese aspecto, tiene como objetivo general pensar de otra forma el papel del Supremo Tribunal Federal en un modelo de control de constitu-cionalidad, y también su legitimidad, justificación de sus decisiones y deliberación interna, con la superación de la dicotomía activismo judicial/deferencia al legislativo, teniendo en vista la necesidad de readecuación de la Teoría de la Separación de los Poderes, de forma que se lleve a Constitución en serio y se presenta una respuesta a los deseos de desarrollo democrático-social brasileño. Al final, tiene en consideración la necesidad de que algún órgano delibere en sede de control de constitucionalidad no significa que este debe ser permanente o que no pueda haber alguna suerte de dialogo entre los poderes, concibiendo así, que el Supremo Tribunal Federal no detiene el mono-polio de la guardia de la constitución, habiendo la posibilidad de un papel más protagonista do legislativo, a partir de la utilización de los mecanismos ya existentes o mismo de la creación de nuevos dispositivos que vengan a permitir diálogos institucionales.PALABRAS CLAVE: Activismo judicial. Diálogos institucionales. Control de constitucionalidad

scholarly journals The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Government in Poland: On Judicial Reform Reversing Democratic Transition

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. 1839-1870 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Śledzińska-Simon
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Judicial Reform ◽  
National Council ◽  
Court Administration ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThis article argues that the establishment of the National Council of the Judiciary in 1989 and the empowerment of the general assemblies of court judges gave rise to the idea of judicial self-government in Poland. This very idea of self-government, implying that judges hold important decision-making or veto powers on matters concerning the judiciary, was regarded as a precondition of the separation of powers and judicial independence, neither of which existed under Communist rule. However, the package of laws introduced in 2017 marks the end of judicial self-government as we know it. Not only did it undermine the independence of the National Council of the Judiciary by altering the mode of electing its judicial members, but it also concentrated the power over the judiciary in the hands of the executive branch, allowing for, inter alia, the exchange of key positions in court administration and the reconfiguration of the Supreme Court. This article examines the impact of this “reform” on such values as independence, accountability, and transparency. Investigating the role of judicial self-government in ensuring the principle of separation of powers and democracy, the article concludes with an assessment of the early consequences of the introduced changes for the Polish judiciary.

Role and place of the parliament of Kazakhstan in the system of checks and balances

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-87
Author(s):  
Timur Kanapyanov
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Constitutional Reforms ◽  
Informal Practices

This article examines the system of checks and balances in post-Soviet Kazakhstan in general and the role of the Parliament of Kazakhstan in that system in particular. As opposed to the scientific mainstream in Kazakhstan which explains established system of checks and balances as a result of formal constitutional reforms, this article undertakes broader analytical framework and examines the system of checks and balances in Kazakhstan taking into account a correlation of formal and informal practices. The goal of the article is to show that in post-Soviet Kazakhstan the separation of powers is established without proper checks and balances. The inference drawn from the article is that the separation of powers in Kazakhstan is blocked by the strong constitutional and informal powers of the President, which allows him to control and interfere in affairs of all branches of power.

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