scholarly journals Power and Legitimacy in International Politics: Britain and Germany’s Responses to the U.S.’s Wars Against Iraq in 1991 and 2003

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Afrimadona Afrimadona

The paper evaluates the constructivist claim that legitimacy embedded in a country’s foreign policy shapes the responses of other countries’ foreign policy. I test the claim using four cases of Britain’s and Germany’s responses to US’s invasion in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The choice of US’s invasion in Iraq in 1991 and 2003 was made on the ground that the latter was regarded as utterly illegitimate due to a lack of UN’s authorization. Thus, both cases reveal a variation in the extent of legitimacy (positive versus negative cases). My observation of Britain’s and Germany’s foreign policy responses is based on the fact that both countries are US’s allies. Thus, by examining allies’ responses to US’s invasion in Iraq in these two periods, I control for countries’ type of relationship with the US that may affect their behavior towards the country. My observation shows that only one out of the four cases (Germany’s response to US’s invasion in 2003) supports the claim that legitimacy is the main concern underlying states’ foreign policy response. In general, this study also suggests that legitimacy may matter under normal situation. During crises, however, states tend to be more pragmatic and power-based explanation seems more convincing.

2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (12) ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
V. Vasil'ev

The article investigates approaches taken by major political parties and civil society in the FRG toward the Transatlantic partnership. It reveals the tendencies of the prospective promotion of Berlin’s cooperation with Washington; the article also gives a forecast of further interaction between the EU and the USA, indicates the direction of discourse regarding the future Russia–Germany relations model in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and in reference to the increased transatlantic solidarity. Disputes in German socio-political circles on the issue of the FRG’s policy toward the U.S. are emerging all the time, but they have to be considered within a concrete historical and political context. Being of primary significance for all German chancellors, the Trans-Atlantic factor has been shaping itself in a controversial way as to the nation’s public opinion. This has been confirmed by many opinion polls, including the survey on the signing of the EU–U.S. Agreement on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Chancellor A. Merkel is playing an important role: she is either ascribed full compliancy with Washington, or is being tentatively shown as a consistent government figure in advancing and upholding of Germany's and the EU's interests. A. Merkel has implemented her peace-seeking drive in undoing the Ukrainian tangle by setting up the “Normandy format” involving the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine while having cleared it through with the U.S. President B. Obama well in advance. Despite the increasing criticism of Washington’s policy among some part of Germans, for the majority of German voters, the USA remains a country of implementable hopes, the only power in the world possessing a high education level and the most advanced technologies. Americans, for their part, are confident of the important role that Berlin plays in world politics, particularly in what concerns the maintenance of unity within the EU. Berlin aims at further constructive interaction with the USA in the frame of NATO as well as within other Trans-Atlantic formats. Notwithstanding the steady tendency toward increasing of the Washington policy’s critical perception degree in German society, officially Berlin continues as Washington’s true ally, partner and friend. There is every reason to believe that after the 2017 Bundestag elections, the new (the former) Chancellor will have to face a modernized Trans-Atlantic partnership philosophy, with a paradigm also devised in the spirit of the bloc discipline and commitments to allies. The main concern for Berlin is not to lose its sovereign right of decision-making, including the one that deals with problems of European security and relations with Moscow. Regrettably, Germany is not putting forward any innovative ideas on aligning a new architecture of European security with Russia’s participation. Meanwhile, German scholars and experts are trying to work out a tentative algorithm of a gradual return to the West’s full-fledged dialogue with Russia, which, unfortunately, is qualified as an opponent by many politicians. Predictably, the Crimea issue will remain a long-lasting political irritant in relations between Russia and Germany. Although not every aspect of Berlin’s activation in its foreign policy finds support of the German public, and the outburst of anti-American feeling is obvious, experts believe that the government of the FRG is “merely taking stock of these phenomena and ignores them”. Evident is the gap between the government's line and the feeling of the German parties’ basis – the public. It is noteworthy that the FRG has not yet adopted the Law on Holding General Federal Referendums on key issues of the domestic and foreign policy. There is every indication to assume that the real causes of abandoning the nationwide referendums are the reluctance of the German ruling bureaucracy and even its apprehensions of the negative voting returns on sensitive problems, – such as basic documents and decisions of the EU, the export of German arms, relations with the U.S., etc. The harmony between Berlin’s "Realpolitik" and German public opinion is not yet discernible within the system of Trans-Atlantic axes.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-351
Author(s):  
Matheus de Carvalho Hernandez

A II Conferência Mundial para os Direitos Humanos da ONU, conhecida como Conferência de Viena, realizada em 1993, foi objeto de estudo da literatura de Relações Internacionais durante os anos noventa principalmente, inclusive no Brasil, devido à destacada participação da delegação brasileira. Entretanto, há ainda uma carência na área em relação à análise da importante participação dos Estados Unidos nesse evento da ONU. Sendo assim, o objetivo deste artigo é tentar contribuir no sentido de suprir essa lacuna, isto é, tentar compreender melhor a participação dos EUA – assim como suas motivações e contradições no que tange à política externa – nesse que foi o mais importante evento internacional em matéria de direitos humanos no pós-Guerra Fria. A hipótese aqui discutida é que a participação destacada dos EUA na referida Conferência seria resultado de dois fatores associados: um impulso inicial favorável aos direitos humanos, incitado pela necessidade do recém eleito Bill Clinton demonstrar relativa coerência com suas críticas às posturas de seu antecessor em matéria de direitos humanos; e a formação inicial de uma equipe de governo ligada à temática dos direitos humanos. Por outro lado, a análise da participação dos EUA em Viena diante do foco de Clinton nas questões econômicas domésticas e em comparação com outras ações de política externa parece demonstrar a permanência da ambivalência da política externa de direitos humanos dos EUA, resultando no que se designa como dupla padronização. The Second World Conference on Human Rights, known as the Vienna Conference, held in 1993, was studied by the literature of International Relations especially during the 1990s, including in Brazil, due to the outstanding participation of the Brazilian delegation. However, there is a lack of studies about the significant participation of the U.S. in the meeting. Thus, the aim of this article is to contribute towards filling this gap, in other words, to better understand the American involvement – as well as their motivations and contradictions regarding foreign policy – in this event, considered the most important international human rights event in the post-Cold War era. The hypothesis here is that the U.S. outstanding participation in the Conference would be the outcome of two linked factors: an initial push to favor human rights incited by the need of the newly elected Bill Clinton to demonstrate coherence with his criticism on the former administration's acts in the human rights field; and the initial composition of a government staff closer to human rights issues. On the other hand, the analysis of U.S. active involvement in Vienna - in contrast to the focus of Clinton on domestic and economic issues and compared to other foreign policy actions - seems to point to the continuing ambivalence of human rights foreign policy of the U.S., thus resulting in what is designated as double-standard.


Author(s):  
Bayasgalan Sanallkhundev

Since the 1900s when Mongolia fought for its independence, it was looking for an ally or a supporter on which it could rely on. One of the options was third neighbor. During the dramatic times Mongolia tried to approach Japan, as the closest possible country to have relation, and the U.S. as a country somehow caught its attention, to establish, if not diplomatic, at least trade relation. Third neighbor policy is unique, as it is associated only with Mongolia due to its unique geographic location. Looking for third neighbor, it is important for Mongolia to maintain balance between two big neighbors, and to have relationship with other developed countries. But the U.S. saw Mongolia not only as a young and a good example of democracy, and strategic partner, but also possible “ally” which lies between Russia and China. Third neighbor policy is not just an ordinary policy in foreign policy; it is a concept which is important for Mongolia, for a country which is sandwiched between two big nuclear Powers. With changing international environment Mongolia’s strategic importance never left behind. Here will be discussed that Mongolia’s third neighbor policy cannot be limited just with foreign policy or relationships with other countries. But it could have broader meaning from geo-strategic perspective, depending from international politics. I am arguing that third neighbor policy is more than just a foreign policy, it is a concept.


Author(s):  
Nuri Gökhan Toprak

The concept of influence can be defined as a tool of international actors, a form of power, the ability to overcome obstacles in order to achieve different purposes or the desired result in the process of power relations established between actors in international politics. According to the approach that aims to reach the concept of influence as the desired result, in the process of setting up influence states try to influence each other through different methods and tools in which can be used through states’ own capacities. In addition to political and military tools, economic impact tools related to the field of foreign trade and finance are frequently used today. Economic impact tools, such as external aid, which may be positive or rewarding, may also be negative or punitive in a range from the boycott to the blockade. The study aims to provide a qualitative assessment of the United States' (US) economic sanctions against Iran in the context of the use of economic impact tools in international politics. In order to achieve this aim, 12 executive orders issued by the US on the grounds that Iran poses a threat to its national security, foreign policy and economy will be examined. In the conclusion of the study, the assumption that the US sanctions against Iran almost for 40 years has become a multilateral structure such as commercial and financial blockade from a structure related to bilateral relations such as boycott and embargo will be tested.


1980 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 490-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Segal

The notion of a great power triangle composed of the U.S., U.S.S.R. and PRC, and the “card games” played within this geometric configuration, are now particularly prevalent in the field of international politics. It is the purpose of this analysis to study the relevance of the great power triangle concept for Chinese foreign policy. A primary assumption will be that an understanding of Beijing's previous policies in a tripolar system will be a useful guide to the policies and problems of the present. Therefore we will begin with a review of the development of tripolarity and China's past attitudes. We will then concentrate on some crucial aspects of the triangle, the difficulties facing the Chinese leaders, and some possible policy options derived from our focus on the great power triad.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Anak Agung Banyu Perwita ◽  
Denisa Rizkiya

The policy was introduced by the U.S. President Barack Obama early in his first administration in 2010, marked specific changing to the U.S. foreign policy like never before. The U.S. continuously views South and South East Asia, including the Indian Ocean, as a crucial driver for America’s economic growth and prosperity throughout the 21st century. Numerous numbers of cooperation and partnership have been done to enhance the ties between the U.S. and the regions. The U.S. presence and involvement in most essential regional meetings and summits can also be seen as an effort to seek opportunities, politically, economically, as well as security. This article tries to analyze how the U.S. rebalance towards Asia policy, a term used for the U.S.' foreign policy influenced the regional stability in Asia-Pacific region. 


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-136
Author(s):  
Mete Kaan Kaynar ◽  
Gökhan AK

At the outset, Europe needed to develop its defense policy and structure in line with its foreign policy while the Union was evolving in institutional enlargement process during every other 10 years of time. The reason was not behind it, but in the façade of the Union building. Otherwise the Union would not be able to enable Europe to play its full part in world affairs while the ‘security’ was gaining a key-role in the international politics and relations. Since there was a security vacuum in Europe after WW’, the US urged European states to create a sort of defence structure embedded to already-formed NATO or integrated with NATO, but including German Army in both cases. Decades had passed and in the late 1990s the European Security Defence Identity and Policy was formed up as a parallel structure to NATO systems. Eventually in the start of 2000s, the EU system turned into a Common Security and Defence Policy for member states only. This research tries to explore and analyze the effects, paradigms, prospects and coexistence possibilities of this two polar-defence-system in the Europe, that’s to say between NATO and the CFSP.


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria do Céu de Pinho Ferreira Pinto

When the Arab Spring broke out, the United States was in a quandary over how to handle the crisis in its attempt to balance its moral obligations and ideals without undercutting its strategic interests and those of its close allies. Flaws in US diplomatic approach have contributed to one of the most serious foreign policy crisis for a US administration to date with consequential upheaval and erosion of the US-built balance of power. The reactions and policy responses of the Obama administration highlight the difficulties in grasping with the new reality in the Middle East and in enunciating a policy platform that could combine American interests and values.


2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (11) ◽  
pp. 47-55
Author(s):  
K. Zueva

The article examines US–France relations, in particular within the NATO framework, as well as positions of France in the Alliance, its participation in NATO operations and its desire to play a more active role in this organization. The pilot of American interests in the Asian-Pacific region and events in Ukraine revive aspirations of Europeans for more active building of the “European defense”. The France-Britain military collaboration is developing intensively. However, France considers the formation of the “European army” as a question of a very long-term perspective. The article also examines the stance of France on the free trade zone between the EU and the U.S. The Atlantic solidarity is one of the most important directions in the French foreign policy. In power, Francois Hollande continues his predecessor's policy in this sphere. Nowadays, France demonstrates the accordance with the US almost in all international issues from Syria to Ukraine. France has shown its dependence on the US policy in such questions as “Mistrals” delivery to Russia and the attitude to the Ukrainian crisis. The scandal around the American ANB spying after French political and business elite did not destroy this dependence. The participation of France in NATO is the most important format of transatlantic relations. The French expert association and opposition forces constantly criticize the transatlantic direction of Hollande's foreign policy. The greater and greater part of French elite stands for the returning of an independent voice of France in international affairs. The great anxiety in French society is provoked by the U.S. pulling into the crusade against Russia. However, in the present situation, French leaders are not going to spoil relations with their transatlantic partner, because they believe that only together with the U.S. they can counter contemporary challenges of the modern world.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 462-471
Author(s):  
Wassim Daghrir

Should the United States’ global mission be to make the world “safe for democracy”, as Woodrow Wilson said, or, in the words of John Quincy Adams, should the US be “the well-wisher of freedom and independence of all” but the “champion and vindicator only of our own”? The debate between Idealists and Realists in US foreign policy has been going on forever. Idealists hold that the US should make its internal political philosophy, namely Democracy, the goal of its foreign policy. Realists, on the other hand, esteem that the US foreign policy should be mainly oriented towards the protection and enhancement of “the National Interest”. My line of reasoning is that the balance has always shifted towards Realism and, occasionally, aggressive Realism. U.S. interventions in Latin America offer telling case studies. They have taken the shape of a mixture of overt and covert interventions in conjunction with the significant political, economic and military pressures. Washington’s efforts to check hostile developments in the Americas necessitated the investment of considerable tax-dollars, political capital, and even American lives. To accomplish its political, strategic, and economic objectives in the area, the U.S. has devoted extensive human and material resources. The strategy to follow might differ depending on each country’s specificity or on the reactions of the U.S. Congress and public opinion. The big lines, however, remain unaffected, as we will try to find out through our study of the U.S. interventions in El Salvador.


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