Fundamentos hobbesianos de la economía moderna. Una aproximación

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Alejandro Pérez y Soto Domínguez ◽  
Katherine Flórez Pinilla ◽  
José M. Carballido Cordero

ResumenEste artículo resultado de investigación, busca introducir al lector en los aportes de Thomas Hobbes a la economía como ciencia. Este filósofo, aunque no figura como un autor relevante en los textos tradicionales de pensamiento económico, logró elaborar de manera sólida numerosos conceptos epistemológicos, antropológicos e institucionales recogidos por varias escuelas, entre las que se encuentran los marxistas, neoclásicos y keynesianos, quienes sustentan en ello el control centralizado de la acción humana. Aunque su trabajo originalmente no tuvo un fin eminentemente económico, es posible establecer cómo sus aportes filosóficos tienen alcances en las ciencias sociales, y en especial en la economía. Sus contribuciones se centraron en las nociones de colectivización del individuo y de la planificación centralizada. Además, Hobbes es, al menos en parte, el inspirador del socialismo como modo de orden social centralizado.Recibido: 20/08/2015   Aceptado: 18/11/2015 AbstractThe present essay is the outcome of a research program, and it aims to present the reader the main contributions of Thomas Hobbes to the economic science. Although this thinker has not been considered a relevant author in the traditional textbooks of economic thought, he nevertheless elaborated numerous solid epistemological, anthropological, and institutional concepts which have been incorporated into the theoretical corpus of several schools of thought, like the Marxist, Neoclassical, and Keynesian, concepts that buttress the idea of the centralized control of human action. Despite the fact that his work was not originally intended to be applied in the economic field, it is plausible to admit that his philosophical contributions have had their significance in the social sciences, especially in economics. In particular, these contributions will focus on the notions of collectivization of the individual and central planning. Hobbes is, at least in part, the inspirer of socialism understood as a form of centralized social order.Received: 20/08/2015  Accepted: 18/11/2015

Author(s):  
Rom Harre

Classical behaviourism has had almost no direct reflection in the social sciences, in that there has never been a behaviourist social psychology or sociology. However, various features of the cluster of behaviourist doctrines have been widespread in the human sciences. Behaviourism as it developed from its roots in the proposals of Watson, and in its transformation by Skinner, had two influential aspects, one metaphysical and the other methodological. The metaphysics of behaviourism was positivistic. It was hostile to theory, favouring a psychology the subject matter of which was limited to stimuli and responses. It was hospitable to the conception of causation as regular concomitance of events, rejecting any generative or agent causal concepts. The methodology of behaviourism was hospitable to simple experimental techniques of inquiry, seeking statistical relations between independent and dependent variables. It was hostile to descriptions of human action that incorporated the intentions of the actor, favouring a laconic vocabulary of neologisms. Metaphysically and methodologically behaviourism favoured the individual as the locus of psychological phenomena. But, in practice, the use of statistical analyses of data abstracted psychological processes from real human beings leaving only simplified automata in their place.


1999 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-26
Author(s):  
Henk Flap

A recent theoretical development within the social sciences has been the emergence of the social capital research program. This is a program on relational resources, their creation, use. and effects. It took shape first within sociology and anthropology, nowadays it is also growing in popularity within political sciences and economics.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-54
Author(s):  
P. Conrad Kotze ◽  
Jan K. Coetzee

Transformation has come to be a defining characteristic of contemporary societies, while it has rarely been studied in a way that gives acknowledgement to both its societal effects and the experience thereof by the individual. This article discusses a recent study that attempts to do just that. The everyday life of a South African is explored within the context of changes that can be linked, more or less directly, to those that have characterized South Africa as a state since the end of apartheid in 1994. The study strives to avoid the pitfalls associated with either an empirical or solely constructivist appreciation of this phenomenon, but rather represents an integral onto-epistemological framework for the practice of sociological research. The illustrated framework is argued to facilitate an analysis of social reality that encompasses all aspects thereof, from the objectively given to the intersubjectively constructed and subjectively constituted. While not requiring extensive development on the theoretical or methodological level, the possibility of carrying out such an integral study is highlighted as being comfortably within the capabilities of sociology as a discipline. While the article sheds light on the experience of transformation, it is also intended to contribute to the contemporary debate surrounding the current “ontological turn” within the social sciences.


Author(s):  
Rubens Ramón Méndez

Cuando el Trabajo Social comenzó a sistematizarse y a organizarse a partir de Mary Richmond, se proponía como un programa de investigación distinto dentro de las Ciencias Sociales (Lakatos, 1999). Distinto porque toma los planteos teóricos dados en las Ciencias Sociales desde �las circunstancias históricamente determinadas y existencialmente posicionadas; creando nuevas perspectivas sobre esos planteos teóricos� (Méndez, 2006) y porque con su práctica profesional, evalúa y muestra el problema de las consecuencias efectivas y potenciales de la utilización de los conocimientos (Dewey, 1967) en la construcción de las prácticas sociales (discursivas o no discursivas).Presentar la emergencia de un discurso propio de las personas y documentar lo real de las prácticas sociales, mostrar cómo es que a algunos enunciados que no son en sí mismos ni verdaderos ni falsos, se les otorgan el �estatuto de verdad�; es lo que hace que el Trabajo Social deba ser vigilado y desarmado en sus efectos.Si el discurso no es el medio por lo que se establecen las luchas en esta sociedad de discursos; sino que es por el discurso, por lo que se lucha. Si el discurso es �aquel poder del que quiere uno adueñarse� (Foucault, 1983), las Ciencias Sociales no podían dejar al azar el discurso del Trabajo Social.When Social Work became systematized and organized after Mary Richmond, it was described as a different research program within the social sciences (Lakatos, 1999). It was different because it considered the theoretical propositions in the social sciences from �historically determined and existentially positioned circumstances, thereby creating new perspectives on those theoretical propositions� (Méndez, 2006) and because through professional practice Social Work assesses and highlights the problem of the real and potential consequences of the use of knowledge in the construction of social practices (Dewey, 1967), whether discursive or non-discursive.As Social Work presents the emergence of people�s own discourse and documents the reality of social practices while it also presents statements which are neither true nor false as necessary truths, Social Work should be watched and disarmed in its consequences.Discourse is not the means through which fights are established in our discourse society; it is discourse that is fought about. If discourse is �that power we wish to get hold of� (Foucault, 1983), then the social sciences should not ignore the discourse of Social Work.


Author(s):  
Lars Taxén

Usually, models of the intellect take the individual mind and body as the point of departure and proceed outward towards the social and natural environment in which the individual is immersed. As a consequence, important social dimensions contributing to the epigenetic development of the individual are less articulated. This chapter suggests modeling the intellect from a more balanced perspective that recognizes both social and individual aspects–the coordination of actions. The author argues that coordination is made possible by certain innate dispositions called activity modalities: contextualization, spatialization, temporalization, stabilization, and transition. Consequently, a central task for modeling the intellect is to understand how perceptions received through sensory modalities are related to the activity modalities. To this end, the author proposes a research program for modeling the intellect, based on the concept of “activity” in the Russian Activity Theory and the activity modalities. Provisional arguments for the relevance of these modalities are discussed in three different realms associated with the intellect: the social, conceptual, and neural ones. The chapter is concluded with some preliminary research questions, pertinent for the research program.


2019 ◽  
pp. 63-85
Author(s):  
J.P.S. Uberoi

This chapter presents a discussion of international intellectual trends in the social sciences, theoretical and empirical studies in India, the question of independence of mind or home rule in intellectual institutions. Following the swarajist project outlined earlier of viewing Europe and its systems of knowledge and practices from an independent Indian point of view, this chapter is in effect a research outline for a new structural sociology in India. We are introduced to structuralism as it exists in the world, its scope and definition and as a methodology for the social sciences. This is followed by the approach to structuralism as scientific theory, method and as philosophical world view. Finally discusses are the principles of structural analysis, structuralism in language, literature and culture, in social structure, with regard to society and the individual, religion, philosophy, politics, sociology and social-anthropology.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-114
Author(s):  
Maren Freudenberg ◽  
Tim Weitzel

The introduction to the special issue on ‘charisma’ offers a very brief overview of the development of the concept in the social sciences and various critiques and intersecting debates. It casts a close look at Max Weber’s sometimes contradictory use of the concept and the different ways he conceptualized it in his sociology of religion and his sociology of domination. It then examines alternative theoretical approaches to ‘charisma’ that emerge in the course of the twentieth century before outlining this special issue’s contribution to the conceptual debate and the individual articles’ operationalization of the term by viewing charisma as relational, communicative, procedural, as well as related to ideas, practices, and objects.


2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (279) ◽  
pp. 282-301
Author(s):  
Laurent Jaffro ◽  
Vinícius França Freitas

Abstract Little attention has been paid to the fact that Thomas Reid's epistemology applies to ‘political reasoning’ as well as to various operations of the mind. Reid was interested in identifying the ‘first principles’ of political science as he did with other domains of human knowledge. This raises the question of the extent to which the study of human action falls within the competence of ‘common sense’. Our aim is to reconstruct and assess Reid's epistemology of the sciences of social action and to determine how it connects with the fundamental tenets of his general epistemology. In the first part, we portray Reid as a methodological individualist and focus on the status of the first principles of political reasoning. The second part examines Reid's views on the explanatory power of the principles of human action. Finally, we draw a parallel between Reid's epistemology and the methodology of Weberian sociology.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 105-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest Mandel

Professor Jon Elster advances the proposal that Marx – and Marxists–really stand for ‘methodological individualism,’ as opposed to ‘methodological collectivism.’ He defines ‘methodological individualism’ in the following terms: Social science explanations are seen as three-tiered. First, there is a causal explanation of mental states, such as desires and beliefs … Next, there is intentional explanation of individual action in terms of the underlying beliefs and desires … Finally, there is causal explanation of aggregated phenomena in terms of the individual actions that go into them. The last form is the specifically Marxist contribution to the methodology of the social sciences.1


2000 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Haller

Carl Menger's theory of invisible-hand explanations is rooted in his methodology of the social sciences. Contrary to his 18th-century Scottish forerunners he explains both the emergence and the persistence of unplanned social institutions exclusively by the individual pursuit of perceived self-interest. Contrary to Hayek's evolutionary functionalism, Menger's theory is not confined to the explanation of efficient or beneficial institutions. And contrary to Buchanan and Vanberg's constitutional contractualism, it does not require that people form stable preferences over rules.


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