Montesquieu on Love: Notes on The Persian Letters

1964 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 658-661 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kettler

Among students of political philosophy, Montesquieu is chiefly honored as author of The Spirit of the Laws. His earlier important work, The Persian Letters, is more often cited than read and is considered primarily as a collection of fragments, some of which may be useful for clearing up some disputed point or other in the interpretation of the magnum opus. In these notes I propose to treat it as a meaningful whole—as a book which in fact has the theme which it purports to have, the theme of love and its relation to social institutions. This is not an altogether novel approach, even among political scientists. The late Franz Neumann, for example, has pointed out the importance of this theme in his introduction to the Hafner edition of The Spirit of the Laws. Nevertheless, I believe that Montesquieu's conception of love is sufficiently important and the implications of his conception sufficiently interesting, so that a closer analysis will not be redundant.

1995 ◽  
Vol 16 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Mary Anne Perkins

A few months ago I read Peter Nicholson's The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists for the first time. In the index I found more than a hundred references to Hegel and only one to Samuel Taylor Coleridge. However, as many of the latter's writings, published for the first time in recent years, become generally accessible there is an increasing sense that he has been unfairly deprived of his due status as a philosopher. This is partly, no doubt, the syndrome of the prophet in his own country and partly the inevitable consequence of much of his later work remaining unpublished until recent years. Coleridge himself, with what some would take to be confirmation of an over-sensitivity to criticism, felt the neglect of his work went deeper and betrayed an anti-philosophical trait in British character. Despite his close reading of the work of many of his German contemporaries it seems that he did not read more than sixtyone pages of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik. His margin notes to this work are, on the whole, negative in their criticism. However, despite significant disagreements, there is much common ground in theme, argument and conclusion between his many drafts of the ‘Logosophia’, his intended magnum opus, and Hegel's system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 277-294
Author(s):  
Yong Huang

AbstractIt has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter ZÖLLER

The essay focuses Kant’s engagement with Plato at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, which presents a crucial but often overlooked feature of Kant’s magnum opus. In particular, the essay examines Kant’s positive pronouncements on the “Platonic republic” (Platonische Republik) in Book One of the Transcendental Dialectic by placing them in the twofold context of the first Critique’s affirmative retake on Plato’s Forms (Ideen) and its original views on juridico-political matters. More specifically, the essay aims to show that Kant’s prime position in legal and political philosophy, as contained in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), involves a normative conception of civic life that places the societal exercise of individual freedom under universal laws. Section 1 explores the extent of affinity between Plato and Kant as arch-representatives of ancient and modern idealism. Section 2 traces the transition from Platonic dogmatism to Kantian criticism in the theory of ideas. Section 3 presents Kant’s appropriation of the idea of the “Platonic republic” for purposes of a specifically modern republican account of the rule of law under conditions of freedom.


Author(s):  
Judith N. Shklar

After Utopia was the author's first book, a harbinger of her renowned career in political philosophy. Throughout the many changes in political thought during the last half century, this important work has withstood the test of time. The book explores the decline of political philosophy, from Enlightenment optimism to modern cultural despair, and offers a critical, creative analysis of this downward trend. It looks at Romantic and Christian social thought, and shows that while the present political fatalism may be unavoidable, the prophets of despair have failed to explain the world they so dislike, leaving the possibility of a new and vigorous political philosophy. With a foreword examining the book's continued relevance, this current edition introduces a remarkable synthesis of ideas to a new generation of readers.


Author(s):  
Fatima Fena

Ḥājj Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī (1212/1797 or 1798–1289/1873), was one of the major followers and commentators of Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendent philosophy. Sabzawārī’s profound understanding of the transcendent philosophy and his skill in teaching and commenting upon it was such that after Mullā Ṣadrā himself, Sabzawārī is generally considered to have played one of the most important roles in the development and propagation of this school. The most important work of Sabzawārī is the Ghurar al-farāʾid and his own commentary upon it is a relatively systematic summary of introduction to Mullā Ṣadrā’s magnum opus, the Asfār. The chapter introduces and analyzes the major principles and foundations of Sabzawārī’s philosophical thought, including the three fundamental principles of the ontology of the transcendent philosophy: the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd), the unity of the reality of existence (waḥdat ḥaqīqat al-wujūd), and gradation in the levels of being (tashkīk al-wujūd).


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark R. Reiff ◽  

While the volume of material inspired by Rawls’s reinvigoration of the discipline back in 1971 has still not begun to subside, its significance has been in serious decline for quite some time. New and important work is appearing less and less frequently, while the scope of the work that is appearing is getting smaller and more internal and its practical applications more difficult to discern. The discipline has reached a point of intellectual stagnation, even as real-world events suggest that the need for what political philosophy can provide could not be more critical. What follows then is a set of statements about how I believe that we, as political philosophers, should approach what we do. It contains my view as to what political philosophy should be about, how political philosophy should be done, and how courses in political philosophy should be taught, interlaced with commentary on the current state of the profession.


1996 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 365-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Brighouse

A recent resurgence of interest within analytical political philosophy in the status of ethnic and national minorities coincides with the re-emergence of national identity as a primary organizing principle of political conflict, and with an increasing attentiveness to identity and recognition as organizing principles of political struggle. The recent theoretical literature within political philosophy has focused very much on recognizing the importance of national identity, and allowing attention to national sentiment to inform the design of social institutions.In this paper I shall state the case for a version of the position which Will Kymlicka has dubbed ‘benign neglect’ toward cultural identities. Benign neglect is the position that the state should, as far as possible, be neutral among the cultural (and hence national) sentiments of its citizens. The position is, I think, implicit in the theoretical work of many contemporary liberals, and also in much socialist theory and some socialist practice. But it is rarely defended explicitly. Liberal theory is generally developed on the unrealistic assumptions that the society to be regulated is closed and coincides with the membership of a single nation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jake Monaghan

Political philosophy often focuses on “major institutions” that make up the “basic structure” of society. These include political, economic, and social institutions. In this paper I argue first that policing plays a substantial role in generating the kinds of inequalities and problems that are concerns of social or structural justice, and therefore that police agencies qualify as a major institution. When we abandon full compliance or similar idealizations, it is clear that policing is not a concern secondary to, e.g., the electoral system or the scheme of property rights in a society. Nor, I argue, does maintaining full compliance or moral character idealizations obviate an active enforcement role. Eliminating that role from an idealized model society requires engaging in a methodologically and substantively unattractive amount of abstraction. The result is that an active enforcement role is at the core of a complete theory of justice rather than something that is significant only “downstream” from more fundamental issues.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergey Gavrilets ◽  
Mahendra Duwal Shrestha

Human behavior and collective actions are strongly affected by social institutions. A question of great theoretical and practical importance is how successful social institutions get established and spread across groups and societies. Here, using institutionalized punishment in small-scale societies as an example, we contrast two prominent mechanisms - selective imitation and self-interested design - with respect to their ability to converge to cooperative social institutions. While selective imitation has received a great deal of attention in studies of social and cultural evolution, the theoretical toolbox for studying self-interested design is limited. Recently Perry et al. (2018) expanded this toolbox by introducing a novel approach, which they called foresight, generalizing standard myopic best response for the case of individuals with a bounded ability to anticipate actions of their group-mates and care about future payoffs. Here we apply this approach to two general types of collective action – “us vs. nature” and “us vs. them” games. Our results show that foresight increases leaders’ willingness to punish free-riders. This, in turn, leads to increased production and the emergence of an effective institution for collective action. We also observed that largely similar outcomes can be achieved by selective imitation, as argued earlier. Foresight and selective imitation can interact synergistically leading to a faster convergence to an equilibrium. Our approach is applicable to many other types of socialinstitutions and collective action.


1990 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-258
Author(s):  
Mustansir Mir

Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi's multi-volume Tafhim al-Quran is a majorQur'an commentary of the twentieth century. Written over a period of aboutthirty years, the work runs the gamut of Qur'anic-and Islamic-thought anddoctrine, and is the magnum opus of a writer called by Wilfred CantwellSmith "the most systematic thinker of modern Islam." As such, Tafhim isan important work. An English translation exists, but clearly there was aneed for a new translation, and that is what Zafar Ishaq Ansari attemptsto provide in Towards Understanding the Qur'an, of which two volumes,covering the first six surahs of the Qur'an, have so far been published.Ansari's translation may be called "authorized" in that it was the author'swish that Ansari render Tafhim into English. The translation reads quite well.Being intimately familiar with Mawdiidi's style, and being a writer of reputein his own right, Ansari has done a good job of rendering Tafhim into English.Besides possessing a high degree of readability, the work has other notablefeatures. The translator has furnished complete documentation for thequotations in the original work, including all ahadith, and, while retainingand translating the highly useful subject index of the Urdu original, has addeda glossary of terms, biographical notes, a bibliography, and a general index.On occasions, alternative interpretations, offered by other scholars, are noted(e.g. of the object pronoun in ya'rifanahu in the Qur'an, 2:146 [TowardsUnderstanding the Quran, 1:125), or of alladh'ina yakhafana in 5:23 [ibid.,2:151, n. 451), the reasons for the use of certain Islamic terms by Mawdudi(e.g. "caliphate" for pre-Islamic kingships, etc. [2:153]) are given, and termsand expressions which an Urdu reader would understand because of hisparticular cultural background are explained for the English reader. The amountof such notes and explanations seems to increase in Volume 2.A few problems may be noted. Here and there certain portions of theoriginal text are not translated. From the author's Preface and Introductionespecially, several paragraphs have been left out. While every attempt is madeto convey the general meaning of the parts omitted, the omissions in somecases are not indicated. Unlike the Biographical Notes, the Glossary of Terms,found in each volume, is not meant to be cumulative. There are, however,some repetitions in the Glossary of Vol. 2 (e.g. Ahl al-Dhimmah, Din, Hadith, ...


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