Russia's Return to the Middle East

1998 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Gresh

Since the eastward expansion of NATO dashed Moscow's early hopes of being integrated into the West, Russia has pursued an independent foreign policy focused mainly on Central Asia and the Middle East, including "rogue" states shunned by Washington. Among Russia's advantages are tens of thousands of Arabic-speaking former Soviet experts and a growing regional anti-Americanism. At the same time, Russian Muslims are becoming more assertive. Russia's dependence on the West for economic aid, however, sharply limits its margin of maneuver.

After the 1990, it is very important that in the immediate vicinity of the geopolitical changes that have occurred in Turkey. The first changes is Iran and Iraq on the edge. Especially the Turkey-Iran and Iraq, all kinds of geopolitical developments occurring in the triple border, to a critical value. Because the triple border Iran and Iraq by Turkey as a safety check. For this reason, has become the center of all kinds of illegal developments. Iran, conducts a policy of asymmetric after 1990, in the Caucasus, and the Middle East and Central Asia geography. This policy from time to time an anti-U.S. hostility toward the West and exacerbate. The attitude of the West and the United States due to the foreign policy of Turkey's neighbor Iran rather problematic periods. Because the entire Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey's policies on Iran, which is a pretty effective. For this reason, Iran, Turkey is a country that needs to be analyzed by far the best.


Author(s):  
İlkin MİKAYILOV

This article’s main argument is that after failure of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ oriented foreign policy Turkey is experiencing the transformation of foreign policy and more focusing towards the regions which were ignored before. After Arab Spring, especially after the Syrian Crisis, it has been observed that ‘zero problem with neighbours’ oriented foreign policy became ineffective and lost its effect in the Middle East. However, this does not mean that Turkey’s foreign policy loses its assertiveness. After assertive policies towards Middle East and Mediterranean areas, Turkey’s assertive foreign policy shifted towards new regions, which are historically, have less confrontation with Turkey and has positive trends against Turkey such as Caucasus and Central Asia. In this context, while the relations with the Turkic Council were deepened, the policy towards this region became clear with the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. During the Second Nagorno- Karabakh War Turkey gave strong support to Azerbaıjan both in term of rhetoric and military support as well based on Turkish drones and other Turkish made military equipment which shows the assertiveness of Turkey. The development of the Turkic Council’s member countries both politically and economically made organization an important regional actor. Thus, Turkic Council become an important tool for Turkish foreign policy in terms of assertiveness. Turkey’s assertive foreign policy will increase which is the in compliance with the Turkey’s national security. Also for region countries, it is important that Turkey put weight on region, which is crucial for Turkish foreign policy. Keywords: Assertiveness, Caucasus, Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkic Council.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alexander Slocombe

<p>Understanding national identity through foreign policy provides a strong means of ascertaining the prevailing social constructions within a great power nation state. There is a growing need to understand the national identities of Russia and China without pre-theorising or depending on asymmetric comparative studies with regional states. China and Russia are frequently compared to their regional neighbours which undermines understanding their unique identities. There are also frequent misunderstandings of contemporary Chinese and Russian national motives, often likening the modern Russian state to the Soviet Union, or attempting to understand China as a challenger to US unipolarity. Both great powers exhibit common characteristics of authoritarianism, both have recently endured massive social and national changes, and both have global interests that manifest in the Middle East such as securing vital geostrategic resources, both states are conscious of their native Muslim populations and to be recognised as a great power identity both must demonstrate influence in the Middle East. Yet, there have been significant differences in agendas and outcomes of their foreign policy decisions. This thesis seeks to use a constructivist framework to discern Russian and Chinese identity through comparison of their respective foreign policy. Contrary to “neo-realist” and “neo-liberal” arguments that accept state interests as rational, determined by the international system, and not determined by identity, this thesis seeks not to pre-theorise but to identify how their respective actions towards three key case studies in the Middle East; the Syrian Civil Conflict, the Iranian Nuclear Framework, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, indicate their prevailing social constructions. This thesis compares Russian and Chinese attitudes and actions towards these cases. Despite their similar disposition and principles towards international relations these two nations had significant points of difference. Drawing upon foreign policy analysis and a comparative model this thesis finds that despite the commonalities between the Russian and Chinese nations, Russian identity as great power, unique Eurasian power, and an alternative to the West, ensures a defiance of its relatively weak economic position to engage in positions of leadership in the Middle East, whilst China’s identity constructions that are common with Russia, its great power, civilisational, and alternative to the West constructions manifest despite an increasingly influential and material position in the world order, has provided little incentive to engage in meaningful ways throughout the Middle East’s recent conflicts.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-437
Author(s):  
Marc Owen Jones

Many of the studies of disinformation tend to reflect transatlantic security concerns, and focus on the activities of Russia and China. There is notably less analysis of disinformation in the Arabic-speaking world and wider MENA region. This article analyses a number of MENA-based COVID-19 disinformation campaigns from 2020, highlighting how COVID-19 disinformation has been instrumentalised by regional actors to attack rivals or bolster the legitimacy of their own regimes. It highlights in particular how certain ‘superspreaders’ of disinformation tend to promote Saudi, Emirate and right wing US foreign policy in the Middle East.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-500
Author(s):  
Mehmet Şahin

The Turkish foreign policy (TFP) after the Cold War had been based on traditional institutionalized values. In 2009, the governing party consolidated its power and additionally, the international environment provided more space for decision-makers. As a result, the government seeks to change foreign policy preferences in accordance with its agenda. This article examines this change from a neoclassical realist perspective and argues that due to lack of systemic pressure, Turkey can seek new alignments in the Middle East, rather than overlapping its interests with the West.


Author(s):  
Y. Kudryashova

Turkey carried away by the role of the model for Sunni states aimed at becoming the leader of Islamic world and reestablishing the Ottoman Empire’s sphere of influence. Ankara distinctly changed priorities of its foreign policy in favor of the Middle East and pursued a course of gradual dissociation from the West subject to its own views at world and regional situation. Ankara’s task was not to exceed the limits of Western alliance, but for all that to advance at most its national interests. Turkey’s political leaders systematically used any opportunity to promote neoosmanist aspirations and the model of Turkish democracy in the Middle East and Northern Africa. The dynamic development of Turkish economy supported this process. However at this time the goals of Turkish neoosmanist policy are unachievable because of their excessive ambition and lack of resources for their realization.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 34-51
Author(s):  
Alessandro Figus

Abstract Nowadays, Iranian foreign policy is developing following a defensive line along three axes: nuclear energy, respect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Peace in the Middle East. This paper analyzes the strategical role of Iran in reaction to the new Trump policies. There is international apprehension about the issue of nuclear weapons, a matter that reflects an alarming situation that could lead to the opening of a new war front.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Abdul, Mughis Irfan Siddeqi

This study examines the Saudis foreign policy towards Iran and the situation in Middle East due to Saudis proxies in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. It also seeks the growing Iranian influence and interest in Middle East causing a sense of unrest for Gulf States. This article also encompasses the factors under which great Sunni alliance has been formed and the Saudis attempt to isolate Iran at least in the Islamic world. This article is conceptual in nature as it relies to a large extent on secondary sources of data i.e Print and electronic media. It also throws light on the current situation in Middle East and the religious, ideological, geostrategic concerns and geopolitical rivalry of two great nations i.e of Iran and Saudis. This paper also discusses the Saudis expectations from the west and particularly from America and growing ties of Iran with America and the west. It also highlights on silent character of Israel and the rising threat of ISIS in Middle East.  


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alexander Slocombe

<p>Understanding national identity through foreign policy provides a strong means of ascertaining the prevailing social constructions within a great power nation state. There is a growing need to understand the national identities of Russia and China without pre-theorising or depending on asymmetric comparative studies with regional states. China and Russia are frequently compared to their regional neighbours which undermines understanding their unique identities. There are also frequent misunderstandings of contemporary Chinese and Russian national motives, often likening the modern Russian state to the Soviet Union, or attempting to understand China as a challenger to US unipolarity. Both great powers exhibit common characteristics of authoritarianism, both have recently endured massive social and national changes, and both have global interests that manifest in the Middle East such as securing vital geostrategic resources, both states are conscious of their native Muslim populations and to be recognised as a great power identity both must demonstrate influence in the Middle East. Yet, there have been significant differences in agendas and outcomes of their foreign policy decisions. This thesis seeks to use a constructivist framework to discern Russian and Chinese identity through comparison of their respective foreign policy. Contrary to “neo-realist” and “neo-liberal” arguments that accept state interests as rational, determined by the international system, and not determined by identity, this thesis seeks not to pre-theorise but to identify how their respective actions towards three key case studies in the Middle East; the Syrian Civil Conflict, the Iranian Nuclear Framework, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, indicate their prevailing social constructions. This thesis compares Russian and Chinese attitudes and actions towards these cases. Despite their similar disposition and principles towards international relations these two nations had significant points of difference. Drawing upon foreign policy analysis and a comparative model this thesis finds that despite the commonalities between the Russian and Chinese nations, Russian identity as great power, unique Eurasian power, and an alternative to the West, ensures a defiance of its relatively weak economic position to engage in positions of leadership in the Middle East, whilst China’s identity constructions that are common with Russia, its great power, civilisational, and alternative to the West constructions manifest despite an increasingly influential and material position in the world order, has provided little incentive to engage in meaningful ways throughout the Middle East’s recent conflicts.</p>


Author(s):  
Alexandra Gerena Cubbon

William Gladstone was a British politician who served as prime minister four times during his career, his first premiership lasting from 1868 until 1874. He was educated at Eton College and Christ Church, Oxford, from which he graduated in 1831. Gladstone began his political career in Parliament in 1832 as a High Tory, but he became a member of the Liberal Party in 1859 after being appointed chancellor of the exchequer under Lord Palmerston. His chancellorship resulted in such legislation as the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1866. During the 1860s and 1870s Gladstone’s domestic policies advocated ‘civic individuality’, while his foreign policy was anti-imperialist and favourable to Irish Home Rule. His views on empire stood in stark contrast to those of his political rival, Conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, who supported imperial expansion in the Middle East and Central Asia. Gladstone famously denounced the Ottoman Empire’s repression of the Bulgarian April uprising in the 1876 pamphlet Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East.


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