Entender el trabajo como clave de crecimiento personal

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-159
Author(s):  
Silvia Carolina Martino

What work is, what means man works and why man works allow us to find some keys to understand the reality of the company as a human manifestation that is not only at the service of productivity and efficiency, but first and foremost at the service of man and therefore of his development and that of society. This communication will try to explain what the work is and what is understood by the company as a productive activity. And as a consequence of this, how work links us to the essence of the universe and of other people, leads us to give reason that man is faber, he is the only one who works (Sellés, 2006, 454) and finally he is faber because he is sapiens. Work is a purely human subject. Man –any man– improves or worsens working and, also, stops working. Thus Leonardo Polo, for example, states that "at work, man becomes ennobled or debased. Here again, the first of the subjective sense of work on its objective sense is followed. Virtue is a value superior to utility” (Polo, 2015, 216). And virtue, good and norm are the three pillars of ethics. Understand that person perfects the world with his work, that person improves himself through work, this means that he is better, more ethical; and that person is linked to other people ethically through his work is a crucial issue to understand what work means and the deep connection with person and ethics. "It is understood by work that human action through which man is perfected as man while perfecting physical reality" (Sellés, 2006, 455). Work, without denying its part of effort and fatigue, has a positive meaning because it is what makes man grow in humanity. And to work is to add to the world more perfection than he offers and to perfect himself as a man. If man is to give, add, this is because as a person overcomes. The same man is not immune to what he does but in his doing something happens to him inside. In this sense man is said to be a perfecting perfector (Polo, 1994, 14), that is, to the extent that he improves the world, he improves himself; and insofar as he improves himself, he can improve the world: the former is a prerequisite for the latter.

Author(s):  
Станислав Борзых ◽  
Stanislav Borzykh

This book is devoted to the issues of the uniqueness of matter, life and consciousness - or mind. Despite the fact that we are taught to look at the world around us through the prism of this concept, in reality it is much more prosaic than it is customary to think. Neither the universe settings that allow the matter to take place, nor the complex machinery of a living cell that leads to the emergence of a new phenomenon in physical reality, nor even the human intellect, which we believe is the apex of evolution, cannot be recognized as something special and unique. Those laws and norms that allow all this to happen belong to this world and they are by it constituted, and therefore are not something outstanding and surprising. The infinity of the universe makes any talk that all of the above is unique and original meaningless and futile. On the contrary, there are good reasons to think that life, reason, and whatever else in what we see the uniqueness of both the world and ourselves, are an inevitable consequence of those processes that are observed in physical reality. Moreover, they were both predictable and expected. This paper shows that all these phenomena are trivial and relatively simple. We were just lucky players in the lottery, which somewhere necessarily had to lead to a win, and exactly this we are observing around. Much more experiments have ended in nothing, and this makes our case far less interesting than it seems to us. In dry residue, neither being, nor life, nor reason is something amazing, but all that is just banal.


Apeiron ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 244-269
Author(s):  
Ernesto Paparazzo

Abstract The present article investigates a passage of the Timaeus in which Plato describes the construction of the pyramid. Scholars traditionally interpreted it as involving that the solid angle at the vertex of the pyramid is equal, or nearly so, to 180°, a value which they took to be that of the most obtuse of plane angles. I argue that this interpretation is not warranted, because it conflicts with both the geometrical principles which Plato in all probability knew and the context of the Timaeus. As well as recalling the definitions and properties of plane angles and solid angles in Euclid’s Elements, I offer an alternative interpretation, which in my opinion improves the comprehension of the passage, and makes it consistent with both the immediate and wider context of the Timaeus. I suggest that the passage marks a transition from plane geometry to solid geometry within Plato’s account of the universe.


Author(s):  
Paul Kalligas

This chapter presents the English translation of Paul Kalligas’s commentary on the third Enneads of Plotinus. The third Ennead is focused on physical reality and cosmological issues, but viewed from a more general perspective, “dealing with considerations about the universe” (VP 24.59–60). It is the most miscellaneous in character, and Porphyry spends some time in trying to justify his inclusion of treatises like III 4, III 5 and III 8 (VP 25.2–9), without mentioning III 9, which is but a cento of disparate notes without any unity. Nevertheless, this Ennead consistently revolves around issues and concepts central to Plotinus’s understanding of how the universe functions, the forces that pervade it and make it work as it does, and the way in which the various kinds of soul that Plotinus postulates (and which, according to the standard Platonic doctrine, are the cause of every change and motion in the world) govern and organize it into an integrated and coherent whole.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart T Doyle

Is human free will compatible with the natural laws of the universe? To ‘compatibilists’ who see free actions as emanating from the wants and reasons of human agents, free will looks perfectly plausible. However, ‘incompatibilists’ claim to see the more ultimate sources of human action. The wants and reasons of agents are said to be caused by physical processes which are themselves mere natural results of the previous state of the world and the natural laws which govern it. This paper argues that the incompatibilists make a mistake in appealing to such non-agent sources of human action. They fail to realize that free will may exist at one scale, but not at the scales where they look. When free will is considered from the correctly scaled perspective, it does seem compatible with determinism and natural laws.


Somatechnics ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peta Hinton

In her 2007 monograph Meeting the Universe Halfway, Karen Barad introduces her reader to a world of movement and flux, where bodies ceaselessly participate in their own material configuration, where bodily integrity and identity is entangled in the dynamic materialisation of its social and political significance, and where processes of understanding and meaning making are bound up in ‘an ongoing performance of the world in its differential dance of intelligibility and unintelligibility’ (2007: 149). Through her reading of Niels Bohr's ‘philosophy-physics’, Barad introduces us to a quantum universe that poses some counterintuitive challenges to the modernist worldview which understands matter to be determinate and measurable, or that may quietly preserve something of matter's evidence against culture's symbolic dexterity. In advancing her agential realist account, Baradmoves beyond anthropocentric constraints to conceive of the world in its ‘extraordinary liveliness’ (2007: 91), an enlarged and productive scene of agency engaged in an ongoing performance of its own intelligibility, articulating itself differently. With the suggestion that agency is extended beyond the framework that assigns it to the intentions and accountability of the human subject, Barad offers a powerful rethinking of the politics and ethics of identity in her claim that the ethical call is ‘embodied in the very worlding of the world’ (2007: 160). In this paper I undertake a close reading of Barad's argument to consider its implications for how we might conceive a corporeal ethics that accounts for the production of inequalities and exclusions within the very becoming of the world, and becoming embodied. In the process, I argue that through asomatechnical unfolding of matter, the experimental apparatus, and concept, Barad prompts some challenging considerations for feminist approaches to what ‘the ethical’ constitutes or should achieve.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 08-13
Author(s):  
DURG V. RAI ◽  
SUNIL JAWLA ◽  
SAURABH BAJPAI

A considerable interest has been generated since ages for knowledge about the bead with the universe symbol- Om.  The word Om is known and considered as the beginning, middle and the end of present, past and the future. The chanting of Om brings awareness about the physical reality of the world and the human body, the subtle impressions of the mind, emotions, thoughts and beliefs of our life. According to the Indian philosophy, Om is a spiritual symbol referred to as Atman (soul) and Brahman (reality, entirety of the universe, truth, divine, supreme spirit, cosmic principles & knowledge). This syllable is one of the most important symbols in universal religion, and often found in Vedas, Upanishads & other ancient texts. It is the sacred spiritual chanting made during the recitation of spiritual texts, puja and prayers, ceremonies, weddings, meditations & Yoga. In the present work, morphological studies have been carried out to see the surface of rudraksha (Elaeocarpus ganitrus) which indicates the presence of the universal symbol as a common sight in the divine beads of rudraksha. During microscopical studies it was observed that the Om symbol was present on the surface of various cells of rudraksha bead indicating the existence of Om at cellular level. The present study further strengthens the belief that the presence of symbol Om in Universal.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasil Dinev Penchev

One can construct a mapping between Hilbert space and the class of all logics if the latter is defined as the set of all well-orderings of some relevant set (or class). That mapping can be further interpreted as a mapping of all states of all quantum systems, on the one hand, and all logics, on the other hand. The collection of all states of all quantum systems is equivalent to the world (the universe) as a whole. Thus that mapping establishes a fundamentally philosophical correspondence between the physical world and universal logic by the meditation of a special and fundamental structure, that of Hilbert space, and therefore, between quantum mechanics and logic by mathematics. Furthermore, Hilbert space can be interpreted as the free variable of "quantum information" and any point in it, as a value of the same variable as "bound" already axiom of choice.


Author(s):  
Walid El Khachab

In this article, the surface of the world is envisaged as a face. Cinema as a record of this surface, and as a medium which “re-invented” the face in the close-up shot, makes it possible to reflect on the status of the human subject in the universe, thanks to the concept of cinematic pantheism. Following Elie Faure, the author underscores the pantheistic nature of cinema and claims that cinematic pantheism is the way by which film produces simultaneously transcendence and immanence, and materializes the unity of both, thus confirming Siegfried Kracauer's theory according to which man, nature and culture are part of the same “visible phenomena” in cinema. Cinema transforms all beings into surfaces: it operates by facialization and surfacialization. On the other hand, the article revisits Deleuze and Guattari's concept of faciality and argues that it describes a surface operating as the interface of the body in its interaction with other bodies in the media, the realm of the divine, or the universe. Thus faciality is also landscapity, and activating the camera means “transfiguring” the human (or the landscape) into face and introducing a vis-a-vis: the face of God, as immanent transcendence. In that sense, cinematic mysticism, as in Paradjanov's, Makhmalbaf's and Mikhalkov's films, is pantheistic.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-66
Author(s):  
Monika Szuba

The essay discusses selected poems from Thomas Hardy's vast body of poetry, focusing on representations of the self and the world. Employing Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concepts such as the body-subject, wild being, flesh, and reversibility, the essay offers an analysis of Hardy's poems in the light of phenomenological philosophy. It argues that far from demonstrating ‘cosmic indifference’, Hardy's poetry offers a sympathetic vision of interrelations governing the universe. The attunement with voices of the Earth foregrounded in the poems enables the self's entanglement in the flesh of the world, a chiasmatic intertwining of beings inserted between the leaves of the world. The relation of the self with the world is established through the act of perception, mainly visual and aural, when the body becomes intertwined with the world, thus resulting in a powerful welding. Such moments of vision are brief and elusive, which enhances a sense of transitoriness, and, yet, they are also timeless as the self becomes immersed in the experience. As time is a recurrent theme in Hardy's poetry, this essay discusses it in the context of dwelling, the provisionality of which is demonstrated in the prevalent sense of temporality, marked by seasons and birdsong, which underline the rhythms of the world.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-30
Author(s):  
Kelly James Clark

In Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican’s challenging and provocative essay, we hear a considerably longer, more scholarly and less melodic rendition of John Lennon’s catchy tune—without religion, or at least without first-order supernaturalisms (the kinds of religion we find in the world), there’d be significantly less intra-group violence. First-order supernaturalist beliefs, as defined by Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican (hereafter M&M), are “beliefs that claim unique authority for some particular religious tradition in preference to all others” (3). According to M&M, first-order supernaturalist beliefs are exclusivist, dogmatic, empirically unsupported, and irrational. Moreover, again according to M&M, we have perfectly natural explanations of the causes that underlie such beliefs (they seem to conceive of such natural explanations as debunking explanations). They then make a case for second-order supernaturalism, “which maintains that the universe in general, and the religious sensitivities of humanity in particular, have been formed by supernatural powers working through natural processes” (3). Second-order supernaturalism is a kind of theism, more closely akin to deism than, say, Christianity or Buddhism. It is, as such, universal (according to contemporary psychology of religion), empirically supported (according to philosophy in the form of the Fine-Tuning Argument), and beneficial (and so justified pragmatically). With respect to its pragmatic value, second-order supernaturalism, according to M&M, gets the good(s) of religion (cooperation, trust, etc) without its bad(s) (conflict and violence). Second-order supernaturalism is thus rational (and possibly true) and inconducive to violence. In this paper, I will examine just one small but important part of M&M’s argument: the claim that (first-order) religion is a primary motivator of violence and that its elimination would eliminate or curtail a great deal of violence in the world. Imagine, they say, no religion, too.Janusz Salamon offers a friendly extension or clarification of M&M’s second-order theism, one that I think, with emendations, has promise. He argues that the core of first-order religions, the belief that Ultimate Reality is the Ultimate Good (agatheism), is rational (agreeing that their particular claims are not) and, if widely conceded and endorsed by adherents of first-order religions, would reduce conflict in the world.While I favor the virtue of intellectual humility endorsed in both papers, I will argue contra M&M that (a) belief in first-order religion is not a primary motivator of conflict and violence (and so eliminating first-order religion won’t reduce violence). Second, partly contra Salamon, who I think is half right (but not half wrong), I will argue that (b) the religious resources for compassion can and should come from within both the particular (often exclusivist) and the universal (agatheistic) aspects of religious beliefs. Finally, I will argue that (c) both are guilty, as I am, of the philosopher’s obsession with belief. 


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