scholarly journals Motivation reduces positive and negative emotional distractions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Amy Walsh

<p>Attention is biased toward emotional stimuli, which are often important for our biologically-determined goals of survival and reproduction. But to succeed in our daily tasks we must sometimes ignore emotional stimuli that are not relevant to current goals. In four experiments, I examine the extent to which we can ignore emotional stimuli if we are motivated to do so. I draw on the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework which proposes that we use two modes of control to deal with distraction: reactive control, which shifts attention back to a task after distraction has occurred; and proactive control, which allows us to anticipate and control distraction before it occurs. In non-emotional contexts, task motivation encourages use of more effective, but more effortful, proactive control to ignore emotionally-neutral distractions. But, little is known about how we can control our attention to ignore highly distracting emotional stimuli. In all experiments, participants completed a simple visual task while attempting to ignore task-irrelevant negative (mutilation scenes), positive (erotic scenes), and neutral images (scenes of people). Distraction was indexed by slowing on distractor trials relative to a scrambled distractor, or no distractor, baseline. To manipulate motivation, half the participants completed the task with no performance-contingent reward; the other half completed the task with the opportunity to earn points and/or money for fast and accurate performance. In Experiment 1 the images were presented centrally, so attention must be shifted from the distractor location to complete the task. Reward reduced distraction by both positive and negative emotional images. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, and measured pupil dilation to index the timecourse of cognitive effort. The aim of Experiment 2 was to determine whether motivation elicits a shift to proactive control to reduce emotional distraction, as it does in non-emotional contexts. Again, reward reduced positive and negative distraction. Pupil findings indicated that reward dynamically enhanced proactive control prior to stimulus-onset, facilitating rapid disengagement from distractors, regardless of their expected emotional value. In contrast, a sustained proactive strategy was used across blocks in which emotional distractors were expected, relative to blocks in which neutral distractors were expected. In the final two experiments, the distractors were presented peripherally and so must capture attention away from the central targets to impair performance. In Experiment 3, and in Experiment 4 – in which the points did not represent money – reward reduced attentional capture by positive and negative emotional distractors. Together, findings show that motivation can enhance control of positive and negative distractions that appear both centrally, and peripherally. Findings extend the DMC framework to an emotional context; motivation elicits a shift to proactive control, even when distractors are high arousal emotional stimuli. Further, in three out of four experiments, reward reduced emotional to a greater extent than neutral distraction, consistent with reward altering the outcome of goal-driven attentional competition between the targets and distractors. Understanding the complex interactions between motivation, emotion, and cognitive control will help to elucidate how we successfully navigate the world to achieve our goals.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Amy Walsh

<p>Attention is biased toward emotional stimuli, which are often important for our biologically-determined goals of survival and reproduction. But to succeed in our daily tasks we must sometimes ignore emotional stimuli that are not relevant to current goals. In four experiments, I examine the extent to which we can ignore emotional stimuli if we are motivated to do so. I draw on the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework which proposes that we use two modes of control to deal with distraction: reactive control, which shifts attention back to a task after distraction has occurred; and proactive control, which allows us to anticipate and control distraction before it occurs. In non-emotional contexts, task motivation encourages use of more effective, but more effortful, proactive control to ignore emotionally-neutral distractions. But, little is known about how we can control our attention to ignore highly distracting emotional stimuli. In all experiments, participants completed a simple visual task while attempting to ignore task-irrelevant negative (mutilation scenes), positive (erotic scenes), and neutral images (scenes of people). Distraction was indexed by slowing on distractor trials relative to a scrambled distractor, or no distractor, baseline. To manipulate motivation, half the participants completed the task with no performance-contingent reward; the other half completed the task with the opportunity to earn points and/or money for fast and accurate performance. In Experiment 1 the images were presented centrally, so attention must be shifted from the distractor location to complete the task. Reward reduced distraction by both positive and negative emotional images. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, and measured pupil dilation to index the timecourse of cognitive effort. The aim of Experiment 2 was to determine whether motivation elicits a shift to proactive control to reduce emotional distraction, as it does in non-emotional contexts. Again, reward reduced positive and negative distraction. Pupil findings indicated that reward dynamically enhanced proactive control prior to stimulus-onset, facilitating rapid disengagement from distractors, regardless of their expected emotional value. In contrast, a sustained proactive strategy was used across blocks in which emotional distractors were expected, relative to blocks in which neutral distractors were expected. In the final two experiments, the distractors were presented peripherally and so must capture attention away from the central targets to impair performance. In Experiment 3, and in Experiment 4 – in which the points did not represent money – reward reduced attentional capture by positive and negative emotional distractors. Together, findings show that motivation can enhance control of positive and negative distractions that appear both centrally, and peripherally. Findings extend the DMC framework to an emotional context; motivation elicits a shift to proactive control, even when distractors are high arousal emotional stimuli. Further, in three out of four experiments, reward reduced emotional to a greater extent than neutral distraction, consistent with reward altering the outcome of goal-driven attentional competition between the targets and distractors. Understanding the complex interactions between motivation, emotion, and cognitive control will help to elucidate how we successfully navigate the world to achieve our goals.</p>


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gina M. Grimshaw ◽  
Laura Kranz ◽  
David Carmel ◽  
Rosie Moody ◽  
Christel Devue

Attending to emotional stimuli is often beneficial, because they provide important social and environmental cues. Sometimes, however, current goals require that we ignore them. To what extent can we control emotional distraction? Here we show that the ability to ignore emotional distractions depends on the type of cognitive control that is engaged. Participants completed a simple perceptual task at fixation while irrelevant images appeared peripherally. In two experiments, we manipulated the proportion of trials in which images appeared, in order to encourage use of either reactive control (rare distractors) or proactive control (frequent distractors). Under reactive control, both negative and positive images were more distracting than neutral images, even though they were irrelevant and appeared in unattended locations. However, under proactive control, distraction by both emotional and neutral images was eliminated. Proactive control was triggered by the meaning, and not the location, of distracting images. Our findings argue against simple bottom-up or top-down explanations of emotional distraction, and instead show how the flexible use of cognitive control supports adaptive processing of emotional distractors.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fanny Grisetto ◽  
Yvonne N. Delevoye-Turrell ◽  
Clémence Roger

AbstractFlexible use of reactive and proactive control according to environmental demands is the key to adaptive behavior. In this study, forty-eight adults performed ten blocks of an AX-CPT task to reveal the strength of proactive control by the calculation of the proactive behavioral index (PBI). They also filled out the UPPS questionnaire to assess their impulsiveness. The median-split method based on the global UPPS score distribution was used to categorize participants as having high (HI) or low (LI) impulsiveness traits. The analyses revealed that the PBI was negatively correlated with the UPPS scores, suggesting that the higher is the impulsiveness, the weaker the dominance of proactive control processes. We showed, at an individual level, that the PBI increased across blocks and suggested that this effect was due to a smaller decrease in reactive control processes. Notably, the PBI increase was slower in the HI group than in the LI group. Moreover, participants who did not adapt to task demands were all characterized as high impulsive. Overall, the current study demonstrates that (1) impulsiveness is associated with less dominant proactive control due to (2) slower adaptation to task demands (3) driven by a stronger reliance on reactive processes. These findings are discussed in regards to pathological populations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 254-278
Author(s):  
Lisa V. Eberhardt ◽  
Ferdinand Pittino ◽  
Anna Scheins ◽  
Anke Huckauf ◽  
Markus Kiefer ◽  
...  

Abstract Emotional stimuli like emotional faces have been frequently shown to be temporally overestimated compared to neutral ones. This effect has been commonly explained by induced arousal caused by emotional processing leading to the acceleration of an inner-clock-like pacemaker. However, there are some studies reporting contradictory effects and others point to relevant moderating variables. Given this controversy, we aimed at investigating the processes underlying the temporal overestimation of emotional faces by combining behavioral and electrophysiological correlates in a temporal bisection task. We assessed duration estimation of angry and neutral faces using anchor durations of 400 ms and 1600 ms while recording event-related potentials. Subjective ratings and the early posterior negativity confirmed encoding and processing of stimuli’s emotionality. However, temporal ratings did not differ between angry and neutral faces. In line with this behavioral result, the Contingent Negative Variation (CNV), an electrophysiological index of temporal accumulation, was not modulated by the faces’ emotionality. Duration estimates, i.e., short or long responses toward stimuli of ambiguous durations of 1000 ms, were nevertheless associated with a differential CNV amplitude. Interestingly, CNV modulation was already observed at 600–700 ms after stimulus onset, i.e., long before stimulus offset. The results are discussed in light of the information-processing model of time perception as well as regarding possible factors of the experimental setup moderating temporal overestimation of emotional stimuli. In sum, combining behavioral and electrophysiological measures seems promising to more clearly understand the complex processes leading to the illusion of temporal lengthening of emotional faces.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (10) ◽  
pp. 1924-1945
Author(s):  
Lucía Magis-Weinberg ◽  
Ruud Custers ◽  
Iroise Dumontheil

Prospective memory (PM) refers to the cognitive processes associated with remembering to perform an intended action after a delay. Varying the salience of PM cues while keeping the intended response constant, we investigated the extent to which participants relied on strategic monitoring, through sustained, top–down control, or on spontaneous retrieval via transient bottom–up processes. There is mixed evidence regarding developmental improvements in event-based PM performance after the age of 13 years. We compared PM performance and associated sustained and transient neural correlates in 28 typically developing adolescents (12–17 years old) and 19 adults (23–30 years old). Lower PM cue salience associated with slower ongoing task (OT) RTs, reflected by increased μ ex-Gaussian parameter, and sustained increases in frontoparietal activation during OT blocks, both thought to reflect greater proactive control supporting cue monitoring. Behavioral and neural correlates of PM trials were not specifically modulated by cue salience, revealing little difference in reactive control between conditions. The effect of cue salience was similar across age groups, suggesting that adolescents are able to adapt proactive control engagement to PM task demands. Exploratory analyses showed that younger, but not older, adolescents were less accurate and slower in PM trials relative to OT trials than adults and showed greater transient activation in PM trials in an occipito-temporal cluster. These results provide evidence of both mature and still maturing aspects of cognitive processes associated with implementation of an intention after a delay during early adolescence.


eLife ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Pasquereau ◽  
Robert S Turner

The subthalamic nucleus (STN) is hypothesized to play a central role in the rapid stopping of movement in reaction to a stop signal. Single-unit recording evidence for such a role is sparse, however, and it remains uncertain how that role relates to the disparate functions described for anatomic subdivisions of the STN. Here we address that gap in knowledge using non-human primates and a task that distinguishes reactive and proactive action inhibition, switching and skeletomotor functions. We found that specific subsets of STN neurons have activity consistent with causal roles in reactive action stopping or switching. Importantly, these neurons were strictly segregated to a ventromedial region of STN. Neurons in other subdivisions encoded task dimensions such as movement per se and proactive control. We propose that the involvement of STN in reactive control is restricted to its ventromedial portion, further implicating this STN subdivision in impulse control disorders.


Author(s):  
F. Lieder ◽  
G. Iwama

AbstractBeyond merely reacting to their environment and impulses, people have the remarkable capacity to proactively set and pursue their own goals. The extent to which they leverage this capacity varies widely across people and situations. The goal of this article is to propose and evaluate a model of proactivity and reactivity. We proceed in three steps. First, we model proactivity in a widely used cognitive control task known as the AX Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT). Our theory formalizes an important aspect of proactivity as meta-control over proactive and reactive control. Second, we perform a quantitative model comparison to identify the number and nature of meta-control decisions that are involved in the regulation of proactive behavior. Our findings suggest that individual differences in proactivity are governed by two independent meta-control decisions, namely deciding whether to set an intention for what to do in a future situation and deciding whether to recall one’s intentions when the situation occurs. Third, we test the assumptions and qualitative predictions of the winning model against data from numerous experiments varying the incentives, cognitive load, and statistical structure of the task. Our results suggest that proactivity can be understood in terms of computational models of meta-control. Future work will extend our models from proactive control in the AX-CPT to proactive goal creation and goal pursuit in the real world.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse C Niebaum ◽  
Nicolas Chevalier ◽  
Ryan Mori Guild ◽  
Yuko Munakata

Developmental changes in executive function are often explained in terms of core cognitive processes and associated neural substrates. For example, younger children tend to engage control reactively in the moment as needed, whereas older children increasingly engage control proactively, in anticipation of needing it. Such developments may reflect increasing capacities for active maintenance dependent upon dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, younger children will engage proactive control when reactive control is made more difficult, suggesting that developmental changes may also reflect decisions about whether to engage control, and how. We tested awareness of temporal control demands and associated task choices in 5- and 10-year-olds and adults using a demand selection task. Participants chose between one task that enabled proactive control and another task that enabled reactive control. Adults reported awareness of these different control demands and preferentially played the proactive task option. Ten-year-olds reported awareness of control demands but selected task options at chance. Five-year-olds showed neither awareness nor task preference, but a subsample who exhibited awareness of control demands preferentially played the reactive task option, mirroring their typical control mode. Thus, developmental improvements in executive function may in part reflect better awareness of cognitive demands and adaptive behavior, which may in turn reflect changes in dorsal anterior cingulate in signaling task demands to lateral prefrontal cortex.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Kranz

<p>According to the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver, 2012) distraction can be controlled either proactively (i.e., before the onset of a distractor) or reactively (i.e., after the onset of a distractor). Research clearly indicates that, when distractors are emotionally neutral, proactive mechanisms are more effective at controlling distraction than reactive mechanisms. However, whether proactive control mechanisms can control irrelevant emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distraction is not known. In the current thesis I examined cognitive control over emotional distraction. In Experiment 1, I tested whether proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction as effectively as neutral distraction. Participants completed a distraction task. On each trial, they determined whether a centrally presented target letter (embedded amongst a circle of ‘o’s) was an ‘X’ or an ‘N’, while ignoring peripheral distractors (negative, neutral, or positive images). Distractors were presented on either a low proportion (25%) or a high proportion (75%) of trials, to evoke reactive and proactive cognitive control strategies, respectively. Emotional images (both positive and negative) produced more distraction than neutral images in the low distractor frequency (i.e., reactive control) condition. Critically, emotional distraction was almost abolished in the high distractor frequency condition; emotional images were only slightly more distracting than neutral images, suggesting that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction almost as effectively as neutral distraction. In Experiment 2, I replicated and extended Experiment 1. ERPs were recorded while participants completed the distraction task. An early index (the early posterior negativity; EPN) and a late index (the late positive potential; LPP) of emotional processing were examined to investigate the mechanisms by which proactive control minimises emotional distraction. The behavioural results of Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, providing further support for the hypothesis that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distractions. While proactive control was found to eliminate early emotional processing of positive distractors, it paradoxically did not attenuate late emotional processing of positive distractors. On the other hand, proactive control eliminated late emotional processing of negative distractors. However, the early index of emotional processing was not a reliable index of negative distractor processing under either reactive or proactive conditions. Taken together, my findings show that proactive mechanisms can effectively control emotional distraction, but do not clearly establish the mechanisms by which this occurs.</p>


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