scholarly journals Dismissal of KPK Employees from Legal Positivism and Alternative Solutions

2021 ◽  
pp. 175
Author(s):  
Dominikus Dalu Sogen ◽  
Dewa Ayu Putri Asvini ◽  
Detty Kristiana Widayat
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Human Right ◽  
The Public ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
The People ◽  
National Human ◽  
The Law

Studying the philosophy of law means studying various schools of law. Amongst the variety of legal theories, there are adherents of legal positivism or the positive legal theory postulated by John Austin (a philosopher whose thoughts on law are outlined in a work entitled The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 1832). Are Austin's thoughts still relevant for the practice of law inthe modern era, considering that law is made for the public interest? Is it appropriate for the law to be made by authorities (superior) to bind subordinates (inferior), whereas the people are only in a position to obey the law? In a functioning democracy public participation is important in decision-making by the elected legislators. Presumably, law is not made arbitrarily or unilaterally, but it is supposed to take into account the interest of the public or the interest of the groups it is designed to address. A prominent example currently in the public spotlight isthe dismissal of 57 Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) employees due to their stated ineligibility following their failure to pass the National Insight Test Assessment. For this matter, a judicial review (JR) has been requested from the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court who in the meantime have published their decisions. In addition, there have been recommendations from the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) and the Indonesian Ombudsman regarding the occurrence of human rights violations and maladministration in the transfer of KPK employees to ASN. Where JR's decision by the two judicial institutions is different from what is recommended by Human Right Commission and the Indonesian Ombudsman. Here it can be seen that there are differences in the application of the law with the positive law that applies and is detrimental to the rights of KPK employees.

scholarly journals The Elimination of Constitutional Court's Authority in The Dispute Case of General Election of Regional Head (Analysis of Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 97/PUU-XI/2013)

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jentel Chairnosia
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Vice President ◽  
General Election ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Public ◽  
The People ◽  
The Law ◽  
Settlement Of Disputes

The enactment of Law Number 32 Year 2004 is a manifestation of the development ofadvanced democracy, namely all local chief elected directly by the people except the positionof the Governor of Yogyakarta. However, in its development, the implementation of theGeneral Elections of Regional Head gave rise to dissatisfaction which resulted in the appealof the results of the General Election to the court for various reasons. The presence of theConstitutional Court as an institution that resolved the dispute over the General Election ofRegional Heads has not been able to provide justice to the public, especially the emergenceof many Constitutional Court rulings that cause debate. In its development, the ConstitutionalCourt abolished its authority in the settlement of disputes in the General Election of RegionalHeads as stipulated in Decision Number 97 / PUU-XI / 2013. The Constitutional Court is ofthe opinion that the Constitutional Court only has the authority to resolve election disputes ofDPR, DPD, President/Vice President because the election is done nationally, while theelection is conducted in certain areas only. In addition, the volume of incoming cases relatedto election disputes more than the law review case which is the main authority of theConstitutional Court, so that this can affect the quality of the decisions of the ConstitutionalCourt considering the dispute resolution of the results of the General Election should beterminated within fourteen days. DOI: 10.15408/jch.v5i2.7090

scholarly journals WHAT SHOULD BE THE FORM OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE LAWMAKING PROCESS? AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICAN CASES

Obiter ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Moses Retselisitsoe Phooko
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
South African ◽  
Public Involvement ◽  
Participatory Democracy ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Public ◽  
The People ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Making

South Africa’s new constitutional democracy places a duty on various legislators to facilitate public participation in the law-making process as mandated by the principles of participatory democracy provided for in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. This has resulted in a series of court cases wherein the electorate, inter alia, challenged the legislation on the basis that the results did not reflect the views of the people. The courts’ earlier jurisprudence seemed to be placing more emphasis on participatory democracy as opposed to representative democracy. However, recent court decisions indicate a shift towards representative democracy. The central question presented in this paper is whether the consideration of the views of the public by the provincial and national legislatures is merely a matter of procedure, or that those views are indeed considered in the law-making process. In an attempt to answer this question, the paper will evaluate and critique some of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal decisions on public involvement in either the legislative or law-making process. The argument presented in this discourse is that, if the public’s wishes are considered by the legislature, then the outcome would be influenced by the people’s demands. An otherwise negative outcome shows that public participation in the law-making process is a procedural matter and has no substantive value.

Emergencies and Human Rights

2019 ◽  
pp. 89-108
Author(s):  
David Dyzenhaus
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
The Political ◽  
State Of Emergency ◽  
Political Judgement ◽  
The People ◽  
The Law

‘May the safety of the people be the supreme law!’ Cicero’s slogan is invoked to justify the claim that during a state of emergency, the political sovereign may do whatever in his judgement is required to secure the people, including acting against the law. It would seem to follow that when human rights are made into legal entitlements, they may legitimately be suspended along with other legal protections during a state of emergency. As a result, human rights would be relativized to what we can think of as a political judgement about when the safety of the people is not in issue. The author contests this claim through an argument based in Hobbes’s political and legal theory that the safety of the people is a juridical concept, as is sovereignty itself. The sovereign cannot act outside of law and his exercises of power have to be justified to his subjects as being according to law, where accordance with law requires respect for human rights. These ideas are located in the constitutionalist tradition which stretches back to Cicero and his much-misinterpreted slogan.

scholarly journals Philosophical Study of Hans Kelsen's Thoughts on Law and Satjipto Rahardjo's Ideas on Progressive Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 195
Author(s):  
Muhammad Harun
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Philosophical Study ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
Human Aspects ◽  
Hans Kelsen ◽  
The Law ◽  
And Behavior

<p>The purpose of this paper is to compare and evaluate the thoughts of Hans Kelsen with Satjipto Raharjo. Both offer their respective theories, namely Hans Kelsen's pure legal theory and Satjipto Rahardjo's progressive law. In this theory, both of them base their philosophical approach. After reviewing, the theories of these two figures are relevant for interpreting the law. This paper uses a critical paradigm with a combination of normative or doctrinal and sociological or non-doctrinal approaches. The results showed that Hans Kelsen directed his mind that legal positivism considers moral speech, values are finished and final when it comes to the formation of positive law. Pure Legal Theory is not a perfect copy of transcendental ideas, but it does not try to see the law as a posterity of justice. While Rahardjo's progressive law rests on the aspects of rules and behavior. Regulations will build a positive and rational legal system. While the behavioral or human aspects will drive the rules and systems that are built.</p><p> </p><p>Tujuan penulisan ini adalah untuk membandingkan dan mengevaluasi pemikiran Hans Kelsen dengan Satjipto Raharjo. Keduanya menawarkan teori masing-masing, yaitu teori hukum murni Hans Kelsen dan hukum progresif Satjipto Rahardjo. Dalam teori ini, keduanya sama-sama mendasarkan pendekatan secara filosif. Setelah dikaji, teori dari kedua tokoh ini relevan untuk memaknai hukum. Tulisan ini menggunakan paradigima kritis dengan pendekatan kombinasi normatif atau doktrinal dan sosiologis atau non doktrinal. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Hans Kelsen lebih mengarahkan pikirannya bahwa positivisme hukum yang menganggap pembicaraan moral, nilai-nilai telah selesai dan final manakala sampai pada pembentukan hukum positif. Teori Hukum Murni bukanlah salinan ide transendental yang sempurna, namun tidak berusaha memandang hukum sebagai anak cucu keadilan. Sementara hukum progresifnya Rahardjo bertumpu pada aspek peraturan dan perilaku (rules and behavior). Peraturan akan membangun suatu sistem hukum positif yang logis dan rasional. Sedangkan aspek perilaku atau manusia akan menggerakkan peraturan dan sistem yang dibangun. </p>

scholarly journals Philosophical Study of Hans Kelsen's Thoughts on Law and Satjipto Rahardjo's Ideas on Progressive Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 199
Author(s):  
Muhammad Harun
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Philosophical Study ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
Human Aspects ◽  
Hans Kelsen ◽  
The Law ◽  
And Behavior

<p>The purpose of this paper is to compare and evaluate the thoughts of Hans Kelsen with Satjipto Raharjo. Both offer their respective theories, namely Hans Kelsen's pure legal theory and Satjipto Rahardjo's progressive law. In this theory, both of them base their philosophical approach. After reviewing, the theories of these two figures are relevant for interpreting the law. This paper uses a critical paradigm with a combination of normative or doctrinal and sociological or non-doctrinal approaches. The results showed that Hans Kelsen directed his mind that legal positivism considers moral speech, values are finished and final when it comes to the formation of positive law. Pure Legal Theory is not a perfect copy of transcendental ideas, but it does not try to see the law as a posterity of justice. While Rahardjo's progressive law rests on the aspects of rules and behavior. Regulations will build a positive and rational legal system. While the behavioral or human aspects will drive the rules and systems that are built.</p><p> </p><p>Tujuan penulisan ini adalah untuk membandingkan dan mengevaluasi pemikiran Hans Kelsen dengan Satjipto Raharjo. Keduanya menawarkan teori masing-masing, yaitu teori hukum murni Hans Kelsen dan hukum progresif Satjipto Rahardjo. Dalam teori ini, keduanya sama-sama mendasarkan pendekatan secara filosif. Setelah dikaji, teori dari kedua tokoh ini relevan untuk memaknai hukum. Tulisan ini menggunakan paradigima kritis dengan pendekatan kombinasi normatif atau doktrinal dan sosiologis atau non doktrinal. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Hans Kelsen lebih mengarahkan pikirannya bahwa positivisme hukum yang menganggap pembicaraan moral, nilai-nilai telah selesai dan final manakala sampai pada pembentukan hukum positif. Teori Hukum Murni bukanlah salinan ide transendental yang sempurna, namun tidak berusaha memandang hukum sebagai anak cucu keadilan. Sementara hukum progresifnya Rahardjo bertumpu pada aspek peraturan dan perilaku (rules and behavior). Peraturan akan membangun suatu sistem hukum positif yang logis dan rasional. Sedangkan aspek perilaku atau manusia akan menggerakkan peraturan dan sistem yang dibangun. </p>

CIVIL AND LEGAL LIABILITY OF JUDGES

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Pension System ◽  
Legal Liability ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Model Code ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

The article presents the conceptual foundations of bringing judges to civil and legal liability. It was found that the civil and legal liability of judges is one of the types of legal liability of judges. It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine provides for a clearly delineated list of the main cases (grounds) for which the state is liable for damages for damage caused to a legal entity and an individual by illegal actions of a judge as a result of the administration of justice. It has been proved that bringing judges to civil and legal liability, in particular on the basis of the right of recourse, provides for the payment of just compensation in accordance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. It was established that the bringing of judges to civil and legal liability in Ukraine is regulated by such legislative documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Explanatory Note to the European Charter on the Status of Judges (Model Code), the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the procedure for compensation for harm caused to a citizen by illegal actions of bodies carrying out operational-search activities, pre-trial investigation bodies, prosecutors and courts», Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of certain provisions of Article 2, paragraph two of clause II «Final and transitional provisions» of the Law of Ukraine «On measures to legislatively ensure the reform of the pension system», Article 138 of the Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges» (the case on changes in the conditions for the payment of pensions and monthly living known salaries of judges lagging behind in these), the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights».

Private Water, Public Good

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madeline Baer
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Citizen Participation ◽  
Water Policy ◽  
Human Right ◽  
The Public ◽  
Strong State ◽  
Neoliberal Reforms ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
State Interventions

Chapter 4 provides an in-depth case study of water policy in Chile from the 1970s to present, including an evaluation of the outcomes of water policy under the privatized system from a human rights perspective. The chapter interrogates Chile’s reputation as a privatization success story, finding that although Chile meets the narrow definition of the human right to water and sanitation in terms of access, quality, and price, it fails to meet the broader definition that includes citizen participation in water management and policy decisions. The chapter argues that Chile’s relative success in delivering water services is attributable to strong state capacity to govern the water sector in the public interest by embedding neoliberal reforms in state interventions. The Chile case shows that privatization is not necessarily antithetical to human rights-consistent outcomes if there is a strong state role in the private sector.

scholarly journals Does the Law Determine What Heritage to Remember?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie-Sophie de Clippele
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Identity ◽  
Cultural Heritage ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
Historical Knowledge ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Political Will ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Law ◽  
Ideological Manipulation

AbstractCultural heritage can offer tangible and intangible traces of the past. A past that shapes cultural identity, but also a past from which one sometimes wishes to detach oneself and which nevertheless needs to be remembered, even commemorated. These themes of memory, history and oblivion are examined by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur in his work La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli (2000). Inspired by these ideas, this paper analyses how they are closely linked to cultural heritage. Heritage serves as a support for memory, even if it can be mishandled, which in turn can affect heritage policies. Memory and heritage can be abused as a result of wounds from the past or for reasons of ideological manipulation or because of a political will to force people to remember. Furthermore, heritage, as a vehicule of memory, contributes to historical knowledge, but can remain marked by a certain form of subjectivism during the heritage and conservation operation, for which heritage professionals (representatives of the public authority or other experts) are responsible. Yet, the responsibility for conserving cultural heritage also implies the need to avoid any loss of heritage, and to fight against oblivion. Nonetheless, this struggle cannot become totalitarian, nor can it deprive the community of a sometimes salutary oblivion to its own identity construction. These theoretical and philosophical concepts shall be examined in the light of legal discourse, and in particular in Belgian legislation regarding cultural heritage. It is clear that the shift from monument to heritage broadens the legal scope and consequently raises the question of who gets to decide what is considered heritage according to the law, and whether there is something such as a collective human right to cultural heritage. Nonetheless, this broadening of the legislation extends the State intervention into cultural heritage, which in turn entails certain risks, as will be analysed with Belgium’s colonial heritage.

Domestic politics and the power to punish: The case of national human rights institutions

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 385-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan M. Welch
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
The Public ◽  
Legal Punishment ◽  
International Pressure ◽  
National Human ◽  
National Human Rights Institutions

Why do states give institutions the ability to legally punish them? While past research focuses on international pressure to delegate authority to third parties, I argue that domestic politics plays a key role. By viewing domestic politics through a principal–agent framework, I argue that the more accountable individual legislators remain to the public, the more likely it is that the legislature will delegate legal punishment authority. I focus on National Human Rights Institutions—domestic institutions tasked with protection and promotion of human rights—to build the argument. Electoral institutions that decrease monitoring of legislator agents, or institutional makeup that allows the executive to displace the public as the principal lead to National Human Rights Institutions without punishment power. Using Bayesian logistic analyses I test four hypotheses, all of which are in agreement with the argument.

scholarly journals On the rule of law and the quality of the law: reflections of the constitutional-turned-international judge

2019 ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Egidijus Küris
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Tradition ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Law

Western legal tradition gave the birth to the concept of the rule of law. Legal theory and constitutional justice significantly contributed to the crystallisation of its standards and to moving into the direction of the common concept of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights uses this concept as an interpretative tool, the extension of which is the quality of the law doctrine, which encompasses concrete requirements for the law under examination in this Court, such as prospectivity of law, its foreseeability, clarity etc. The author of the article, former judge of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and currently the judge of the European Court of Human Rights, examines how the latter court has gradually intensified (not always consistently) its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, inherent in all the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that in some of its judgments it concentrates not anymore on the factual situation of an individual applicant, but, first and foremost, on the examination of the quality of the law. The trend is that, having found the quality of the applicable law to be insufficient, the Court considers that the mere existence of contested legislation amounts to an unjustifiable interference into a respective right and finds a violation of respective provisions of the Convention. This is an indication of the Court’s progressing self-approximation to constitutional courts, which are called to exercise abstract norm-control.La tradición occidental alumbró la noción del Estado de Derecho. La teoría del Derecho y la Justicia Constitucional han contribuido decisivamente a la cristalización de sus estándares, ayudando a conformar un acervo común en torno al mismo. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos emplea la noción de Estado de Derecho como una herramienta interpretativa, fundamentalmente centrada en la doctrina de la calidad de la ley, que implica requisitos concretos que exige el Tribunal tales como la claridad, la previsibilidad, y la certeza en la redacción y aplicación de la norma. El autor, en la actualidad Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y anterior Magistrado del Tribunal Constitucional de Lituania, examina cómo el primero ha intensificado gradualmente (no siempre de forma igual de consistente) su confianza en el Estado de Derecho como principio general, inherente a todos los preceptos que forman el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, hasta el punto de que en algunas de sus resoluciones se concentra no tanto en la situación de hecho del demandante individual sino, sobre todo y ante todo, en el examen de esa calidad de la ley. La tendencia del Tribunal es a considerar que, si observa que la ley no goza de calidad suficiente, la mera existencia de la legislación discutida supone una interferencia injustificable dentro del derecho en cuestión y declara la violación del precepto correspondiente del Convenio. Esto implica el acercamiento progresivo del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos a los Tribunales Constitucionales, quienes tienen encargado el control en abstracto de la norma legal.

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