scholarly journals The Myth of When and Where: How False Assumptions Still Haunt Theories of Consciousness

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sepehrdad Rahimian

Recent advances in Neural sciences have uncovered countless new facts about the brain. Although there is a plethora of theories of consciousness, it seems to some philosophers that there is still an explanatory gap when it comes to a scientific account of subjective experience. In what follows, I will argue why some of our more commonly acknowledged theories do not at all provide us with an account of subjective experience as they are built on false assumptions. These assumptions have led us into a state of cognitive dissonance between maintaining our standard scientific practices on one hand, and maintaining our folk notions on the other. I will then end by proposing Illusionism as the only option for a scientific investigation of consciousness and that even if ideas like panpsychism turn out to be holding the seemingly missing piece of the puzzle, the path to them must go through Illusionism.

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald P. Gruber ◽  
Ryan P. Smith ◽  
Richard A. Block

Flow and passage of time puzzles were analyzed by first clarifying their roles in the current multidisciplinary understanding of time in consciousness. All terms ( flow, passage, happening, becoming) are carefully defined. Flow and passage are defined differently, the former involving the psychological aspects of time and the latter involving the evolving universe and associated new cerebral events. The concept of the flow of time (FOT) is deconstructed into two levels: (a) a lower level ― a perceptual dynamic flux, or happening, or flow of events (not time); and (b) an upper level ― a cognitive view of past/present/future in which the observer seems to move from one to the other. With increasing evidence that all perception is a discrete continuity provided by illusory perceptual completion, the lower-level FOT is essentially the result of perceptual completion. The brain conflates the expression flow (passage, for some) of time with experiences of perceptual completion. However, this is an illusory percept. Converging evidence on the upper-level FOT reveals it as a false cognition that has the illusory percept of object persistence as its prerequisite. To research this argument, an experiment that temporarily removes the experience of the lower-level FOT might be conducted. The claustrum of the brain (arguably the center of consciousness) should be intermittently stimulated to create a scenario of discrete observations (involving all the senses) with long interstimulus intervals of non-consciousness and thereby no perceptual completion. Without perceptual completion, there should be no subjective experience of the lower-level FOT.


2021 ◽  
pp. 181-195
Author(s):  
Thomas Fuchs

Since its development around 1800, psychiatry has been moving between the poles of the sciences and the humanities, being directed toward subjective experience on the one hand and toward the neural substrate on the other hand. Today, this dualism seems to be overcome by a naturalism which identifies subjective experience with neural processes—according to the slogan “mental disorders are brain diseases.” Psychiatry thus tends to isolate mental illnesses from the patients’ social relationships and to neglect subjectivity and intersubjectivity in their explanation. What should be searched for instead is a paradigm that can establish psychiatry as a relational medicine in an encompassing sense: as a science and practice of biological, psychological and social relations, and their disorders. Within such a paradigm, the brain may be grasped and researched as the central “relational organ” without reductionist implications.


NeuroSci ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-234
Author(s):  
Fredric Schiffer

In this paper I will address questions about will, agency, choice, consciousness, relevant brain regions, impacts of disorders, and their therapeutics, and I will do this by referring to my theory, Dual-brain Psychology, which posits that within most of us there exist two mental agencies with different experiences, wills, choices, and behaviors. Each of these agencies is associated as a trait with one brain hemisphere (either left or right) and its composite regions. One of these agencies is more adversely affected by past traumas, and is more immature and more symptomatic, while the other is more mature and healthier. The theory has extensive experimental support through 17 peer-reviewed publications with clinical and non-clinical research. I will discuss how this theory relates to the questions about the nature of agency and I will also discuss my published theory on the physical nature of subjective experience and its relation to the brain, and how that theory interacts with Dual-Brain Psychology, leading to further insights into our human nature and its betterment.


1968 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 479-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars-Ake Idahl ◽  
Bo Hellman

ABSTRACT The combination of enzymatic cycling and fluorometry was used for measuring glucose and glucose-6-phosphate in pancreatic β-cells from obese-hyperglycaemic mice. The glucose level of the β-cells corresponded to that of serum over a wide concentration range. In the exocrine pancreas, on the other hand, a significant barrier to glucose diffusion across the cell membranes was demonstrated. During 5 min of ischaemia, the glucose level remained practically unchanged in the β-cells while it increased in the liver and decreased in the brain. The observation that the pancreatic β-cells are characterized by a relatively low ratio of glucose-6-phosphate to glucose may be attributed to the presence of a specific glucose-6-phosphatase.


Author(s):  
Walter Ott

Descartes’s treatment of perception in the Optics, though published before the Meditations, contains a distinct account of sensory experience. The end of the chapter suggests some reasons for this oddity, but that the two accounts are distinct is difficult to deny. Descartes in the present work topples the brain image from its throne. In its place, we have two mechanisms, one purely causal, the other inferential. Where the proper sensibles are concerned, the ordination of nature suffices to explain why a given sensation is triggered on the occasion of a given brain motion. The same is true with regard to the common sensibles. But on top of this purely causal story, Descartes re-introduces his doctrine of natural geometry.


1971 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 537-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Lende ◽  
Wolff M. Kirsch ◽  
Ralph Druckman

✓ Cortical removals which included precentral and postcentral facial representations resulted in relief of facial pain in two patients. Because of known failures following only postcentral (SmI) ablations, these operations were designed to eliminate also the cutaneous afferent projection to the precentral gyrus (MsI) and the second somatic sensory area (SmII). In one case burning pain developed after a stroke involving the brain stem and was not improved by total fifth nerve section; prompt relief followed corticectomy and lasted until death from heart disease 20 months later. In the other case persistent steady pain that developed after fifth rhizotomy for trigeminal neuralgia proved refractory to frontal lobotomy; relief after corticectomy was immediate and has lasted 14 months. Cortical localization was established by stimulation under local anesthesia. Each removal extended up to the border of the arm representation and down to the upper border of the insula. Such a resection necessarily included SmII, and in one case responses presumably from SmII were obtained before removal. The suggestions of Biemond (1956) and Poggio and Mountcastle (1960) that SmII might be concerned with pain sensibility may be pertinent in these cases.


2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (04) ◽  
pp. 1650016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Loukianos Spyrou ◽  
David Martín-Lopez ◽  
Antonio Valentín ◽  
Gonzalo Alarcón ◽  
Saeid Sanei

Interictal epileptiform discharges (IEDs) are transient neural electrical activities that occur in the brain of patients with epilepsy. A problem with the inspection of IEDs from the scalp electroencephalogram (sEEG) is that for a subset of epileptic patients, there are no visually discernible IEDs on the scalp, rendering the above procedures ineffective, both for detection purposes and algorithm evaluation. On the other hand, intracranially placed electrodes yield a much higher incidence of visible IEDs as compared to concurrent scalp electrodes. In this work, we utilize concurrent scalp and intracranial EEG (iEEG) from a group of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) patients with low number of scalp-visible IEDs. The aim is to determine whether by considering the timing information of the IEDs from iEEG, the resulting concurrent sEEG contains enough information for the IEDs to be reliably distinguished from non-IED segments. We develop an automatic detection algorithm which is tested in a leave-subject-out fashion, where each test subject’s detection algorithm is based on the other patients’ data. The algorithm obtained a [Formula: see text] accuracy in recognizing scalp IED from non-IED segments with [Formula: see text] accuracy when trained and tested on the same subject. Also, it was able to identify nonscalp-visible IED events for most patients with a low number of false positive detections. Our results represent a proof of concept that IED information for TLE patients is contained in scalp EEG even if they are not visually identifiable and also that between subject differences in the IED topology and shape are small enough such that a generic algorithm can be used.


1917 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 557-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carroll G. Bull

Streptococci cultivated from the tonsils of thirty-two cases of poliomyelitis were used to inoculate various laboratory animals. In no case was a condition induced resembling poliomyelitis clinically or pathologically in guinea pigs, dogs, cats, rabbits, or monkeys. On the other hand, a considerable percentage of the rabbits and a smaller percentage of some of the other animals developed lesions due to streptococci. These lesions consisted of meningitis, meningo-encephalitis, abscess of the brain, arthritis, tenosynovitis, myositis, abscess of the kidney, endocarditis, pericarditis, and neuritis. No distinction in the character or frequency of the lesions could be determined between the streptococci derived from poliomyelitic patients and from other sources. Streptococci isolated from the poliomyelitic brain and spinal cord of monkeys which succumbed to inoculation with the filtered virus failed to induce in monkeys any paralysis or the characteristic histological changes of poliomyelitis. These streptococci are regarded as secondary bacterial invaders of the nervous organs. Monkeys which have recovered from infection with streptococci derived from cases of poliomyelitis are not protected from infection with the filtered virus, and their blood does not neutralize the filtered virus in vitro. We have failed to detect any etiologic or pathologic relationship between streptococci and epidemic poliomyelitis in man or true experimental poliomyelitis in the monkey.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-159
Author(s):  
Jonathan M. P. Wilbiks ◽  
Sean Hutchins

In previous research, there exists some debate about the effects of musical training on memory for verbal material. The current research examines this relationship, while also considering musical training effects on memory for musical excerpts. Twenty individuals with musical training were tested and their results were compared to 20 age-matched individuals with no musical experience. Musically trained individuals demonstrated a higher level of memory for classical musical excerpts, with no significant differences for popular musical excerpts or for words. These findings are in support of previous research showing that while music and words overlap in terms of their processing in the brain, there is not necessarily a facilitative effect between training in one domain and performance in the other.


2009 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 2526-2537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvie Lardeux ◽  
Remy Pernaud ◽  
Dany Paleressompoulle ◽  
Christelle Baunez

It was recently shown that subthalamic nucleus (STN) lesions affect motivation for food, cocaine, and alcohol, differentially, according to either the nature of the reward or the preference for it. The STN may thus code a reward according to its value. Here, we investigated how the firing of subthalamic neurons is modulated during expectation of a predicted reward between two possibilities (4 or 32% sucrose solution). The firing pattern of neurons responding to predictive cues and to reward delivery indicates that STN neurons can be divided into subpopulations responding specifically to one reward and less or giving no response to the other. In addition, some neurons (“oops” neurons) specifically encode errors as they respond only during error trials. These results reveal that the STN plays a critical role in ascertaining the value of the reward and seems to encode that value differently depending on the magnitude of the reward. These data highlight the importance of the STN in the reward circuitry of the brain.


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