Optimising Peace through a Universal Global Peace Treaty to Constrain Risk of War from a Militarised Artificial Superintelligence

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Draper

An artificial superintelligence (ASI) emerging in a world where war is still normalised may constitute a catastrophic existential risk, either because the ASI might be employed by a single nation-state to wage war for global supremacy or because the ASI goes to war on behalf of itself to establish global supremacy; these risks are not mutually incompatible in that the first can transition to the second. We presently live in a world where few states actually declare war on each other or even war on each other. This is because the 1945 United Nations’ Charter's Article 2 states that UN member states should “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”, while allowing for “military measures by UN Security Council resolutions” and “exercise of self-defense”. In this theoretical ideal, wars are not declared; instead, 'international armed conflicts' occur. However, costly interstate conflicts, both ‘hot’ and ‘cold’, still exist, for instance the Kashmir Conflict and the Korean War. Furthermore, a ‘New Cold War’ between AI superpowers (the United States and China) looms. An ASI-directed/enabled future interstate war could trigger ‘total war’, including nuclear war, and is therefore ‘high risk’. One risk reduction strategy would be optimising peace through a Universal Global Peace Treaty (UGPT), which could contribute towards the ending of existing wars and towards the prevention of future wars, through conforming instrumentalism. A critical juncture to optimise peace via the UGPT is emerging, by leveraging the UGPT off the announcement of a ‘burning plasma’ fusion reaction, expected from circa 2025 to 2035, as was attempted, unfortunately unsuccessfully, in 1946 with fission, for atomic war. While this strategy cannot cope with non-state actors, it could influence state actors, including those developing ASIs, or an ASI with agency.

The Sit Room ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 279-284
Author(s):  
David Scheffer

A result from which “all ugliness will flow again.” WARREN CHRISTOPHER THE BOSNIAN WAR took three years of intensive diplomacy to end, while combat and atrocities were unremitting. The talking phase of armed conflicts has veered wildly from days to decades in recent history, and often failed completely when one side fought to achieve outright military victory. There were no negotiations to end World War II; only total defeat of the Axis Powers sufficed. The Korean War ended in a stalemate absent any substantive talks, and the United States and North Korea remained, technically, at war, for decades thereafter. Negotiations to end the Vietnam War began in 1968 and continued into the next decade only to be eclipsed by the total victory of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces in 1975. The catastrophic Syrian conflict began in 2011 and continued unabated despite years of U.N.-sponsored talks in Geneva. The Colombian government and the indigenous guerilla group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC), finally ended their civil war in 2016 with a peace agreement after 26 years of on-again, off-again negotiations....


Author(s):  
Christine Hong

To the extent North Korea features within Asian American literature and culture, it primarily does so in a body of Korean American cultural production—memoirs, biographies, documentary films, oral histories, fiction, and multi-media political advocacy—that is distinctively post-9/11 but not-yet post-Korean War. The irresolution of the Korean War, a war that has yet to be ended by a peace treaty, serves as defining extraliterary context for representations of North Korea. Not reducible to historical setting, much less an event safely concluded in the past, the Korean War, as a contemporaneous structure of enmity between the United States and North Korea, conditions the significance of this cultural archive—its urgency, politics, and reception. Often markedly instrumental in nature, indeed defined by the antithetical political ends it wishes to foster, Asian (mainly Korean) American cultural production on North Korea falls into two broad camps: on the one hand, “axis of evil” accounts that advocate, at times explicitly, for US intervention against North Korea, and on the other, more emergent cultural expressions that seek to expose the human costs of unending US war with North Korea.


2018 ◽  
pp. 97-130
Author(s):  
Denzenlkham Ulambayar

Since the 1990s, when previously classified and top secret Russian archival documents on the Korean War became open and accessible, it has become clear for post-communist countries that Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong were the primary organizers of the war. It is now equally certain that tensions arising from Soviet and American struggle generated the origins of the Korean War, namely the Soviet Union’s occupation of the northern half of the Korean peninsula and the United States’ occupation of the southern half to the 38th parallel after 1945 as well as the emerging bipolar world order of international relations and Cold War. Newly available Russian archival documents produced much in the way of new energies and opportunities for international study and research into the Korean War.2 However, within this research few documents connected to Mongolia have so far been found, and little specific research has yet been done regarding why and how Mongolia participated in the Korean War. At the same time, it is becoming today more evident that both Soviet guidance and U.S. information reports (evaluated and unevaluated) regarding Mongolia were far different from the situation and developments of that period. New examples of this tendency are documents declassified in the early 2000s and released publicly from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in December 2016 which contain inaccurate information. The original, uncorrupted sources about why, how and to what degree the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) became a participant in the Korean War are in fact in documents held within the Mongolian Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. These archives contain multiple documents in relation to North Korea. Prior to the 1990s Mongolian scholars Dr. B. Lkhamsuren,3 Dr. B. Ligden,4 Dr. Sh. Sandag,5 junior scholar J. Sukhee,6 and A. A. Osipov7 mention briefly in their writings the history of relations between the MPR and the DPRK during the Korean War. Since the 1990s the Korean War has also briefly been touched upon in the writings of B. Lkhamsuren,8 D. Ulambayar (the author of this paper),9 Ts. Batbayar,10 J. Battur,11 K. Demberel,12 Balảzs Szalontai,13 Sergey Radchenko14 and Li Narangoa.15 There have also been significant collections of documents about the two countries and a collection of memoirs published in 200716 and 2008.17 The author intends within this paper to discuss particularly about why, how and to what degree Mongolia participated in the Korean War, the rumors and realities of the war and its consequences for the MPR’s membership in the United Nations. The MPR was the second socialist country following the Soviet Union (the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) to recognize the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and establish diplomatic ties. That was part of the initial stage of socialist system formation comprising the Soviet Union, nations in Eastern Europe, the MPR, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and the DPRK. Accordingly between the MPR and the DPRK fraternal friendship and a framework of cooperation based on the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism had been developed.18 In light of and as part of this framework, The Korean War has left its deep traces in the history of the MPR’s external diplomatic environment and state sovereignty


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 68-85
Author(s):  
D. V. Streltsov

The article analyzes long-term external and internal factors determining the course of development of Russian-Japanese relations in 2019-2020. On the one hand, the anti-Russian component in Tokyo's foreign policy is shaped by its membership in the Security Treaty with the United States and its solidarity with the sanctions policy of the Group of Seven towards Russia. On the other hand, Japan and Russia are both interested interest in political cooperation in creating multilateral dialog mechanisms of international security in East Asia, resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, and easing tensions around territorial disputes in the East China and South China seas. Among the economic factors, the author focuses on the significant place of Russia in the context of Japan's task of diversifying sources of external energy supplies, as well as on Russia's desire to avoid unilateral dependence on the Chinese market while reorienting the system of foreign economic relations from the West to the East. Personal diplomacy of political leaders plays a significant role in relations between Russia and Japan, and, above all, close personal relationships and frequent meetings between Prime Minister Abe and President Putin, which make it possible to partially compensate the unfavorable image of the partner country in the public opinion of both Russia and Japan. Against the background of a deadlock in the Peace Treaty talks which emerged in 2019, the search for a way out of the diplomatic impasse is on the agenda. In the author's opinion, it would be appropriate at the first stage to proceed to the conclusion of a basic agreement on the basis bilateral relations, which would be "untied" from the Peace Treaty. In addition, Russia could stop criticizing Japan for its security policy and show greater understanding of the Japanese initiative in the field of quality infrastructure. In turn, Japan could take a number of strategic decisions on cooperation with Russia and announce them in the Prime Minister's keynote speech. In addition, Tokyo could stop positioning the issue of the peace Treaty as the main issue in relations with Russia, which would allow our countries to "untie" bilateral relations from the problem of border demarcation and focus on their positive agenda.


Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák

This chapter traces the development of the law of belligerent occupation in order to identify trends relevant to the regulation of internationalized armed conflicts. It observes that despite the general grounding of this body of law in a state-centric paradigm, several isolated developments have contemplated the possibility of non-state actors becoming belligerent occupants of a portion of state territory. Moreover, the chapter highlights that the law of belligerent occupation has undergone a fundamental transformation as part of a general trend of individualization and humanization of international law. Therefore, it is no longer simply a brake on inter-state relations and a protector of states’ interests and institutions. Instead, the law has gradually brought individuals’ interests to the fore, putting persons before institutions and individuals before states. Overall, the chapter uncovers the historical reasons that support an extensive view of the applicability of the law of occupation to modern internationalized armed conflicts.


Author(s):  
Sahr Conway-Lanz

The Korean War demonstrated the serious problems that the United States had adhering to the new 1949 Geneva Conventions and the severely limited protections that these new treaties provided. The protections for war victims were undermined both by serious gaps in the treaties that failed to provide much safety from bombing to civilians and by US deviations from the agreements in the handling of refugees and prisoners of war. However, Americans did not discard the agreements in the wake of their troubled Korean War experiences. Instead, the war helped to legitimize and lay the foundation for the further internalization of the new laws through their formal implementation, the public controversy they generated, and a boomerang effect of atrocity accusations. Despite failing to provide much protection for Korean War victims, the treaties were part of a broader international consensus-building process that helped to spread humanitarian norms.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 242-243

There is given below a brief general statement of the type of treaty envisioned by the United States Government as proper to end the state of war with Japan. It is stressed that this statement is only suggestive and tentative, and does not commit the United States Government to the detailed content or wording of any future draft. It is expected that after there has been an opportunity to study this outline, there will be a series of informal discussions designed to elaborate on it and make clear any points which may be obscure at first glance.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110411
Author(s):  
Vincent Bauer ◽  
Michael Reese ◽  
Keven Ruby

Scholars of civil wars have long argued that non-state actors can use selective punishment to reduce collaboration with state adversaries. However, there is little systematic evidence confirming this claim, nor investigation into the mechanisms at play. In this paper, we provide such evidence from the drone war in Pakistan. Militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas engaged in a brutal counterespionage campaign with the aim of reducing collaboration with the United States. Our analysis combines a novel dataset of collaborator killings with data on drone strike outcomes. We find that strikes killed half as many militant leaders and fighters following collaborator killings and that this suppressive effect likely works by deterring spying in the future. Beyond providing an empirical confirmation of the selective punishment hypothesis, our paper suggests an unacknowledged vulnerability of the drone program to reprisals against local allies and collaborators that limits its effectiveness as a long-term tool of counterterrorism.


Author(s):  
Sandra Grigaravičiūté

The research reveals appointment, competence and type of activities of the authorized representatives of the Council of Lithuania delegated to represent the Council of Lithuania, Lithuania’s interests or affairs abroad (in neutral and “belligerent countries”) from 22 October 1917 to 11 November 1918. The Entente Powers include the United States, Great Britain, France and also Italy in some cases. Russia, which also belonged to the Entente, is left outside the scope of the research, because after Soviet Russia signed the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (3 March 1918), it did no longer fight on the side of the Entente. The research on the diplomacy of the Council of Lithuania in the Entente Powers was carried out on the basis of published (press, memoirs, published documents) and unpublished sources (from the Lithuanian Central State Archives, Manuscripts Department of the Wroblewski Library of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences). The study employed the methods of analysis and comparison, the descriptive method, and the comparison of sources and literature. While processing the primary sources, in particular in French and German languages, the logistic-analytical method was applied (the notional content and information analysis was carried out). The research consists of two parts. In the first part of investigation the author analyzes the appointment and competence of the authorized representatives of the Council of Lithuania in neutral and “belligerent countries” and concludes, that the analysis of the circumstances of appointment and chronology of the authorized representatives of the Council of Lithuania in neutral and “belligerent countries” as well as the content of their authorizations made it clear that permanent authorized representatives, Juozas Purickis and Vladas Daumanatas-Dzimidavičius, who were appointed on 22 October 1917, had their residence in Lausanne and constituted a part of the collegial body of Lithuanian National Council, were authorized to represent the Council of Lithuania; however, only Purickis’ authorization included the phrase “to represent Lithuania’s interests abroad”; there was no indication as to what countries were meant. An equivalent wording – “to represent Lithuania’s interests abroad” – was also included in the texts of authorizations of non-permanent authorized representatives – Augustinas Voldemaras and Konstantinas Olšauskas. The material contained in the minutes of the meetings of the Council of Lithuania entails that “representation in belligerent countries” also meant representation in the Entente Powers, though no direct indication was included. In the second part of the study the author reveals the specific type of activities of the authorized representatives of the Council of Lithuania (October 1917 – November 1918) and states, that Permanent representatives of the Council of Lithuania, who were based in Lausanne and formed a part of the collegial Lithuanian National Council, did not always coordinate their diplomatic steps in the Entente Powers or in their embassies in Bern; hence, the Council of Lithuania had to deny or dissociate itself from certain statements made by the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) (the declaration of separation from Russia of 25 December 1917; the protest telegram of June 1918). Both permanent and non-permanent representatives of the Council of Lithuania authorized to represent Lithuania’s interests abroad shared the same goal of seeking “the recognition of the right to self-determination for the Lithuanian nation” and the recognition of independence declared by the Council of Lithuania (on the basis of Part I of the Act of 11 December 1917 and the Act of 16 February 1918).


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-477
Author(s):  
Sascha Lohmann

Abstract The ideal of the European Union (EU) as a global peace and security actor is increasingly clashing with the reality of a multipolar world defined by militarised conflict, and a loosening of the formerly close trans-Atlantic relationship with the United States. European policy-makers have identified strategic autonomy as a possible remedy in the face of a growing number of internal and external security threats. This paper adds to the conceptualisation of strategic autonomy by contextualising its current usage and political genealogy. Empirically, European strategic autonomy is examined concerning the efforts to preserve the Iranian nuclear deal after the Trump administration had ceased US participation in May 2018. In particular, the paper assesses the European response to counter the re-imposed unilateral United States (US) sanctions against European individuals and entities by updating the so-called blocking regulation, and setting up a special purpose vehicle (spv) for facilitating trade with Iran. The results show that the European struggle toward achieving strategic autonomy has largely failed, but that it holds valuable lessons to approximate this ideal in the future.


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