scholarly journals How the Far-Right Polarises Twitter: 'Highjacking' Hashtags in Times of COVID-19

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Darius ◽  
Fabian Stephany

Twitter influences political debates. Phenomena like fake news and hate speech show that political discourse on micro-blogging can become strongly polarised by algorithmic enforcement of selective perception. Some political actors actively employ strategies to facilitate polarisation on Twitter, as past contributions show, via strategies of 'hashjacking'. For the example of COVID-19 related hashtags and their retweet networks, we examine the case of partisan accounts of the German far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and their potential use of 'hashjacking' in May 2020. Our findings indicate that polarisation of political party hashtags has not changed significantly in the last two years. We see that right-wing partisans are actively and effectively polarising the discourse by 'hashjacking' COVID-19 related hashtags, like #CoronaVirusDE or #FlattenTheCurve. This polarisation strategy is dominated by the activity of a limited set of heavy users. The results underline the necessity to understand the dynamics of discourse polarisation, as an active political communication strategy of the far-right, by only a handful of very active accounts.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Darius ◽  
Fabian Stephany

With a network approach, we examine the case of the German far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and their potential use of a "hashjacking" strategy - the use of someone else’s hashtag in order to promote one's own social media agenda. Our findings suggest that right-wing politicians (and their supporters/retweeters) actively and effectively polarise the discourse not just by using their own party hashtags, but also by "hashjacking" the political party hashtags of other established parties. The results underline the necessity to understand the success of right-wing parties, online and in elections, not entirely as a result of external effects (e.g. migration), but as a direct consequence of their digital political communication strategy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margit Feischmidt

AbstractAnalyzing the newly emerged Trianon cult, this article argues that the current wave of memory politics became the engine of new forms of nationalism in Hungary constituted by extremist and moderate right-wing civic and political actors. Following social anthropologists Gingrich and Banks, the term neonationalism will be applied and linked with the concept “mythomoteur” of John Armstrong and Anthony D. Smith, emphasizing the role of preexisting ethno-symbolic resources or mythomoteurs in the resurgence of nationalism. Special attention will be given to elites who play a major role in constructing new discourses of the nation and seek to control collective memories, taking their diverse intentions, agendas, and strategies specifically into consideration. This “view from above” will be complemented with a “view from below” by investigating the meanings that audiences give to and the uses they make of these memories. Thus, the analysis has three dimensions: it starts with the analysis of symbols, topics, and arguments applied by public Trianon discourses; it continues with the analysis of everyday perceptions, memory, and identity concerns; and finally ends with an anthropological interpretation of memory politics regarding a new form of nationalism arising in the context of propelling and mainstreaming populist right-wing politics. The main argument of this article is that although the Hungarian Trianon cult, identified as national mythomoteur, invokes a historical trauma, it rather speaks to current feelings of loss and disenfranchisement, offering symbolic compensation through the transference of historical glory, pride, and self-esteem within a mythological framework. This article is part of a larger effort to understand the cultural logic and social support of new forms of nationalism in Hungary propelled by the populist far right.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agneta Fischer ◽  
Charlotte Brands ◽  
David Abadi

When it comes to political communication on social media, Facebook has arisen as one of the most important platforms. Recent research on populist discourses provides evidence for populist ideology fragments emerging across Facebook posts. Moreover, the level of populist language styles and the adoption of typical populist rhetoric appears to be ‘endemic' across political actors across the whole political spectrum, even among non-populist ones. In total, 51 posts from Geert Wilders were analyzed before and 71 in the period after the 2019 Dutch elections (N = 122). This study tackles the use of the founding elements of populist communication strategies: references to the people, references to the elites, and references to the others. For a populist leader, Wilders’ Facebook posts do not contain many references to the people. Instead, he focuses on the elites (e.g., the EU) and on the others (e.g., Muslims or asylum seekers). The clearest difference between the pre- and post-election period seems to be that Wilders gradually changes his populist communication strategies from a focus on the elites, to a focus on the others. In doing so, he uses more references to religion and blaming the others. He also refers more to people within the country (asylum seekers and immigrants) in the post-election period (36,6%) than in the pre-election period (23,5%). His posts show clear examples of populist nativism, while he paints a picture of a battle between the Netherlands and the EU (the elites), Muslims or asylum seekers (the others).


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-36
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Kamińska-Korolczuk

The impact of hate speech contained in the statements of the Alternative for Germany party representatives on changes taking place in the media management system in Germany The purpose of the article is to present the introduced legal solutions regulating the functioning and management of the media system in Germany, which came into force under the influence of changes in political communication. A case study is presented examples of hate speech in the discourse of the party of the new right-wing populism –Alternative for Germany (Alternative fur Deutschland, AfD). The party uses rhetoric which until now has been marginal in the German media and since the refugee crisis it has become an increasingly common form of expression. The analysis was conducted against the backdrop of events that influenced the Bundestags to adopted Law improving law enforcement in social networks (Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken, Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, NetzDG). The analysis leads to the conclusions that the new right-wing populism changed the style of communication on the German political scene, which is not without influence on the decisions making by the legislator to introduce specific legal provisions regulating the management and framework of discourse in the social media in this state.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1391-1414
Author(s):  
Maja Pavlović ◽  
Ljubiša Bojić

State represents a social phenomenon which is constantly changing - just like all political actors. The direction of that evolution is determined by the development and current state of the art in technological domain. That explains how the rise of social media and new ICTs has shaped the contemporary political communication. This paper sheds light on the manner in which digital tools are exploited in an unpredictable social ambience which is characterized by numerous political crises. Special attention has been given to the phenomenon of digital astroturfing and political disinformation trends in Venezuela and Brazil. We have found that the dynamic technological development combined with the use of political bots has been creating the potential for fake news, thus impacting election processes and endangering democracy. Therefore, these phenomena need further scientific examination.


Author(s):  
N. Nurlaela Arief ◽  
Siti Karlinah

Abstract Indonesia has been facing a serious threat from fake news and hate speech which is wildly disseminated through social media. As the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, health issues and their link to religion are one of the most discussed topics on social media in this country. The aim of this study is to introduce a strategy to counterbalance fake news on vaccine issues. This research employed a mixed-method approach that used content of analysis data obtained from social media monitoring. In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 participants from various sectors related to vaccine issues. Monitoring of six female Facebook users in anti-vaccine groups revealed that the top five topics discussed in Indonesia were halal certification, conspiracy, adverse effects, adjuvants, and vaccine substitution. This research recommends a communication strategy to counterbalance fake news on the vaccine, employing both medical professionals and trusted, influential members of the religious community to educate the public. They should have a strong background in medical issues and understand Islamic perspectives. The involvement of Ulama (Islamic religious leaders) is important and needed to explain that vaccines do not violate religious law.


2022 ◽  
pp. 234-255
Author(s):  
Afonso Biscaia ◽  
Susana Salgado

This chapter examines the discourse of the Portuguese right-wing populist André Ventura and compares it with his close counterparts, Santiago Abascal, Marine Le Pen, and Matteo Salvini. The empirical analysis is focused on the 2021 presidential campaign and looks at Twitter and YouTube as parts of an integrated political communication strategy that are used as tools of exposure and message dissemination. The results show how André Ventura appropriates the features of right-wing populism but adapts those to the Portuguese specific context as a strategy to gain both wider media visibility and popular support.


2019 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Davis ◽  
Joe Straubhaar

When examining the decline of the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores and the ascension of the right-wing extremist Jair Bolsanaro of the far-right Partido Liberal Social to the 2018 presidency, political scientists David Samuels and Cesar Zucco have argued that this shift is best understood not through positive characteristics of Bolsonaro’s candidacy but through antipetismo [‘anti-PT-ism’], an intensely personal resentment of the Partido dos Trabalhadores. We assert that popular right-wing Facebook groups and networks formed around the communication network WhatsApp-fueled antipetismo by channeling anger originating in the 2013 nationwide protests away from a variety of social, political, and issues and toward a villainous depiction of Partido dos Trabalhadores leaders and valorization of anti-Partido dos Trabalhadores activists like Bolsanaro, as well as some focus on his own conservative, nationalist agenda. To interrogate this assertion, we propose two specific lines of research. The first is a qualitative textual analysis of the social media accounts of two of the most active anti-Partido dos Trabalhadores groups: Vem Pra Rua and O Movimento Brasil Livre. Through close reading of the materials distributed on these sites, we will illustrate how they channeled general unrest into a specifically partisan attack. The next line of research and case will be an examination of the role of mainstream news networks (namely TV Record) and WhatsApp by those campaigning for recently elected president Bolsonaro for a continued negative campaign against left candidates, specifically the Partido dos Trabalhadores, using fake news items like the supposed ‘gay kit’ that was being circulated in schools by the Partido dos Trabalhadores and others on the left to persuade children to become gay. When possible, we will analyze examples of the materials that were circulated that have emerged in the press coverage and will examine the processes that were used to target and persuade people to forward the materials created for the campaign.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-153
Author(s):  
Miyoung Chong

Abstract After Russia’s malicious attempts to influence the 2016 presidential election were revealed, “fake news” gained notoriety and became a popular term in political discourses and related research areas. Empirical research about fake news in diverse settings is in the beginning phase while research has revealed limitedly that “what we know about fake news so far is predominantly based on anecdotal evidence.” The purpose of this study is to investigate fake news included in politically opposing hashtag activism, #Gunreformnow and #NRA (The National Rifle Association). This study attempted to lay out the process of identifying fake news in the hashtag activism network on Twitter as a two-step process: 1) hashtag frequency analysis, top word-pair analysis, and social network analysis and 2) qualitative content analysis. This study discovered several frames through a qualitative approach. One of the prominent fake news frames was intentionally misleading information that attacks the opposing political party and its advocators. The disinformation tweets overall presented far-right wing ideologies and included multiple hashtags and a YouTube video to promote and distribute their agendas while calling for coalition of far-right wing supporters. However, the fake news tweets often failed to provide a reliable source to back up credibility of the content.


2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-552
Author(s):  
Roland Atzmüller ◽  
Alban Knecht ◽  
Michael Bodenstein

Abstract The paper analyses and assesses social policy reforms of the conservative, far-right and right-wing populist coalition government in Austria between 2017 and 2019 in the light of the debates about welfare chauvinist, authoritarian and populist social policies. The latter had gained in importance over the previous years due to the upsurge of far-right and right-wing populist parties and the (at least partial) accommodation of mainstream parties to this tendency in many countries. The policies of the government were based on the view that the social problems associated with immigration were (at least) one of the main underlying causes for the problems affecting the Austrian society. The paper shows that the government initiated strategies to tackle these developments via a renationalisation of social policies. The analysis is focused on implemented and planned activities geared mainly towards the (former) margins of the Austrian welfare regime (social assistance, active labour market policies, unemployment assistance, youth integration policies), as well as on the ideological articulations the government uttered to justify these reforms via the combination of welfare chauvinist orientations with centre-right concerns about market dynamics and public finances. Our analysis concludes that nativist/racialised, nationalist and welfare chauvinist social policies transcend the distinction of deserving and non-deserving social groups, which raises the question about the social imaginaries that lie beneath the attempts of far-right political actors to shape societies through the reform of welfare.


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