CHAPTER SIX. Federalism, Political Parties, and the Burden of National Unity: Still Making Federalism Do the Heavy Lifting?

2020 ◽  
pp. 138-164
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Kubinec ◽  
Sharan Grewal

Is power-sharing an effective way for endangered transitional democracies to reduce political tensions and improve government performance? We provide one of the first quantitative tests of this question in Tunisia, the Arab Spring's only success story. We argue that power-sharing may reduce polarization for a limited time, but at the cost of undermining democratic institutions. To measure polarization, we examine all rollcall votes from Tunisia's first and second post-transition parliaments. We employ a time-varying ideal point model and examine whether power-sharing agreements led to convergence in political parties' ideal points. Our analysis reveals that Tunisia's national unity government in 2015 temporarily moderated political tensions and allowed for parliamentary activity to resume. However, despite a broadening of the coalition in mid-2016, polarization reemerged and crucial legislation stalled. Moreover, longitudinal survey data suggest that the failure of power-sharing in Tunisia contributed to disillusionment with political parties, parliament, and democracy.


Author(s):  
Sara Rich Dorman

This chapter explores how ZANU used the creation of a government of national unity (GNU) between 2008 to 2013 to regain control of the political landscape. It tracks the economic and social crises that led to power-sharing, and explores the political dynamics first from the perspective of political parties and then from civil society. We see how church leaders and chiefs were (re-)incorporated into the ZANU discursive project, and how NGOs were marginalized from political discourse. The GNU limited and contained the extremes of political violence and economic crisis. This allowed ZANU to capitalize on its successes, build a new coalition of supporters and regain control of the state through the 2014 general election. Despite an institutional facade of unity, political factionalization deepened, and politics became increasingly driven by a dynamic of "winner takes all."


2003 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
Éric Bélanger

Issue ownership refers to political parties' recognized capacity or reputation to deal competently with a number of issues and problems. Canadian perceptions of party competence in five issue areas are examined: unemployment, inflation, national unity, public finance management and international affairs. Using aggregate-level Gallup poll data from a 50-year period, the study shows not only that Canadians distinguish between federal parties based on their issue-handling capabilities, but also that party images are not impervious to change. Two particular moments of realignment in party images are identified: the beginning of the 1960s, and the early 1990s. The image of the federal Liberal party clearly benefited from both periods. Beyond the expected projection effect of party popularity, two factors are shown to account at least partially for these variations over time in issue ownership. The parties' performance while in office and the arrival of new competitors within the party system in the 1993 election are both found to significantly affect perceptions of party competence in Canada.


Author(s):  
Aleksandra Pavicevic

The beginning of the process of repeated actualisation and revitalisation in Serbia coincided with the beginning of the social, economic and political crisis on the territory of the former SFRY, which took place in the beginning of 1990s.On the official political (and life) scene during the 1990s and in the first decade of the 21 century, religious symbols have been used liberally. In everyday life, casinos, brothels and new cars are consecrated, religious paraphernalia become current fashion accessories, icons are used to decorate premises of political parties, tycoons and businessmen, while images of saints entice customers from consumer goods, such as paper napkins, towels, key rings, spirits bottles, etc. Festive days, holidays, transitional and critical situations are frequently marked with mass gatherings under religious text or implications, but certainly once again using religious paraphernalia, only this time those which evoke collectivity and national unity. Thus, while in public premises it is usual to see an icon of St. Sava, the first Serbian archbishop, as well as the icon of the White Angel, a detail from the painting The myrrh-bearers on Christ's grave, at mass celebrations, but equally so at revolutionary street protest rallies (which in the capital were plentiful during the last dozen years), as well as at celebrations of town Patron Saint's days and various festivities, there appears the image of the Theotokos. Leading processional walks of the towns, it emerges as a symbol which manages to mobilise the nation with its fullness and multi-layered meaning. Political and ideological usage of Virgin Mary icons is characteristic of not only modern Serbian society. This paper also brings the review of traditional cult and respect of Virgin Mary and Her icons and their usage in secular context in previous historical periods.


Res Publica ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 293-299
Author(s):  
Christian Bovy

The State reform is at the root of a deep mutation of institutions in Wallonia.  Indeed, the regionalist trend has increased. With this renunciation of the French speakers from Brussels, the two political parties, FDF and PRL, have decided to join their efforts in order to safeguard their interests. A lot of Walloons get worried about federal Belgium Kingdom. Being anxious to demonstrate their attachment to Belgium, they organize a unitary demonstration and thus show their affection to late King Baudouin, symbol of national unity. 1993 is also theyear of "juridical affairs". With the investigations about the murder of André Cools, some socialist politicians are harassed. Misappropriation of stolen securities, corruption, murder are the headlines in the newspaper almost wholeyear.  From an economic point ofview, the province of Hainaut region highly reached by the economic crisis gets some help from the European Community being called "Objective I Europe". In the educative field, the French speaking teaching is deeply modified.


Author(s):  
Adriana Boersner

Venezuela formally democratized in 1958 after several political and social forces fought together against the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez. The evolution of this democracy was fast, partly due to the rapid economic growth and social mobility that prevailed as a result of oil wealth. In October 1958, three political parties, Acción Democrática, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente, and Unión Republicana Democrática, signed a political pact, commonly known as Punto Fijo. In this document, all political parties committed themselves to respect the results of the elections and establish a government of national unity with equitable representation of the political forces. In 1961 a new constitution consolidated the principles of the nascent representative democracy. However, over time, economic inequality, power centralism, and patronage relationships led the country to fall into an institutional crisis. After a strong devaluation of the national currency in 1983, a critical event known as Viernes Negro, and fiscal adjustments, the government proposed macroeconomic adjustments in 1989, including cuts in subsidies on domestic gasoline. This resulted in massive riots across the country. This episode is historically known as El Caracazo or El Sacudón. Amid the economic and social turmoil, a lieutenant colonel named Hugo Chávez and other military leaders launched a military coup in 1992. Although the coup was unsuccessful in removing the president from power, Chávez became known at the national level. After two years in prison and launching a political party, Hugo Chávez won the presidential election in 1998. The contemporary literature on Venezuelan politics is periodized, emphasizing the division between the pre- and post-Chávez periods. Much of the work analyzing Venezuela prior to 1998 focuses on specific issues such as the economy and oil rentierism, El Caracazo, and the characteristics of the party system. Contrary, initial accounts of Chávez’s government mostly highlight his charismatic leadership. Later works, especially after the year 2002, focus much more on the authoritarian features of Chávez regime related to, for example, autocratic legalism, the supremacy of one-party regime, the connections between the government of Venezuela and other nondemocratic leaders in the world, and attacks against media and the press. Although experts do not agree about what type of authoritarianism exists is Venezuela, or even if one can characterize the first years of Chávez’s rule as an authoritarian one, since 2013, with Nicolás Maduro as president, the authoritarian features of the Venezuelan political regime are more manifest than ever.


1992 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-145
Author(s):  
Sheldon Maram

Brazilian specialists have long recognised the importance of the 1960 presidential elections, which set in motion a process that culminated in a 21—year military dictatorship. Only in 1989 did Brazilians witness once again the direct election of a president. Nonetheless, scholarly literature on this event is sparse and often tends toward the ahistorical view that the election of Jânio Quadros in 1960 was part of an inexorable process. Almost entirely ignored are the reasons why Brazil's largest political party, the Partido Social Democrático or PSD, nominated for president a weak candidate, Marshal of the Brazilian Army Henrique Teixeira Lott.1Clearly, Lott himself was not part of a praetorian guard that imposed his candidacy. Indeed, the Marshal was a reluctant candidate, who offered to withdraw in October 1959 in favour of a ‘national unity candidate’.2 In my view Lott's nomination had much more to do with a complex series of manoeuvres carried out by Brazil's president Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–61) than with his own actions. For Kubitschek, the political parties and presidential aspirants in 1960 were merely pawns in his highly personalistic vision of the political process. Constitutionally barred from seeking immediate re—election, Kubitschek initially manoeuvred to induce his party, the PSD, not to run its own presidential candidate. When this effort failed, he displayed, at the very least, ambivalence regarding the fate of the party's candidate.An analysis of Kubitschek's actions and motivations presents methodological challenges to the historian. Historians traditionally rely heavily on written documentation to support their analysis of actions and motivations.


1975 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Jenson

In a recent article in this Journal, Paul M. Sniderman, H. D. Forbes, and Ian Melzer challenge the proponents of what they characterize as the “textbook theory” of Canadian parties. They claim that their examination of the 1965 and 1968 Canadian national election studies contradicts the conclusions of almost every analyst of parties and voting in Canada. While a little debunking of long-held interpretations is always valuable in any discipline, one should exercise caution. Conventional wisdom does not usually acquire that status without containing at least some small measure of validity. In this case I must conclude that more confusion has been created than has been cleared away and previous analysts should not be considered to have erred quite as much as the authors of this article would like us to believe. Sniderman et al. argue that, because of “an obsession with national unity” on the part of political parties and a fear of fragmentation which produces undifferentiated politics of accommodation, “Canadian voters tend to lack strong loyalties to the older parties, at least when compared to the Americans and the British. As a consequence, electoral support for the older parties in Canada tends to be unstable.”The first part of this proposition asserts that concern with national unity necessarily produces such similar policy positions that parties are interchangeable, being distinguished only by their leadership. Although this is an interesting proposition, it will not be dealt with here.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 739-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Crowther

Over the course of the past ten years the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for national Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) has progressively extended its control over Macedonian political, social, and economic life, restricting the space for democratic discourse and limiting completion. Throughout this period it has acted in concert with elites representing the country’s Albanian minority and has included Albanian political parties, currently the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) as minority coalition partners. This article will examine the conditions that gave rise to illiberalism in Macedonia and the interaction between ethnic politics and the retreat from democracy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (02) ◽  
pp. 45-60
Author(s):  
Muqaddas Khan

Emergence of Islamic State (IS) in Iraq has forged havoc in country. Unlike other radicalist groups, IS is the product of socio-political and institutional nuisance, rather to be ignited by ethno-religious fracas. This paper is aimed to analyse the relationship between state institutions and society; how weak state institutions facilitate the genesis of insurgency; and how the institutional malaise created grounds for insurgency to infiltrate in Iraq? The American intervention of Iraq eroded the state vital institutions. Henceforth, the democratic transition under Maliki’s administration, despite of establishing national unity, hatched ethno-sectarian cleavage in society. Maliki’s proclivities of centralization and immature culture of political parties in running the affairs of parliament alienated the Sunni community in Iraq. Moreover, the American perception of Sunni community under Saddam Hussein further inflamed the communal discord. Such bias culminated mass exodus on the pattern of communal and sectarian bases from Bagdad to other regions of the country. Once, the ground was set for resentment against other sects, ethnicities and state, then it was easy for radicalist groups to exploit the deprived communities accordingly.


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