Wert und moralischer Wert bei Kant*

2021 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 406-432
Author(s):  
Stephan Zimmermann

Talk of value can be documented in various of Kant's writings. It sometimes appears frequently, and some of the basic concepts of Kant's moral philosophy are even sometimes explained with the help of the concept of a moral value. The paper examines the question what this talk means. Kant himself does not make this an issue, and even the secondary literature has so far hardly investi- gated what he understands by a value as such. From there, it is then possible to develop the meaning that talk of a moral value must have. Neither does Kant address this issue, and the secondary literature has hardly approached the talk of a special value, namely the moral one, from Kant's general understanding of value, although this provides deep insights.

Author(s):  
Robert Guay

Schopenhauer claims that his understanding of morality identifies and preserves its essential content as it is shared among various philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions. Indeed, he seems to argue that only by rooting moral value, virtue, and responsibility as he does in compassion and beneficence can a satisfactory account of morality be given. At the same time, however, Schopenhauer also insists that no prescriptive account of morality can be given: the very idea of a moral rule is spurious, and morality can only be approached from a theoretical perspective. In this chapter, the author argues that Schopenhauer reconciles this tension between conventional and revisionist strands by justifying morality as the appropriate form of responsiveness to the intrinsic senselessness of existence. Morality, then, is not a rational or strategic pursuit but an expression of the correct attitude toward the unavailability of any sensible pursuit; it is practical insofar as it needs to be sustained in order to express the appreciation of metaphysical truth. The author then addresses three sets of issues: why compassion is a superior form of responsiveness to indifference or arbitrariness, the extent to which this account preserves the content of morality as conventionally understood, and the extent to which this account enables Schopenhauer to address objections regarding the distinctness of persons, the importance of phenomenal concerns, and the possibility of agency.


Author(s):  
Neera K. Badhwar

Philosophical interest in friendship has revived after a long eclipse. This is due largely to a renewed interest in ancient moral philosophy, in the role of emotion in morality, and in the ethical dimensions of personal relations in general. Questions about friendship are concerned with issues such as whether it is only an instrumental value (a means to other values), or also an intrinsic value – a value in its own right; whether it is a mark of psychological and moral self-sufficiency, or rather of deficiency; and how friendship-love differs from the unconditional love of agapē. Other issues at stake include how – if at all – friendship is related to justice; whether the particularist, partialist perspective of friendship can be reconciled with the universalist, impartialist perspective of morality; and whether friendship is morally neutral.


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jenny Jones ◽  
Petra Strube ◽  
Marion Mitchell ◽  
Amanda Henderson

Background: Compassion, understood as empathy for another who is experiencing physical, mental, emotional and/or spiritual suffering, is an essential element of our shared understandings of nursing and the constitution of the professional nurse. Theoretical foundation: Charles Taylor account of ethics which concerns ‘what or who is it good to be’ rather than the predominant analytical moral philosophy approach which concentrates on ‘what ought one to do’ is the core concern of this discussion. An ontological appreciation of our shared human condition is the premise upon which the discussion is based. Discussion: This article proposes that concept by opening a dialogical space, nurses can engage in reflection and sense making wherein they explore individually and collectively the conflicts and confusions encountered in their day-to-day work. Through their dialogues, nurses – individually and collectively – orient and reorient themselves and each other towards what they see as meaningful and purposeful in their lives and in doing so they are well positioned to reaffirm their commitment to compassion as a value which both anchors and orients their day-to-day work. Implications: The provision of opportunities in the workplace, in the form of dialogue, to articulate often unspoken assumptions and frameworks in which nursing work is carried out can not only initiate the building of pathways of support but also assist nurses reaffirm their compassion – arguably the essence of their nursing practice.


Dialogue ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-236
Author(s):  
Anthony Cunningham

Any good ethical theory aspires to provide as comprehensive a guide to moral value and motivation as possible. Within modern moral philosophy, conceptions of moral value have been dominated largely by considerations of justice and concerns for the common good, and moral shortcomings have been accounted for primarily by appeal to ignorance, weakness, indifference or outright hostility to moral values. Yet the ways in which we fall short are far more complicated. By discussing one interesting example here, I hope to provide some support for the claim that our conceptions of moral value and motivation need enrichment. In making my case, I utilize a character who is more like a caricature than a figure from ordinary life. This touch of hyperbole is deliberate. Reflect for a moment on the function of a good cartoon caricature. By exaggerating physical features, it draws our attention to characteristics that go unnoticed in their normal context. Whereas cartoon caricatures aim at amusement, my goal is to distil some of our perceptions of moral excellence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-61
Author(s):  
Muhammad Yusril Ihza Mahendra ◽  
Dina Amelia

Moral Value is a value that affects individual and social behavior in behaving. The current study aimedto find the categories of moral values that John Green tries to convey in The Fault in Our Stars noveland to interpret its meaning by using the theory of Universal Moral Values by Kinnier et. al with fourmajor moral values. To be able to understand moral values in the story without misinterpretation andthe lessons can be applied in real life. This study used the qualitative method because it focuses ondescribing and interpreting the moral values in descriptive. The primary source of data is taken fromthe novel The Fault in Our Stars in the form of narrations and the secondary data is from previousstudies in the form of statements that comes from the study findings. The results of the current studyshow that the categories of moral values found in the novel are (1) Commitment to something greaterthan oneself, (2) Self-respect, but with humility, self-discipline, and acceptance of personalresponsibility, and (3) Respect and caring for others, while the moral value that is not found is (4)Caring for other living things and environment which indicates that John Green inserted moral valuesin the novel more about the personal lives of the characters and the relationships between them, whichto civilize it, readers, to have the moral as an individual, being good to other people and to believe tosomething greater.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73
Author(s):  
Solomiia Khorob

The purposeof the article is to interpret the main determinants of the literary discussion of 1925–1928 years in the development of Ukrainian journalism during the XXth –early XXIst centuries.Research methodsthat enablethe implementation of the purpose and objectives: cultural-historical, comparative and hermeneutic, as well as the method of receptive aesthetics.Results and discussion. The article examines the ways of transformation of key provisions from the pamphletsof Mykola Khvylovyi in the journalistic activity of the scientist Yurii Sherekh, the writer Oksana Zabuzhko and the theater director Vlad Troiitskyi. Ideas such as “psychological Europe”, “Asian renaissance” and “romance of vitalism” are taken into account.It is proved that the concept of “psychological Europe” is significantly transformed in the works of Yurii Sherekh and Oksana Zabuzhko. Unlike Mykola Khvylovyi, the diaspora scholar notes the impossibility of such a value orientation, because provincialism as a central set of Ukrainians (according to Yurii Sherekh), in fact denies this possibility.It is noted that Oksana Zabuzhko, on the other hand, continues to develop this determinant in her essays, agreeing with the pamphleteer, but in modern coordinates it is necessary to focus on psychological America, not Europe. Thus, two interpretive views on this concept are traced and substantiated that is complete denial and rewriting of the idea.The comprehension of “Asian Renaissance” and the “romance of vitalism” determinants is interpreted through skepticism and the impossibility of these processes (Yurii Sherekh), through the addition of the concept –“Afro-Asian Renaissance” –to the unconscious support and relevance of the idea in modern Ukrainian processes.Conclusions.The study confirms the development and longevity of the concepts that are implemented in journalism, because chronologically the article covered materials written in different periods –from the first decades of the twentieth century tothe first decades of the twenty-first century.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 375-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Jackendoff

AbstractA system of values plays an important intermediary role in the human conceptual system. An individual associates a value – an abstract valence and quantity – with a past, present, or contemplated object or action in the environment, and uses values to help determine what actions to take. Value can be categorized into a number of different types, the most important of which for the purposes of the present article are affective value (how good the action is for someone), normative value (how good the action is of someone), and esteem (how good a reputation someone has). Normative value in turn divides into several subdomains such as moral value, legality, etiquette, and religious value. In addition, values can be divided along the orthogonal dimension of objective (value tout court) versus subjective (value in the eyes of a particular person). Each type of value plays its own characteristic role in affecting choice of action in interaction with the others.Given an explicit formulation of systems of value, it then becomes possible to work out more precise accounts of value-laden systems of concepts. Two are explored here: fairness and freely chosen reciprocity, the latter including retaliation, restitution, honoring, shaming, and apologizing.The overall hypothesis that emerges from the investigation is that the basic categories of value and the inference rules built on them are human universals. Cultures' value systems differ primarily in (a) what actions and objects are assigned what values and (b) the relative weighting of different sources of value in cases where they interact.


Author(s):  
I.V. Tkachenko ◽  
E.V. Evdokimova ◽  
K.Yu. Komarova ◽  
L.G. Lisitskaya

The work is aimed at studying the psychological conditions of formation at the subjective level in adolescence of an emotionally positive accepting attitude toward the role of mother. The authors conducted a theoretical and empirical study aimed at exploring the relationship between the perceptions of the phenomenon of motherhood, adolescents’ relationships with their parents, and their attitudes toward their personality. Respondents aged 13-16 years of boarding school №1 “Cossack” of Armavir took part in the study. For the empirical study methods were used: “Perceptions of the ideal parent” (R.V. Ovcharova); PARI technique — “Parent-Child Relations” (E.S. Schaefer, R.K. Bell); Test-questionnaire of self-relation (V.V. Stolin, S.R. Panteleev). The results of the study allow us to state that there is a significant inverse relationship between the excessive emotional distance between parents and their child and the cognitive indicator of ideas about motherhood in boarding school students (-0.248). A similar relationship exists between parents’ excessive emotional distance from their child and their self-acceptance (-0.306), that is, the higher the distance, the lower the adolescent’s self-acceptance. It was proved that the child’s self-acceptance and his or her ideas about an ideal mother are interdependent factors (0, 281). Theoretical analysis of psychological research confirmed that the acceptance of motherhood as a special value is in close connection with the awareness of the meaning of one’s life and varies in its defined value depending on the internal position, experience of intrafamily relationships, internalized benchmarks and ideals. The results of the study formed the basis of the model of formation of the value attitude towards motherhood among students.


Author(s):  
J Verschuuren

In this article, “things” lawyers call “principles” of environmental law will be discussed from a theoretical perspective. Three fundamental questions are answered: 1. Where does the high moral value that is usually attributed principles come from? 2. What is the exact difference between a principle and a legal rule, and between a principle and a policy? 3. What is the relationship between a principle and more concrete legal rules and policies?   It is argued that principles of environmental law receive their high moral value from the ideal of sustainable development. An ideal is a value that is explicit, implicit or latent in the law, or the public and moral culture of a society or group that usually cannot be fully realised, and that partly transcends contingent, historical formulations, and implementations in terms of rules and principles. Principles form a necessary link between directly applicable and enforceable environmental legal rules and the underlying ideal. They are a necessary medium for ideals to find their way into concrete rules and can be used to bridge the gap between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration.   Because of their basis in (written or unwritten) law and their possible direct and intense influence on legal rules concerning activities that may harm the environment, they must be placed within the morality of duty: a bridgehead within the morality of duty reaching out for the morality of aspiration. From the general function of principles of forming a beachhead in the morality of duty, nine more concrete functions can be derived. These functions principles, both of a substantive and of a procedural nature, have, make it possible to distinguish them from legal rules. 


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