Game Analysis on Profits of Water Diversion Project Supply Chain Under the Overall Loss of Supply Chain in Undeveloped Areas
This paper compares and analyzes the effects of different amounts of government subsidies and subsidy patterns on water supply, pricing, and profit distribution, and takes water diversion project supply chain composed of water transfer company and the water work as the study object, using financial accounting method innovatively, establishing non-cooperative and cooperative game models of two under government subsidies. The results show that as the number of subsidies increased, the optimal amount of water supply and the profits increased, but the price of water work decreased. When the amount of subsidy stays same, the price of water plant also stays same. However, the price of the water transfer company is constantly changing, the higher the proportion of subsidies it received, the lower the price. In terms of data, the authors take a practical example – the Tao River Water Diversion Project to analyze. This paper’s limitation is that the conclusion is based on a single water transfer company and a single water plant as the research object. However, the actual situation of the water transfer project is that a water transfer company faces a complex supply chain network formed by many water plants and farmers’ water users’ associations.