scholarly journals Singapore and the Arctic: Is the Gibraltar of the East Going to Materialize its Geopolitical Ambitions?

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Viguier

The Arctic is becoming the new place to be for states, companies and academics, as the ice retreat is uncovering new strategic and geopolitical stakes. Arctic sates have already updated their Arctic policies, including their geopolitical stakes and Asian states with an Observer status to the Arctic Council are following the trend, but few of them don’t have an Arctic policy yet, Singapore being one of them. Highly participative within the Arctic Council’s working groups and building a strong cooperation, Singapore still remains mysterious in its approach. Then, what are the Gibraltar of the East’s geopolitical ambitions in the Arctic?

Polar Record ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Koivurova ◽  
Kai Kokko ◽  
Sebastien Duyck ◽  
Nikolas Sellheim ◽  
Adam Stepien

ABSTRACTThe European Union's (EU's) intention of becoming a permanent observer in the Arctic Council and the reluctance of Arctic actors to grant it that status have made the union's aspirations in the Arctic the subject of a continuing debate. The discussion appears to be dominated by geographical considerations and the EU's gradually emerging Arctic policy. This article puts forward a different view of the EU's presence in the region, one drawing on an analysis of relevant EU competences. As a complex international actor, the EU has acquired a broad array of decision-making powers from its member states, powers that partly extend to Iceland and Norway via the EEA Agreement. Moreover, the EU has in many cases become a relevant actor in international negotiations and treaty making processes the outcomes of which are of crucial importance for the governance of the Arctic. Our argument in the third and concluding section is that only by including the EU in Arctic governance can the international community provide better prospects for the union to sensitise its policies and discourses to the Arctic realities and for other Arctic actors to understand how the union functions. This argument is supported by an analysis of the EU's restrictions on the import of seal products and the ensuing litigation.


Author(s):  
Nikolay Kotlyarov

In recent years, the international expert community has demonstrated a growing interest in China's Arctic policy. To a great extent, such an interest has been triggered by recent gaining an observer status in the Arctic Council by China, as well as by China's efforts to actively participate in elaborating the rules of global governance. China has a range of interests in the Arctic, including climate change problems, opportunities for energy diversification, and development of the Northern Sea Route. Among Russian experts, the discussion on the desirability of cooperation with China has lately shifted towards the acknowledging the need to strengthen Russia-China strategic partnership in the Arctic, particularly in the context of worsening relations between Russia and Western countries. The chapter addresses recent trends in Russia's and China's attitudes to bilateral cooperation in the Arctic and analyzes experts' approaches to the settlement of disputes, including such issues as the legal regime of the Arctic and the development of navigation along the Northern Sea Route.


2020 ◽  
pp. 73-77
Author(s):  
T.S. Sukhodaeva ◽  

The article discusses the features of the Arctic zone, its place in the world economy and international relations. The reasons for the intersection of the geopolitical interests of the leading states of the world in this region are revealed. The main directions of scientific and technical cooperation in the development of the Arctic are identified. The role of the Arctic Council in solving the problem of coordinating the interests of various actors in the region is shown. The strategic necessity of the development of the Arctic as a region free of conflicts and rivalry is substantiated. The analysis of the Russian Arctic policy and mechanisms for its implementation. The author substantiates the conclusion that the development of the Russian Arctic zone can become a driving force for the qualitative growth of the national economy, the formation of the country's competitive advantages in the long term, as well as maintaining the global ecological balance and stability.


Author(s):  
Ya. V. Leksyutina ◽  

Since 2013, when the Republic of Korea (ROK) was admitted in the Arctic Council as an observer and issued its first Arctic policy, Seoul has strengthened its engagement in the Arctic and revealed its strong interest in expanding the economic cooperation in the Arctic with Russia. Seeing Arctic cooperation as mutually beneficial and further advancing the bilateral relations, Russia and the ROK have made a number of policy statements on their intentions to develop cooperation in the Arctic. This paper reveals the specifics and current scale of Russia’s cooperation with the ROK in the development of the resource base of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and the Northern Sea Route.


Author(s):  
Nikita Lipunov

The goal of US Arctic policy today is to consolidate its status as an Arctic power. To that end, the Biden administration has reshuffled personnel and institutions, stepped up the fight against climate change, initiated infrastructure projects in Alaska, and emphasised multilateral cooperation, including through NATO and the Arctic Council. The White House is not interested in excessive confrontation with Russia in the region and recognises the need for clear 'rules of the game' in the Arctic.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-318
Author(s):  
Alexander N. Vylegzhanin ◽  
◽  
Elena V. Kienko ◽  

The article, in the context of the contemporary status of the Arctic, examines the legal and political documents adopted by China, Japan and South Korea in regard to their arctic policy, including those agreed upon by these three States. The alarming reaction to such documents in the Arctic coastal states, firstly, in the USA and Canada, is also considered in the article. Relevant western scholars’ arguments are scrutinized, such as the increase of “China’s military power”; China’s “insatiable appetite” for access to natural resources in the Arctic; the argument that “China seeks to dominate” the Arctic and the situation when “the Arctic Council is split”; the notion that China makes other non-Arctic States create separate legal documents concerning the regime of the Arctic Ocean. The article concludes that the western interpretation of such documents is alarming only in relation to China. The research shows that up till now there are no grounds for such estimations of China’s negative role. However, statements by Chinese officials as cited in the article and some provisions stipulated in “China’s Arctic policy” contradict the common will of the Arctic coastal states in regard to the legal regime of the Arctic Ocean as reflected in the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008. In such a dynamic legal environment, new instruments of collaboration are in demand, which might involve China and other non-Arctic states in maintaining the established legal regime of the Arctic. Thus, the new instruments would deter the creation (with unpredictable consequences) by China, Japan and South Korea of new trilateral acts relating to the status of the Arctic.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 328-348
Author(s):  
Romain Chuffart ◽  
Sakiko Hataya ◽  
Osamu Inagaki ◽  
Lindsay Arthur

As Japan is considered a non-regional actor in Arctic governance, this paper begins with analysing how Japan navigates the web of Arctic governance and how it manages to create a coherent Arctic narrative and engages with the Arctic both inside and outside the region. The present research argues that the construction of an Arctic identity is a praxis performed through time that needs to be constantly reaffirmed. To illustrate this point, the paper then uses a lateral rather than linear approach to assess the influence of the Arctic on Japan at present. This paper assesses Japan’s engagement on the main stage where Arctic governance is performed (i.e. The Arctic Council) since the release of Japan’s Arctic Policy and under the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability project, Japan’s flagship program for Arctic research. Looking to the future, countries such as Japan who are willing to be involved in all parts of Arctic governance will have to make a choice about what kind of Arctic relationships they want to create and in which of these relationships Japan could invest more.


2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 52-62
Author(s):  
X. Guangmiao

With a brief history review of China’s participation in the 20th century Arctic activities, the article discusses basic directions of China’s Arctic interests in the 21th century, examines their legal grounds and mechanisms for their pursuit. Considering China‘s Arctic interests related to climate change, economic, scientific and political activities, the author emphasizes that the latter primarily serve its desire for a better understanding of climate change dynamics and economic interest. While elaborating on legal issues, the author also admits the existence of legal disputes that impede the pursuit of Chinese interests. Furthermore, when introducing the mechanisms for China’s Arctic interests pursuit as a complex which can be achieved in governmental, academic and commercial aspects, the obstructive practical factors in the process of implementation, and the shortcomings of the according mechanisms are discussed. Attempting to analyze the perspective and summarize the basic position of Chinese government on the present issue, the author adopts the methods of history research, document research, interdisciplinary research and comparison, and draws the conclusion that, as a non-Arctic state, China does not regard Arctic as a foreign policy priority and raises no claims in the region. China shows respect to the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Arctic countries, while insisting that non-Arctic states should also exercise the right of scientific research and navigation. To develop a partnership of cooperation, Arctic and non-Arctic states should recognize and respect each other's rights under the international law. China endorses UNCLOS to be the main legal instrument of the Arctic Governance and considers the Arctic Council as the most influential international forum promoting the development of Arctic Governance and cooperation. Unprepared as China has been to form its official Arctic policy, it will continue to actively participate in all aspects of the governance and cooperation in the region.


Polar Record ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (6) ◽  
pp. 672-679 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marzia Scopelliti ◽  
Elena Conde Pérez

ABSTRACTIn recent years, radical changes such as rapid warming and ice retreat have become evident in the Arctic region, as recognised by the scientific community, as well as Arctic and non-Arctic states. Against this background, where the Arctic is accumulating economic importance and geopolitical significance for Arctic states and international stakeholders, the main regional actors have engaged in increased cooperation efforts, which is in contrast to the often invoked talk about an imminent conflict or ‘race for resources in the region’. At the same time, modernisation and expansion of military activities and capabilities have been pursued by several Arctic states. While these measures cannot be exclusively attributed to a militarisation of the Arctic and require further discussion, a misperception of such actions may result in the destabilisation of regional cooperation efforts. Furthermore, when considered in a broader context, possible threats to peaceful coexistence in the Arctic are more likely to arise from the present global situation. For example, the invasion of Ukraine has provoked a partial shift in regional cooperation and an uncontrolled spillover effect of the conflict between Russia and Western countries could disrupt regional stability. Drawing on the perspective of International Relations (IR) literature, and considering the absence of a regional institution devoted to security issues, this article highlights the importance of adopting confidence- and security-building measures among all relevant actors in order to create a forum for the discussion of ‘hard’ security topics, to prevent any destabilising effect on Arctic cooperation and security. Such measures may be promoted within existing fora, primarily the Arctic Council.


Polar Record ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svein Vigeland Rottem

Abstract The Arctic Contaminants Action Programme (ACAP), originally intended to follow up the work of AMAP (the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme) on identifying the sources of pollution, became an official working group under the Arctic Council in 2006. ACAP has focussed on pollution from Russian sources, the main objective being to accelerate the reduction of national emissions of various environmental pollutants and climate forcers. Basically, ACAP initiates projects with a scientific basis in AMAP assessments of the health of the Arctic. The idea behind the creation of ACAP was to channel the work of the Arctic Council in a more practical direction and to improve the use of the knowledge produced by AMAP. ACAP is one of only two Council working groups not to have been specifically evaluated and analysed by external bodies and academics. This article undertakes a critical analysis of ACAP and argues that there are great potentials for improving its work. ACAP has established a forum where it has been possible to facilitate pilot projects aimed at limiting harmful emissions; this work should be strengthened.


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