Law and Prosocial Behavior

2014 ◽  
pp. 194-212
Author(s):  
Lynn Stout
Keyword(s):  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Empirical Reality ◽  
The Social ◽  
Experimental Games

This chapter examines the relevance of prosocial behavior to law. It begins by tracing the history of the homo economicus model of human behavior, its role in contemporary behavioral law and economics, and why the concept of utility does not solve the problem of the model. It then looks at the emergence of a behavioral economics approach to human behavior that incorporates the empirical reality of prosociality without undermining the predictive power of economic analysis. It also discusses the empirical methodology known as experimental gaming, focusing on the application of three experimental games—the social dilemma game, dictator game, and ultimatum game—to study when and how people will act prosocially. In particular, the article considers three basic lessons about human behavior offered by the social dilemma game, ultimatum game, and dictator game. In addition, it explores how prosocial behavior influences regulation, negligence rules, and contracting, along with corporate law. The chapter concludes by stressing the value of incorporating prosocial behavior into the analysis of legal and policy problems.

scholarly journals The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Seier
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Other Regarding

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games.

scholarly journals Do Economists Punish Less?

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Jonas Kaiser ◽  
Kasper Pedersen ◽  
Alexander Koch
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
The Public ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
The Social ◽  
Economics Students

A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social order and for sustaining the provision of public goods. We study the decision whether to engage in costly punishment of a free rider in a survey-based experiment with 1423 students from seven study areas in the social sciences, as well as medicine at Aarhus University, Denmark. Using a dictator game and a social dilemma game, that captures essential features of the public goods game, we replicate previous findings that economics students give significantly less than students from other disciplines. However, when subjects decide whether or not to punish a free rider, we find that economics students are just as likely to punish as students from other disciplines.

scholarly journals THE EVOLUTION OF HOMO ECONOMICUS

2016 ◽  
pp. 129-142
Author(s):  
N. V. Komarovskaia
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Economic Research ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Economic Decision Making

The article provides a review of the ways in which interdisciplinary research in modern economic thought gives a more realistic understanding of human behavior and economic decision making. On the one hand, economic imperialism drove wider application of economics methods across social sciences and brought about new interdisciplinary fields, such as law and economics, economic sociology, public choice theory, etc. On the other hand, the origin of behavioral economics, experimental economics, and neuroeconomics bridging psychology, neurobiology, and economics influences the change in the methodology used by the economics itself and fuels transformation of the model of rational economic behavior 'homo economicus', one of the central assumptions of the neoclassical economics. George Akerlof and Robert Shiller's animal spirits, prospect theory of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, research by Amartya Sen, Daniel McFadden, Vernon Smith, and other economists focusing on decision making either significantly limit, or supplement the homo economicus concept providing a deeper insight into the nature of human rationality. Behavioral economics has already become so strong as a separate discipline that it can be classified into two streams - Classical and Modern, and its main principles should be incorporated into a basic course of traditional economics. The achievements of behavioral economics yield higher quality of economic research and forecasting. Interdisciplinary approach to the human behavior studies and transformation of homo economicus offer new tools for the development policy making.

The Social Development Model

2018 ◽  
pp. 223-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Cambron ◽  
Richard F. Catalano ◽  
J. David Hawkins
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Social Development ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Development Model ◽  
Antisocial Behaviors ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Social Development Model ◽  
The Social ◽  
Empirical Tests

This chapter presents an overview of the social development model (SDM)—a general theory of human behavior that integrates research on risk and protective factors into a coherent model. The goal of this synthesis is to provide more explanatory power than its component theories. This chapter first specifies the model constructs and their hypothesized relationships to prosocial and antisocial behaviors. It then provides a synthesis of what has been learned from empirical tests of social development hypotheses for predicting pro- and antisocial behaviors. This chapter also highlights interventions derived from the SDM and summarizes their impact on pro- and antisocial behaviors. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting future directions for SDM-based research.

THE EARLY MODERN ORIGINS OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-54
Author(s):  
Richard Boyd
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Francis Bacon ◽  
Economic Rationality ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Behavioral Psychology ◽  
Human Conduct ◽  
The Social

AbstractFor all the recent discoveries of behavioral psychology and experimental economics, the spirit of homo economicus still dominates the contemporary disciplines of economics, political science, and sociology. Turning back to the earliest chapters of political economy, however, reveals that pioneering figures such as Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and Adam Smith were hardly apostles of economic rationality as they are often portrayed in influential narratives of the development of the social sciences. As we will see, while all three of these thinkers can plausibly be read as endorsing “rationality,” they were also well aware of the systematic irrationality of human conduct, including a remarkable number of the cognitive biases later “discovered” by contemporary behavioral economists. Building on these insights I offer modest suggestions for how these thinkers, properly understood, might carry the behavioral revolution in different directions than those heretofore suggested.

scholarly journals Comparing mind perception in strategic exchanges: human-agent negotiation, dictator and ultimatum games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minha Lee ◽  
Gale Lucas ◽  
Jonathan Gratch
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Social Actors ◽  
Ultimatum Games ◽  
Mind Perception ◽  
Cognitive Aptitude ◽  
Negotiation Agents ◽  
Emotional Capacity

AbstractRecent research shows that how we respond to other social actors depends on what sort of mind we ascribe to them. In a comparative manner, we observed how perceived minds of agents shape people’s behavior in the dictator game, ultimatum game, and negotiation against artificial agents. To do so, we varied agents’ minds on two dimensions of the mind perception theory: agency (cognitive aptitude) and patiency (affective aptitude) via descriptions and dialogs. In our first study, agents with emotional capacity garnered more allocations in the dictator game, but in the ultimatum game, agents’ described agency and affective capacity, both led to greater offers. In the second study on negotiation, agents ascribed with low-agency traits earned more points than those with high-agency traits, though the negotiation tactic was the same for all agents. Although patiency did not impact game points, participants sent more happy and surprise emojis and emotionally valenced messages to agents that demonstrated emotional capacity during negotiations. Further, our exploratory analyses indicate that people related only to agents with perceived affective aptitude across all games. Both perceived agency and affective capacity contributed to moral standing after dictator and ultimatum games. But after negotiations, only agents with perceived affective capacity were granted moral standing. Manipulating mind dimensions of machines has differing effects on how people react to them in dictator and ultimatum games, compared to a more complex economic exchange like negotiation. We discuss these results, which show that agents are perceived not only as social actors, but as intentional actors through negotiations, in contrast with simple economic games.

scholarly journals Ethical dilemmas are really important to potential adopters of autonomous vehicles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tripat Gill
Keyword(s):  
Autonomous Vehicles ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Innovation Adoption ◽  
Preliminary Evidence ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Early Adopters ◽  
The Social ◽  
Legal And Ethical Issues ◽  
Theoretical Standpoint

AbstractThe ethical dilemma (ED) of whether autonomous vehicles (AVs) should protect the passengers or pedestrians when harm is unavoidable has been widely researched and debated. Several behavioral scientists have sought public opinion on this issue, based on the premise that EDs are critical to resolve for AV adoption. However, many scholars and industry participants have downplayed the importance of these edge cases. Policy makers also advocate a focus on higher level ethical principles rather than on a specific solution to EDs. But conspicuously absent from this debate is the view of the consumers or potential adopters, who will be instrumental to the success of AVs. The current research investigated this issue both from a theoretical standpoint and through empirical research. The literature on innovation adoption and risk perception suggests that EDs will be heavily weighted by potential adopters of AVs. Two studies conducted with a broad sample of consumers verified this assertion. The results from these studies showed that people associated EDs with the highest risk and considered EDs as the most important issue to address as compared to the other technical, legal and ethical issues facing AVs. As such, EDs need to be addressed to ensure robustness in the design of AVs and to assure consumers of the safety of this promising technology. Some preliminary evidence is provided about interventions to resolve the social dilemma in EDs and about the ethical preferences of prospective early adopters of AVs.

scholarly journals Contextualised strong reciprocity explains selfless cooperation despite selfish intuitions and weak social heuristics

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan Isler ◽  
Simon Gächter ◽  
A. John Maule ◽  
Chris Starmer
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemma ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Strong Reciprocity ◽  
Time Patterns ◽  
The Social ◽  
Primary Driver ◽  
Collective Benefit ◽  
Research And Policy

AbstractHumans frequently cooperate for collective benefit, even in one-shot social dilemmas. This provides a challenge for theories of cooperation. Two views focus on intuitions but offer conflicting explanations. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis argues that people with selfish preferences rely on cooperative intuitions and predicts that deliberation reduces cooperation. The Self-Control Account emphasizes control over selfish intuitions and is consistent with strong reciprocity—a preference for conditional cooperation in one-shot dilemmas. Here, we reconcile these explanations with each other as well as with strong reciprocity. We study one-shot cooperation across two main dilemma contexts, provision and maintenance, and show that cooperation is higher in provision than maintenance. Using time-limit manipulations, we experimentally study the cognitive processes underlying this robust result. Supporting the Self-Control Account, people are intuitively selfish in maintenance, with deliberation increasing cooperation. In contrast, consistent with the Social Heuristics Hypothesis, deliberation tends to increase the likelihood of free-riding in provision. Contextual differences between maintenance and provision are observed across additional measures: reaction time patterns of cooperation; social dilemma understanding; perceptions of social appropriateness; beliefs about others’ cooperation; and cooperation preferences. Despite these dilemma-specific asymmetries, we show that preferences, coupled with beliefs, successfully predict the high levels of cooperation in both maintenance and provision dilemmas. While the effects of intuitions are context-dependent and small, the widespread preference for strong reciprocity is the primary driver of one-shot cooperation. We advance the Contextualised Strong Reciprocity account as a unifying framework and consider its implications for research and policy.

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