A Novel Two-Stage Game Model for Pricing Cloud/Fog Computing Resource in Blockchain Systems

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinmian Chen ◽  
Yukun Cheng ◽  
Zhiqi Xu
Keyword(s):  
Fog Computing ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stage Ii ◽  
Game Model ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Dynamic Interactions ◽  
Computing Resource ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Stage Game

Cloud/fog computing resource pricing is a new paradigm in the blockchain mining scheme, as the participants would like to purchase the cloud/fog computing resource to speed up their mining processes. In this paper, we propose a novel two-stage game to study the optimal price-based cloud/fog computing resource management, in which the cloud/fog computing resource provider (CFP) is the leader, setting the resource price in Stage I, and the mining pools act as the followers to decide their demands of the resource in Stage II. Since mining pools are bounded rational in practice, we model the dynamic interactions among them by an evolutionary game in Stage II, in which each pool pursues its evolutionary stable demand based on the observed price, through continuous learning and adjustments. Backward induction method is applied to analyze the sub-game equilibrium in each stage. Specifically in Stage II, we first build a general study framework for the evolutionary game model, and then provide a detailed theoretical analysis for a two-pool case to characterize the conditions for the existence of different evolutionary stable solutions. Referring to the real world, we conduct a series of numerical experiments, whose results validate our theoretical findings for the case of two mining pools. Additionally, the impacts from the size of mining block, the unit transaction fee and the price of token on the decision makings of participants are also discussed.

scholarly journals Marketing Resource Allocation Strategy Optimization Based on Dynamic Game Model

2022 ◽  
Vol 2022 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yan Long ◽  
Hongshan Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Nonlinear Dynamics ◽  
Network Model ◽  
Data Transmission ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Transmission Model ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Cooperative Solution ◽  
Subgame Consistency ◽  
Stage Game

Game theory has become an important tool to study the competition between oligopolistic enterprises. After combing the existing literature, it is found that there is no research combining two-stage game and nonlinear dynamics to analyze the competition between enterprises for advertising. Therefore, this paper establishes a two-stage game model to discuss the effect of the degree of firms’ advertising input on their profits. And the complexity of the system is analyzed using nonlinear dynamics. This paper analyzes and studies the dynamic game for two types of application network models: data transmission model and transportation network model. Under the time-gap ALOHA protocol, the noncooperative behavior of the insiders in the dynamic data transmission stochastic game is examined as well as the cooperative behavior. In this paper, the existence of Nash equilibrium and its solution algorithm are proved in the noncooperative case, and the “subgame consistency” of the cooperative solution (Shapley value) is discussed in the cooperative case, and the cooperative solution satisfying the subgame consistency is obtained by constructing the “allocation compensation procedure.” The cooperative solution is obtained by constructing the “allocation compensation procedure” to satisfy the subgame consistency. In this paper, we propose to classify the packets transmitted by the source nodes, and by changing the strategy of the source nodes at the states with different kinds of packets, we find that the equilibrium payment of the insider increases in the noncooperative game with the addition of the “wait” strategy. In the transportation dynamic network model, the problem of passenger flow distribution and the selection of service parameters of transportation companies are also studied, and a two-stage game theoretical model is proposed to solve the equilibrium price and optimal parameters under Wardrop’s criterion.

scholarly journals Evaluating the Minor Coarse Cereals Product Crowdfunding Platform through Evolutionary Game Analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 1299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Yu ◽  
Muhammad Hafeez ◽  
Lihan Liu ◽  
Muhammad Tariq Mahmood ◽  
Hong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Relative Price ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Price Difference ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Advance Payment ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
The Social ◽  
Sowing Period ◽  
Modern Era

In the modern era, the minor coarse cereals (MCC) are particularly popular among consumers. Price fluctuations cause misperceptions for growers, but also bring about complications for processing enterprises and consumers. To solve this problem, a multi-grain product crowdfunding platform is proposed. To this end, an evolutionary game model is constructed to investigate the game equilibrium between growers and crowdfunders. The analysis determines that evolutionary game equilibrium is related to the relative price difference between the sowing period and the harvest period, and to the social/logistical cost. Under normal circumstances, the crowdfunder may default when the sowing-period price is greater than the harvest-period price. The grower may default if the sowing-period price is less than the harvest-period price. Therefore, in the design of a crowdfunding system for MCC products, a certain percentage of advance payment (30%) and certain default deposits should be collected from crowdfunders and growers, respectively.

A Two-Stage Game Model for Combined Heat and Power Trading Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 506-517 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chenyu Wu ◽  
Wei Gu ◽  
Rui Bo ◽  
Ping Jiang ◽  
Zhi Wu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Combined Heat And Power ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Trading Market ◽  
Power Trading ◽  
Stage Game

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

A bargaining game model for efficiency decomposition in the centralized model of two-stage systems

2013 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongbao Zhou ◽  
Liang Sun ◽  
Wenyu Yang ◽  
Wenbin Liu ◽  
Chaoqun Ma
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Efficiency Decomposition ◽  
Centralized Model

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Innovation Behavior of Industrial Cluster Based on Subject Adaptability

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Jia ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cooperative Innovation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.

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