scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Gao ◽  
Zhen-Yu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Power Construction ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

The government, investors, and the public have formed a dynamic multi-game relationship on the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) project, but few studies include them in a system to study their win–win solutions. Firstly, we constructed a tripartite game model of the government, investors, and the public based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, the evolutionary process of tripartite strategy behaviors was studied with the system dynamics (SD) model. Finally, the impact of changes in key factors on behavior strategies was studied through sensitivity analysis. The results show the following: (1) In the outsourcing of new energy and power construction PPP projects, the three parties will eventually reach the equilibrium state of {government supervision, public participation, investors effort}, the three parties achieve a win–win situation and the project benefits are the highest at this time, and the public participation will play an important role in promoting the smooth outsourcing of PPP projects. (2) The strategic choices of the government, investors, and the public are sensitive to changes in the corresponding exogenous variables. (3) The security factor plays a crucial role in the choice of public strategy. The public’s choice is not only affected by its own income and cost, but also by the amount of compensation promised by the government and the estimated damage caused by the investor.

30. Parliament and Petitions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Caygill ◽  
Anne-Marie Griffiths
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
The Public ◽  
System P ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines how the UK Parliament has used the e-petitions system to address some of the common criticisms about the relationship between the institution of government and the public. In May 2014, the House of Commons agreed to establish a ‘collaborative’ e-petitions system which would enable the public to petition the House of Commons and to call for action from the government. A Petitions Committee was created on 20 July 2015, and the new e-petitions site was launched the following day. The chapter first provides an overview of the changing nature of participation with Parliament, especially voting in elections, before discussing contemporary developments in petitioning Parliament. In particular, it considers public (paper) petitions and compares it to the e-petitions system. It also analyses the impact of e-petitions on Parliament and public participation and concludes with an assessment of challenges facing the e-petitions system.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Coal Enterprise Resource Integration Under Government Regulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Sun ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Weixing Zhu ◽  
Lin Ma ◽  
Yuting Dong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Resource Integration ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Coal Enterprise ◽  
The Government ◽  
Coal Enterprises ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Based on the perspective of government regulation, this paper discusses how to guide and restrict coal enterprises to conduct resource integration behavior, and whether the government supervises this behavior. First, through empirical research, government regulations of coal enterprises are given practical policy implications. Second, using evolutionary game and simulation technology, from the perspective of government regulation, we explore the complex behavioral interaction mechanism between the dominant and inferior coal enterprises, the mechanism between the government and coal enterprises, and analyze the impact of key factors on the dynamic evolution process. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters is discussed in details, which provides useful decision-making suggestions for the government and enterprises. Results demonstrate that:(1) when the power gap between enterprises is great, government regulations are not effective for inferior enterprises;(2) the combination of government regulation can help to improve the efficiency of coal enterprise strategy selection;(3) excessive government regulations make the strategic choices of the government and coal enterprise tend to swing, failing to achieve effectively resource integration and government supervision.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lixia Liu ◽  
Yuchao Zhu ◽  
Shubing Guo
Keyword(s):  
Innovation Diffusion ◽  
Agricultural Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Agricultural Innovation ◽  
Agricultural Enterprises ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Encouraging the adoption and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technology innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change, reduce environmental pollution, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a game model among agricultural enterprises, government, and farmers and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary process and evolutionary stable strategies of the major stakeholders. The impact of innovation subsidies, carbon taxes, and adoption subsidies on low-carbon agricultural innovation diffusion is simulated using Matlab software. The results show that the government’s reasonable subsidies and carbon taxes for agricultural enterprises and farmers can increase the enthusiasm of agricultural enterprises and farmers to participate in low-carbon agriculture. This study can be used as a basis for the government to formulate more targeted policies to promote the diffusion of low-carbon agricultural innovation.

scholarly journals System Dynamics Analysis of Evolutionary Game Strategies between the Government and Investors Based on New Energy Power Construction Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Project

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Gao ◽  
Zhen-Yu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
System Evolution ◽  
Power Construction ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government

The public-private-partnership (PPP) is a new mode for the government and social capital to jointly invest in public infrastructure projects. In particular, PPP projects for new energy power construction have been strongly supported in some countries in recent years, because it can not only reduce financial pressure on the government, but also promote the development of new energy. Current scholars study the economic benefits of PPP projects for new energy power construction from a macro perspective, and they rarely study behavioral strategies of the government and social capital as a game process of project construction from a micro perspective. This paper will fill this gap. This study firstly built an evolutionary game model of the government and investors based on new energy power construction PPP projects. Secondly, taking China’s typical new energy power construction PPP project–waste incineration power generation as an example, the system dynamics (SD) model was proposed to simulate the evolutionary process of game players’ behavioral strategies. Finally, the effects of key factors in the construction of PPP project on the strategies’ stability were studied. The results show that: (1) there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the game system between the government and investors, and system evolution is characterized by periodic behavior. (2) When the government implements dynamic bounty measures, the system evolution process is still a closed loop with periodic motion. However, when the government implements dynamic punishment measures, there is a stable ESS in the hybrid strategy of the game system. (3) The government can increase unit fines when making dynamic strategic adjustments, which will not only promote the active cooperation of investors, but also reduce the probability of government supervision, thereby reducing costs.

scholarly journals The behavior of consumer buying new energy vehicles based on stochastic evolutionary game

Filomat ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (15) ◽  
pp. 3987-3997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Guan ◽  
Guoxing Zhang ◽  
Diyi Liu ◽  
Xu Tan ◽  
Dong Wu
Keyword(s):  
External Disturbance ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Government Support ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Support Cost ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

China?s current vehicle emissions caused by air pollution problems have become increasingly prominent. How to improve new energy vehicle market share, and effectively guide the consumer buying behavior become a problem, which the government and social have to be solved. In this paper, according to establish the stochastic evolutionary game model between the government and consumers in the car market, introducing of random factors analysis on the impact of evolutionary stability ,will obtain the stable strategy of government and automotive consumers. And on the basis of it, we study the government support, cost of vehicles, the use of cost, the utility of automobile use for the ways of evolutionary stability, with case further illustrates the external disturbance factors on consumer purchase of new energy vehicles in evolutionary game process stability. Studies show that: the increasing government subsidy policy, the reducing life cycle costs of new energy vehicles and the improving effectiveness of new energy vehicles will lead the model?s evolution to the orientation of consumer purchasing new energy vehicles.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision Behavior for Public-Private Partnership Projects with Public Participation

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Congdong Li ◽  
Xiaoli Li ◽  
Yu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
The Public ◽  
Private Behavior ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Participation Level ◽  
The Government

The public can directly or indirectly participate in the PPP (public-private partnership) projects and then has an impact on the project profit and public or private behavior. To explore the influence of the public participation of the PPP projects supervision behavior, this paper analyzes the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that the supervision strategy is not chosen when the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit; it can make private sector consciously provide the high-quality public products/services with the improvement of public participation level. Therefore, the government should reduce the cost of public participation and improve the public participation level and influence through the application of the Internet, big data, and other advanced technologies, in order to restrain the behavior of the private sector and improve the supervision efficiency.

Novel Coronavirus 2019 Outbreak: A Global Epidemic

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (12) ◽  
pp. 1458-1464
Author(s):  
Sweta Kamboj ◽  
Rohit Kamboj ◽  
Shikha Kamboj ◽  
Kumar Guarve ◽  
Rohit Dutt
Keyword(s):  
World Health ◽  
Upper Respiratory Tract ◽  
Global Epidemic ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government ◽  
Tract Disease ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Novel Coronavirus ◽  
Health Organization ◽  
The Impact

Background: In the 1960s, the human coronavirus was designated, which is responsible for the upper respiratory tract disease in children. Back in 2003, mainly 5 new coronaviruses were recognized. This study directly pursues to govern knowledge, attitude and practice of viral and droplet infection isolation safeguard among the researchers during the outbreak of the COVID-19. Introduction: Coronavirus is a proteinaceous and infectious pathogen. It is an etiological agent of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). Coronavirus, appeared in China from the seafood and poultry market last year, which has spread in various countries, and has caused several deaths. Methods: The literature data has been taken from different search platforms like PubMed, Science Direct, Embase, Web of Science, who.int portal and complied. Results: Corona virology study will be more advanced and outstanding in recent years. COVID-19 epidemic is a threatening reminder not solely for one country but all over the universe. Conclusion: In this review article, we encapsulated the pathogenesis, geographical spread of coronavirus worldwide, also discussed the perspective of diagnosis, effective treatment, and primary recommendations by the World Health Organization, and guidelines of the government to slow down the impact of the virus are also optimistic, efficacious and obliging for the public health. However, it will take a prolonged time in the future to overcome this epidemic.

The Right to Information in India Implementation and Impact

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
_______ Naveen ◽  
_____ Priti
Keyword(s):  
Public Life ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
The Public ◽  
Know How ◽  
The People ◽  
The Government ◽  
Right To Information ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact

The Right to Information Act 2005 was passed by the UPA (United Progressive Alliance) Government with a sense of pride. It flaunted the Act as a milestone in India’s democratic journey. It is five years since the RTI was passed; the performance on the implementation frontis far from perfect. Consequently, the impact on the attitude, mindset and behaviour patterns of the public authorities and the people is not as it was expected to be. Most of the people are still not aware of their newly acquired power. Among those who are aware, a major chunk either does not know how to wield it or lacks the guts and gumption to invoke the RTI. A little more stimulation by the Government, NGOs and other enlightened and empowered citizens can augment the benefits of this Act manifold. RTI will help not only in mitigating corruption in public life but also in alleviating poverty- the two monstrous maladies of India.

scholarly journals System Dynamics Model for the Evolutionary Behaviour of Government Enterprises and Consumers in China’s New Energy Vehicle Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Yao Wan ◽  
Huirong Lv
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Motor Vehicle ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Vehicle Market

Exhaust pollution and energy crises are worsening worldwide. China has become the largest motor vehicle producer; thus, promoting the use of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has important practical significance. In this paper, considering the limited rationality of governments, NEV enterprises and consumers, we study the subsidy policy of the China NEV market using the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) methods. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed and the replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix are obtained. A SD simulation of the model was conducted to further clarify the impact of the initial market proportion and three variables used in the model. The results show that the initial market proportion affects the evolution speed but does not affect the evolution result when the three group players all choose a mixed strategy. For governments, they should not hastily cancel price subsidies provided to consumers; rather, they should dynamically adjust the rate of the subsidy decrease and increase the consumers’ extra cost for purchasing fuel vehicles (FVs). NEV enterprises should appropriately increase their investments in the research and development (R&D) of NEVs.

Discursive Democracy and New Labour: Five Ways in Which Decision-Makers Manage Citizen Agendas in Public Participation Initiatives

2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Williams
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Local Authority ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Final Analysis ◽  
New Labour ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
The Public ◽  
Labour Policy ◽  
The Government

New Labour's conceptualisation of public participation in local government creates a tension in public participation practice. Government legislation and guidance require local authorities to develop and provide citizen-centred services, engage the public in policy-making and respond to the public's views. Seen in this light, New Labour policy draws from radical democratic discourse. However, local authority staff are also expected to act in accordance with the direction set by their line managers, the Council and the government and to inform, engage and persuade the public of the benefit of their authority's policies. In this respect, New Labour policy draws from the discursive model of civil society, conceptualising public participation as a method for engendering civil ownership of the formal structures of representative democracy. Tension is likely to arise when the ideas, opinions and values of the local authority differ from those expressed by the participating public. This paper uses a local ‘public participation’ initiative to investigate how the tension is managed in practice. The study shows how decision-makers dealt with the tension by using participatory initiatives to supply information, understand the views of the public and encourage public support around pre-existing organisational agendas. Problems occurred when citizens introduced new agendas by breaking or manipulating the rules of participation. Decision-makers responded by using a number of distinctive methods for managing citizens’ agendas, some of which were accompanied by strategies for minimising the injury done to citizens’ motivations for further participation. The paper concludes that New Labour policy fails to deal with the tensions between the radical and discursive models of participation and in the final analysis draws mainly from the discursive model of participation. Furthermore, whilst New Labour policy promotes dialogue between the public and local authority, it does not empower local authority staff to achieve the goal of citizen-centred policy-making.

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