scholarly journals Has Third-Party Monitoring Improved Water Pollution Data Quality? Evidence from National Surface Water Assessment Sections in China

Water ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 2917
Author(s):  
Liange Zhao ◽  
Mengyao Hong ◽  
Xueyuan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Surface Water ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Water Environment ◽  
Environmental Data ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Important Indicator ◽  
Data Manipulation ◽  
Water Assessment

In China, the central government assesses local governments based on data monitored and reported by local agencies, and the accuracy of local statistics has been controversial. In order to further guarantee the authenticity and reliability of surface water monitoring data, the central government will gradually withdraw the local monitoring powers of the national surface water assessment section and implement third-party monitoring to achieve “national assessment and national monitoring.” This paper is based on the time-point water data of important national water quality automatic monitoring stations from 2015 to 2020, using the McCrary (2008) density test to infer possible data manipulation phenomena, and analyze whether third-party monitoring has improved the accuracy of China’s environmental data. The results of the study show that between 2015 and 2020, the observed 81 monitoring sites had varying degrees of data discontinuity. The discontinuity of the data after third-party monitoring was reduced in dissolved oxygen (DO) measurement, an important indicator in the assessment, implying that third-party monitoring has improved the quality of water environment data and the accuracy of the data. The research in this article provides a reference for third-party participation in environmental governance and proves that the participation of these organizations can reduce data manipulation behaviors of local governments and ensure the effectiveness of environmental data.

scholarly journals Does the “Miracle Drug” of Environmental Governance Really Improve Air Quality? Evidence from China’s System of Central Environmental Protection Inspections

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 850 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruxin Wu ◽  
Piao Hu
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Air Quality ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Treatment Effect ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Local Officials ◽  
The Media ◽  
Positive Effect

Central environmental protection inspections have completed their goal of full coverage of 31 provinces in China, and more than 17,000 officials have been held accountable. The media has evaluated the effectiveness of central environmental protection inspections using the notions of “instant results” and the “miracle drug of environmental governance.” Can this approach effectively promote local environmental governance? This paper takes the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution as an example. Using the method of regression discontinuity, central environmental protection inspections are found to have a positive effect on the air quality index (AQI), but this effect is only short term and unsustainable. Additionally, there are inter-provincial differences. Judging from the research results on sub-contaminants, the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution is mainly reflected in PM10, PM2.5 and CO. Under the current situation in which PM10 and PM2.5 are the main assessment indexes, this phenomenon indicates that due to the political achievements and promotion of local officials and for reasons of accountability, it is more effective for the central government to conduct specific environmental assessments through local governments than to conduct central environmental protection inspections.

scholarly journals Game Theory-Based Analysis of Local Governments’ Behavioral Dissimilation in the Third-Party Soil Pollution Control under Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization

Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Soil Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Party Control ◽  
The Third Party

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.

scholarly journals Will Third-Party Treatment Effectively Solve Issues Related to Industrial Pollution in China?

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (18) ◽  
pp. 7685
Author(s):  
Qiao Peng ◽  
Yao Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Environmental Services ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Trial Basis ◽  
Local Levels

China expanded the application of the third-party treatment model (TPTM) in 2017 for effectively tackling the issues related to industrial pollution on a trial basis, and the model could diversify the government’s toolbox for addressing industrial pollution. With multiple players such as local governments, polluters, and environmental services providers (ESP) involved in the TPTM, appropriate guidance and coordination among the three players are critical to the success of the TPTM. This study constructs an evolutionary game model for the three players to capture their interaction mechanisms and simulates the three-player evolutionary game dynamics with the replicator dynamics equation. The simulation results show that heavier penalties for pollution and lower regulatory costs incurred by local governments could effectively improve the performance of the TPTM. Moreover, although environmental incentives provided by the central government to local levels do not affect the ultimate performance of the TPTM, they do shorten the time needed for the effect of the TPTM to emerge. The study concludes by proposing policy recommendations based on these results.

France

2019 ◽  
pp. 170-189
Author(s):  
Laurent Neyret
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Precautionary Principle ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Environmental Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Private And Public

This chapter examines the important aspects of environmental law in France. It first provides an overview of how powers are allocated with regards to environmental law in France, with particular emphasis on the major trends in the construction of environmental law such as its codification and constitutionalization and the expansion of environmental governance to private law instruments. The discussion then turns to the structure and substance of environmental law in France, taking into account private and public law instruments used in environmental protection. The chapter also analyses the application of environmental rules through the central government, local governments, specialized agencies, and courts. Finally, it looks at some selected issues which have been recently addressed in French environmental law, including the application of the precautionary principle, the remediation of ecological damage, the protection of the environment through criminal law, and the role of the private sector in protecting the environment.

scholarly journals Impact of rating and praise campaigns on local government environmental governance efficiency: Evidence from the campaign of establishment of national sanitary cities in China

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. e0253703
Author(s):  
Genli Tang ◽  
Minghai Lin ◽  
Yilan Xu ◽  
Jinlin Li ◽  
Litai Chen
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Public Transportation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Public Services ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Long Term Effects ◽  
The Impact

Background Ecological and environmental protection is essential to achieving sustainable and high-quality development, which highlights the important role of environmental governance. In terms of the practical actions of environmental governance, the central government in China has carried out continuous rating and praise campaigns, and local governments have actively promoted this effort. However, the related performance consequences have not been empirically investigated. We aimed to verify whether this incentive policy can improve the efficiency of environmental governance and whether this governance method has long-term effects. In addition, we sought to identify mechanisms through which the policy can improve environmental governance. Method We take the rating and praise campaign of the Establishment of National Sanitary Cities (EONSCs) as a quasi-natural experiment and use the panel data for 174 cities from 2004 to 2016 and the propensity score matching-difference in differences (PSM-DID) method to test the impact of rating and praise campaigns on environmental governance efficiency. Results EONSCs campaign can improve the efficiency of environmental governance by 0.7595 (p<0.01), which is significant at the 1% level; the effects are clearly significant during the evaluation process and the year in which cities are named National Sanitary Cities (NSCs) but decrease annually thereafter. The EONSCs campaign has a significant promoting effect on public services provision, such as public infrastructure investment, public transportation and education. Conclusions (1) The rating and praise campaigns can effectively improve the efficiency of environmental governance; (2) the incentive effect is distorted and is not a long-term effect; (3) the impact of the rating and praise campaign of EONSCs on the efficiency of environmental governance is mainly realized through the provision of corresponding public services that are closely related to environmental protection. The findings of this paper provide empirical support for the effectiveness of the central government’s rating and praise campaigns and could motivate local governments to actively participate in environmental governance. Moreover, the findings provide an important reference for further improving the rating and praise campaigns and the level of environmental governance.

scholarly journals ANALISIS KOORDINASI KELEMBAGAAN DALAM PENYELENGGARAAN PENYULUHAN PERTANIAN (Studi Kasus Kec. Berastagi Kab. Karo)

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 68
Author(s):  
Nana Nurlina Ginting ◽  
Matius Bangun
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Qualitative Method ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Group Discussion ◽  
Agricultural Extension ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Open Group ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Post Harvest ◽  
Cultivation Techniques

The extension of the extension is strongly influenced by the extension institution itself both structurally from the center to the regions and functionally in the regions in relation to other cross-sectoral relations. The dynamics of changes in extension institutions from the central government have influenced institutional changes in the regions, both in terms of materials, methods and funding of extension. This research uses the descriptive qualitative method with the main problem is how to coordinate the implementation of agricultural extension in a Strutural and Functional manner and what efforts are made by the Karo Regency Government in responding to the dynamics of change so that it can still improve the performance of agricultural extension workers. The conclusion of this study is that in order to anticipate the dynamics of institutional changes, extension coordination is placed in the Functional (non-structural / non-structural / non-esslon) Agricultural Extension Coordination Secretariat which is accountable to the District Head through the Head of the Agricultural Service. Efforts that can be made by local governments in accordance with farmers' perceptions in terms of extension methods are: a. PPL visits to locations, b. Open Group Discussion, c. Demonstration Plots and d. Socialization.In terms of extension material are: a. Marketing Network, b. Latest drug, fertilizer and pesticide information, c. Nursery and Cultivation Techniques, and d. Post Harvest Handling; while striving for financing comes from: a. APBN, b. Provincial APBD, c. Karo Regency APBD and and d. Non-binding Third Party.

OPTIMALISASI PERAN PEMDA DALAM MENGATASI KENDALA PELAKSANAAN KONSERVASI KEANEKARAGAMAN HAYATI DI DAERAH (STUDI KASUS PROVINSI BENGKULU)

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antung Deddy Radiansyah
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Biodiversity Conservation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Wild Plants ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Conservation Areas ◽  
Conservation Area ◽  
Conservation Policies

Gaps in biodiversity conservation management within the Conservation Area that are the responsibility of the central government and outside the Conservation Areas or as the Essential Ecosystems Area (EEA) which are the authority of the Regional Government, have caused various spatial conflicts between wildlife /wild plants and land management activities. Several obstacles faced by the Local Government to conduct its authority to manage (EEA), caused the number and area of EEA determined by the Local Government to be still low. At present only 703,000 ha are determined from the 67 million ha indicated by EEA. This study aims to overview biodiversity conservation policies by local governments and company perceptions in implementing conservation policies and formulate strategies for optimizing the role of Local Governments. From the results of this study, there has not been found any legal umbrella for the implementation of Law number 23/ 2014 related to the conservation of important ecosystems in the regions. This regulatory vacuum leaves the local government in a dilemma for continuing various conservation programs. By using a SWOT to the internal strategic environment and external stratetegic environment of the Environment and Forestry Service, Bengkulu Province , as well as using an analysis of company perceptions of the conservation policies regulatary , this study has been formulated a “survival strategy” through collaboration between the Central Government, Local Governments and the Private Sector to optimize the role of Local Government’s to establish EEA in the regions.Keywords: Management gaps, Essential Ecosystems Area (EEA), Conservation Areas, SWOT analysis and perception analysis

Asymmetrical Attribution of Performance in China

Asian Survey ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 978-1003
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Chen Chen ◽  
Jun Xiang
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Cultural Theory ◽  
Political Trust ◽  
Mediation Model ◽  
Multilevel Mediation ◽  
Dual Pathway ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Existing studies of the impact of economic development on political trust in China have two major gaps: they fail to explain how economic development contributes to the hierarchical trust pattern, and they do not pay enough attention to the underlying mechanisms. In light of cultural theory and political control theory, we propose adapting performance theory into a theory of “asymmetrical attribution of performance” to better illuminate the case of China. This adapted theory leads to dual pathway theses: expectation fulfillment and local blaming. Using a multilevel mediation model, we show that expectation fulfillment mainly upholds trust in the central government, whereas local blaming undermines trust in local governments. We also uncover a rural–urban distinction in the dual pathway, revealing that both theses are more salient among rural Chinese.

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