Cleavages and Links

Author(s):  
Keren Sereno ◽  
Azi Lev-On

In the past decade, the Internet has extensively penetrated the political landscape in Israel. A variety of actors, including parties, Knesset members, NGOs, and more, have realized the significance of using the Internet to promote their goals and have established an online presence via a variety of platforms. Consequently, the Internet is becoming a fertile ground to study Israeli society with its multiple cleavages. This chapter analyses how the ideological cleavage in the Israeli society is manifest online, through the linking patterns between political Websites. Link analysis is used to study political visibility and centrality online, to map the channels of information flow between the various political actors, and to identify recognition and discourse networks between the various political actors. From the link analysis of the sites of some 200 political parties, MPs, and NGOs, we found no links between right-wing and left-wing political sites; each side in the political spectrum conducts a different linking strategy. Most of the sites of political parties and MPs received no in-bound links from the other political sites. On the other hand, NGOs have a central role in the online political networks in Israel and maintain a relatively dense linking network.

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Fabio Wolkenstein

In addition to summarizing the book’s main themes as described, this Introduction places special emphasis on connecting the problem animating the book—the apparent incapacity of contemporary parties to mediate between citizens and the state—to current political developments in established Western democracies, showing that the issues the book addresses are not only of academic interest but also directly relevant to ongoing public debates about the state and health of representative democracy. Chief amongst the themes foregrounded here is the rise of so-called ‘populist’ parties on the left and right of the political spectrum, as well as the re-branding of established political actors as ‘movements’ (think, e.g. of Emmanuel Macron’s La République en Marche). These phenomena are interpreted as part of a larger ‘revolt against intermediary bodies’—meaning first and foremost a rebellion against political parties. The Introduction suggests that this ‘revolt’ brings with it only a temporary shift in how representative politics looks, without actually reversing the disconnect between parties and voters or compelling established political parties to give up their privileges and de-colonize the institutions of the state. This argument sets the stage for the book’s core contention that more thought has to be put into finding ways to reconnect political parties with society.


Author(s):  
M.E. Omarov ◽  

This article defines the main ideological positions of Kazakhstani political parties, expressed in the form of their display on the graphic political spectrum, developed by the psychologist Hans Eysenck. The concept of the political spectrum is given, the main types of political spectrum that exist and are used at present, as well as their authors, are determined. The necessity of using Eysenck’s graphic political spectrum as the most rational way of placing political ideologies in the form of geometric models is substantiated. The analysis of the program documents of the political parties of the Republic of Kazakhstan, because of which information was obtained about their ideological affiliation, for their further distribution on the spectrum. The parties are distributed along the political spectrumin accordance with their ideological guidelines, as indicated in the officially approved political programs. The distribution of parties was carried out using two dichotomies: left-wing – right-wing and authoritarian-democracy.


1973 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 267-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter R. Moody

“Kremlinological” approaches to the study of contemporary Chinese politics are sometimes criticized for seeming to embody the “rather crude view of politics being concerned with factional strife and power politics.” Certainly, for most politicians most of the time, it would be wrong as well as cynical to regard “power” as being the ultimate goal. On the other hand, few would deny that politics does, in part, involve factional strife and power politics, and some political scientists believe that political behaviour may be best explained through a focus on the play of power. Thus, Joseph Schlesinger explains certain aspects of American politics by what he calls “ambition theory”: “A politician's behavior is a response to his office goals.” Anthony Downs works out a good deductive explanation of the behaviour of political parties in a democracy by starting with the hypothesis that politicians act in a rational manner, espousing ideologies and policies which enable them to maintain or expand their power. The point of these hypotheses is not that politicians are an unusually venal race of men; the hypotheses do not purport to be accurate descriptions of political motivations. Rather, the assertion is that whatever the ultimate motives of political actors, an approach which hypothesizes that they will behave as though power were their goal does yield helpful and concise explanations of their behaviour. This article about the political career of one Chinese politician, T'ao Chu, from 1956 through 1966, will attempt to see how far hypotheses concentrating on “pure power” provide a useful explanation of events in comparison with those which give more weight to stated political opinions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 104 (4) ◽  
pp. 140-150
Author(s):  
Natalia Velikaya ◽  
◽  
Roman Tatarov ◽  

The article outlines the main populist political parties of the Republic of Moldova, the main reasons for their appearance and socio-political factors that determined the content of the populist discourse in the post-Soviet period. Firstly, the phenomenon of new populism in Moldova arises from the high involvement of external players in its internal political life, who often associate themselves with the Moldovan political forces, acting as their constant allies. Secondly, the political forces of Moldova are characterized by impermanence of interests, which under the influence of external forces are able to transform, sometimes taking cardinal forms. Considering populist rhetoric and technologies as the main resource of political actors in conditions of uncertainty, the authors assess parties on both the right and left sides of the political spectrum. It is highlighted that the dominant themes of populist discourse in modern Moldova are the following: the opposition of the European integration model to the alternative movement for closer cooperation with Russia, the traditional left-wing opposition to liberal constructs in the economic sphere, and the problem of corruption. It is concluded that populist rhetoric may expand in the coming years and that a number of populist parties will consolidate on both the left and right flanks of the political spectrum. Populist rhetoric is presented in one way or another in almost all political parties, but the real populist forces will not enter the political establishment and will remain non-majoritarian.


2019 ◽  
pp. 78-103
Author(s):  
S.A. Romanenko

The article is devoted to the analysis of representations about AustriaHungary in Russia in political and publicists societies including Bolsheviks, Social Democrats, liberals (cadets), as well as MFA analysts from February to October. On the basis of the materials on foreign policy and the correlation of revolution and world war, from Russian daily press and journalists, which have not been studied before, the author comes to the conclusion that the representatives of the left flank of the political spectrum had neither information nor conceptually built ideas about the situation in AustriaHungary, about the perspectives for the development of revolutionary processes in the multinational state and its direction and aims. On the other hand, this was also largely characteristic of the moods of the AustroHungarian politicians, whether progovernment or opposition,Статья посвящена анализу представлений об АвстроВенгрии в России в политических и публицистических обществахв том числе большевиков, социалдемократов, либералов (кадетов), а также аналитиков МИД с февраля по октябрь. На основе материалов по внешней политике и соотношение революции и мировой войны, из российской ежедневной прессы и журналистов, которые до этого не изучались, автор приходит к выводу, что представители левого фланга политического спектра не имели ни информации, ни концептуально выстроенных представлений о ситуации в АвстроВенгрии, о перспективах развития революционных процессов в многонациональном государстве и его направленности, а также о том, что они не могли цели. С другой стороны, это было также в значительной степени характерно для настроений австровенгерских политиков, будь то проправительственные или оппозиционные, для которых цели национального движения уже в 1917 году играли гораздо большую роль, чем для русских. Для сравнительного анализа на основе архивных материалов приводятся позиции Министерства иностранных дел (Временного правительства) и Петроградского Совета.


Author(s):  
Harry Nedelcu

The mid and late 2000s witnessed a proliferation of political parties in European party systems. Marxist, Libertarian, Pirate, and Animal parties, as well as radical-right and populist parties, have become part of an increasingly heterogeneous political spectrum generally dominated by the mainstream centre-left and centre-right. The question this article explores is what led to the surge of these parties during the first decade of the 21st century. While it is tempting to look at structural arguments or the recent late-2000s financial crisis to explain this proliferation, the emergence of these parties predates the debt-crisis and can not be described by structural shifts alone . This paper argues that the proliferation of new radical parties came about not only as a result of changes in the political space, but rather due to the very perceived presence and even strengthening of what Katz and Mair (1995) famously dubbed the "cartelization" of mainstream political parties.   Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v7i1.210


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21
Author(s):  
Iswandi Iswadi

  The ideology contestation is basically a classic polemic, where after independence the ideology of Islam was confronted with nationalism and took root until now (reform). However, the momentum of the 2019 election political contestation was again marked by the struggle of ideology namely ideology of Islamism and nationalism. The polemic began with the emergence of religious issues that were raised on the surface of political actors as a hegemony in taking the sympathy of voters. The existence of religion as a central issue began in 2016-2017 related to the prosecution of Ahok who insulted religious values ​​(Islam), and among the political parties involved in the demonstrations namely PPP, PKS, PBB, and PKB. In that momentum the beginning of the revival of Islamic ideology as the power in defending Islamic sovereignty. Judging from the ideology of political parties in Indonesia in the 2019 election political contestation, the ideology of political parties based on the statutes and bylaws (AD / ART) that the ideology applied can be classified into three parts namely ideology Nationalism, Islamism, and Nationalist-Religious, and the three ideologies. This can be proven based on the results of a survey from Australia 2017-2018 based on the voters. However, political parties based on multiple ideologies, PAN, PKB and Democrats, each have priority orientation. PAN and PKB tend to polarize the values ​​of Islamism (religious), while Democrats are more dominated by nationalist issues. The concept of Islamic political ideology, in the context of political contestation in political party elections, is basically a necessity to implement the values ​​of ri'ayah, taqwin, irshad and ta'dib through political education, or campaign in elections to achieve mutual benefit, both parties whose ideology Islamism, nationalism and nationalist-religious, so as to build the moralistic side of society, and intelligence in responding to the issues that exist in the election apart from that, political parties in confronting political contestation the emphasis of the movement must reflect the value of poverty, the three ideologies have been packaged in the values ​​of Pancasila in the third principles of Indonesian unity.         Asbtak Kontestasi ideology pada dasarnya polemik klasik, dimana pasca kemerdekaan ideologi islam dihadapkan dengan nasionalisme dan mengakar sampai sampai saat ini (reformasi). Akan tetapi momentum pemilu 2019 kontestasi politik kembali diwarnai pergulatan ideology yakni ideology islamisme dan nasionalisme. Polemik tersebut berawal dengan mencuatnya isu keagamaan yang dimunculkan dipermukaan pelaku politik sebagai hegemoni dalam mengambil simpati  pemilih. Eksistensi agama sebagai sentral isu berawal tahun 2016-2017 terkait penuntutan terhadap ahok yang melecehkan nilai-nilai agama (islam), dan diantara partai politik yang terlibat dalam demonstrasi yakni PPP, PKS, PBB, dan PKB. Dalam momentum tersebut awal mencuatnya kembali ideologi islam sebagai of the power dalam mempertahan kedaulatan Islam. Menilik ideologis partai politik di Indonesia pada konstestasi politik pemilu 2019, ideology partai politik berdasarkan anggaran dasar dan anggaran rumah tangga (AD/ART) bahwa ideologi yang diterapkan dapat diklasifikasikan menjadi tiga bagian yakni ideology Nasionalisme, Islamisme, dan Nasionalis-Religius, dan ketiga ideology tersebut dapat dibuktikan dengan berdasarkan hasil survey dari asutralia 2017-2018 berdasarkan pemilih. Namun demikian partai poltik yang berasaskan ideologi ganda, PAN, PKB dan Demokrat, masing-masing memiliki kiblat prioritas. PAN dan PKB condong polarisasi nilai-nilai islamisme (religious), sedangkan Demokrat lebih didominasi oleh isu-isu nasionalis. Konsep ideology politik islam, dalam konsteks kontestasi politik dalam pemilu partai politik pada dasarnya sebuah keharusan mengimplementasikan nilai-nilai ri’ayah, taqwin, irsyad dan ta’dib melalui pendidikan politik, ataupun kampanye dalam pemilu guna mencapai kemaslahatan bersama, baik partai yang berideologi islamisme, nasionalisme dan nasionalis-religius, sehingga terbangun sisi moralistik masyarakat, dan kecerdasan dalam menanggapi isu-isu yang ada dalam pemilu. selain dari itu partai politik dalam menghadapi konstestasi politik penekanan gerakannya harus mencermikan nilai kemaslahan, ketiga ideology tersebut telah kemas dalam nilai-nilai pancasila pada sila ketiga persatuan Indonesia. 


MaRBLe ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Estelle Paquay

Since 2009, the rise of the most important Belgian Francophone left-wing populist party, i.e. the Parti du Travail de Belgique (PTB), has been increasingly seen as a challenge for mainstream parties. Given the lack of research on Belgium within the field of political left-populist discourse, this paper analyses the effect of the growing popularity of the left-populist party on mainstream parties’ discourse. To investigate this issue, a discourse analysis has been conducted following the Modified Spatial Theory which argues that, when triggered, mainstream parties choose between three different strategies (accommodative, dismissive, or adversarial) to respond to the rise of populism. The findings show that, the rise of the PTB has had more effect on the Socialist Party’s discourse, which has accommodated and converged with the PTB on several typically populist issues, while the other two mainstream parties have rather dismissed and tried to discredit the political discourse of the PTB.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (12) ◽  
pp. 216-223
Author(s):  
Ashok Thapa ◽  
Sushil Rajbhandari

The female characters created by BP Koirala and Pradip Nepal in Narendra Dai and Swapnil Shahar respectively have been compared and contrasted in this paper. Although Koirala and Nepal represent two poles of the Nepalese political spectrum, with Koirala pursuing democratic socialism doctrine and Nepal following communist ideology, the characters they create in their novels do not completely reflect the political schooling of their creators. The female characters in both the novels share some common traits of characters which most of the women in the Nepalese society, even today, exude, such as compassion, sacrifice, and docility. However, these female characters also display enough courage to rebel against the prevalent patriarchal dominance. The plot of Nepal’s novel is considerably politically colored, and thus the female characters in his novel discuss progressive ideas and even act accordingly. Koirala’s novel on the other hand deals more with socio-psychological issues and these conditions the dispositions of his characters. Nevertheless, his female characters too display rebellious traits and speak back to the patriarchal hegemony both through words and actions. As compared to Nepal, however, Koirala seems to have better succeeded in creating well-rounded female characters that not only abide by the then societal norms and values but also display mutiny against unjust treatment.


2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ron Formisano

During the 1980s and 1990s in countries across the globe, new populist protest movements and radical political organizations emerged to challenge traditional parties, ruling elites, and professional politicians, and even long-standing social norms. The revolts against politics-as-usual have arisen from many kinds of social groupings and from diverse points on the political spectrum. Through the 1980s, in Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and North America, populist discontent erupted intermittently. But the end of the Cold War, particularly in Europe, unleashed a torrent of popular movements and political parties opposed to what the discontented perceived as the corruption and deceitfulness of the political classes and their corporate patrons. Some protest movements promoted more democracy, pluralism, and economic opportunity; some expressed intolerance, bigotry, and xenophobic nationalism.


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