Reconciliation of Identity Groups in Iraq

Author(s):  
Nazar Jamil Abdulazeez

Since the parliamentary elections in 31st April 2014, the political process in Iraq described as a fragile, ethnic tension have mounted and security situation declined tremendously with the rises of Islamic State in Sunni Arab populated areas. Since 10th June 2014, over a million internally displaced people approached Iraqi Kurdistan Region in a two-week time period. More than 300,000 monitories, including Yazidi Kurds and Christians, have fled to Duhok city. Additionally, over 40,000 civilians Yazidis trapped for a week in the mountain of Snjar, running from Islamic State (IS). This text works out measures for accommodating conflicts and claims of Iraqi sectarian groups. In order to explore and assess application of those means in conflict accommodation in Iraq, first, this text analyses the conflict through identifying actors, outlines the structure of the conflict and change in the dynamic of the conflict over the time. Second section of this text, illustrates the means for reconciliation of different identities in the world of politics based on the conflict analysis.

Author(s):  
Nazar Jamil Abdulazeez

Since the parliamentary elections in 31st April 2014, the political process in Iraq described as a fragile, ethnic tension have mounted and security situation declined tremendously with the rises of Islamic State in Sunni Arab populated areas. Since 10th June 2014, over a million internally displaced people approached Iraqi Kurdistan Region in a two-week time period. More than 300,000 monitories, including Yazidi Kurds and Christians, have fled to Duhok city. Additionally, over 40,000 civilians Yazidis trapped for a week in the mountain of Snjar, running from Islamic State (IS). This text works out measures for accommodating conflicts and claims of Iraqi sectarian groups. In order to explore and assess application of those means in conflict accommodation in Iraq, first, this text analyses the conflict through identifying actors, outlines the structure of the conflict and change in the dynamic of the conflict over the time. Second section of this text, illustrates the means for reconciliation of different identities in the world of politics based on the conflict analysis.


Ethnicities ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-500 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene Costantini ◽  
Dylan O’Driscoll

This article examines the practices and narratives of inclusion and exclusion in Iraq in relation to ethnic and religious minorities displaced by the Islamic State and the resulting war. Examining the displacement in Iraq through the lens of citizenship, and utilising 29 in-depth qualitative interviews with internally displaced people (IDPs) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, this article argues that displacement has been accompanied by practices and narratives meant to include internally displaced people in a particularistic articulation of belonging rather than to ensure a substantive participation as Iraqi or Kurdistan Region of Iraq citizens. Rhetoric of citizenship in Iraq changes between civic and ethnosectarian belonging based on conflict dynamics and the competition for power, whilst remaining ethnosectarian in reality. Thus, internally displaced people and their citizenship have become entangled in wider ethnosectarian competition in Iraq, and narratives and practices of citizenship change to fit the objectives of these wider actors, mainly Baghdad and Erbil, rather than being based on inclusiveness and civic identity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-188
Author(s):  
Samme Dick

This article examines the emergence of Zoroastrianism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq since 2015 as a new religion inspired by Kurdish nationalism, feminism, ecologism and humanism. The author argues that the emergence of Zoroastrianism at this particular time is due to a combination of the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in 2014, legislative change and the importance some Kurdish nationalists historically attached to Zoroastrianism as the suggested original religion of the Kurds. The article outlines the historical context of Zoroastrianism in Kurdistan, and then explores the origins, beliefs and organisational structure of Kurdish Zoroastrianism. Also discussed are the legislative changes enabling the rise of the movement since 2015. This study draws on interviews with Kurdish Zoroastrian leaders as well as with representatives from the World Zoroastrian Organization, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs and the Alliance of Iraqi Minorities.ABSTRACT IN KURMANJIJi nû ve pêxistina agir: Baweriya Zerduştî li Kurdistana IraqêEv gotar, li ser peydabûna Zerduştiyê li Herêma Kurdistanê ya Iraqê hûr dibe, ku ji 2015an vir ve wek dînekî nû yê ji netewegeriya kurd, femînîzm, ekolojîzm û humanîzmê îlham wergirtî tê dîtin. Nivîskar îddia dike ku peydabûna Zerduştiyê ya bi taybetî wê demê ji ber hejmareke sedeman e: di 2014an de peydabûn û xurtbûna Dewleta Îslamî li Iraqê û Levantê, guherîna qanûnî û girîngiya nêrîna hin netewegerên kurd ku ji aliyê dîrokî Zerduştiyê wek dînê resen ê kurdan dibînin. Gotar, çarçoveya dîrokî ya Zerduştiyê li Kurdistanê bi kurtî rave dike û paşê li kok, bawerî û avahiya rêxistinî ya Zerduştiya kurdî dikole. Ji hêleke din, nîqaş dike ku guherînên hiqûqî ji 2015an vir ve rê li ber xurtbûna tevgerê vekiriye. Ev xebat xwe dispêre hevpeyvînên bi rêberên Zerduştiyên kurd re ligel hin şandeyên ji Rêxistina Zerduştiyan a Cîhanê, Wezareta Bexş û Karên Dînî ya Hikumeta Herêma Kurdistanê û Hevpeymaniya Kêmîneyên Iraqê.ABSTRACT IN SORANIGeşandinewey agireke: Zerdeştêtî le Kurdistanî ÊraqdaEm babete timaşay rewşî  wediyarkewtinî Zerdeştêtî dekat le Kurdistanî Êraqda, le sall 2010da wek ayînêkî nwê debînrêt ke le netewegerîy kurdî, fêmênîzm, jîngeparêzî û mirovparêzî îlham werdegirêt. Nûser bangeşey ewe dekat ke derkewtinî Zerdeştêtî lem kateda ke Dewlletî Îslamî Da'îş le Şam û Êraq le 2013 ser helldeda û be yasa rêgey pê dedirêt, şitêkî giringe  bo gerranewey kurd bo  ayînî neteweyî xoy wek ewey ke hendêk kurdî neteweperist  basî deken.  Babeteke rîşey mêjûyî Zerdeştêtî le Kurdistan nîşan dedat, herwaş rîşey  bawerr û binaẍey damezrawey Zerdeştêtî dedate ber roşnayî. Dîsan guftugoy gorranî yasa lew bareyewe bote hoyî derkewtinî em ayîne le 2015da. Em babete legell serok û bawerrdaranî Zerdeştîy le Kurdistan û damezrawey Zerdeştîyanî cîhanî û legell wezaretî karubarî ayînî le ḧukumetî herêmî Kurdistan û damezrawey kemînekanî Êraqda çawpêkewtinî encam dawe.ABSTRACT IN ZAZAKINewe ra geşkerdişê adirî: Kurdîstanê Îraqî de zerduştîyeNa meqale qayîtê zerduştîye kena ke sey bawerîya newîye serra 2015î ra nat Herêmê Kurdîstanî yê Îraqî de vejîyaye û hetê neteweperwerîya kurdan, femînîzm, dorûverperwerîye û merdimperwerîye ra îlham girewt. Nuştox musneno ke vejîyayîşê zerduştî yê ê demî çend sebeban ra qewimîya: hêzdarbîyayîşê DAÎŞ yê serra 2014î, vurîyayîşê qanûnî û tayê neteweperwerê kurdan ê ke tarîx de giranî daye zerduştîye ser ke aye sey dînê kurdan o eslî pêşnîyaz bikerê. Na meqale xulasaya kontekstê tarîxî yê zerduştîya Kurdîstanî dana û dima esl, bawerî û awanîya rêxistinan yê zerduştîya kurdan ser o cigêrayîş kena. Ser o kî vurîyayîşê qanûnî munaqeşe benê. Nê vurîyayîşî serra 2015î ra nat vejîyayîşê tevger kerd mumkîn. No cigêrayîş roportajanê bi serekanê kurdan ê zerduştîye û bi temsîlkaranê Rêxistina Zerduştîyan a Dinya, Wezaretê Ewqaf û Kar û Barê Dînî yê hukmatê Herêmê Kurdîstanî û Yewîya Eqalîyetanê Îraqî esas gêno


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-56
Author(s):  
Layla Abdulkhalk Abass

Internally displaced persons are peoples displaced in it is own country but not crossed a border. After (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria attacked in 2014 to Iraq, millions of Iraqi people flee from their own city war zone to safe camps in Kurdistan region north of Iraq, Arbat camp is one of these camps. Iraqi civilian people constitute most new displacement persons around the world as at least 2.2 million were displaced in 2014. An important part of basic maternal health care is antenatal care that must be provided during pregnancy. Aim of this study is to provide demographic data of Internally Displaced Persons pregnant women and the effect on antenatal care knowledge and practices among of Arbat camp that visits to camp health centers on their health. Assessment of knowledge and practices of pregnant women about antennal care. A cross-sectional descriptive study has been conducted to assess the knowledge and practices of (103) women attended to antenatal care of internally displaced persons) at Arbat camps between 1 January to 30 June 2016. Data collected through the questionnaire form by face-to-face interview. Statistical analyses performed by using SPSS version 16.0, to find descriptive analysis like percentage and frequency and for relative statistical analysis. The results have revealed that most of the pregnant women were in the active reproductive age group 18-25 years old 56(54.4%) pregnant women, housewives 102(99%), illiterate 48(46.6%) pregnant women, were in families that have low income with 48(46.6%) pregnant women with significant relation to the knowledge and practices to antenatal care. In conclusion, most pregnant women have very good knowledge about antenatal care except about performing oral health hygiene during pregnancy. The majority of pregnant women in camps have very good knowledge about all practices that must be do during antenatal except taking medication without a physician prescription.


Author(s):  
Kathryn Gleadle

This chapter considers how, as ratepayers, householders, electors, parliamentary constituents, petitioners, welfare providers, and policy experts, women in Britain were commonly treated as political subjects. Women were ‘borderline citizens’ whose status hovered permanently in the interstices of the political nation: their involvement could be evoked and sanctioned as quickly as it could be dismissed and undermined. This chapter focuses on the structural qualities of the political process and the ways in which they variously facilitated or limited female participation. It was in the parish that women enjoyed the most expansive opportunities, yet parochial authority was increasingly eroded in this period thanks to reforms such as the Poor Law Amendment Act and the Municipal Corporations Act. This chapter also discusses the involvement of women in parliamentary elections, local elections, and petitioning.


1991 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-55
Author(s):  
John Prendergast

Over 300,000 Sudanese perished primarily from hunger during 1988-89 in one of the most avoidable human tragedies in recent history. Mostly from the war-torn southern part of the country, these civilians were deliberately starved by central government, and to a lesser extent the insurgent Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which used the deprivation of food as a tactic of war. The threat of further genocidal actions by the Islamic fundamentalist junta in Khartoum and the private militias allied with the government continue to daily threaten the lives of millions of internally displaced people. Due to these man-made causes and nature’s lack of rain, up to ten million Sudanese are at risk of malnutrition, hunger and starvation in 1991.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 111-126
Author(s):  
Ahmed Zaghloul Shalata

In the first parliamentary elections after Mr. Mubarak’s overthrow in February 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood’s newly formed Freedom and Justice Party had won nearly half the seats in the People’s Assembly. The Muslim Brotherhood, had, over the two previous years, gained political expansion in parliament. The Brotherhood entered into a coalition with other Islamist parties including two Salafist parties, forming an Islamist bloc, but their experience ended with their removal from power and significant changes in the structure of the Brotherhood. Based on the political programs of the Islamist parties in Egypt, this article seeks to analyze the experience of Islamists in power by focusing on their practical perceptions of the Islamist political system. The article concludes that the political Islamist organizations lacked a coherent mechanism to propel them from the stage of the organization’s (political party) management to a stage of state administration. Egyptian Islamist groups had no specific perception of the nature of the state, or of an applied model to implement the “Islamic state.” Although these groups had a declared project, which they had been attempting to establish for decades, their focus was solely on discussing the expected outcome they had hoped to achieve, while neglecting to elaborate on how their affairs could be run, once in power. This shortfall was due to an accumulation of the multiple problems the groups had faced, whether they be conceptual reasons of state, power issues, or the organizational obstacles strewn along the paths of the components that comprised the group, which had prevented them, over decades, from overcoming them. Hence, the traditional mechanisms they continued to apply while in power proved inadequate in responding to the crises inherent in the experience of government. They failed to introduce new mechanisms to address the issues as dictated by the necessity for practical experience and solutions once they had attained power.


1987 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Hasan Turabi

I. IntroductionAlthough I have been directly involved in a political process that seeks toestablish an Islamic state, I am not going to describe the forms that an Islamicgovernment might take in any particular country. Rather, I will try to describethe universal characteristics of an Islamic state. These derive from theteachings of the Qur'an as embodied in the political practice of the ProphetMuhammad (pbuh), and constitute an eternal model that Muslims are boundto adopt as a perfect standard for all time. The diversity of historical circumstances,however, in which they try to apply that ideal introduces anecessary element of relativity and imperfection in the practice of Islam.An Islamic state cannot be isolated from society, because Islam is a comprehensive,integrated way of life. The division between private and public,the state and society, which is familiar in Western culture, has not been knownin Islam. The state is only the political expression of an Islamic society. Youcannot have an Islamic state except insofar as you have an Islamic society.Any attempt at establishing a political order for the establishment of a genuineIslamic society would be the superimposition of laws over a reluctant society.This is not in the nature of religion; religion is based on sincere conviction andvoluntaiy compliance. Therefore an Islamic state evolves from an Islamicsociety. In certain areas, progress toward an Islamic society may be frustratedby political suppression. Whenever religious energy is thus suppresed, itbuilds up and ultimately erupts either in isolated acts of struggle or resistance,which are called terrorist by those in power, or in a revolution. In circumstanceswhere Islam is allowed free expression, social change takes placepeacefully and gradually, and the Islamic movement develops programs ofIslamization before it takes over the destiny of the state because Islamicthought - like all thought - only flourishes in a social environment of freedomand public consultation (shura) ...


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Nicolaus ◽  
Serkan Yuce

Even though almost three years have passed since the black banners of the terror organisation, calling themselves the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) were first hoisted throughout the Yezidi heartland of Sinjar, the Yezidi community continues to be targeted by ISIS, militias. 300,000 vegetate in camps as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Iraqi Kurdistan; thousands of others have been killed, are missing, or remain in captivity where they are subjected to unspeakable sexual and physical abuse. With deference for these victims of violence, and without detracting from the collective suffering and trauma of the entire Yezidi community of Sinjar (families, women, men, and children alike), the authors have chosen to focus the present article on the plight and misery of the females; who were, and still are, facing despicable sexual abuses, unfathomable atrocities, and unfettered human rights violations. In doing so, they highlight the views of the fundamentalist Islam practiced by ISIS that encourages sex-slavery, while elaborating on the complacent acceptance of ISIS terror tactics by the local Sunni population of the territories they control. The work goes on to describe how survivors escaped, as well as how they are received and treated by the Yezidi community and state authorities. This discussion includes an overview of the national and international mechanisms available for prosecuting ISIS members for their crimes of genocide against the Yezidi people. The authors further stress that the genocide has contributed to, and even accelerated the process of the Yezidi selfidentification as a unique ethno-religious entity; which, in turn, has produced changes to their religious traditions. These changes will be briefly covered by examining a new approach to the institution of the Kerāfat.


1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr

Islamic revivalism is often believed to be solely committed to the Islamization of society, viewing politics as merely an instrument in the struggle to realize its aim. The record of Islamic revivalist movements—as exemplified by one of the oldest and most influential of them, the Jamaʿat-i Islami, or Islamic party of Pakistan—however, brings this presumption into question. The nature of the linkage between Islamic revivalism as a particular interpretive reading of Islam and politics is more complicated than is generally believed. Political interests, albeit still within an Islamic framework, play a more important and central role in the unfolding of revivalism—even overriding the commitment to Islamization—than is often ac knowledged. Participation in the political process eschews a blind commitment to Islamization and encourages adherence to organizational interests, and as is evi dent in the case of Pakistan, to the democratic process, characteristics that are not usually associated with Islamic movements. The dynamics and pace of this pro cess are controlled by the struggles for power within an Islamic movement as well as vis-à-vis the state. It is through grappling with these struggles that the commit ment to Islamization is weighed against the need to adhere to organizational and political interests; this is the process that governs the development of Islamic re vivalism. Beyond this general assertion, the manner in which the struggle for power unfolds, the variables that influence it, and the nature of its impact on the development of revivalism need to be explored further.


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