Study of Evolutionary Game Model between Supply Chain Enterprises Growth

2013 ◽  
Vol 422 ◽  
pp. 327-335
Author(s):  
Yu Lai ◽  
Yong Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Core Competence ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Collaborative Management ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Negotiation Model ◽  
Core Ability ◽  
Collaborative Competition ◽  
The Relationship

Collaborative competition between manufacturers and monopoly supplier is a game relationship, which is very complicated. It involves many factors, both collaborative management relations, and there is competition between non-cooperatives. The enterprise core ability in the relationship is the research variables of the analysis. Meanwhile, it is necessary to establish a negotiation model, but because the quantization of core competence has a certain degree of difficulty, to quantify and measure the bargaining power is very difficult. Quantification of core competence and bargaining power are to be further analyzed and researched.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

The Empirical Study on the Evolutionary Game Based Agricultural Products Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
pp. 419-437
Author(s):  
Jun Sun ◽  
Ruben Xing
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Relative Size ◽  
Quality And Safety ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Safety Issues ◽  
Spss Software ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Agricultural Supply

This research paper is to use a method of Evolutionary Game to investigate the relationship between a large supplier and a franchised supermarket in China. The authors would like to go through their empirical study with their filtered answers from the survey using SPSS software on agricultural supply chain for their quality safety factors. Their research is using factor analysis with five target factors which are: the excess return, cost, the relative size of cooperative enterprises, hitchhiking, and overflows income. Applying these factors to the evolutionary game model, analyze the earning status from the both players under their own policies, then make suggestions or proposals for quality and safety issues of agricultural supply chain management.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of Chinese cross border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology in supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 03078
Author(s):  
KunYang Liu ◽  
Yong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Technological Revolution ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Technical Ability ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
Mathematical Derivation

Blockchain technology is considered to be the representative technology of the fourth technological revolution, and logistics and supply chain field has been considered as the main application direction in the next step by industry and academia. In order to study the behavior and intention of Chinese cross-border logistics enterprises to introduce blockchain into internal supply chain, this paper constructs a model of cross-border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology on the basis of bounded rationality based on the game model, this paper attempts to find out the factors that affect the introduction of blockchain into the internal supply chain through mathematical derivation and numerical analysis. The game results show that the willingness of cross-border logistics enterprises to adopt blockchain is closely related to the technical ability of blockchain, the incremental performance after the introduction of blockchain, the conversion cost of blockchain technology, and other factors. Enterprises should coordinate various factors and choose to adopt blockchain technology according to their own situation.

scholarly journals Can Status Inequality Organize Cooperation in Multi-leader Systems? An Evolutionary Theory

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsuan-Wei Lee ◽  
Yen-Ping Chang ◽  
Yen-Sheng Chiang
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Task Groups ◽  
Cooperative Interactions ◽  
Evolutionary Function ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Status Inequality ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Multiple Leaders

Abstract Status hierarchies often emerge in small collective task groups. In these groups, clearly defined hierarchies facilitate and stabilize structured cooperative interactions among group members, supporting their evolutionary function in the real world. What the existing research in this field has failed to consider, however, is that cooperation matters in these hierarchies with clear status inequality, as well as in other more realistic, multiple-leader groups with less clear hierarchies. Multi-leadership is ubiquitous but, by definition, flattens status inequality and may, in turn, jeopardize its capacity to sustain cooperation. Leveraging the relationship between multi-leadership and cooperation, our evolutionary game model reveals that hierarchies, in general, promote cooperation in groups with multiple leaders, but these hierarchies only do that up to a point, after which multi-leadership backfires. Accordingly, the model provides not only a theoretical account for how multi-leadership coexists with cooperation but also the conditions under which the coexistence would break.

Study on Participant Behavior Game of Electronic Products Reverse Supply Chain Based on ECP

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 411-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingbao Wang ◽  
Zhiping Du ◽  
Hong Duan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Simulation Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Electronic Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
Differential Equation Method ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Abstract In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile reverse supply chain based on ECP; an evolutionary equilibrium model is to be sought for by utilizing the replication dynamic differential equation method; and the trilateral game strategy’s revolutionary trend and consistency have been analyzed by means of SD simulation method when government implements the static or dynamic reward and punishment strategy. The finding results reveal that, under the static reward and punishment strategy, the revolutionary process of trilateral game strategy is always unstable whether the initial behavior strategy is unitary or mixed. Therefore, it is more reasonable for the government to adopt the strategy of dynamic reward and punishment, and it is also stable and reciprocal for all the stakeholders when implementing this strategy.

The Empirical Study on the Evolutionary Game Based Agricultural Products Supply Chain

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Sun ◽  
Ruben Xing
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Relative Size ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Safety Factors ◽  
Safety Issues ◽  
Spss Software ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Agricultural Supply

This research paper is to use a method of Evolutionary Game to investigate the relationship between a large supplier and a franchised supermarket in China. The authors would like to go through their empirical study with their filtered answers from the survey using SPSS software on agricultural supply chain for their quality safety factors. Their research is using factor analysis with five target factors which are: the excess return, cost, the relative size of cooperative enterprises, hitchhiking, and overflows income. Applying these factors to the evolutionary game model, analyze the earning status from the both players under their own policies, then make suggestions or proposals for quality and safety issues of agricultural supply chain management.

scholarly journals A Game Model Between Governments and Enterprises in the Green Supply Chain of the Home Appliance Industry

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Xu Ai ◽  
Gao Shufeng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Green Supply Chain Management ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Management Approach ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Effective Management ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Home Appliance ◽  
The Relationship

Green supply chain management is a kind of effective management approach for home appliance industry to pursue the strategy of sustainable development and improve the product international competitiveness. In this paper, a game model is proposed to study the relationship and game status between governments and enterprises in the green supply chain of the home appliance industry. Through the equilibrium analysis of the game model, some countermeasures are put forward, which can be helpful to improve the construction of the green supply chain in the home appliance industry.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Emission Reduction and Promotion in Low-Carbon Supply Chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 1965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baiyun Yuan ◽  
Longfei He ◽  
Bingmei Gu ◽  
Yi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Reduction ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Game Theoretic

Aiming at exploring the interplay principles of operations strategies among members of dvertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts and coordination in low-carbon sulow-carbon supply chain, as well as their impact on system performance, we develop an evolutionary game model to capture emission reduction and low-carbon promotion actions, which are typically conducted by one manufacturer and one retailer in every two-echelon supply chain, respectively. We exploit the evolutionary game model to analyze players’ behavioral patterns of their interacting strategies, whereby we attain the evolutionary stable strategies and their associated existing preconditions under various scenarios. We acquire a number of managerial insights, and particularly find that the evolutionary stable strategies of the channel carbon reduction and promotion are remarkably influenced by incremental profits resulted from causes, such as every player’s unilateral participation in emission reduction. In addition, we investigate a player’s free-rider opportunistic practice in cooperative carbon reduction and joint participation in emission reduction. However, the magnitude of profit increment will heavily influence the result of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). Finally, the extensive computational studies enable us to verify the effectiveness of preceding models.

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