(3) a desire to compromise, or a need to compromise, to ensure that major aspects of the draft statute get through the legislative process, and are not blocked by the opposition within, or external to, the government. In the Court of Appeal in Mandla v Dowell Lee, Lord Denning looked at the history of the word ‘ethnic’, charting its meaning and usage through three editions of the Oxford English Dictionary (1890, 1934, 1972). However, he always argued that words do not and cannot have a literal meaning and yet, here, in a highly contentious case, he traced the history of words. He noted that, in its original Greek form, ‘ethnic’ meant ‘heathen’ and was used by the translators of the Old Testament from Hebrew to Greek to mean nonIsraelite, or gentile. Earlier in this text, in Chapter 2, we considered the issue of the use of the phrase ‘the original Greek’. He identified the first use of ‘ethnic’ in English as describing people who were not Christian or Jewish. Lord Denning referred to the 1890 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary to confirm this etymology. He then referred to the 1934 edition, stating that its meaning had, by then, changed to denote ‘race, ethnological’. This is hardly surprising as the great anthropological expeditions of the 1920s and 1930s introduced the idea of ethnography as the descriptions of unknown groupings of people. His Lordship stated that the 1934 version indicated that ‘ethnic’ meant ‘divisions of races’ and, as far as he was concerned, this was right. This is, of course, a highly dubious and subjective viewpoint. But a judge has the power, via language analysis, to make a choice between what is, and what is not, right. Indeed, this is the judge’s task. The court has to decide. Finally, he referred to the 1972 version of the dictionary, which gave a wider definition of ‘ethnic’. It was this definition that was relied upon by the plaintiff’s counsel. Here, ‘ethnic’ was defined as relating to: …common racial, cultural, religious, or linguistic characteristics, especially designating a racial or other group within a larger system. Lord Denning then turned to discuss ‘origins’ for, as used in s 3 of the Race Relations Act, ‘ethnic’ appears in a small phrase including the word ‘origins’ (‘or ethnic or national origins’). Turning again to the dictionary, noting its usage with parentage he decides that it meant, as in previous case law, ‘a connection arising at birth’. ‘Origin’, he said, therefore meant a group with a common racial characteristic. His Lordship reconsidered the entire phrase as used in s 3: …a group of persons defined…by reference to…ethnic…origins. He concluded that the group must be distinguishable from another by a definable characteristic. Re-reading his judgment in the Court of Appeal, it is noticeable that he constantly used the words he is supposed to be defining in the definitions. Yet, Lord Denning’s normally preferred technique was the teleological, the mischief or the purposive rule. He may have reasoned in a manner more in keeping with the Race Relations Act if he had used his favourite technique of the purposive approach.

2012 ◽  
pp. 120-120
2014 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caleb J Stevens

AbstractThis article demonstrates that there has never been a clear definition of public land in Liberian legal history, although in the past the government operated as if all land that was not under private deed was public. By examining primary source materials found in archives in Liberia and the USA, the article traces the origins of public land in Liberia and its ambiguous development as a legal concept. It also discusses the ancillary issues of public land sale procedures and statutory prices. The conclusions reached have significant implications for the reform of Liberia's land sector.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoolo 'Nyane

ABSTRACT Lesotho has a bicameral parliamentary system based on the British model. While the National Assembly is clearly a representative House elected by the citizenry, the purpose, structure and legislative powers of the Senate as the Second Chamber have been a matter of considerable controversy throughout the history of parliamentary democracy in the country. The National Assembly generally has the upper hand not only in the legislative process but also in the broader parliamentary system - it chooses the Prime Minister, it places its confidence in the government and it can withdraw such confidence. The fact that the model generally gives the National Assembly the upper hand is a matter of common cause. What is in question, though, is the nature and extent of the limitation of the powers of the Senate in terms of the Constitution. This article investigates this question and contends that the composition of, and restrictions on, the Senate need to be reviewed in order to enable the Chamber to play a meaningful role in Lesotho's parliamentary democracy . Key words: Constitution of Lesotho, Bicameralism, Senate, National Assembly, Powers of the Second Chamber


Author(s):  
Antonio Acosta

The formation of El Salvador’s oligarchy was a long and complex process. Its beginning can be traced to 1848, when the first export of Salvadoran coffee took place. The first stage in its formation may be seen as ending in 1931, just before the army’s great “slaughter” of the rural population after the crisis of 1929. This long period is divided into two parts, with the year 1890 marking a change. Before that date, although El Salvador was beginning to feel the effects of the Industrial Revolution and the reorganization of the world markets, the country’s international politics were focused primarily on Central America. However, from 1890 on, the business sector expanded and penetrated deeply into the country based on the capital accumulated from the coffee industry. To that was added certain foreign participation, especially from the United States. This is why the period of 1848–1890 is considered the origin of the oligarchy, and 1890–1931 is seen as the formation of this social sector that has marked the history of the country up to the 21st century. A plausible definition of the term oligarchy is provided by Waldo Ansaldi: the combination of a social class defined by its function in the economic structure and the particular form of government it developed and practiced. The Salvadoran oligarchy was initially made up of the large landowners and traders whose economic power was based on their access to land and labor, acquired to a large degree at a very low price and often through non-commercial relationships. This minority experienced a transition toward a profile with increasingly capitalistic characteristics—that is, a more complex managing class with more and more wage labor, although in poor working conditions. In spite of this, it retained purely oligarchic features in the way it controlled political power and in its use of abundant, though not always wage-earning, labor, so that it can hardly be considered bourgeoisie. Coffee, including its cultivation, processing and export, was the principal (although not the only) basis of the enrichment of the oligarchy and of their political power. The development and consolidation of the oligarchical class was based on their control of the state and, as a result, also of their monetary, credit, and above all, fiscal policies. Representatives of the oligarchy came to control the government through electoral as well as military means, enabling them to reproduce and expand their power.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-83
Author(s):  
Venkat Rao Pulla ◽  
Bharath Bhushan Mamidi

We share two observations based on what we have seen in India. First, that the hegemonic politics in India ushered in institutional and structural inequalities in their wake and second, that the political leadership continued to be aspirational irrespective of ideologies desiring to scale up in the hierarchy of global economic and political power. These two observations pertain to the contemporary history of five decades of development in India. As a result of the above two observations, we make a further two observations that for the Aām Aādmi (the common man), the political parties that sit in the government and their respective ideologies do not matter. And for the state and the political elites, the negative consequences such as marginalisation, exclusion and desperation of the common folks that emanate from the models chosen for development do not matter.   It is in such contexts, social activists argue for a legitimate space for the vying intersects of poverty, caste, class, occupations, habitats amidst such motivated globalisation. They also continue to raise difficult conversations around patriarchy, religious hierarchy, bonded labour, and the girl child.  One such social activist that was concerned about all the above issues was Swami Agnivesh.  He was not antigovernment, anti-democracy, anti-institutional, anti-hierarchy, anti-religious. He sought to restore a new and deeper meaning of freedom (democracy), a new meaning of hierarchy, social care, and even a new definition of spirituality that is social. He was a man who never stopped dreaming of humanising India. In this article, we reminisce about our association with Swami Agnivesh and attempt to espouse his thought based on our hearing, reading, and reflection.    Briefly, we present his life, achievements, and social activism, and more importantly, we attempt to interpret his conception of social spirituality and the ‘power of love’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 421-487
Author(s):  
T. Twining

This article presents a new interpretation of Richard Simon’s Histoire critique du Vieux Testament (1678). It argues that the initial prohibition of Simon’s work in 1678 has separated it from the debates and arguments that chiefly shaped its contents. It gives an account of the developments in seventeenth-century biblical criticism that preceded Simon’s work before offering a new account of the genesis and composition of the Histoire critique du Vieux Testament. Following this, it presents an examination--based in part on previously unexamined material drawn from Simon’s library--of three of the central and most innovative parts of Simon’s project: his definition of his approach as a ‘critical history’, his new history of the Hebrew text of the Old Testament, and his novel use of manuscript material. The study concludes with a reconsideration of Simon’s work immediately following the Histoire critique du Vieux Testament’s prohibition, arguing that in a series of Latin works Simon attempted to use the methods and shared assumptions of seventeenth-century biblical criticism to justify his work to his contemporary scholars.


2003 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 242-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
RACHEL A. ANKENY

When I immigrated to Australia from the United States a few years ago, at first I found many similarities between the countries. But underneath the apparent similarities, notably a shared language, lay much deeper differences in history, politics, and culture that have considerable impacts on attitudes and approaches to issues in bioethics and medicine. For instance, debates continue regarding cloning and embryonic stem cell research, particularly given the long history of research in reproductive medicine and reproductive technologies in Australia. Although there are individuals and groups opposed to such research on grounds associated with pro-life or anti-abortion stances, the discussions more often hinge on what should be funded by the government and eventually what should be provided to all within the public system of healthcare. This theme is one common thread that unites many current controversies in bioethics, but perhaps not for the reasons that an outsider might at first expect. Indeed, allocation of limited resources is part of what is considered relevant, but money is rarely presented as the decisive issue in these debates. Instead, considerations such as what is medically necessary (based on a broad definition of what is medical), what contributes to a “good life” (as defined by what are increasingly heterogeneous community standards), and how to respect and enable fulfillment of autonomous decisions by individuals and families in this rapidly changing context are key to many of the disputes. This brief report is necessarily selective, but it is designed to give a flavor of the terms of the debates as they are currently developing.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-143
Author(s):  
Obed Frausto Gatica

This article provides a theoretical framework to help us understand the controversies between the federalist and anti-federalists in the early history of the United States of America during the Federal Convention in 1787 as a conflict of two political philosophical traditions. The sources of these opposed traditions may be traced back to the disputes in ancient Greek philosophy, in thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle who defined politics in different ways. Plato grounds his definition of politics in epistêmê, which means that society should be ruled by the wisest. The federalist argued the best form of government is one where the people could avoid decision-making and leave the wisest representatives to handle politics. In opposition to this, Aristotle believes that politics should be inspired by the notion of phrônesis, which means that decisions should be considered collectively. Similarly, the anti-federalist believed that the government tends to be corrupted, and citizens should be suspicious of the government. They believed the ideal way to govern society is to have everyone involved in decision-making.


school hours. Mr Mandla reported the matter to the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) who took up the case. The CRE alleged that the son had been unlawfully discriminated against, either directly or indirectly, on racial grounds, in that he had been denied a place at the school because of his custom of wearing a turban. 4.8.3 The meaning of the word ‘ethnic’ in s 3 of the Race Relations Act 1976 The case raised a number of issues. The first issue, which was of tremendous importance to the Sikh community, was whether the Race Relations Act was the relevant statute to take action under. The Race Relations Act states that it is unlawful to discriminate against another on racial grounds in the areas covered by the Act. One of these areas is education. To bring an action, it had to be proved that Sikhs were a racial group. Section 3 of the Act defines racial grounds as: …a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins. The main argument centred around whether Sikhs fitted into the word ‘ethnic’ as other words and phrases in the list in s 3 were accepted as not applicable. The trial court found that Sikhs were not a racial group and the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal and came before Lord Denning. The Court of Appeal had two choices. It could take the teleological approach—looking at the wider context—considering the history behind the legislation, the mischief that it was designed to rectify; or it could choose a formalist approach, considering the text, the word or words, and their possible meanings in a more literal sense. Lord Denning had always, in essence, taken a teleological approach. He had, for much of his legal career as a senior judge, fought against blind literalism. He had always fought for the right to ‘fill in the gaps’ left in legislation. Indeed, his career was often based on the right to take the broader teleological view rather than the narrow, literalist view. Surprisingly, he chose, in this case, to take the formalist approach, to stand by the literal meaning of the words. He discussed the history of the word ‘ethnic’ (its etymology). Certainly, the etymology of the word is fascinating; however, why did the legislators put in the word ‘ethnic’? Did they do so after scanning its etymology? Of course, it is not known. Yet, an interpretation based on the history of a word obviously presumes that, yes, the legislators did consider the etymology of the word. Otherwise, there is no point in the court doing so. When constructing legal rules in fixed verbal form, language is of the utmost importance. Thought is given to the best words to be used to ‘fix’ or ‘stick’ the rule, so that contrary interpretations cannot be reached by courts; and so that the mischief to be tackled is tackled. However, as noted in Chapter 2, the flexibility of language will not allow it to be permanently fixed. The choice of words is often determined by: (1) a desire to make it impossible for judges to change the meaning; (2) a desire to make a major policy change as uncontentious as possible;

2012 ◽  
pp. 119-119

Author(s):  
Javier Moreno-Lázaro

ABSTRACTIn this article I examine the history of the Mexican Stock Exchange from the end of the Revolution until 1975, under the hypothesis that it did not carry out its pertinent functions in corporate financing but was rather an economic and political instrument of the government. Due to state intervention and the deficient definition of property rights, its functioning was completely anomalous except during this period. The article represents a first step in the study of the role of the stock exchange in Latin American corporatist economic models.


Author(s):  
Piotr W. Juchacz

Abstract The main objective of the paper is to present a model of the good practices of deliberative cooperation in a parliamentary setting. This goal is achieved through applying the three functions of the deliberative system—epistemic, ethical and democratic (Mansbridge et al. 2012)—to an analysis of cooperation between different stakeholders during the work of a Polish Parliamentary Subcommittee. They are used as an evaluative tool for analysing the cooperation of MPs, members of the public and representatives of the government (promoters of the bill). The paper analyses a concrete example of the work of the Permanent Subcommittee on the government bill amending the Act on Public Benefit Activity and Voluntary Work in the Polish Parliament. This concrete example is presented as a model of good practices when it comes to deliberative cooperation between representatives of the authorities and citizens aiming at the development of shared practical judgement. The paper consists of three parts. In the first, a systemic approach to deliberative democracy is briefly introduced, and the history of the work on the bill is outlined. The main part consists of an analysis of the three speeches of three main stakeholders in the legislative process, from the perspective of their view of legislative deliberations, and in terms of the three functions of deliberative system. In the conclusions, four main issues are analysed with reference to the presented legislative deliberations: 1. Legislative committees as mixed deliberative spheres; 2. Internal/external deliberation; 3. The distinction between stakeholders/ordinary citizens; and 4. Deliberative stance/deliberative mindset.


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