Hate speech: the roles and responsibilities of political leaders according to the Council of Europe

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-358
Author(s):  
Robert Smith ◽  
Mark Perry

The COVID-19 pandemic and the recent term of the United States President, Donald Trump, brought the term “fake news” to the attention of the broader community. Some jurisdictions have developed anti-fake news legislation, whilst others have used existing cybercrime legislation. A significant deficiency is the lack of a clear definition of fake news. Just because a person calls something “fake news” does not mean that it is indeed false. Especially during pandemics, the primary aim should be to have misinformation and disinformation removed quickly from the web rather than prosecute offenders. The most widely accepted international anti-cybercrime treaty is the Convention on Cybercrime developed by the Council of Europe, which is silent on fake news, the propagation of which may be a cybercrime. There is an Additional Protocol that deals with hate speech, which the authors consider to be a subset of fake news. Using examples from Southeast Asia, the paper develops a comprehensive definition of what constitutes fake news. It ensures that it covers the various flavours of fake news that have been adopted in various jurisdictions. Hate speech can be considered a subset of fake news and is defined as the publication or distribution of fake news with the intention to incite hatred or violence against ethnic, religious, political, and other groups in society. The paper proposes some offences, including those that should be applied to platform service providers. The recommendations could be easily adapted for inclusion in the Convention on Cybercrime or other regional conventions. Such an approach is desirable as cybercrime, including propagating fake news, is not a respecter of national borders, and has widespread deleterious effects. Keywords: Fake news; hate speech; Convention on Cybercrime; draft legislation


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luís Cardoso ◽  
Ana Catarina Bruno

Social networks are interactive platforms developed to facilitate relations and exchanges of information between people who share the same interests, experiences and opinions (Recuero, 2009). The main goal of this study is to know the definition of cyberculture and cyberspace and understand the phenomenon of hate speech on social networks. The theoretical framework of the article is about the understanding of cyberculture and cyberspace, the evolution of social networks and the definition of hate speech and its targets. Finally, a case study is carried on the combat policies against hate speech lead by the Council of Europe. The methodology will include state of art analysis, literature review and the observation of the Council of Europe website. <p> </p><p><strong> Article visualizations:</strong></p><p><img src="/-counters-/edu_01/0810/a.php" alt="Hit counter" /></p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-42
Author(s):  
Gülnaz Rəfail qızı Ələsgərova ◽  

Providing an opportunity for society to develop and progress, freedom of speech is surely one of the vital conditions for sustainable democracy. Nevertheless, freedom of speech is not an absolute right and exhaustive list of limitations are delineated by many jurisdictions. In Europe as well it is still subject to accepted restrictions designed to prohibit incitement to hatred or conflict with other human rights. This article discusses approaches to hate speech as a legitimate ground for restriction of freedom of speech. The article is dedicated to a comparative analysis of the case law of the ECHR and the provisions of the Recommendations adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe. In particular, the author tries to find a clear distinction between speech that is not welcome by the majority of society and the prohibition of hate speech. Key words: freedom of speech, hate speech, standards of Council of Europe, European Court on Human Rights, context of speech, call for violence


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 218-236
Author(s):  
Natalie Alkiviadou

Hate speech and hate crime are an anathema to any society. On a United Nations level, the central tools to tackle such hatred are Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. On a Council of Europe level, the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention tackles racist and xenophobic material, threats and insults as well as revisionist rhetoric transmitted and disseminated through computer systems. On a European Union level, there is the Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia. In none of the above-mentioned instruments do we find provisions on homophobic and transphobic speech and crime, nor are there equivalents of documents such as the Framework Decision with the thematic of homophobia and transphobia. This creates a hierarchy of hate, with some forms of hate considered more important than others by the aforementioned institutions, a reality that goes against the very essence of international human rights law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 139-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanos Stavros

European governments that have to react to religious hate speech can turn for guidance to ecri—the Council-of-Europe specialized monitoring-mechanism on racism and intolerance. They can be advised on how to use a variety of tools: criminal, administrative and civil law, self-regulation, prevention and, quite significantly, more speech. ecri’s protection complements that afforded by the European Court of Human Rights. The combination of judicial and non-judicial responses proposed by the Council of Europe can ensure that the fight against religious hatred does not entail unnecessary restrictions to fundamental freedoms.


Author(s):  
Daniele Cangemi

This paper presents the Council of Europe current work on sexist hate speech and sexism. After an overview on sexist hate speech, its different forms, the factors contributing to it and the connection between sexist hate speech and freedom of expression, this contribution presents relevant Council of Europe standards and activities (including the new Committee of Ministers Recommendation on preventing and combating sexism), extracting from them the key elements that should guide governments, media, civil society and other relevant stakeholders in their action against sexism. A ‘checklist’ of indicators and actions to eliminate sexist hate speech is presented as a conclusion.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 695-725
Author(s):  
Grant M. Armstrong ◽  
Julie Wronski

One of the most controversial elements of political tolerance concerns support for hate speech. We argue that there are two factors that can reduce tolerance for hate speech: 1) moral foundations and 2) party cues. U.S. citizens’ tolerance of hate speech will be reduced when it is framed as a violation of a specific moral foundation, opposed by a political party, or when the morality violation is utilized by party elites. Using two survey experiments, we manipulated the target of hate speech (i.e. Muslims or the American flag), whether the speech violated a moral foundation (i.e. harm or loyalty), and which political party supported or opposed the hate speech in question. For flag burning, moral frames and party cues on their own reduced U.S. citizens’ tolerance relative to a non-political control, while moral frames and party cues were successful in reducing tolerance of anti-Muslim speech compared to a free speech appeal. Partisans were generally responsive to cues from the in-party. We also found instances of moral repackaging, where morally incongruent appeals from the in-party reduced tolerance of flag burning among Democrats. Among Republicans, harm morality decreased tolerance of anti-Muslim speech when invoked by the in-party, but increased tolerance when used by the out-party – an indication of the power of party cues to repackage moral arguments and to trigger backlash. These results provide a better understanding of what factors can affect tolerance for hate speech, providing political leaders and social justice advocates with a roadmap to alleviate this problem.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-115
Author(s):  
Beatriz Herrero-Jiménez ◽  
Adolfo Carratalá

Mass media, and especially television, are powerful discursive instruments, responsible for the construction of social imagery through ideologically determined content. For this reason, the creation of a regulatory body with authority over the audiovisual sector in countries without one was urged by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 2000. Spain is the only EU country without an audiovisual council with authority at the state level. Currently, only the Audiovisual Council of Catalonia (CAC), created in 2000, and the Audiovisual Council of Andalusia (CAA), which dates from 2004, operate in Spain. Within an environment increasingly marked by hate speech, this research analyzes the proceedings of the Andalusian and Catalan Audiovisual Councils between 2004 and 2019 as it pertains to discrimination against vulnerable groups. Every pronouncement made by both councils on potentially discriminatory discourses was retrieved (n=156). These were content analyzed by codifying, among others, the following variables: type of action, the source that motivated it, the disseminating media outlet, the evaluated content, the type of discrimination alleged, the decision taken, and the type of sanction imposed by the councils, as the case may be. The results indicate that most of the actions concerned involve discrimination against women, originate from third-party complaints and target content broadcast on public television.


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