The prohibition of the threat or use of force in cyberspace: novel legal frontier or adaptation of old frameworks?

2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-113
Author(s):  
Triantafyllos Kouloufakos

Defined as ‘a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures’ cyberspace is created by people for the people. However, this is not always the case. Cyber operations conducted by states may amount to the use of force. The opinions, though, regarding the threshold that must be reached differ, and there are diverse theories on when a cyber operation constitutes the use of force. Furthermore, there are cases of operations that despite not reaching the threshold of use, fall under the definition of threat of force, under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Finally, cyber operations that fail to reach the threshold may still be contrary to international law, constituting a prohibited intervention in the internal affairs of another state. Le cyberespace, défini comme « un domaine caractérisé par l’usage de l’électronique et du spectre électromagnétique pour stocker, modifier et échanger des données via des systèmes en réseaux et les structures physiques qui y sont attachées », est créé par des gens et pour les gens. Ce n’est pourtant pas toujours le cas. Des cyberopérations menées par des États peuvent représenter un emploi de la force. Mais les avis divergent quant au seuil devant être atteint, et les théories pour déterminer quand une cyberopération constitue un emploi de la force sont diverses. En outre, il existe des cas d’opérations qui n’atteignent pas ce seuil, mais qui relèvent pourtant de la définition de menace de la force, au sens de l’article 2(4) de la Charte des Nations unies. Enfin, des cyberopérations n’atteignant pas ce seuil peuvent néanmoins être contraires au droit international, en ce qu’elles constituent une intervention interdite dans les affaires intérieures d’un autre État. Omschreven als ‘een domein dat wordt gekenmerkt door het gebruik van elektronica en het elektromagnetische spectrum om gegevens op te slaan, te wijzigen en uit te wisselen via netwerksystemen en bijbehorende fysieke infrastructuren’ komt cyberspace tot stand door en voor mensen. Dat is echter niet altijd het geval. Cyberoperaties geleid door staten kunnen neerkomen op het gebruik van geweld. Over de drempel die bereikt moet worden lopen de meningen echter uiteen, en er zijn verschillende theorieën om te bepalen wanneer bij een cyberoperatie sprake is van gebruik van geweld. Verder zijn er gevallen van operaties die, ook al wordt de drempel van geweldgebruik niet bereikt, onder de definitie van bedreiging met geweld vallen, zoals bedoeld in artikel 2, lid 4, van het VN-Handvest. Ten slotte kunnen cyberoperaties die de drempel niet bereiken, nog steeds in strijd zijn met het internationaal recht en gelijkstaan aan een verboden interventie in de interne aangelegenheden van een andere staat. Definido como ‘un dominio caracterizado por el uso de la electrónica y el espectro electromagnético para almacenar, modificar e intercambiar datos a través de sistemas en red e infraestructuras físicas asociadas’, el ciberespacio es creado por personas para las personas. Sin embargo, no siempre ocurre así. Las operaciones cibernéticas realizadas por los Estados pueden equivaler al uso de la fuerza. No obstante, las opiniones sobre el umbral que se debe alcanzar difieren, existiendo diversas teorías sobre cuándo una ciber-operación constituye uso de la fuerza. Además, existen casos de operaciones que, a pesar de no alcanzar el umbral de uso propiamente dicho, entran sin embargo dentro de la definición de amenaza de uso de la fuerza, según el artículo 2 (4) de la Carta de la ONU. Finalmente, las operaciones cibernéticas que no alcanzan dicho umbral pueden, no obstante, seguir siendo contrarias al Derecho Internacional, constituyendo una intervención prohibida en los asuntos internos de otro Estado. Definito come ‘un dominio caratterizzato dall'uso dell'elettronica e dello spettro elettromagnetico per memorizzare, modificare e scambiare dati tramite sistemi in rete e infrastrutture fisiche associate’ il cyberspazio è creato dalle persone per le persone. Tuttavia, non è sempre così. Le operazioni cyber condotte dagli Stati possono equivalere all'uso della forza. Le opinioni, tuttavia, per quanto riguarda la soglia che deve essere oltrepassata sono diverse e ci sono differenti teorie su quando un'operazione cyber costituisca uso della forza. Inoltre, ci sono casi di operazioni che, pur non raggiungendo la soglia di utilizzo, rientrano nella definizione di minaccia all’uso della forza, ai sensi dell'articolo 2, paragrafo 4, della Carta delle Nazioni Unite. Infine, le operazioni cibernetiche che non raggiungono la soglia possono tuttavia essere contrarie al diritto internazionale, costituendo un intervento vietato negli affari interni di un altro Stato. Der Cyberspace, der definiert wird als ‘ein Bereich, gekennzeichnet durch den Gebrauch der Elektronik und des elektromagnetischen Spektrums, um Daten über vernetzte Systeme und dazugehörige physische Infrastrukturen zu speichern, zu ändern und auszutauschen’, wird von Menschen für Menschen geschaffen. Dies ist allerdings nicht immer der Fall. Cyberoperationen, die von Staaten durchgeführt werden, können der Anwendung von Gewalt gleichkommen. Allerdings gehen die Meinungen über die zu erreichende Schwelle auseinander, und es gibt verschiedene Theorien zur Frage, wann eine Cyberoperation die Anwendung von Gewalt ausmacht. Außerdem gibt es Fälle von Operationen, die als Androhung von Gewalt im Sinne von Artikel Volume 2 (Issue 4) der Charta der Vereinten Nationen bezeichnet werden können, und dies obwohl die Schwelle der Gewaltanwendung nicht erreicht wird. Schließlich können Cyberoperationen, die die Schwelle nicht erreichen, trotzdem gegen das Völkerrecht verstoßen, und somit ein verbotenes Eingreifen in die inneren Angelegenheiten eines anderen Staates darstellen.

Author(s):  
Mathias Forteau

This chapter examines one of the most contentious issues in the jus ad bellum: whether and when international law permits a state to use force unilaterally to rescue its nationals abroad when their lives or security are threatened. It first considers the definition of the phrase ‘rescuing nationals abroad’ and the legal scope and legal nature of the justification based on the necessity of carrying out such an act. It analyses the opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the matter before assessing the current position of international law on the permissibility of rescuing nationals abroad. It also discusses whether the use of force to rescue nationals abroad can be invoked for humanitarian assistance purposes involving non-nationals. The chapter shows that the notion of ‘rescuing nationals abroad’ is ambiguous from a legal perspective and that the legality of using force to rescue nationals abroad has remained unclear since 1945.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 997-1008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcela Prieto Rudolphy

Abstract In this article, I argue that there are two main objections against Heike Krieger’s view on what ‘a populist approach to international law’ entails. First, there are two methodological obstacles that counsel against constructing ‘a populist approach to international law’: populism varies significantly depending on its definition of ‘the people’ and international law is a fragmented regime. Second, the opposition between a ‘law of coordination’ and a ‘law of cooperation’ to which Krieger resorts is misleading, for it obscures the fact that the value of cooperation and coordination lies primarily in the values for which we coordinate and cooperate. As such, I argue that this opposition may make us partially blind to two important dangers that some forms of populism may pose right now: their cooperating to reshape international law and institutions according to (some) of their values and their refusing to cooperate or coordinate in the achievement of urgent goals. Nonetheless, I conclude that the precise shape of these dangers – as well as how to resist them – remains blurry if we do not pay proper attention to the ways in which different forms of populism define ‘the people’.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Kułaga

The Use of Drones in Combating International Terrorism from the Perspective of ‘ius ad bellum’Summary The increasing practice of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (military UAVs, commonly known as drones) by some countries to eliminate suspected terrorists raises a number of controversies from the perspective of international law. These controversies are also related to the specific features of military UAVs, which make it possible to kill targeted individuals without risk to the military personnel of the country concerned, and thereby may encourage the abusive interpretation of the applicable legal regulations. This article discusses these issues from the perspective of ius ad bellum, in particular the right to self-defence. It shows the main controversial points on the scope of invoking the right to self-defence in such cases, in particular the possibility of invoking the right to self-defence in response to an attack by a non-state entity, the question of pre-emptive self-defence, the importance of the severity of the force used as a condition allowing for the use of force in self-defence, and the relevance of the principles of proportionality and necessity. The article also presents an outline of the vast and highly controversial issues associated with the definition of terrorism from the point of view of international law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jure Vidmar

AbstractThe secession of Crimea and—more broadly—the conflict in Ukraine reopened questions concerning the limits of a democratic expression of the will of the people and the use of force in order to procure annexation of a territory belonging to another State. This article seeks to clarify the law governing the change of the legal status of a territory through secession and merger with another state. It argues not only that the right of self-determination does not grant an entitlement to alter the legal status of a territory, but also that general international law does not prohibit such an alteration. The rules of international law favor the stability of theexistinginternational borders and thus the territorial status quo, but this does not mean that a unilateral attempt at altering an existing territorial arrangement automatically constitutes an internationally wrongful act. Any change of the legal status of a territory becomes illegal, however, upon anoutsideuse of force. Such an illegality cannot be “cured” by a democratically expressed will of the people.


2022 ◽  
pp. 33-47
Author(s):  
S. V. Korostelev

The purpose of this article is to eliminate methodological discrepancies in the definition of the problem of “hybrid” use of force and the possibility of using this construct when interfering in the internal affairs of states. In any conflict situation, the behavior of states in moving towards their national goals can be explained through how they do combine and synchronize (as it is often defined at the present time — «hybrid») the use of means of compellence and coercion available to them. In general, conceptually «hybrid war» can be described as “the synchronized use of multiple instruments of national power, specially selected to obtain mutually reinforcing effects on specific vulnerabilities across the entire spectrum of social processes. The substance of the modern security environment has led to an increase in the number of areas of conflict of interests of actors, the complexity and dynamism of conflicts, and the unpredictability of their outcomes. The formation of the practice of attribution of international responsibility, and the development of the international institutions supporting it, took place gradually and, ultimately, led to such a development of the international security environment, which made an appeal to «hybridity» to promote national interests in the process of political competition of social groups or individuals with divergent interests for power inevitable. The problem of terminology is one of the main obstacles to a clear understanding of the operation of the «hybridity» construct in political competition. The active use of the definition «hybrid» by propaganda in combination with the terms «war», «threats», «hostilities in the gray zone», «operations», «tactics», «competition does not turn into a state of war» political discourse, since these terms are almost never linked to the definition of the desired state of international relations by the state leadership. And if we are talking about the outcome of the collision of interests of actors in competition or conflict, then this desired result is «historically» defined by the term «victory». Thus, the definition of the substance of «victory» is a necessary initial point to onset analyzing the possibilities of turning to any of the instruments of national power in a «hybrid» confrontation.


2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 403
Author(s):  
Christopher K. Penny

The definition of ‘terrorist activity’ is fundamental to Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation. Following the recent trial of Momin Khawaja before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, it is clear that the ‘armed conflict’ exclusion – exempting wartime activities undertaken in accordance with international law – poses serious challenges to the coherence of this legislative regime, threatening the effectiveness of future domestic terrorism prosecutions. This article examines the ‘armed conflict’ exclusion and its judicial treatment in Khawaja, identifying key challenges and making specific recommendations to address them. Coupled with other issues arising from the ‘armed conflict’ exclusion, Khawaja serves to highlight a clear and pressing need for amendment of the statutory definition of ‘terrorist activity.’La définition d’ « activité terroriste » est un élément fondamental de la législation canadienne contre le terrorisme. Suite au récent procès de Momin Khawaja devant la Cour supérieure de justice de l’Ontario, il est clair que l’exclusion « conflit armé » - qui fait exemption d’activités en temps de guerre entreprises conformément au droit international – présente des défis importants à la cohérence de ce régime législatif, menaçant l’efficacité de poursuites contre le terrorisme au Canada à l’avenir. Cet article examine l’exclusion « conflit armé » et le traitement juridique que l’on en fait dans Khawaja, identifiant des défis-clés et faisant des recommandations précises pour en traiter. En conjonction avec d’autres questions que soulève l’exclusion « conflit armé », Khawaja sert à mettre en évidence un besoin clair et pressant de modification à la définition statutaire d’ « activité terroriste ».


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 503-530
Author(s):  
Suleiman Usman Santuraki

  The coordinated blockade of the State of Qatar by some of its neighbours in June 2017 has raised questions on the sovereignty of the state and the extent to which coercion is allowed in international law. This article considers the reasons behind the blockade and the subsequent demands by Qatar’s neighbours. It evaluates the blockade of Qatar based on the twin principles of international law: the prohibition on the use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. The article argues that the language of article 2 (4), read together with the purposes of the United Nations (UN), render any forcible attempt to coerce a sovereign state into surrendering its sovereignty illegal. The article also considers the debate on whether economic and political coercion amounts to force. It submits that the coordinated blockade and the subsequent “13 points” demands threaten Qatar’s sovereignty, because the blockade contravenes the purposes of the UN. The article also argues that the blockade amounts to an interference in the internal affairs of Qatar, even if economic or political coercion are not considered as force. The article finds that the blockade does not categorically amount to a threat or use of force; but it certainly violates the principle of non-intervention as enshrined in the UN Charter.


2018 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 01008
Author(s):  
V. Upeniece

The Charter of the United Nations wasthought to establish a normative order, maintain international peace and security. According to the Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs”[1]. However the Article 51 doesnot propose a legal definition of the conduct which is considered as an armed attack or the commencement of such an attack. It does not propose strict criterions for the use of force for self-defence. As a result different interpretations of this norm have been arising and continuing to change in response to new situations and threats.


2005 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 603-625
Author(s):  
J.-Maurice Arbour

It is a well-established principle of international law that the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State is forbidden. It is also recognized that every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic System as well as its political social and cultural Systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever. But international law does not prohibit the use of force in the exercice of the right of self-defence if an armed attack occurs and some writers state that there is no rule of international law which forbids the government of one state from rendering assistance to the government of another state. This article is primarily concerned with legal issues related to soviet invasion of Afghanistan; its purpose is to examine official statements put forward in Moscow in order to justify the legality of this armed intervention. As will be seen, there is a perfect similarity between legal arguments used in 1956, 1968 and 1980; this is being done in order to give the domestic crisis an international colouring and to justify a demand for foreign intervention. It must be noted that Soviet troops are "not interfering" in the international affairs of Afghanistan: on the contrary, they are "fighting for" the principle of socialist self-determination of the people of Afghanistan... By definition a war conducted by the USSR is a just and defensive war...


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document