scholarly journals Conquest or voluntary annexation? The political process of incorporation of Kartli-Kakheti on Kingdom into the Russian Empire, 1796 – 1801

Author(s):  
M. A. Volhonskiy

The article highlights the political process of accession in 1801, KartliKakheti to the Russian Empire, which was the result of the development of RussianGeorgian relations in the second half of the XVIII century, the article shows that the military-political weakness of the Georgian Kingdom became the main reason for the failure of the prisoner in 1783 the Treaty of Georgievsk, according to which Russia took under its protectorate of Eastern Georgia. Awareness of this fact has forced both Georgian and Russian ruling upper classes to begin to seek new forms of allied relations. Ensuing after the death of king Irakli II between representatives of the Royal family fight for throne significantly weakened the Georgian Kingdom. In the face of external threats from Iran, the only way to keep Eastern Georgia from ruin was its accession to Russia.

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-90
Author(s):  
Boris Valentinovich Petelin ◽  
Vladilena Vadimovna Vorobeva

In the political circles of European countries attempts to reformat the history of World War II has been continuing. Poland is particularly active; there at the official level, as well as in the articles and in the speeches of politicians, political scientists and historians crude attacks against Russia for its commitment to objective assessments of the military past are allowed. Though, as the authors of this article mention, Russian politicians have not always been consistent in evaluation of Soviet-Polish relationships, hoping to reach a certain compromise. If there were any objections, they were mostly unconvincing. Obviously, as the article points, some statements and speeches are not without emotional colouring that is characteristic, when expressing mutual claims. However, the deliberate falsification of historical facts and evidence, from whatever side it occurs, does not meet the interests of the Polish and Russian peoples, in whose memory the heroes of the Red Army and the Polish Resistance have lived and will live. The authors point in the conclusions that it is hard to achieve mutual respect to key problems of World War II because of the overlay of the 18th – 19th centuries, connected with the “partitions of Poland”, the existence of the “Kingdom of Poland” as part of the Russian Empire, Soviet-Polish War of 1920. There can be only one way out, as many Russian and Polish scientists believe – to understand the complex twists and turns of Russo-Polish history, relying on the documents. Otherwise, the number of pseudoscientific, dishonest interpretations will grow.


2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 84-95
Author(s):  
Vladimi D. Puzanov

The reforms of Peter I became the basis for the gradual restructuring of all the military forces of Siberia. The main role in the Russian military cavalry of the Peter's era was played by dragoons. Under Peter I, dragoon regiments were the only type of Russian regular cavalry. In the field army, Peter I ordered the formation of 34 dragoon regiments. In addition, garrison dragoon regiments were formed in the province in the strategically important cities of Azov, Astrakhan, Kazan, and Tobolsk. In the 3050s of the XVIII century, the number of field dragoon regiments of the Russian Empire decreased to 20. In 1744, 3 field dragoon regiments Olonetsky, Vologda and Lutsk, and 2 field infantry regiments Shirvan and Nasheburg were sent to Siberia to protect the region from the Dzungars. By the decree of the Senate of September 29, 1744, all the Russian troops of Siberia were subordinated to the chief commander of the Siberian Corps, who was subordinate to the Military College. Major-General Christian Kinderman was appointed the main commander in Siberia. In March 1756, the Russian army consisted of 3 cuirassiers, 29 dragoons, and 46 infantry regiments, totaling 78 army regiments, with 172,440 men. As a result, during the Seven Years ' War, the number of field dragoon units in Russia decreased by 3 times and by 1763 was only 7 regiments. As a result, if in 1754 the dragoons were 36,627 people (92.6 %), then by 1767 there were only 4,802 people (12.8%) from the Russian cavalry in their ranks.


Author(s):  
Aleksandr S. Minin

The article is devoted to the analysis of additional monetary payments for the higher bureaucracy of the Russian Empire of Alexander I and Nicholas I. this issue is not sufficiently studied in domestic and foreign historiography. Researchers either did not specifically consider additional monetary payments, or did not allocate a specific group of Ministerial bureaucracy. The Ministers, together with the Emperor, determined the political course, and as the permanent entourage of the monarch, they formed the “face” of the reign. Under Nicholas I, many Ministers held high positions for more than 10 years. The basis of monetary income of Russian officials was a salary by rank or position. In addition, there were additional payments: canteens, apartments, runs, and other money. For Junior officials, the amount of these payments was strictly regulated. For Ministers and adjutants-General, it depended on the Emperor’s attention to a particular person. In the article, special attention is paid to the Minister of state property P. D. Kiselev as a fairly typical figure for the era of Nicholas I. Additional payments to P. D. Kiselev can be compared with the amount of the annual salary. The basis of its capital was a one-time grant of 600,000 piastres as a reward for the administration of Moldova and Wallachia, which turned the average local nobleman into a rich nobleman. Despite legal regulations that set the Ministerial salary, Ministers of equal rank could receive different salaries and additional payments. Dependence on cash payments were made by the Russian Ministers from the nobles to officials. This indicates the gradual modernization of the state apparatus of the Russian Empire, the formation of a regular bureaucracy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 948 (6) ◽  
pp. 54-64
Author(s):  
M.Yu. Orlov

In the middle of the XIX century in Russia there wasa boom of commercial or civil cartography. The author describes the reasons as well as the background for such a strong growth. The influence of the general political and economic situation in the Russian Empire on the appearance of the first privately-owned publishers of maps was considered in detail. The Depot of maps established in 1797 by Paul I, later (1812) rearranged into the Military Topographical Depot, monopolized all cartographic activities in Russia. The require for cartographic products among the civilian population, as well as the scarcity of funding from the treasury of issuing maps, forced the Military Topographical Depot to sell part of its products and prepare not only topographic maps, but also training maps and atlases for release. The author considers the publication of an open catalog of maps and atlases by the military department in 1858, which had a strong influence on the development of the cartographic market in details. For the first time, the expenditures and revenues from the publication of maps and atlases were shown; the dynamics of increasing sales and their dependence on changes in the political and economic structure of Russia are studied. The technical revolution in printing at the beginning of the 19th century, the emergence of lithography and new printing machines made it possible to increase the circulation of maps and reduced their cost. The inability of the military to meet the demand for maps and atlases was used by the first entrepreneurs who were the founders of civilian cartography. The causes of appearing private cartographic institutions are discussed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 123-136
Author(s):  
Lyubov V. Ulyanova

The article analyzes the political discourse of the officials of the main political surveillance structure, – the Police Department, – in the period of 1880s (organization of the Department) and until October, 1905, when the Western-type Constitution project finally prevailed. The comparative analysis of the conceptual instruments (“Constitutionalists”, “Oppositionists”, “Radicals”, “Liberals”) typically used in the Police Department allows one to come o the conclusion that the leaders of the Russian empire political police did not follow the “reactionary and protective” discourse, did not share its postulates, but preferred the moderate-liberal-conservative path of political development. Along with that, the Police Department also demonstrated loyal attitude to zemsky administration and zemsky figures, covert criticism of “bureaucratic mediastinum”, the tendency to come to an agreement with public figures through personal negotiations, intentional omittance of reactionary and protective repressive measures in preserving autocracy. All this allows to come to the conclusion that the officials of the Police Department shares Slavophil public and political doctrine.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 426-453
Author(s):  
Kirill Petrov

Abstract The phenomenon of color revolutions has occupied a prominent place in Russian politics for a good reason. The major threat of color revolutions as modern political warfare designed by Western countries deeply affected the political process in Russia since 2005. It may have appeared that the imperative of resisting them was the result of a non-democratic regime reacting to neighboring countries’ uprisings. Some portrayed it as authoritarian learning. This paper suggests that the counteractions stemmed from the interests of disunited Russian elite groups who were seeking opportunities to reinforce their dominance and capitalize on the idea of significant external threats. The phenomenon reshaped the balance within elite groups and led to the consolidation of law enforcement networks on the eve of Putin’s third term. Further, the prevailing perception of color revolutions discouraged any elite splits that could lead to proto-democratic rules.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (10-4) ◽  
pp. 196-205
Author(s):  
Vadim Mikhailov ◽  
Konstantin Losev

The article is devoted to the issue of Church policy in relation to the Rusyn population of Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire. In the second half of the 19th century, the policy of the Austro-Hungarian administration towards the Rusyn Uniate population of the Empire underwent changes. Russia’s victories in the wars of 1849 and 1877-1878 aroused the desire of the educated part of the Rusyns to return to the bosom of the Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, even during the World War I, when the Russian army captured part of the territories inhabited by Rusyns, the military and officials of the Russian Empire were too cautious about the issue of converting Uniates to Orthodoxy, which had obvious negative consequences both for the Rusyns, who were forced to choose a Ukrainophile orientation to protect their national and cultural identity, and for the future of Russia as the leader of the Slavic and Orthodox world.


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