Personal autonomy and the burqa

Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Anne Phillips

No one wants to be treated like an object, regarded as an item of property, or put up for sale. Yet many people frame personal autonomy in terms of self-ownership, representing themselves as property owners with the right to do as they wish with their bodies. Others do not use the language of property, but are similarly insistent on the rights of free individuals to decide for themselves whether to engage in commercial transactions for sex, reproduction, or organ sales. Drawing on analyses of rape, surrogacy, and markets in human organs, this book challenges notions of freedom based on ownership of our bodies and argues against the normalization of markets in bodily services and parts. The book explores the risks associated with metaphors of property and the reasons why the commodification of the body remains problematic. The book asks what is wrong with thinking of oneself as the owner of one's body? What is wrong with making our bodies available for rent or sale? What, if anything, is the difference between markets in sex, reproduction, or human body parts, and the other markets we commonly applaud? The book contends that body markets occupy the outer edges of a continuum that is, in some way, a feature of all labor markets. But it also emphasizes that we all have bodies, and considers the implications of this otherwise banal fact for equality. Bodies remind us of shared vulnerability, alerting us to the common experience of living as embodied beings in the same world. Examining the complex issue of body exceptionalism, the book demonstrates that treating the body as property makes human equality harder to comprehend.


Author(s):  
Joshua Kotin

This book is a new account of utopian writing. It examines how eight writers—Henry David Thoreau, W. E. B. Du Bois, Osip and Nadezhda Mandel'shtam, Anna Akhmatova, Wallace Stevens, Ezra Pound, and J. H. Prynne—construct utopias of one within and against modernity's two large-scale attempts to harmonize individual and collective interests: liberalism and communism. The book begins in the United States between the buildup to the Civil War and the end of Jim Crow; continues in the Soviet Union between Stalinism and the late Soviet period; and concludes in England and the United States between World War I and the end of the Cold War. In this way it captures how writers from disparate geopolitical contexts resist state and normative power to construct perfect worlds—for themselves alone. The book contributes to debates about literature and politics, presenting innovative arguments about aesthetic difficulty, personal autonomy, and complicity and dissent. It models a new approach to transnational and comparative scholarship, combining original research in English and Russian to illuminate more than a century and a half of literary and political history.


Author(s):  
Markus D. Dubber

Dual Penal State: The Crisis of Criminal Law in Comparative-Historical Perspective addresses one of today’s most pressing social and political issues: the rampant, at best haphazard, and ever-expanding use of penal power by states ostensibly committed to the enlightenment-based legal-political project of Western liberal democracy. Penal regimes in these states operate in a wide field of ill-considered and little constrained violence, where radical and prolonged interference with the autonomy of the very persons upon whose autonomy the legitimacy of state power is supposed to rest has been utterly normalized. At bottom, this crisis of modern penality is a crisis of the liberal project itself; the penal paradox is merely the sharpest formulation of the general paradox of power in a liberal state: the legitimacy of state sovereignty in the name of personal autonomy. To capture the depth and range of the crisis of contemporary penality in ostensibly liberal states, Dual Penal State leaves behind customary temporal and parochial constraints, and turns to historical and comparative analysis instead. This approach reveals a fundamental distinction between two conceptions of penal power, penal law and penal police, that run through Western legal-political history, one rooted in autonomy, equality, and interpersonal respect, and the other in heteronomy, hierarchy, and patriarchal power. Dual penal state analysis illuminates how this distinction manifests itself in the history of the present of various penal systems, from the malign neglect of the American war on crime to the ahistorical self-satisfaction of German criminal law science.


Author(s):  
David Wendell Moller

This chapter details the vicissitudes of race and poverty shaped J. W. Green’s upbringing in the Deep South as well as his adjustment to urban living as an adult. His lack of education, employment opportunity, and personal empowerment led to a “life on the streets.” Stoic faith saw him through a life and death in poverty. Mr. Green teaches us that everyone comes to this phase of life with strengths to cull from their cultural and spiritual beliefs. Mr. Green also teaches us that dignified dying does not require the unfettered exercise of personal autonomy, although a deep and abiding respect for the self-worth of the individual is necessary.


Author(s):  
Lubomira Radoilska

This chapter explores four kinds of skepticism about autonomy in general and its applicability to psychiatric ethics in particular. It is argued that although there are valuable lessons to be learnt from each of these skeptical challenges, their overall contribution is best understood in terms of friendly correctives to an autonomy-centered normative and conceptual framework instead of viable alternatives to it. The first four sections each provide a logical reconstruction of a distinct skeptical line of reasoning about autonomy and expand on its implications for psychiatric ethics: skepticism about personal autonomy; skepticism about autonomy as an agency concept; vulnerability-grounded skepticism about autonomy; and paternalism-friendly skepticism about autonomy. The fifth section identifies and explores the underlying presuppositions that motivate the previously discussed forms of skepticism about autonomy, and the sixth reflects on the significance of psychiatric ethics for rebutting skepticism about autonomy and developing a new, more promising positive theory.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Andrea Rodríguez-Prat ◽  
Donna M. Wilson ◽  
Remei Agulles

Abstract Background/Objective Personal autonomy and control are major concepts for people with life-limiting conditions. Patients who express a wish to die (WTD) are often thought of wanting it because of loss of autonomy or control. The research conducted so far has not focused on personal beliefs and perspectives; and little is known about patients’ understanding of autonomy and control in this context. The aim of this review was to analyze what role autonomy and control may play in relation to the WTD expressed by people with life-limiting conditions. Methods A systematic integrative review was conducted. The search strategy used MeSH terms in combination with free-text searching of the EBSCO Discovery Service (which provides access to multiple academic library literature databases, including PubMed and CINAHL), as well as the large PsycINFO, Scopus, and Web of Science library literature databases from their inception until February 2019. The search was updated to January 2021. Results After the screening process, 85 full texts were included for the final analysis. Twenty-seven studies, recording the experiences of 1,824 participants, were identified. The studies were conducted in Australia (n = 5), Canada (n = 5), USA (n = 5), The Netherlands (n = 3), Spain (n = 2), Sweden (n = 2), Switzerland (n = 2), Finland (n = 1), Germany (n = 1), and the UK (n = 1). Three themes were identified: (1) the presence of autonomy for the WTD, (2) the different ways in which autonomy is conceptualized, and (3) the socio-cultural context of research participants. Significance of results Despite the importance given to the concept of autonomy in the WTD discourse, only a few empirical studies have focused on personal interests. Comprehending the context is crucial because personal understandings of autonomy are shaped by socio-cultural–ethical backgrounds and these impact personal WTD attitudes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Lara

AbstractCan Artificial Intelligence (AI) be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual's capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these proposals, this article proposes a virtual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology.


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