Transcendental Subjectivity, Embodied Subjectivity, and Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism

2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-44
Author(s):  
Rosa Spagnuolo Vigorita

This paper intends to analyze the question of the embodied subjectivity in Emmanuel Levinas’s work, starting from a specific point of view: the controversial reception of Husserl’s phenomenology. In the early period of his confrontation with Husserl, Levinas criticizes the excess of theoreticism in transcendental idealism. However, he then seems to discover right inside of it the conditions to bring the philosophical debate out of the limits of knowledge theory. This is when he recognizes the important role played by the body in the husserlian description of the act of sense-giving (Sinngebung). Though, while praising Husserl for his conception of sensibility – as the “Commentaires nouveaux” clearly show – Levinas actually proceeds to an original rethinking of the meaning of incarnation, beyond the purity of the ego, and the supposed “property” of the flesh.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Andermann

The discussion over the befallenness (Widerfahrnis) of experience illustrates how the philosophical tradition has substantially assumed an active and conscious subject. The constitutive meaning of the pre-egoistic and passive, anonymous dimensions of perception and agency become apparent through what befalls us, what we are suffering from, through befallenness, accidentalness and events beyond our control. This article deals with the status of the sovereign subject through a critical discussion of the principles of intentionality and the constitution of world in transcendental subjectivity, showing the development of phenomenology, above all between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, as emphasising passivity and anonymity.


Author(s):  
Paul F. Snowdon

The overall question of this chapter is: what relevance do Kant’s Paralogisms have for current philosophy? After characterising Kant’s negative points about rational psychology, it is argued that once we abandon transcendental idealism and we appreciate that Kant’s assumption that we lack intuitions of ourselves is problematic, then Kant’s approach lacks a convincing basis. It is further argued that Strawson’s much more favourable reading of Kant’s argument relies on certain conceptual assumptions that are also unwarranted. The major and important lesson for our time, it is suggested, is that Kant identifies a serious weakness in a popular style of pro-dualist reasoning.


Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi

Whereas a certain popular (Fregean) interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality makes Husserl into an internalist and methodological solipsist, the aim of Chapter 4 is to show that Husserl’s commitment to transcendental idealism prevents his theory from being either. I first discuss competing interpretations of Husserl’s concept of the noema, and argue that the Fregean interpretation misreads the transcendental character of Husserl’s phenomenology. I next present an interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism that highlights its difference from metaphysical idealism and shows why Husserl’s conception of the mind–world relationship cannot be adequately captured within the internalism–externalism framework. In the final part of the chapter, I discuss how the claim that Husserl is a methodological solipsist fails to engage properly with his account of transcendental intersubjectivity, and how that latter account eventually transforms the very character of the transcendental project.


Sexualities ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-349
Author(s):  
Maricela DeMirjyn

This article discusses the performance work by disability activist, Maria R. Palacios who is a Latina feminist writer, poet and spoken word performer. Using narrative inquiry as a method of investigation, performances by Palacios are analyzed within the context of sexuality and disability studies. Specific performances are reviewed under the framework of the nonprofit organization Sins Invalid: An Unshamed Claim to Beauty in the Face of Invisibility, and include the following pieces by Palacios: Maria Full of Sin (2008), Testimony (2009), Hunger (2009), My Sexy Disability (2010) and Vagina Manifesto (2009). As a performance project, Sins Invalid notes in its mission statement that its ‘performance work explores the themes of sexuality, embodiment and the disabled body’, and the performances are designed to inspire visions of beauty and sexuality that disrupt heteronormative, as well as ableist, paradigms. A portion of this work will be centered on the Sins Invalid website focusing on entries in the form of blog postings dedicated to the performances by Palacios. Additionally, her autobiographic and culturally focused spoken word pieces and poems, such as Making Love to Woman in a Wheelchair (2007), will be thematically analyzed regarding her embodied subjectivity as a sexualized and self-identified disabled Latina. In conclusion, an examination of how performance, in conjunction with narrative research, provides a critical lens regarding visibility and the embodiment of dis/abled women of color for future studies is shared.


2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-673
Author(s):  
Joe Saunders ◽  
Martin Sticker

AbstractIn this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We argue that, while it might look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both.


Kant-Studien ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 498-511
Author(s):  
Truls Wyller

Abstract I defend what I take to be a genuinely Kantian view on temporal extension: time is not an object but a human horizon of concrete particulars. As such, time depends on the existence of embodied human subjects. It does not, however, depend on those subjects determined as spatial objects. Starting with a realist notion of “apperception” as applied to indexical space (1), I proceed with the need for external criteria of temporal duration (2). In accordance with Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, these criteria are found in concepts and laws of motion and change (3). I then see what follows from this for a reasonable notion of transcendental idealism (4). Finally, in support of my Kantian conclusions, I argue for the transcendentally subjective nature of particular temporal extension (5).


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-224
Author(s):  
Vitaly G. Kosykhin ◽  
Svetlana M. Malkina ◽  

The article deals with the problem of the return of metaphysics within the framework of the ontological turn of philosophy and the situation of post-metaphysical thinking. The conditions for the possibility of modern metaphysical discourse in the projects of empirical metaphysics and historical ontology are revealed. Historical ontology as a meta-reflexion of philosophy over its own historical foundations is able to bridge the gap between the epistemological static nature of transcendental subjectivity and the ontological dynamism of the growth of scientific knowledge about reality by comprehending the conditions of interaction between science and metaphysics in conditions of post-metaphysical thinking and realistic reversal of ontology. Philosophical knowledge in the context of the ontological turn and the associated return of metaphysics becomes focused not so much on the sharp demarcation of science and metaphysics and postulating the incommensurability of their ontologies, but on identifying mutually enriching areas of research that could give a new impetus to their development.


PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 157-171
Author(s):  
Angelica Nuzzo

This essay discusses Merleau-Ponty's assessment of Kant's philosophy looking first at his critique of Kant's transcendental idealism in the preface to the 1945 Phenomenology of Perception, and second at his account of the duality of the concepts of nature in the 1956-57 lecture notes on Nature at the Collčge de France. In both cases, Merleau-Ponty points to the encounter with the issue of the living/lived body as the stumbling block that halts the transcendental inquiry leading to his transcendental phenomenology. Along this itinerary, countering Merleau-Ponty's reading a different interpretation of Kant is offered. The claim is made that Kant did not evade the problem of the human body but made it functional to his own transcendental inquiry. Task of this essay is to measure the distance that separates the two accounts of Kant's view of sensibility, namely, the critical account that inspires Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body leading him beyond the alleged impasse of Kant's transcendental idealism, and what the author claims to be Kant's own transcendental view of sensibility.


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