scholarly journals Sedat Laciner, Mehmet Ozcan and Ihsan Bal: European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey’s Membership on the European Union

ICR Journal ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 536-539
Author(s):  
Christoph Marcinkowski

Turkey’s 22 July 2007 parliamentary elections resulted in a clear victory for the ruling Justice and Development Party, in Turkish known as Adaket ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP. AKP is part of the right-wing, conservative spectrum of the Turkish political arena. In the West (with the post 9/11 scenario of distrust of anything smacking of ‘Muslim revivalism’) as well as among Turkey’s secular-minded elites and many citizens, the AKP is often perceived as ‘Islamist’ and thus as a danger and detriment to Turkey’s EU membership, regardless of the fact that it had been the AKP government which carried out drastic reforms of its legal and economic, and institutional system. Based on what it views as merely lukewarm support for its accession to the EU and alleged double standards in its negotiations, the Turkish public has become increasingly ‘eurosceptic’ in recent times, as revealed by several surveys. Ankara has been trying desperately to comply with EU legislation and standards, but Brussels has so far refused to back 2013 as a deadline for Turkey’s EU membership. It is believed that the accession process will take at least 15 years, if not longer. In spite of Turkey’s impressive record in terms of moving towards regional integration, the issue of the country’s future EU accession constitutes to date the central controversy of the ongoing enlargement of the EU. Among the Turkish public as well as the present Turkish government (both of which had been rather enthusiastically supportive of the bid for EU membership in the past) significant changes of ‘mood’ in this regard are noticeable.

Author(s):  
Maciej Mróz

The previous model of the Polish-Ukrainian relations has come to an end, while the new one is in the phase of statu nascendi. The fundamental contradiction of the basic interests of Kiev and Warsaw has worked out and is still relevant up to date. While Ukraine is looking for ways to integrate with the EU and needs a strong Europe, putting on Paris and Berlin, and thus ipso facto focusing on strengthening the European community, Poland has entered the path of euro-skepticism and quasi-Jagiellonian policy. The concept of a good change has triggered the most serious reorientation in foreign policy of Poland over the last quarter of a century. The amazement of the outside observers, also in Ukraine, might be aroused by the fact that Polish Eastern policy has been pursued by the same circle of experts under the previous government of the PO–PSL coalition as well as under the current government of the PiS-led united right. After several years of the right-wing rule the Ukrainian analysts see the growing degradation process of Poland’s significance in Europe, its increasing confrontational tendencies towards countries outside the European Union, including relations with Ukraine. Primarily, it is a political dimension, though, it can be perceived also as a symbolic dimension and symbols mean a lot in politics. Key words: Poland; Ukraine; European Union; NATO; United States of America; Russian Federation; Intermarium; Germany.


Author(s):  
Giselle Bosse

In early 2014, a series of dramatic crises in Ukraine generated headlines around the world. Most scholarly attention was placed on the tensions between the West and Russia, and the emergence of a new Cold War, especially following Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and its military incursion in eastern Ukraine. The relations between Ukraine and the European Union (EU) have often been reduced to debates on whether the EU was to blame for the conflict, having “sleepwalked” into the Ukraine crisis by focusing on technical trade issues and failing to recognize the delicate geopolitical context. Other analysts pointed to the EU’s pursuit of regional hegemony, which has failed to recognize Russia’s legitimate geopolitical and economic interests in Ukraine. In practice, Ukraine-EU relations have been more complex and nuanced, certainly when considering that Ukraine already declared its ambition to “return to Europe” and to seek EU membership with its proclamation of independence, in 1991. Ukraine-EU relations are perhaps best understood along four levels of inquiry. The first is domestic dynamics in Ukraine. Since the end of the Cold War, all Ukrainian governments have underlined the “Europeanness” of Ukraine and have also by and large followed a pro-EU course in their foreign policies, including the government under pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych. However, Ukraine’s European choice has often been limited to foreign-policy declarations. Even the pro-European and reform-oriented governments that led Ukraine after the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Maidan Square protests struggled to introduce far-reaching reforms because of the power of the “iron triangle” of oligarchic rule, corruption, and financial instability. The second line of inquiry concerns Ukraine-Russia relations. Since gaining independence, Ukraine’s strategy has been one of limited participation in Russia’s post-Soviet regional integration initiatives in order to safeguard its independence. However, Russia always used “sticks and carrots” vis-à-vis Ukraine to further its own policy objectives, ranging from offering gas-price discounts to cutting off gas supplies, imposing import bans on Ukrainian produce, and, since 2014, threatening and using the military to force Ukraine to acquiesce to its demands. A third line of inquiry is the EU’s policy toward Ukraine, based on bilateral relations and cooperation through the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. The EU has approached Ukraine as one among several neighbors in its attempt to build a ring of well-governed countries along its borders. Although the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe generated more interest in Ukraine, member states have consistently ruled out EU membership for Ukraine. A fourth theme of inquiry is that of EU-Russia relations in the wider international context. Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, the EU clearly prioritized good political and economic relations with Russia over its relationship with its neighbors in the East, including Ukraine. Even when Russia annexed Crimea and when evidence of the role of Russian forces in eastern Ukraine had become impossible to ignore, the EU struggled to find a common stance on Russia.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 687-702
Author(s):  
Neža Kogovšek Šalamon

This article addresses the question of the principle of solidarity in the fields of asylum and migration within the context of accession negotiations between the European Union and the candidate countries for EU membership. When a candidate country fulfils the membership conditions, it is expected that they will share the values of solidarity, mutual assistance and burden sharing in the fields of asylum and migration which will naturally impinge on their state sovereignty. This article is based on the hypothesis that solidarity in the field of asylum and migration has not been discussed within the enlargement process, meaning that the ‘new’ Member States were not aware of the concrete forms that this principle could take in the future. This hypothesis was tested on three case studies by analysing the accession documents of one candidate country from each of the three enlargement cycles (Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia respectively). This article concludes by showing that by agreeing to the EU Treaties, its solidarity clause and the majority vote rules, either as Member States or candidates, the states undertook the duty to transpose obligations in the fields of asylum and migration, even if they did not necessarily agree with them.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Silvana Mojsovska

EU membership has been a compelling goal for the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia), related to the bloc’s stability, economic prosperity and higher standard of living. Each of these countries pursues its own process of EU accession while being also a part of the regional initiatives under the auspices of the EU. This paper provides an overview of the EU accession process of the Western Balkan countries, focusing on their individual achievements and challenges, as well as common features and problems. Also, the content andprospects of regional integration of the Western Balkans through the Regional Economic Area (REA) programme, along with the role of the EU in supporting the regional perspective are discussed. The parallel Western Balkans engagement in both processes supports arguments for the prioritisation of the individual countries’ accession to the EU over Western Balkans regional integration, distinguishing also the challenges of both processes. The methodology for the elaboration of this paper includes methods of analysis and synthesis, based on extensive desk research of available materials.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 147
Author(s):  
Oleg Lozanov ◽  
Stela Zhivkova

Nowadays the European Union includes 28 countries. The last country that has signed an accession treaty was Croatia in 2013. The previous enlargement of the Union was in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania became members. The accession process for these two countries took some time and was related to quite a lot of changes in the economic practices of both countries. The present article reviews the changes that occur in the Bulgarian foreign economic practice, more particularly in the export activity after Bulgaria's accession to the European Union in 2007. The paper analyses the trends in the development, structure and geographical distribution of the country's export during the 10-year period of the country’s EU membership (2007-2016). The main reasons and factors for the main trends are outlined. On the basis of a detailed comparative analysis of the situation before and after the EU accession, the authors try to assess the impact of European integration on the Bulgarian export practices, highlighting both positive and negative results. The paper also elaborates specific recommendations for improvement of the competitiveness of the Bulgarian economy in the context of the country's export changes.


The opportunity for submission of B&H's application for EU membership was opened with the entering into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, and was carried out in February 2016. The membership application must contain European affiliation of the applicant country, inclusion in the European Union as a policy objective of the applicant country, as well as readiness for assuming all objectives and commitments ensuing from membership in the EU. B&H is at the very bottom compared to Central European countries, and is below 30% of European Union average in view of level of development. That points to the necessity of implementation of structural reforms in order to mobilize the private sector, which must be the main generator of growth and increase in employment, and which will gradually bring B&H closer to the EU average. 165,8 billion euros are intended for B&H from IPA II programme for the period 2014-2017, whereas the amount of available funds for the period 2018-2020 will be defined subsequently. It has been decided that 13,7 million years will be allocated annually for socioeconomic and regional development in 2016 and 2017. In 2014, 4 million euros were allocated for undertakings regarding employment, active social policy, education, research and development, promotion of gender equality and human resources development, and 11 million annually in the following years, including 2017. Reforms financed from IPA should provide citizens with better opportunities and allow for development of standards equal to those of EU citizens.


2017 ◽  
pp. 117-126
Author(s):  
Joanna Marszałek-Kawa ◽  
Ahmet Burak

On 29 March 2017, President of the European Council Donald Tusk received a note from UK Ambassador Tim Barrow. Under the document, the procedure of UK’s leaving of the European Union was initiated.1 Gideon Rachman from “Financial Times” compared Brexit to a divorce, stating that the representative of the British government “granted the divorce papers”, thus beginning a “long (planned for two years) attempt to redefine mutual relations” (Rozpoczyna się Brexit…, 2017). In his announcement for the press, Donald Tusk commented: “There is no reason to pretend that this is a lucky day, both in Brussels and in London […] Most Europeans, including almost a half of British voters, would prefer us to be still together” (Wielka Brytania rozpoczyna…, 2017). The stance of the European Council clearly mirrors the moods caused by the decision on Brexit, which are prevailing among all EU member states. It should be noted, however, that leaving the EU by the Brits not only has an impact on their political situation, but it also determines the actions of states aspiring to become members of the Community. The aim of this paper is to discuss the reasons for Brexit and to present the position of the Turkish government on this issue on the basis of the analysis of press articles and politicians’ speeches. The hypothesis we posed assumes that Brexit meant Turkey losing its most important advocate in the Union. Thus, the future of accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union has been called into question. One should also wonder to what degree Turkey’s foreign policy priorities, which have already been redefined under the influence of the war in Syria, the battle with ISIS, the immigration crisis and the futile accession process so far, will be affected by the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union. Will Turkey choose to follow the so-called Trexit route, giving up its membership in the EU? 


Author(s):  
Ljupcho Stevkovski

It is a fact that in the European Union there is a strengthening of right-wing extremism, radical right movement, populism and nationalism. The consequences of the economic crisis, such as a decline in living standards, losing of jobs, rising unemployment especially among young people, undoubtedly goes in favor of strengthening the right-wing extremism. In the research, forms of manifestation will be covered of this dangerous phenomenon and response of the institutions. Western Balkan countries, as a result of right-wing extremism, are especially sensitive region on possible consequences that might occur, since there are several unresolved political problems, which can very easily turn into a new cycle of conflicts, if European integration processes get delayed indefinitely.


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksander Lust

In referenda held in 2003, over 90% of Lithuanians supported joining the European Union (EU), while only two-thirds of Estonians did. Why? This article shows that Lithuanians and Estonians had different economic expectations about the EU. Most Lithuanians hoped that EU membership would help Lithuania overcome its economic backwardness and isolation. By contrast, many Estonians worried that the accession would reinforce Estonia's underdevelopment and dependency on the West. I argue that these expectations reflected the two countries' strategies of economic reform. Lithuania sold state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to their managers and continued to trade heavily with Russia, which slowed down the modernization of its economy. Estonia sold SOEs to foreigners and reoriented its trade rapidly from Russia to the West, which hurt its traditional sectors (particularly agriculture) and infrastructure.


Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 157-169
Author(s):  
Wawrzyniec Banach

European Union towards Western Balkans in the Context of Migration Crisis 2015‑2019 The aim of the article is to analyse the actions taken by the European Union towards the Western Balkans in the context of the migration crisis. The study assumes that the migration crisis was an important factor accelerating the accession process of the Western Balkan countries to the European Union. In order to fulfil the research goal, an analysis of sources (European Union documents) was conducted. The paper uses elements of the theory of the regional security complex as a theoretical framework. Firstly, the activities of the European Union before the migration crisis are discussed. Next, the paper focuses on presenting the course of the crisis on the Western Balkan route. The further part of the study discusses the actions taken by the EU towards the countries of the Western Balkans in response to the migration crisis.


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