scholarly journals THE ACCESSION PROCESS AND IPA FUNDS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RESTRUCTURING PUBLIC SPENDING AND CONVERGENCE TOWARDS THE EU

The opportunity for submission of B&H's application for EU membership was opened with the entering into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, and was carried out in February 2016. The membership application must contain European affiliation of the applicant country, inclusion in the European Union as a policy objective of the applicant country, as well as readiness for assuming all objectives and commitments ensuing from membership in the EU. B&H is at the very bottom compared to Central European countries, and is below 30% of European Union average in view of level of development. That points to the necessity of implementation of structural reforms in order to mobilize the private sector, which must be the main generator of growth and increase in employment, and which will gradually bring B&H closer to the EU average. 165,8 billion euros are intended for B&H from IPA II programme for the period 2014-2017, whereas the amount of available funds for the period 2018-2020 will be defined subsequently. It has been decided that 13,7 million years will be allocated annually for socioeconomic and regional development in 2016 and 2017. In 2014, 4 million euros were allocated for undertakings regarding employment, active social policy, education, research and development, promotion of gender equality and human resources development, and 11 million annually in the following years, including 2017. Reforms financed from IPA should provide citizens with better opportunities and allow for development of standards equal to those of EU citizens.

Author(s):  
Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski ◽  
Maciej Wilga

Multifaceted in its character, the relationship between Poland and the European Union is now more than a quarter of a century old. After the breakdown of the Eastern bloc, Poland signed the Association Agreement with the then European Communities in December 1991, which led up to an EU membership application three years later. Not yet a member, the country had some impact on the Union in the Nice Treaty negotiations (2000–2001), as well as on the European Constitutional Convention proceedings (2001–2003). After a successful EU membership referendum in 2003, reflecting a great deal of societal support, Poland, along with nine other newcomers, became a fully-fledged member of the EU. Once within the bloc, Warsaw was at pains to develop a more coherent EU policy, as it often changed its positions between more collaborative approaches and veto threats, but also absolving a successful rotating EU Council presidency in 2011. The country collaborated with other member states in Central and Eastern Europe—in the Visegrád framework and with the older member states—through the Weimar Triangle, for example, however with sometimes mixed results. Poland has prioritized a number of issues in the EU such as the energy sector, security and defense, and the Eastern partnership, the latter focusing on the EU Eastern neighbors, including Ukraine and Belarus. In particular, during the Ukraine-Russia conflict of 2014–2015, Poland was one of most active actors in the EU foreign policy. However, since 2015 Poland has become a subject of controversy within the EU, regarding the rule of law standards that were criticized by the European Commission and Warsaw’s rejection of a relocation scheme in the EU refugee and migrant policy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 687-702
Author(s):  
Neža Kogovšek Šalamon

This article addresses the question of the principle of solidarity in the fields of asylum and migration within the context of accession negotiations between the European Union and the candidate countries for EU membership. When a candidate country fulfils the membership conditions, it is expected that they will share the values of solidarity, mutual assistance and burden sharing in the fields of asylum and migration which will naturally impinge on their state sovereignty. This article is based on the hypothesis that solidarity in the field of asylum and migration has not been discussed within the enlargement process, meaning that the ‘new’ Member States were not aware of the concrete forms that this principle could take in the future. This hypothesis was tested on three case studies by analysing the accession documents of one candidate country from each of the three enlargement cycles (Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia respectively). This article concludes by showing that by agreeing to the EU Treaties, its solidarity clause and the majority vote rules, either as Member States or candidates, the states undertook the duty to transpose obligations in the fields of asylum and migration, even if they did not necessarily agree with them.


2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-355
Author(s):  
Mihajlo Vucic

The topic of this article is the Serbian foreign policy between its main strategic aims - membership in the European Union, and cooperation with China in the framework of the Belt and Road initiative. Serbia bases its foreign policy upon four pillars - the accession process to the EU and three strategic partnerships with great world powers - China, the United States of America, and Russia. However, the accession process to the EU requires from Serbia to strictly follow its obligations from the Stabilization and Association Agreement, Treaty Establishing the Transport Community, and other treaties signed with the EU which might sometimes conflict with project activities from the Belt and Road partnership process. These obligations relate mostly to competition and environmental protection. The author gives the analysis of the main points of possible conflict and indicates a double standard in the EU approach to the Belt and Road initiative. Then he presents arguments that indicate the Belt and Road can serve as a bridge between candidate countries and the EU internal market. The author concludes that although there exist some structural justifications to EU?s skepticism towards the Belt and Road, the best way to overcome them is to insist on political dialogue on many existing levels between the EU and China, with the aim to exchange information between them on EU rules, policies and standards to make sure Chinese investments and other financial activities in Serbia are in accordance with its accession obligations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 147
Author(s):  
Oleg Lozanov ◽  
Stela Zhivkova

Nowadays the European Union includes 28 countries. The last country that has signed an accession treaty was Croatia in 2013. The previous enlargement of the Union was in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania became members. The accession process for these two countries took some time and was related to quite a lot of changes in the economic practices of both countries. The present article reviews the changes that occur in the Bulgarian foreign economic practice, more particularly in the export activity after Bulgaria's accession to the European Union in 2007. The paper analyses the trends in the development, structure and geographical distribution of the country's export during the 10-year period of the country’s EU membership (2007-2016). The main reasons and factors for the main trends are outlined. On the basis of a detailed comparative analysis of the situation before and after the EU accession, the authors try to assess the impact of European integration on the Bulgarian export practices, highlighting both positive and negative results. The paper also elaborates specific recommendations for improvement of the competitiveness of the Bulgarian economy in the context of the country's export changes.


Author(s):  
Matteo Bonomi ◽  
Milica Uvalic

Serbia is negotiating European Union (EU) membership, a process that started in 2014 after the Brussels-mediated agreement between Kosovo and Serbia was signed in April 2013. Although the Federal Republic (FR) of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was officially included into the EU’s Stabilization and Association Process soon after the fall of the Milošević regime in October 2000, complex political issues have prevented its faster progress toward the EU. EU measures after 2001 in the areas of financial assistance, trade, and legal harmonization have sustained in a major way the country’s political and economic reforms, facilitating fast economic integration with the EU economy, financial and banking integration, the adoption of many laws in conformity with the acquis communuataire, new business opportunities, and increasing foreign direct investment. However, the Serbia–EU integration process has also been accompanied by strict political conditionality that has greatly delayed the establishment of contractual relations. Despite major efforts of various governments to comply with EU conditions, it was only in late April 2008 that Serbia concluded a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, which has paved the way for obtaining candidate status in 2012 and the opening of EU accession negotiations in 2014. In the meantime, EU’s enlargement negotiations framework has been strengthened further, making the negotiation talks much more complex and demanding. In addition to Serbia’s insufficient compliance with accession criteria, particularly reforms of the judiciary and public administration, the contested issue of Kosovo’s independence continues to pose a major threat to Serbia’s entry into the EU. Despite the absence of a common position on the part of the EU, given that Kosovo has still not been recognized by five EU member states, the limited progress in the Belgrade–Priština EU-facilitated dialogue represents one of the major obstacles for Serbia’s EU membership. Serbia’s entry into the EU, which could possibly take place in 2025, is likely to bring many benefits to the country and its population, but also to the EU, as this is a region of not only risks but also opportunities.


ICR Journal ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 536-539
Author(s):  
Christoph Marcinkowski

Turkey’s 22 July 2007 parliamentary elections resulted in a clear victory for the ruling Justice and Development Party, in Turkish known as Adaket ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP. AKP is part of the right-wing, conservative spectrum of the Turkish political arena. In the West (with the post 9/11 scenario of distrust of anything smacking of ‘Muslim revivalism’) as well as among Turkey’s secular-minded elites and many citizens, the AKP is often perceived as ‘Islamist’ and thus as a danger and detriment to Turkey’s EU membership, regardless of the fact that it had been the AKP government which carried out drastic reforms of its legal and economic, and institutional system. Based on what it views as merely lukewarm support for its accession to the EU and alleged double standards in its negotiations, the Turkish public has become increasingly ‘eurosceptic’ in recent times, as revealed by several surveys. Ankara has been trying desperately to comply with EU legislation and standards, but Brussels has so far refused to back 2013 as a deadline for Turkey’s EU membership. It is believed that the accession process will take at least 15 years, if not longer. In spite of Turkey’s impressive record in terms of moving towards regional integration, the issue of the country’s future EU accession constitutes to date the central controversy of the ongoing enlargement of the EU. Among the Turkish public as well as the present Turkish government (both of which had been rather enthusiastically supportive of the bid for EU membership in the past) significant changes of ‘mood’ in this regard are noticeable.


Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (6(69)) ◽  
pp. 161-181
Author(s):  
Bogdan Koszel

The European Union and the Forgotten Conflict over Transnistria The European Community/European Union was not formally involved in the resolution of the Transnistria conflict. It was believed that success would be possible with the help of an OSCE mission with active Russian participation. The EU considers the rebellious Transnistria as an integral part of Moldova. It sought to support its pro-Western course through the PCA and the Association Agreement. Moldova’s lack of prospects for EU membership and strong Russian influence in the country perpetuate existing divisions. In Europe, hardly anyone remembers the frozen conflict over Transnistria. After a brief period of armed struggle in the early 1990s, it did not accumulate any more international tension and attracted no more attention from the international public opinion.


Oikos ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (29) ◽  
pp. 13
Author(s):  
Olga María Cerqueira Torres

RESUMENEn el presente artículo el análisis se ha centrado en determinar cuáles de las funciones del interregionalismo, sistematizadas en los trabajos de Jürgen Rüland, han sido desarrolladas en la relación Unión Europea-Comunidad Andina de Naciones, ya que ello ha permitido evidenciar si el estado del proceso de integración de la CAN ha condicionado la racionalidad política del comportamiento de la Unión Europea hacia la región andina (civil power o soft imperialism); esto posibilitará establecer la viabilidad de la firma del Acuerdo de Asociación Unión Europea-Comunidad Andina de Naciones.Palabras clave: Unión Europea, Comunidad Andina, interregionalismo, funciones, acuerdo de asociación. Interregionalism functions in the EU-ANDEAN community relationsABSTRACTIn the present article analysis has focused on which functions of interregionalism, systematized by Jürgen Rüland, have been developed in the European Union-Andean Community birregional relation, that allowed demonstrate if the state of the integration process in the Andean Community has conditioned the political rationality of the European Union towards the Andean region (civil power or soft imperialism); with all these elements will be possible to establish the viability of the Association Agreement signature between the European Union and the Andean Community.Keywords: European Union, Andean Community, interregionalism, functions, association agreement.


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksander Lust

In referenda held in 2003, over 90% of Lithuanians supported joining the European Union (EU), while only two-thirds of Estonians did. Why? This article shows that Lithuanians and Estonians had different economic expectations about the EU. Most Lithuanians hoped that EU membership would help Lithuania overcome its economic backwardness and isolation. By contrast, many Estonians worried that the accession would reinforce Estonia's underdevelopment and dependency on the West. I argue that these expectations reflected the two countries' strategies of economic reform. Lithuania sold state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to their managers and continued to trade heavily with Russia, which slowed down the modernization of its economy. Estonia sold SOEs to foreigners and reoriented its trade rapidly from Russia to the West, which hurt its traditional sectors (particularly agriculture) and infrastructure.


Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 157-169
Author(s):  
Wawrzyniec Banach

European Union towards Western Balkans in the Context of Migration Crisis 2015‑2019 The aim of the article is to analyse the actions taken by the European Union towards the Western Balkans in the context of the migration crisis. The study assumes that the migration crisis was an important factor accelerating the accession process of the Western Balkan countries to the European Union. In order to fulfil the research goal, an analysis of sources (European Union documents) was conducted. The paper uses elements of the theory of the regional security complex as a theoretical framework. Firstly, the activities of the European Union before the migration crisis are discussed. Next, the paper focuses on presenting the course of the crisis on the Western Balkan route. The further part of the study discusses the actions taken by the EU towards the countries of the Western Balkans in response to the migration crisis.


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