Metaphoric Speculation: Rereading Book 15 of Augustine’s De Trinitate

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90
Author(s):  
Emeline McClellan ◽  

This article argues that De trinitate advocates a process of “reading” God through metaphor. For Augustine, as for Plotinus, human beings understand God (to the degree that this is possible) not by analyzing him rationally but by seeing him through the metaphor of the human mind. But unlike Plotinus, Augustine claims that the imago dei, with its triadic structure of memory, understanding, and will, serves as metaphor only to the extent that it experiences Christ’s redemptive illumination. The act of metaphor is a kind of interior “reading” during which the mind reads the imago dei as a mental text, interprets this text through Christ’s aid, and is simultaneously transformed into a better image.

Author(s):  
Emanuele Castrucci

The human mind has phased out its traditional anchorage in a natural biological basis (the «reasons of the body» which even Spinoza’s Ethics could count on) – an anchorage that had determined, for at least two millennia, historically familiar forms of culture and civilisation. Increasingly emphasising its intellectual disembodiment, it has come to the point of establishing in a completely artificial way the normative conditions of social behaviour and the very ontological collocation of human beings in general. If in the past ‘God’ was the name that mythopoietic activity had assigned to the world’s overall moral order, which was reflected onto human behaviour, now the progressive freeing of the mind – by way of the intellectualisation of life and technology – from the natural normativity which was previously its basic material reference opens up unforeseen vistas of power. Freedom of the intellect demands (or so one believes) the full artificiality of the normative human order in the form of an artificial logos, and precisely qua artificial, omnipotent. The technological icon of logos (which postmodern dispersion undermines only superficially) definitively unseats the traditional normative, sovereign ‘God’ of human history as he has been known till now. Our West has been irreversibly marked by this process, whose results are as devastating as they are inevitable. The decline predicted a century ago by old Spengler is here served on a platter....


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 610-627
Author(s):  
Oren Ergas

This paper locates the main challenge for education in cosmopolitanism within the nature of education when interpreted as a “mind-making process.” Based on this interpretation, education is currently a process that shapes non-cosmopolitan minds, for the practices generally associated with it habituate the human mind to see “reality” through contingent social narratives. The aspiration of education in cosmopolitanism to cultivate “a sense of feeling at home and caring for the world,” requires practices that also liberate the mind from the contingencies of the social narratives into which it happens to be born. For such purpose, education requires an ethical meta-narrative, which applies to all human beings and appeals to a mutual human language. Following calls for embracing a pluralistic epistemology in policy making, this paper proposes the interdisciplinary field of contemplative studies that focuses on the understanding of the embodied mind, as a point of origin for considering education as such and education in cosmopolitanism in particular. Mindfulness is then interpreted as one possible practical pedagogy based on which we can practice detachment from the contingency of social narratives by cultivating grounded-ness in the non-contingency of pre-conceptual embodied first-person experience.


Author(s):  
Pascual F. Martínez-Freire

The mind is a collection of various classes of processes that can be studied empirically. To limit the field of mental processes we must follow the criteria of folk psychology. There are three kinds of mind: human, animal and mechanical. But the human mind is the paradigm or model of mind. The existence of mechanical minds is a serious challenge to the materialism or the mind-brain identity theory. Based on this existence we can put forward the antimaterialist argument of machines. Intelligence is a class of mental processes such that the mind is the genus and the intelligence is a species of this genus. The capacity to solve problems is a clear and definite criterion of intelligence. Again, like in the mind, the human intelligence is the paradigm of the intelligence. There are also three kinds of intelligence: human, animal and mechanical. Searle’s Chinese room argument is misleading because Searle believes that it is possible to maintain a sharp distinction between syntax and semantics. The reasonable dualism in the brain-mind problem defends the existence of brain-mental processes, physical-mental processes, and nonphysical-mental (spiritual) processes. Constitution of the personal project of life, self-consciousness and free volitions are examples of spiritual processes. Usually the intelligence has been considered the most important quality of human beings, but freedom, or the world of free volitions, is a more specific quality of human beings.


Author(s):  
Martin Breul

Summary Being one of most influential anthropologists of contemporary times, Michael Tomasello and his groundbreaking evolutionary approach to a natural history of human beings are still to be received by theological anthropology. This article aims at evaluating the prospects and limitations of Tomasello’s natural history of human ontogeny from a philosophical and theological perspective. The major advantages of Tomasello’s approach are a new conceptual perspective on the mind-brain problem and a possible detranscendentalization of the human mind which leads to an intersubjectively grounded anthropology. At the same time, evolutionary anthropology struggles with the binding force of moral obligations and the human ability to interpret one’s existence and the world in a religious way. This article thus offers a first theological inventory of Tomasello’s account of evolutionary anthropology which praises its prospects and detects its limitations.


Author(s):  
Richard C. Allen

David Hartley’s Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations (1749) offers an inclusive study of human beings, one that brings together neuro-physiology, cognitive and moral psychology, and theology. According to Hartley, the ‘frame’ of body and brain grounds consciousness, so that mind is not something separate from body. Experiences of happiness and suffering combine to shape a person’s evolving sense of self, and this self may grow into awareness of our duty to act always out of love. Expectations of one’s place in the vastness of time help bring this growth about, for these put into perspective the pleasures and pains of the present moment. ‘Association’ is the central principle unifying Hartley’s Observations on Man At the end of the first volume, Hartley makes a bold statement: if an organism ‘could be endued with the most simple kinds of sensation, [it] might also arrive at all that intelligence of which the human mind is possessed’ (17949, vol. 1: Conclusion). Just as association can account for the ‘mind’ of a jellyfish, so also can the theory account for the forms of intelligence that go into living complete human lives. Association first names the physiological processes that generate ideas, and then the psychological processes by which perceptions, emotions, and thoughts fuse or break apart. These processes involve mastering the skilled (‘decomplex’) actions that fill our daily lives, as well as the acts by which the self forms and transforms, as we grow in sympathy, ‘theopathy’ and the moral sense.


2004 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-133
Author(s):  
Niels Henrik Gregersen

Guds frie nåde, troens frie gensvar: Frelsens betingelser hos N. F. S. Grundtvig og John Wesley[Free Divine Grace andfree Response o f Faith: Conditionalist Motives in N. F. S. Grundtvig and John Wesley]By Niels Henrik GregersenThe essay aims to point out common theological grounds between John Wesley (1703-1791) and N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783-1872). It is argued, first, that Wesley and Grundtvig share the same problem of how to reformulate the Reformation insight in God’s unconditional justification in a context of modernity, in which human freedom is seen as essential also in spiritual matters. It is furthermore argued that Wesley and Grundtvig concur in criticizing the Augustinian-Reformed doctrine of double predestination. Both argue that grace is for all humankind, but grace is not an irresistible force that captivates the human mind. Grace, rather, is a divine self-offering that stimulates the sinner to give a positive response to God’s free offer. Due to his Arminian allegiance, Wesley was an outspoken conditionalist, who explicitly criticized Augustine, Luther, and Calvin. Grundtvig’s critique of Augustine and Luther, by contrast, was mostly of a more indirect nature and couched in his independent use of the Augustinian motifs of grace. The most important difference between Wesley and Grundtvig, however, is that whereas Wesley develops an expanded notion of prevenient grace, Grundtvig expands the traditional notion of creation and imago dei. According to Grundtvig’s doctrine of baptism (central to his so-called Church View), the invitation by Christ to become baptized puts the requirement on the old human being (who is not yet baptized by the Holy Spirit) that he or she must renounce the Devil and embrace the truth of God. Grundtvig’s rich doctrine of imago dei and divine providence can thus be seen as a functional equivalent to Wesley’s doctrine of prevenient grace. Grundtvig, however, never shared Wesley’s view of the possibility of a Christian perfection. Instead, Grundtvig developed a theory of the possibility of a post-mortal conversion (cf. 1 Pet 3). This eschatological vision has the same universal scope as Wesley’s doctrine of prevenient grace, but involves a temporal relaxation as compared with Wesley’s evangelicalism.The common ground between Grundtvig and Wesley casts a new light on the very structure of Grundtvig’s theology. Grundtvig’s “Church View” should not be understood as a precursor to 20th century dialectical theology. Divine action, according to Grundtvig, is certainly primary to human activity, but it is not unilateral. The baptismal covenant between God and the human person involves an “agreement”, or contract, between two parties, God and humanity. God offers His divine grace, but human beings should themselves accept grace in order to be part of salvation. This important motif is reflected in Grundtvig’s doctrinal writings, especially in his doctrine of baptism; however, conditionalist motifs can also be found in his hymns and sermons.


Literature has influenced the lives of human beings. In the human mind, there is a space for memories, introspection, foreshadow, flashback and awful remembrances that are coloured by pain, wound, and trauma. Psychological trauma is a sort of harm to the mind that happens because of a seriously upsetting occasion. It is much the same as other psychosomatic ideas in medicinal history, for example, stun and stress. It has been exposed to an assortment of translations crosswise over orders since it rose in the nineteenth century as a thought to catch mental encounters and conditions in current society and societies. Psychological traumatic experiences often involve physical trauma that threatens the survival of human beings and the sense of security. Sigmund Freud is an eminent figure in the literary studies of trauma. The connecting of injury hypothesis and artistic content reveals insight into contemporary fiction as well as focuses on the inborn associations between injury hypothesis and the abstract which have been disregarded. Paul Auster, an American writer, blends absurdism, existentialism and crime fiction, and the search for identity and personal meaning. He creates his own postmodern form in his writings. His, Man in the Dark, is a staggering novel about the numerous substances we possess as wars fire surrounding us. By investigating 'Man in the Dark' through Lacanian thought of a divided subjectivity, the injury for Brill is no nostalgic return of the past. It is depicted as the inconceivable experience with the missed reality which is brought about via 'machine' or reiteration. The paper analyses the function of the traumatized protagonist and discusses the influence of place in the reformulation of the self


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-169
Author(s):  
Sean P. Robertson ◽  

This article argues that, in De Trinitate, Augustine’s ascent to God via a search for the Trinity is successful precisely because of the emphasis he places on the role of Christ in such an ascent. Unlike scholarship which reads this ascent as an exercise in Neoplatonism—whether as a success or as an intentional failure—this article asserts that Augustine successfully discovers an imago trinitatis in human beings by identifying the essential mediation of the temporal and eternal in the person of the Incarnate Word. Of the work’s fifteen books, Books 4 and 13 focus extensively on the soteriological and epistemological role of Christ, who, in his humility, conquered the pride of the devil and reopened humanity’s way to eternity. The Christology in these books plays an important role in Augustine’s argument by allowing his ascent to move from self-knowledge to contemplation of God. Indeed, it is his understanding of the Christological perfection of the imago dei which allows Augustine to discover a genuine imago trinitatis in human beings. For Augustine, the imago is observable in humanity to the extent that an individual is conformed to Christ, the perfect image of the invisible God. Thus, it is only through Christ that a human being can successfully contemplate the Trinity in this imago.


Open Theology ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent M. Smiles

AbstractThis essay vindicates two major aspects of the science-based philosophy of Michael Polanyi: 1. His concept of tacit knowing, and 2. His concept of the multi-levelled character of reality. These two notions relate closely with one another, and together support the thesis to be argued here, that when it comes to understanding human beings, and most especially the human mind, science and religion have to meet on the common ground of the transcendent capacities of human beings, which are pointers to the transcendent character of the universe. The mind is an emergent of the universe, as are all of its other amazing characteristics, but mind is also, therefore, a clue to the character of the universe and its encompassing reality. Mind reflects reality; reality invites mind.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 454-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liam P. Dempsey

AbstractIn this paper, I consider Isaac Newton’s fevered accusation that John Locke is a ‘Hobbist.’ I suggest a number of ways in which Locke’s account of the mind–body relation could plausibly be construed as Hobbesian. Whereas Newton conceives of the human mind as an immaterial substance and venerates it as a finite image of the Divine Mind, I argue that Locke utterly deflates the religious, ethical, and metaphysical significance of an immaterial soul. Even stronger, I contend that there is good reason to suspect that Locke is a crypto-materialist, at least with respect to human beings, and in this respect, could reasonably be labeled a ‘Hobbist.’


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document