The Maison militaire du roi and the Disintegration of the Old Regime

Author(s):  
Guy Rowlands

For all the research that has been done into French politics and society in the fifty years before the Revolution, only a handful of serious studies have looked at the great noble families and the royal court. Moreover, the history of the army, where leading noble families dominated the upper ranks, has been integrated neither with that of the court, nor with that of intra-noble relations. This chapter therefore examines the most prestigious units of the French army — the privileged forces associated directly with the royal households — to bring together the history of the military and the court and suggest why, by the time the old regime collapsed in 1787–89, the great nobility was at loggerheads with the monarchy, and why relations between higher and lesser nobles had deteriorated a great deal since the reign of Louis XIV. The collapse of elite cohesion was ultimately disastrous for all concerned.

1983 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 831-844 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela Pilbeam

France has always envied Paris. A popular interpretation of the history of France has been of conflict between the capital and the provinces in which Paris was the victor, at least from the establishment of the system of intendants by Louis XIV in the late seventeenth century. Radical Paris took the lead in the revolutionary upheavals of the 1790s, in 1830, 1848 and 1870–1. The conflict of the 1790s produced civil and foreign war and led to an even greater domination by Paris through the centralizing policies of Napoleon Bonaparte as military dictator. Under his rule and subsequently, all officials - civil, judicial, military, religious and educational - were appointed by the government in Paris. The Council of State was a corner-stone of this policy in the capital, the departmental prefect in the provinces. In 1830 the results of the July Days were acceptable on the whole to the French; but in 1848 provincial France roundly rejected the radical social revolution favoured by intellectuals and artisans in Paris; in 1871 the Commune of Paris was virtually isolated in its decentralizing and social-reforming ambitions and suffered bloody defeat at the hands of the regular army. Apparently, then, 1830 was the last, and perhaps only, time in the nineteenth century that ‘Paris led, France followed.’ Was 1830 so unique, and if so, why? The Revolution of 1830 was unquestionably Parisian, in that events in the capital determined the timing and location of acts of significant revolutionary violence and in that the major political and administrative changes which followed the revolution were enacted in Paris. Should one therefore assume that the provinces were passive, that they had little impact on events? This revolution may neatly illustrate the success with which Louis XIV, Napoleon and others had centralized France, but that conclusion needs to be based on evidence, not assumption. The most recent complete analysis of the revolution concentrated on Paris, but also delineated some aspects of provincial unrest in 1830, making use of the local studies written for the centenary of the revolution. Some provincial and departmental histories describe the events of 1830 and their local impact.


Author(s):  
А.Э. Титков

Статья посвящена т. н. «русскому фактору» в период после окончания Первой мировой войны и до 1920г. Революционные события в России радикально изменили внешнеполитическую ситуацию на европейском театре и одновременно стали оказывать серьезное влияние на внутреннюю повестку стран участниц конфликта, благодаря активной политике Советской России по продвижению революционных идей и поддержке революционных движений в Европе. Подобная практика была вызвана не столько искренним желанием раздуть революционный пожар и безусловной верой в его возможность, сколько необходимостью физического выживания молодого «пролетарского государства» во враждебном капиталистическом окружении. В статье подробно рассматривается идеологическая подоплека внешней политики Советской России в это период и деятельность на этом поприще ее вождя В.И. Ленина, его попытки повлиять на общественно-политические процессы в Германии, Венгрии и Польше, а также анализируются изменения в идеологической повестке большевиков после провала советской политики по созданию плацдармов для продвижения революции в центральную Европу. Также в статье обращается внимание на то, что за внешней ширмой буржуазной революции в России явно проступают признаки целенаправленной политики по удалению с карты Европы и Азии империй — Османской, Германской, Австро-Венгерской и Российской, чему предшествовала активная компания по девальвации самих монархических институтов. Большевистская же политика по полному демонтажу прежней системы, несмотря на внешнюю враждебность идеологических установок, оказалась вполне приемлемой для тех, кто стремился не допустить пересборки Центральных держав. The article deals with the influence of the so-called Russian factor in the events following the end of the First World War up until 1920. The revolution in Russia radically changed the situation in Europe, having a major impact on the domestic and foreign policies of the belligerent nations, caused by active Soviet support for revolutionary movements in Europe. This practice stemmed not from a sincere desire to fan the revolutionary flames but rather from the survival instinct of the newly-established proletarian state, surrounded by hostile capitalistic countries. The article examines the ideological motivations behind Soviet Russia's foreign policy during this period and the activities of its leader, Vladimir Lenin, as well as his attempts to influence social and political processes in Germany, Hungary, and Poland. The study also analyzes the changes in the ideological agenda of the Bolsheviks after the failure of Soviet policy to create springboards for the advancement of the revolution into Central Europe. Moreover, the paper points out that the smokescreen of the revolution in Russia reveals clear signs of a concerted effort to wipe the Ottoman Empire, the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire from the map of Europe and Asia, preceded by an active campaign aimed at undermining the monarchic institutions themselves. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik policy that sought to completely dismantle the old regime, despite the hostility of its ideology, eventually proved perfectly acceptable for those who aimed to prevent the Central Powers from rising up again.


Scrinium ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 335-339
Author(s):  
Serge A. Frantsouzoff

Abstract The deeds and exploits of St. Lalibäla who was the most famous king of the Ethiopian Zagwe dynasty are still awaiting to be published in full. To the modern researchers this important medieval text is available only in excerpts published by J. Perruchon in the 19th century. The author argues that Lalibäla’s Deeds is far from being an Ethiopian folklore. They comprise valuable authentic data, e.g. the persecution of Lalibäla at the royal court, his escape into the desert, his marriage, his subsequent becoming a king, the organization of his army, taxation policies and history of construction of the famous monolithic churches in the centre of Lasta. The author also argues that the title wäldä nägaśi, which is mentioned in his Deeds as well as its parallel wld/ngšy-n found in Middle Sabaean inscriptions is a sufficient evidence in favour of the military and political continuity between the Aksumite and Zagwe epochs. The Lalibäla’s Deeds comprise many minute details about the everyday life, which suggests that the Christians of Ethiopia had a centuries long oral tradition of preserving and transmitting historical information.


2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

A.B. Nikolaev’s book has not received much attention either in the West or in Russia, but it is an important book that has significantly changed our understanding the February Revolution of 1917. Nikolaev’s meticulously researched monograph, based on a wide array of new sources, challenges the previously dominant interpretation that the Provisional Committee of the State Duma (Duma Committee) was forced to seize power only to stem the tide of the insurgency from below. He argues that the Duma Committee was from its inception clear about its intention to overthrow the old regime and to create a new power to replace it even before the Petrograd Soviet was formed. The Duma Committee played a crucial role in prompting military units to take the side of the revolution, in steering the insurgents to the State Duma, in creating the Military Commission to organize insurgents to occupy strategic positions in the city, in taking over the food supply commission to feed the insurgents, in attacking and destroying the tsarist police, while preventing and suppressing potentially dangerous anarchical pogroms, and in taking control over the imperial bureaucracy. Nikolaev also raises an interesting question about the relationship between the Duma Committee, the State Duma and the Provisional Government by arguing that the Provisional Government made a hasty and cardinal mistake in cutting its relationship with the State Duma. This book is a landmark in the interpretation of the February Revolution, and especially of the role of the Duma liberals in the revolution.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Cussen

Abstract This article scrutinizes the nineteenth-century legacy of the old regime’s commercial empire through the ambiguous case of the Monneron brothers. Having gained fortune and recognition in Indian Ocean trade, the brothers sat as deputies in the National Assembly, but by the end of the 1790s their affairs and reputations had been destroyed. Their experiences reveal how the politics of commerce fundamentally changed during the Revolution. But the Monnerons also draw our attention to structural developments in French commercial imperialism that preceded and transcended the Revolution. They helped facilitate French investment in the Indian Ocean in the final decades of the old regime, a ‘spatial fix’ in merchant capital that was carried out in anticipation of crisis in the Atlantic, and that was consolidated around the turn of the century through the introduction of sugar cultivation in the Mascarene islands. By reading the biographies of the Monnerons alongside the life of their capital, this article attempts to acknowledge the undeniable ruptures of revolutionary politics without losing sight of broader developments in the global history of capitalism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-46
Author(s):  
Adam L Storring

Abstract This article demonstrates that the military ideas of King Frederick the Great of Prussia up to the Seven Years War (1756–1763) were primarily inspired by France, and particularly by the towering figure of King Louis XIV. It examines the intellectual inspirations for Frederick’s military ideas, showing that French military influence reflected the strength of French cultural influence in the long eighteenth century and the importance of Louis XIV as a model for monarchical self-representation. Frederick’s famous personal command of his armies reflected the Enlightenment concept of the ‘great man’ (grand homme), but Frederick thereby sought primarily to outdo the Sun King, whom Voltaire had criticized for merely accompanying his armies while his generals won battles for him. The example of Frederick thus demonstrates that not only rulers but also enlightened philosophers often looked backwards toward older monarchical examples. Frederick sought to create his own ‘Age of Louis XIV’ in the military sphere by imitating the great French generals of the Sun King. Frederick’s famous outflanking manoeuvres followed the example of famous French generals, reflecting the practice of the more mobile armies of the mid-seventeenth century. Frederick used French practice to justify his attacks with the bayonet, and his ‘short and lively’ wars reflected French strategic traditions. The evidence of French influence on Frederick seriously challenges concepts of a ‘German Way of War’, and indeed of supposed national ‘ways of war’ in general, emphasizing the need for a transnational approach to the history of military thought.


2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 1125-1137
Author(s):  
DAVID HOPKIN

Richelieu's army: war government and society in France, 1624–1642. By David Parrott. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xxiv+599. ISBN 0-521-79209-6. £65.00.The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV: royal service and private interest, 1661–1701. By Guy Rowlands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xxiv+404. ISBN 0-521-64124-1. £55.00.The French army, 1750–1820: careers, talent, merit. By Rafe Blaufarb. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. Pp. xii+227. ISBN 0-7190-6262-4. £45.00.The people in arms: military myth and national mobilization since the French Revolution. Edited by Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xi+268. ISBN 0-521-81432. £50.00.From revolutionaries to citizens: antimilitarism in France, 1870–1914. By Paul B. Miller. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2002. Pp. xiii+277. ISBN 0-8223-2766-X. £13.95.Although all the books under review are military histories, international conflict is not their central concern. They are not primarily campaign histories, nor studies of strategic or tactical innovations, nor biographies of great commanders. If they help to answer the military historian's traditional question – how is military might created and used on the battlefield – then they do so indirectly, through an exploration of how the state marshalled its resources for war, particularly in terms of manpower. This is not just a question of emphasis, or of filling in gaps in the historiography; these books mount a sustained critique on the explanatory models favoured by military historians. Military history, David Parrott suggests, too readily falls into a ‘whiggish trap’: a series of clear-sighted war leaders grasp the potential of technology in achieving the state's foreign policy objectives; technological shifts drive changes in the size and organization of armies, and consequently in the development of the state. And thus was the modern world of large, complex, disciplined organizations made. In contrast, we are offered here a selection of error-prone war leaders, constrained at every turn by the social, political, and financial realities of their day, who were intent not on ‘progress’ but on manipulating the system of which they themselves were a part, and as much for their own ends as for those of the state they served.


Author(s):  
Julian Swann

In the summer of 1661, Nicolas Fouquet the charismatic surintendant des finances appointed by the recently deceased cardinal Mazarin was arrested on the orders of the young Louis XIV. His subsequent trial and imprisonment was a crucial turning point in the history of the monarchy. It marked the end of the era of minister-favourites and the establishment of a new governmental system in which the king acted as the point of focus for a personal monarchy, aided and abetted by the secretaries of state. This chapter examines that transition, and the relationship between the royal master and his ministerial servants, and explores the role of disgrace in the functioning of a political system that would endure in many of its defining features until the eve of the Revolution.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document