scholarly journals Democracia finalista y defensa de la Constitución Española : finalist democracy and defence of the Spanish Constitution

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Antonio Sanz Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Teleological Interpretation

La doctrina del Tribunal constitucional rechaza, para nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, el concepto de «democracia militante » y predica un procedimiento de reforma de la Constitución no sujeto a ningún límite material. Con ello el Estado constitucional y democrático se coloca ante uno de sus más peligrosos dilemas: modelo meramente formal o democracia axiológica y finalista. Sin embargo, la interpretación sistemática y teleológica de la Constitución puede permitir una mejor defensa de la ciudadanía y de su democracia.The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in Spanish Juridical Order rejects the concept of «militant democracy» and presents a procedure of constitutional reform without any material limit. A dangerous dilemma exists for the Constitutional Democratic State; a choice between a merely formal model and an axiological finalist democracy. However, a systematic and teleological interpretation of the Constitution could improve the defence of citizenship and democracy.

scholarly journals El control de constitucionalidad de las reformas constitucionales : ¿un oximorón constitucional? : comentario al ATC 9/2012

2012 ◽  
pp. 483
Author(s):  
Ignacio Villaverde Menéndez
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
Chamber Of Deputies

En este artículo su autor analiza el ATC 9/2012 que inadmitió a trámite el recurso de amparo interpuesto por varios parlamentarios contra las resoluciones y acuerdos de la Mesa del Congreso de los Diputados que dieron trámite a la proposición de reforma del artículo 135 CE. El autor sostiene que, dado que la Constitución española no posee cláusulas de intangibilidad, e incluso existiendo, al Tribunal Constitucional tan sólo le es posible juzgar la conformidad constitucional de los actos parlamentarios de elaboración de la reforma constitucional con lo dispuesto en el artículo 23.2 CE; aunque la hipotética declaración de nulidad de dichos actos por vulneración de dicho artículo no se extendería a la reforma misma. Señala también el autor que el Tribunal Constitucional debió admitir a trámite el recurso de amparo y resolverlo mediante Sentencia.In this article the author analyses ATC 9/2012 that refuse to process the application for liberties warrant lodged by several parliamentarians against the resolutions and agreements of the Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies which gave the reform of article 135 EC proposal pending. The author argues that, because the Spanish Constitution does not have clauses of intangibility, and even exist, the Constitutional Court it is just possible constitutional conformy of parliamentary acts of preparation of constitutional reform pursuant to article 23(2) EC. Although a hypothetical Declaration of invalidity of such acts for infringement of that article would not extend to the reform. Also notes the author that the Constitutional Court was admissible the demand and resolve it by a judgment.

scholarly journals The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation as a subject of constitutional responsibility

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-34
Author(s):  
Natalia A. Bobrova
Keyword(s):  
Russian Federation ◽  
Complex Analysis ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Russian President ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
The Right ◽  
Constitutional Legitimacy

The subject of the article is justification of the main elements of the constitutional responsibility of the Russian Constitutional Court in the context of constitutional reform. The purpose of the article is confirmation or refutation of the hypothesis that the Constitutional Court must be subject to constitutional responsibility. The methodology. The author uses methods of complex analysis of legislation, synthesis, as well as formal-logical and formal-legal methods. The main results, scope of application. Russia as a democratic state excludes the existence of legally irresponsible subjects of state power. It concerns the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. Legal irresponsibility characterizes only the absolute monarchy. The article comprehensively examines the problem of responsibility of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the reasons for the poor development of this institution in legislation and academic literature are also considered. The reasons for the Constitutional Court's dependence on the President of the Russian Federation as a "guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian Federation" have been systemized. The author considers duumvirate of guarantors of constitutional legitimacy as a nonsense. The reasons for the Constitutional Court's peculiar use of the law of the legislative initiative are considered. This initiative was used only in the direction of increasing the term of the powers of judges of the Constitutional Court from 65 up to 70 years. The life-long status of the President of the Court is seen as a violation of the principle of equality of judges, which is the most important guarantee of the independence of the Constitutional Court. Constitutional reform-2020 completed the process of dependence of the Constitutional Court on the President of the Russian Federation and the "second government" - the Administration of the Russian President. Some constitutional and legal torts of the Constitutional Court of the Russia are considered also. The author comes to the conclusion that judges of the constitutional court have a special responsibility - political, moral and historical. The main questions are need to be resolved: who has the right to state the torts of the constitutional court and what are the consequences of this statement?

scholarly journals Vigilando al vigilante: el Tribunal Constitucional y sus circunstancias = Guarding the guardian: The constitutional court and its circumstances

2017 ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Miguel Ángel Alegre Martínez
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
The Will ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
The One ◽  
The Guardian

<p>El escaso uso de los mecanismos de reforma constitucional ha hecho recaer sobre el Tribunal Constitucional, casi en exclusiva, la tarea de actualizar la Constitución española de 1978, a través de la interpretación evolutiva de la misma. En este trabajo, nos ocupamos, por una parte, de las dificultades a las que el Tribunal Constitucional ha tenido que enfrentarse en el desempeño de sus funciones; y, por otra, en el mayor o menor acierto en el ejercicio de las mismas. Reflexionamos sobre la delicada posición del Tribunal Constitucional, situado en el límite entre interpretar la voluntad del poder constituyente y sustituirla; así como en la frontera entre el activismo y la autocontención. Intentamos establecer la incidencia de algunas de sus decisiones sobre los problemas que afectan actualmente a nuestro sistema constitucional, en especial al Estado de las Autonomías.</p><p> </p><p>The limited use of the mechanisms of constitutional reform has made to rest on the Constitutional Court, almost exclusively, the task of updating the Spanish Constitution of 1978, through its evolutive interpretation. In this paper, we attend to, on the one hand, the difficulties to which the Constitutional Court has had to face in the development of its functions; and, on the other hand, the greater or lesser success in the exercise of the same. We reflect about the delicate position of the Constitutional Court, located on the border between interpreting the will of the constituent power or replace it; as well as on the border between activism or self-restraint. We are trying to establish the incidence of some of its decisions on the problems that currently affect our constitutional system, in particular to the State of Autonomies.</p>

scholarly journals El principio de no regresividad de los derechos sociales en el ordenamiento constitucional español // The principle of non-regressivity of Social rights in the Spanish Constitutional Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 849
Author(s):  
Miguel Agudo Zamora
Keyword(s):  
Social Cohesion ◽  
Social Model ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
The Social ◽  
Legitimate Expectations

Resumen:Este trabajo analiza la situación en el modelo constitucional español del principio de no regresividad de los derechos sociales. Se parte del análisis sucinto del modelo social de nuestra Constitución lo que implica el reconocimiento de derechos económicos y sociales. Este reconocimiento es la plasmación constitucional de los principios de solidaridad y de cohesión social. El principio de cohesión social ha sido definido por el Consejo de Europa e incluido explícitamente en los tratados constitutivos de la Unión Europea. La necesidad de lograr la cohesión social fundamenta la inclusión en las Constituciones y en los tratados internacionales del principio de no regresividad de los derechos sociales. En la Constitución española de 1978 este principio no se incluye expresamente. La no inclusión en la Constitución de este principio supone un peligro para la cohesión social en tiempos de crisis económica. Por su parte, el Tribunal Constitucional ha sentado una doctrina ambigua sobre este asunto, que ha sido analizada en este trabajo, así como las más significativas aportaciones doctrinales sobre la materia. Para saber cuáles son los limites de la regresividad de los derechos sociales que dotan de contenido este principio se ha realizado una comparativa internacional y de los principios constitucionales. Del estudio del ordenamiento internacional y de los valores y principios constitucionales se ha obtenido una serie de límites a la regresividad del contenido, eficacia y protección de los derechos sociales. Concluye este trabajo sugiriendo una propuesta de reforma constitucional que incluya el principio de no regresividad de los derechos sociales en el texto constitucional estableciendo una serie de requisitos de aquellas medidas que puedan suponer una regresión de contenido de los mismos tales como que deberán justificarse plenamente en referencia a la totalidad de los derechos, valores y principios recogidos en la Constitución y en los tratados internacionales suscritos por el Estado español y en el contexto del aprovechamiento pleno del máximo de los recursos de que se disponga; se aplicarán tras el examen más exhaustivo de todas las alternativas posibles; tendrán en todo caso carácter temporal hasta que las circunstancias económicas permitan restablecer el ámbito material de contenido, eficacia, protección y garantía prexistente de los derechos sociales afectados; en todo caso respetarán el contenido mínimo esencial de los derechos sociales como manifestación de la dignidad humana; serán razonables y estarán suficientemente motivadas; no vulnerarán, entre otros, los principios de seguridad jurídica, confianza legítima, no discriminación e irretroactividad de disposiciones restrictivas de derechos individuales, serán proporcionadas y respetarán los principios de solidaridad, cohesión y sostenibilidad social. Summary1. State, solidarity and social cohesion. 2. Doctrinal and jurisprudential notes on the principle of non-regressivity of social rights. 3. Limits to the regressivity of social rights. a) Limits derived from international law. b) Limits derived from dignity as essential content of social rights. c) Limits derived from the prohibition of arbitrariness: the need for sufficient motivation. 4. Conclusion: constitutionalamendment and non-regressivity of social rights.Abstract:This paper analyzes the constitutional recognition of the principle of non-regressivity of social rights in Spain. It starts from the succinct analysis of the social model of our Constitution which implies the recognition of economic and social rights. This recognition is the constitutionalization of the principles of solidarity and social cohesion. The principle of social cohesion has been defined by the Council of Europe and explicitly included in the constitutive treaties of the European Union. The need to achieve social cohesion underpins the inclusion in the Constitutions and international treaties of the principle of non-regression of social rights. In the Spanish Constitution of 1978 this principle is not expressly included. The non-inclusion in the Constitution of this principle poses a danger to social cohesion in times of economic crisis. For its part, the Constitutional Court has established an ambiguous doctrine on this subject, which has been analyzed in this work, as well as the most significant doctrinal contributions on the subject. In order to know which are the limits of the regressivity of the social rights that give content of this principle an international comparison has been made as well as a study of constitutional principles. Limits to the regressivity of content, effectiveness and protection of social rights have been obtained from the study of international order and constitutional values and principles. This paper concludes by suggesting a proposal for constitutional amendment that includes the principle of non-regressivity of social rights in the Spanish Constitution establishing some requirements of those measures that imply a regression of their content such as: they shall be fully justified in relationship with all the rights, values and principles contained in the Constitution and in the international treaties signed by the Spanish State and in the context of full exploitation of the maximum resources available; Shall be applied after a more comprehensive examination of all possible alternatives; Shall in any case be of a temporary nature until the economic circumstances permit the restoration of the content, effectiveness, protection and pre-existing guarantee of the social rights affected; In any case they will respect the essential minimum content of social rights as a manifestation of human dignity; Shall be reasonable and sufficiently motivated; Shall not infringe, inter alia, the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, non-discrimination and non-retroactivity of provisions restricting individual rights; Shall be proportionate and shall respect the principles of solidarity, cohesion and social sustainability.

scholarly journals De la ‘libertad informática’ a la constitucionalización de nuevos derechos digitales (1978-2018) // From «computing freedom» towards the constitutionalization of new digital rights (1978-2018).

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artemi Rallo Lombarte
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Digital Age ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Contemporary Society ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Digital Rights ◽  
European Directive ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
New Framework

Resumen:La referencia a la informática en la Constitución de 1978 reconoció trascendencia constitucional a la necesidad de protección del individuo frente a los riegos derivados de los avances tecnológicos. Cuatro décadas después, la sociedad contemporánea afronta el reto de constitucionalizar nuevos derechos digitales. En España, sendas leyes (LORTAD y LOPD) desarrollaron el precepto constitucional que consagra la garantía de los derechos frente al uso de la informática. Para preservar a los individuos frente a los riesgos y amenazas de latecnología, el Tribunal Constitución dedujo del artículo 18.4 CE un derecho fundamental autónomo a la protección de datos personales. Las leyes españolas de protección de datos son el resultado de la obligación de cumplir compromisos internacionales (Convenio 108 del Consejo de Europa de 1981) y europeos (Directiva 95/46, artículo 8 de la CDFUE 41 y Reglamento UE 2016/679). Sin embargo, el reconocimiento constitucional o europeo, legal o constitucional, del derecho fundamental a la protección de datos no agota la necesidad de establecer un nuevo marco de protección de los ciudadanos en la era digitalen el que se reconozcan nuevos derechos digitales.SummaryI. Introduction. II. The misleading constitutionalization of «computing ». III. Convention 108 of the council of europe (1981). IV. Data protection right as an autonomous fundamental right. V. LORTAD (1992), LOPD (1999) and its reform. VI. The europeanization of data protection right: Directive 95/46, art. 8 CDFUE and regulation EU 2016/679. VII. Towards the constitutionalization of new digital rights.Abstract:The reference to computing in the Spanish Constitution (1978) recognized constitutional significance to the need for protection against the technological risks. Four decades later, the contemporary society faces the challenge of constitutionalising new digital rights. In Spain, two laws (LOPD and LORTAD) developed the constitutional article that enshrined the guarantee of rights against the use of computers. The Constitutional Court inferred from article 18.4 CE an autonomous fundamental right to the protection of personal data. Spanish data protection laws are the result of the obligation to comply withinternational (Convention 108 of the Council of Europe from 1981) and European (Directive 95/46, article 8 of the CDFUE and Regulation EU 2016/679) commitments. However, the European, legal or constitutional, recognition of the fundamental right to data protection does not exclude the need to establish a new framework for the protection of citizens in the digital age in which new digital rights should be recognized.

scholarly journals Las preferencias ideológicas y políticas judiciales: un modelo actitudinal sobre el voto en el tribunal constitucional de ecuador

2008 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Basabe Serrano
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Linear Regression ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Explanatory Hypothesis ◽  
Political Preferences ◽  
Toma De Decisiones ◽  
America Latina ◽  
Independent Indicator

RESUMEN: El estudio del comportamiento, dinámicas e interacciones de los jueces es un campo de la Ciencia Política que, a pesar de su fertilidad, ha sido analizado residualmente en América Latina. Frente a ello, este trabajo propone un modelo formal sobre el comportamiento de los vocales del Tribunal Constitucional de Ecuador (TC) a través del que se argumenta que las preferencias políticas de los jueces influyen en la dirección que asumen sus votos. Analizado en un amplio período de actividades del TC (1999-2003), y recurriendo a una base de datos de 441 observaciones, el modelo de regresión lineal produce resultados que verifican empíricamente la hipótesis propuesta. Recurriendo a una metodología múltiple, en la que destaca la construcción de un indicador independiente para medir la ubicación ideológica de los jueces, el trabajo concluye sugiriendo criterios a partir de los que se abona el terreno para la posterior exploración, no sólo del voto judicial sino también de las lógicas que conducen los procesos de toma de decisiones en cortes y tribunales de justicia.ABSTRACT: The study of the behavior, dynamic and interactions of the judges, is a field of the Political Science that, in spite of its fertility, has been analyzed residually in Latin America. As opposed to it, this work proposes an formal model of the behavior of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ecuador (TC) in which is argued that the political preferences of the judges influence in the direction who assume their votes. Tested in an ample period of activities of the  TC (1999-2003), and resorting to a data base of 441 observations, the model of linear regression produces results that verify the propose explanatory hypothesis empirically. Resorting to a multiple methodology, in which it emphasizes the construction of an independent indicator to measure the ideological location of the judges, the work also concludes suggesting criteria from whom the land for the later exploration is paid, not only of the judicial vote but of the logics that the processes of decision making in courts of justice lead.

Some Reflections on the Constitutional Review in Albania in a Comparison Key

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 22
Author(s):  
Ismail Tafani ◽  
Renata Tokrri
Keyword(s):  
Balkan Peninsula ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
The World ◽  
Constitutional Legitimacy ◽  
Formal Point ◽  
Constitutional Revision

In this study we will try to analyze the foundations of the Constitution as a pillar and as a guarantee for its solidity. The study will also address the need for revision of the constitution as a fundamental element of its existence and continuity. Particular emphasis will be given to the comparison of the constitutions of the most important countries in the world as regards the procedures and limits to the constitutional revision. In this sense, the constitutions of some Balkan Peninsula countries will be analyzed to draw a comparison and analyze the Albanian Constitution as regards the procedure for its revision. The study intends to analyze the procedures for the revision of the Constitution as well as the explicit and implicit limits to these revisions. In the Constitutional revision in Albania in 2016, the role of the Constitutional Court on the control of the constitutional legitimacy of constitutional revision laws was clarified. Formal constitutionality is usually emphasized since the Albanian constitutional reform underlined that the Constitutional Court in Albania could express itself on the constitutionality of the Constitutional revision law only from a formal point of view.   Received: 2 January 2021 / Accepted: 27 February 2021 / Published: 7 March 2021

The Rule of Law Paradox in the 2016 Constitutional Amendments in Albania

2020 ◽  
pp. 95-110
Author(s):  
Darinka Piqani
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Candidate Country ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
The Rule Of Law

In 2016, the Albanian constitution underwent the most comprehensive constitutional reform since its adoption in 1998. One of the purposes of this reform was to transform the judicial system in Albania in order to detach it from corruption. One of the novelties of the reform was the vetting process of judges and prosecutors at all levels, including judges of the Albanian Constitutional Court. Following termination of mandates of some of the members to the Court, dismissals, and resignations in the context of the vetting process, Albania’s Constitutional Court did not function for more than a year. Although indisputably the constitutional reform and more specifically vetting were designed as a means of guaranteeing the rule of law, it seems that they were contributing factors to the stalemate within the Constitutional Court, thus ultimately undermining the rule of law. This chapter unfolds this paradox in Albania, an EU candidate country.

The Secularized State

2020 ◽  
pp. 220-236
Author(s):  
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde ◽  
Mirjam Künkler ◽  
Tine Stein
Keyword(s):  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
The State ◽  
Religious Communities ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Freedom Of Belief ◽  
The Right

In this article Böckenförde contrasts his concept of open encompassing neutrality (found in most Scandinavian countries and in Germany) with that of distancing neutrality, as practised in France. While the latter champions negative religious freedom, open encompassing neutrality aims for a balancing of negative and positive religious freedom. Religious freedom for Böckenförde is multidimensional and includes the right to have (or not) a religious faith (freedom of belief), to affirm (or not) this faith privately and openly (freedom to profess), to exercise (or not) one’s religion publicly (freedom of worship), and to join together (or not) in religious communities (religious freedom of association). The correlate to these individual and group rights is the open and overarching principle of the state’s neutrality towards religion and other worldviews, entailing a prohibition on the state justifying law on religious grounds. Furthermore, it requires the state not to privilege religion over non-religion and one religious faith over another. Siding with the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court (at a time when he was not a sitting judge), Böckenförde underlines that even religious communities who reject the democratic state have the right to be recognized and legally protected. What matters is not whether communities accept or reject the state, but whether they obey or violate its laws. This was the court’s view on the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and it must also be applied, Böckenförde writes, to religious fundamentalists who do not accept the secular order, as long as they do not violate any laws.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document