scholarly journals La reforma constitucional y la gobernanza económica de la Unión Europea

2012 ◽  
pp. 59
Author(s):  
Antonio Bar Cendón
Keyword(s):  
Golden Rule ◽  
European Council ◽  
The Public ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Europe 2020 ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Excessive Deficit Procedure ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Made In

Este artículo analiza las medidas de reforma adoptadas en el marco de la UE y de sus Estados miembros a efectos de introducir y consolidar en sus respectivos ordenamientos jurídicos el principio básico de estabilidad financiera o presupuestaria, conocido comúnmente como la "regla de oro "; es decir, la exigencia de que toda la administración pública, en sus diferentes niveles de gobierno, mantenga de manera permanente una situación presupuestaria de equilibrio o de superávit. Así, primer lugar, se analizan los precedentes en el Derecho constitucional comparado de esta exigencia constitucional y luego las reformas de los textos constitucionales realizadas en Alemania, España e Italia, pero también la frustrada reforma constitucional iniciada en Francia. y, en segundo lugar, se analizan las reformas en la gobernanza económica de la UE, realizadas tanto a través de documentos político-estratégicos, que establecen el marco general y los principios básicos de actuación, como a través de textos jurídicos que los desarrollan y aplican en la práctica. Así, el artículo analiza en detalle documentos político-estratégicos como el Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento, Europa 2020, el Semestre Europeo, el Pacto por el Euro Plus; y las previsiones jurídicas del Art. 126 del TFUE y el procedimiento aplicable en caso de déficit excesivo; la reforma del Art. 136 del TFUE y el Mecanismo Europeo de Estabilidad; el paquete de seis medidas jurídicas conocido como "The Six Pack"; y la propuesta de nuevas medidas jurídicas de refuerzo en este terreno conocido como "The Two Pack". El artículo, finalmente, analiza también el Tratado de Estabilidad, Coordinación y Gobernanza en la Unión Económica y Monetaria, concluido al margen del ordenamiento jurídico de la UE, y las más recientes propuestas del Consejo Europeo de 28-29 de junio de 2012, sobre un nuevo "Pacto por el Crecimiento y el Empleo" y el informe del Presidente del Consejo Europeo titulado "Hacia una auténtica Unión Económica y Monetaria".This article analyzes the reforms adopted by the EU and its Member States addressed at introducing and consolidating in their respective legal systems the basic principle of financial or budgetary balance, commonly known as the "golden rule "; that is to say, the requirement by which the whole of the public administration, at its different levels of government, must keep on a regular basis a situation of balanced budget or with surplus. In this line, this article analyzes firstly the precedents of this legal requirement in comparative constitutional law and then the amendments made by Germany, Spain and Italy on their constitutional texts, but also the frustrated constitutional reform initiated in France. And secondly, this article analyzes the reforms made in the economic governance of the EU by means of both politicalstrategic documents - which establish the general framework and the basic governing principles - and legal provisions which develop and implement them. In this respect, this article analyzes political-strategic documents such as the Stability and Growth Pact, Europe 2020, the Euro Plus Pact; and the legal provisions of Art. 126 of the TFEU and the excessive deficit procedure; the amendment of Art. 136 of the TFEU and the European Stability Mechanism; the set of six legal instruments commonly known as "The Six Pack ": and the new reinforcing set of two legal instruments - still under discussion - commonly known as "The Two Pack ". Finally, this article analyzes also the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Un ion, agreed outside the framework of the EU legal system, and the recent proposals adopted by European Council of June 28- 29, 2012, concerning a new "Compact for Growth and Jobs" and the President of the European Council report "Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union ",

Merkel's EU Policy: "Kohl's Mädchen" or Interest-driven Politics?

2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorothee Heisenberg
Keyword(s):  
European Council ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Eu Policy ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Council Presidency ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Main Support ◽  
The Eu

This article tries to assess the likely trajectory of Angela Merkel's policies toward the EU in contrast to her predecessor's. With Germany taking the European Council Presidency in the first half of 2007, Merkel will have had a year to put her stamp on the Presidency. By contrast, Gerhard Schröder, who took office in October 1998 had only two months before the German Council Presidency of 1999 began. I argue that Schröder's years will be remembered at the EU for a new emphasis on Germany's interests, and the decline of Germany's interest in and willingness to fund "European Grand Projects." Schröder had no great ambitions to follow Helmut Kohl's footsteps in being "reflexively European." Merkel, by contrast, shows signs early in her tenure to follow more closely her mentor's approach to the EU. I examine Germany's EU budget policies, as well as statements and policies toward the Stability and Growth Pact as the main support for the claim Merkel is different in policy not simply rhetoric.

scholarly journals Spending reviews as tools in the public sector

2019 ◽  
pp. 77-92
Author(s):  
Marta Postuła
Keyword(s):  
Public Management ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
The Public ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Innovative Methods ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
The Uk ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

Worsening performance of public finance reported by a number of countries as a result of the global financial crisis enhanced interest in advanced and innovative methods of fiscal consolidation and stabilisation. Spending reviews are amongst the most comprehensive and advanced methods of this type. In the post-2008 age, spending reviews have been carried out by countries that had used the tool in earlier periods (the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, the UK or Australia) as well as by those who started using them for the first time (Ireland, Canada and France). Spending reviews are used in countries that are well advanced economically and whose public management systems are sufficiently mature.European Union Member States exhibit diverse interest in applying spending reviews which are not mandatory and have not been formalised in international legislation. The EU legislation contains general recommendations for the application of the rational fiscal policy enshrined first in the Treaty provisions, further developed by in the Stability and Growth Pact and detailed in 2011. The paper analyses the up-to-date experiences in using spending reviews in selected countries and draws conclusions from the process.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITALY RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF SUPRANATIONAL FISCAL REGULATION

2021 ◽  
pp. 208-221
Author(s):  
Dmitrii О. Mikhalev ◽  
◽  
Egor’ A. Sergeev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Budget Deficit ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Internal Factors ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Discretionary Fiscal Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Eu

The article presents a retrospective analysis of relations between the government of Italy and the European Union institutions in the context of supranational fiscal regulation in 2002–2019. The authors analyze the influence of external and internal factors on the state of public finance in Italy, note the reasons that made it difficult to meet the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, study the main issues on the agenda in the EU-Italy relations and their evolution. The authors also come to conclusion that unlike the earlier discussions about correcting budget deficit in Italy, current focus of supranational fiscal governance is shifted to preventing it, what challenges the economic sovereignty of Italy and country’s opportunities to conduct a discretionary fiscal policy.

scholarly journals State Aid Rules and Public Financing of Infrastructure. The Case of Autostrada Wielkopolska S.A.

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-96
Author(s):  
Paulina Kubera
Keyword(s):  
Public Expenditure ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Public Financing ◽  
The Road ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Toll Road ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Concession Contract ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Made In

Abstract The operation of a toll road typically involves an economic activity for which State aid rules apply. However, if the construction and operation of the road infrastructure is bundled and they are tendered out together, they usually fall outside the State aid regime. The reason for it lies in the fact that the use of competitive procurement procedures aim to increase the efficiency of public expenditure and to ensure a level playing field for private operators to compete for public contracts. Nevertheless, based on the European Commission’s decisional practice, it transpires that an economic advantage for a concession holder cannot be ruled out automatically, in particular when there are amendments made to the original agreement. On the example of the Autostrada Wielkopolska S.A. case, critical State aid issues are discussed, among others, the application of State aid rules to public financing of infrastructure, the amendments made to a concession contract in the light of the risk assignment problem, as well as the existence of State aid in the form of overcompensation for a concession holder. The considerations are carried out on the canvas of a concrete case; however, they are enriched by the analysis of relevant legal provisions as well as conclusions from the EU courts and the European Commission decisions made in similar cases.

scholarly journals The European Union competence in the public health field

2021 ◽  
pp. 87-92
Author(s):  
V. O. Tyumentsev
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
European Union ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Health Protection ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Public ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Health Field ◽  
The Eu

The subject of this article is the competence of the European Union (EU) in the public health field within the territory of the Member States of this organization. The purpose of this article is to analyze how the EU's competence is distributed in relation to the competence of the member states using the primary treaty of the organization as a source. The article examines the powers of the EU organization within both the main and additional competence and analyzes how the EU interacts with the member states in the framework of health protection in accordance with the legal provisions of the primary source. The main and additional competence of the EU is considered separately, and there is also an analysis of the features and possible prospects of the legal regulation of health protection within the relevant branch of the law of the European Union.

scholarly journals European Union’s Fiscal Rules and New Financial Instruments for 2021- 2017: Bulgaria’s Case Study

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-35
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Financial Instruments ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Economic Cycle ◽  
Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Eu

Fiscal policymaking of the Member States aims to follow fiscal rules through the economic cycle that ensure macroeconomic sustainability in the European Union (EU). After the 2008 global crisis, the Stability and Growth Pact introduced the enhanced supranational fiscal rules, setting additional boundaries to fiscal deficits and government debt. The new ceiling on the structural deficit in public finance laws of Member States has served to protect creditworthiness. The COVID-19 pandemic, which led to a temporary suspension of the fiscal rules, clearly indicates that the key challenges are to implement a countercyclical policy during upturns, building buffers for bad days. Under the Next Generation Europe’s initiative the European Commission (EC) will borrow up to €750 billion and distribute it over 2021-2024 to Member States (European Commission, 2020a). Raising funds in the EU budget and repayment of the EC debt may lead to amendments to the design and application of the EU fiscal rules. This paper lays out the objectives of the EU current fiscal framework and its main pillars, discusses how the EC new financial instruments for the period 2021-2027 will be accounted for in the Member States’ fiscal framework, and what are its possible changes and challenges after Covid-19 and Brexit.

scholarly journals Budget rules with a public debt reduction target

2021 ◽  
pp. 7-24
Author(s):  
Alessandro Petretto
Keyword(s):  
Public Debt ◽  
Structural Adjustment ◽  
Golden Rule ◽  
Short Paper ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Simple Simulation ◽  
Fiscal Compact ◽  
The Stability ◽  
High Level

After the Stability and Growth Pact suspension to face the Covid-19 emergency and subsequent financial crisis, a novel fiscal discipline must be designed for the Euro Area. In this short paper, we formally analyze and compare three budget rules and their efficacy in pursuing a reasonable public debt reduction target, explicitly envisaged by them. The rules we refer to are: (a) the structural adjustment toward a budget medium term objective, required by Fiscal Compact discipline; (b) the expenditure rule proposed by European Fiscal Board and (c) the Musgrave Golden rule. By a simple simulation exercise we argue that the rule proposed by EFB seems to be, for a country with a low rate of growth and a high level of public debt, preferable to the other two.

Political deparadoxification through structural coupling in the EU: a reinterpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julien Broquet
Keyword(s):  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Wird Eine ◽  
Structural Coupling ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Funktionale Differenzierung ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Eu

ZusammenfassungDer Aufsatz schlägt vor, auf der Basis der Luhmannsschen Theorie eine Reinterpretation des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakts der EU vorzunehmen. Die Argumentation basiert auf theoretischen Weiterentwicklungen, die innerhalb der neueren Systemtheorie im Zuge der Beschäftigung mit europäischen Studien vorgenommen worden sind. Es wird argumentiert, dass »ungleiche Europäisierung« sozialer Systeme (Jachtenfuchs) als ein anderer Ausdruck für funktionale Differenzierung zu strukturellen Änderungen innerhalb sozialer Systeme führt und zu einer Redefinition von Kopplungsprozessen in Europa. Der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt ist ein besonders augenfälliges Beispiel dafür. Deshalb wird der Eurostabilitätspakt im vorliegenden Text als eine strukturelle Kopplung von ökonomischem und politischem System analysiert. Ein genauerer Blick auf seine Entstehung führt dabei zu einer Verteidigung der Ansicht, dass es fruchtbar sein könnte, ihn aus einer polykontexturalen Perspektive zu betrachten, wie es im europäischen Kontext generell sinnvoll erscheint, strukturelle Kopplungen verstärkter in den Blick zu nehmen. Auf der Basis des Luhmannsschen Konzepts der Entparadoxierung sozialer Systeme durch die Bezugnahme auf ihre Umwelt wird eine Interpretation des Eurostabilitätspakts vorgenommen, nach der der Ausgangspunkt des Pakts trotz einer vermeintlichen ökonomischen Intention im Wesentlichen in dem politischen Prozess einer Entparadoxierung durch die Bezugnahme auf das ökonomische System liegt.

Taking Stock of the EU Fiscal Rules over the Past 20 Years and Options for Reform

2019 ◽  
Vol 239 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 861-894
Author(s):  
Christophe Kamps ◽  
Nadine Leiner-Killinger
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Maastricht Treaty ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Public Finances ◽  
The Past ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This paper reviews how the European Union’s fiscal rules have developed from the Maastricht Treaty that established the single monetary policy up until today. It shows that the design of these rules did not always follow economic logic but often resulted from political constraints, giving rise to some flaws in the framework from its very beginning. At the same time, the repeated attempts to adjust the fiscal framework to a multitude of circumstances over the past 25 years have made it overly complex and incoherent. Based on a finding that euro area countries’ compliance with the EU fiscal rules has been unsatisfactory, the paper concludes that in its current shape the Stability and Growth Pact is an insufficient disciplining device in good economic times, with the consequence that there are no fiscal buffers, in particular in high-debt countries, such that growth can be supported in economic troughs. Based on this finding, the paper reviews reform options for making the fiscal framework more effective in bringing about sounder public finances and avoiding the pro-cyclicality observed over the past two decades.

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