scholarly journals The problem of anti-psychologism in Hans Kelsen’s “Pure Theory of Law”

Author(s):  
Dmitry Aleksandrovich Savenkov

This article examines the nature and specificity of the criticism of psychologism as a theoretical-methodological orientation towards studying law and its interpretation, which in particular was associated with such version of interpretation of law as the “Pure Theory of Law” of Hans Kelsen. More in-depth representations of modern legal theory in understanding the patterns of law and its essential aspects requires the due coverage of the history of psychological and anti-psychological approaches towards law that form of the major oppositions in the development of legal though at the turn of the XIX – XX centuries. Multiple aspects of H. Kelsen's legal views are yet to be examined, including the correlation of his doctrine with other doctrines, as well as the nature of substantiation of law and the analysis of legal phenomena. The scientific novelty of lies in the fact that based on the analysis of legal views of the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen wirh his pronounced claim to exclude all “non-legal’ elements, it is revealed that a significant part of conceptual-logical apparatus of Kelsen’s teaching and the approaches towards substantiation of law were psychological in nature. Unlike the objective-idealistic positions of H. Kelsen, legal Neo-Kantianism was methodologically more accurate in elucidation of interrelation between the actual legal phenomenon and the role of gnoseological methods of perception and comprehension of law. The assessment of H. Kelsen’s doctrine as the theory of law is subject to criticism in this article, since in reality it is limited to the issues of legal methodology.

2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
JÖRG KAMMERHOFER

AbstractHans Kelsen is known both as a legal theorist and as an international lawyer. This article shows that his theory of international law is an integral part of the Kelsenian Pure Theory of Law. Two areas of international law are analysed: first, Kelsen's coercive order paradigm and its relationship to the bellum iustum doctrine; second, the Kelsenian notion of the unity of all law vis-à-vis theories of the relationship of international and municipal law. In a second step, the results of Kelsenian general legal theory of the late period – as interpreted and developed by the present author – are reapplied to selected doctrines of international law. Thus is the coercive order paradigm resolved, the unity of law dissolved, and the UN Charter reinterpreted to show that the concretization of norms as positive international law cannot be unmade by a scholarship usurping the right to make law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-395
Author(s):  
Andrzej Dziadzio

The Academic Portrait of the Creator of the Pure Theory of Law was written by Thomas Olechowski, a professor of the University of Vienna, and a historian of law with an established academic position, having outstanding expertise in the field of the history of the system of law in Austria in the 19th and 20th centuries. Olechowski collected impressive source material - mainly archival, including Kelsen’s extensive correspondence, university and administrative files connected with all the stages of his life and academic activity, and interviews with still-living persons (oral history) who had met Kelsen directly or indirectly. Owing to the obtained material, often secured through detailed source query in Austrian, Czech, German, and American archives, the author managed to correct and complete many details from his subject’s life and works. Hence, the reviewed biography of Kelsen provides a great deal of new information, which presents a view of his life and academic achievements through a multithreaded method. Various examples of little-known or completely unknown facts from H. Kelsen’s biography will be presented in the review.


Author(s):  
Iuliia Rossius

The goal of this article consists in demonstration of the impact of research in the field of history and theory of law alongside the hermeneutics of Emilio Betti impacted the vector of this philosophical thought. The subject of this article is the lectures read by Emilio Betti (prolusioni) in 1927 and 1948, as well as his writings of 1949 and 1962. Analysis is conducted on the succession of Betti's ideas in these works, which is traced despite the discrepancy in their theme (legal and philosophical). The author indicates “legal” origin of the canons of Bettis’ hermeneutics, namely the canon of autonomy of the object. Emphasis is placed on the problem of objectivity in Betti's theory, as well as on dialectical tension between the historicity of the interpreted subject and strangeness of the object that accompanies legal, as well as any other type of interpretation. The article reveals the key moment of Betti's criticism of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Regarding the question of historicity of the subject of interpretation. The conclusion is made that the origin of the general theory of interpretation lies in the approaches and methods developed and implemented by Betti back in legal hermeneutics and in studying history of law.   Betti's philosophical theory was significantly affected by the idea on the role of modern legal dogma in interpretation of the history of law. Namely this idea that contains the principle of historicity of the subject of interpretation, which commenced  the general hermeneutical theory of Emilio Betti, was realized in canon of the relevance of understanding in the lecture in 1948, and later in the “general theory of interpretation”. The author also underlines that the question of objectivity of understanding, which has crucial practical importance in legal hermeneutics, was transmitted into the philosophical works of E. Betti, finding reflection in dialectic of the subject and object of interpretation.


KPGT_dlutz_1 ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-35
Author(s):  
Ricardo Borrmann

This paper offers an original analysis of the interconnections between law and psychoanalysis through the personal and academic exchanges between Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). After a brief analysis of the similar cultural background of both scholars as Jews who grew up in fin-de-siècle Vienna, the text focuses on the personal encounters between them and subsequently analyzes Kelsen's reception of Freud's work in “The State-Concept and Social-Psychology” (Der Begriff des Staates und die Sozialpsychologie). Kelsen’s text was originally published in 1922 in Freud’s review, Imago, resulting from a conference he held at the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society. This paper analyzes the relevance of Freud’s theory to the construction of the Pure Theory of Law, especially regarding his concept of the state. Furthermore, it presents a new hypothesis for the subjective reasons behind Kelsen’s attraction to psychoanalysis, and for his admiration of Freud, which it tries to understand through the personal context of Kelsen’s life. Finally, it deals with the possible influence of Kelsen on Freud's work, especially with regards to the term "Super-Ego."


1936 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 736-741 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. B. Stern

Among legal philosophers, the time-honored dispute between natural-law schools and legal positivists arouses ever new interest. On the side of the positivists, the “pure theory of law” gains more and more ground. This theory is mainly represented by Professor Hans Kelsen, formerly of Vienna, now of Geneva, and by Professor Alfred von Verdross, of Vienna. In America, systematic consideration was first devoted to it by Dr. Johannes Mattern, who analyzed Verdross's thinking; later, Dr. Josef L. Kunz, one of the foremost followers of Kelsen, took up the discussion, emphasizing the importance of the theory for a scientific basis of international law; and quite recently an article by Dr. Henry Janzen dealt with legal monism as the basis of the “pure theory of law.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleg Grygor ◽  
Yuri Krysiuk ◽  
Angela Boyko ◽  
Vadim Zubov ◽  
Igor Sinegub

At first glance, the relationship between philosophy and theory of law is not applied but is considered a purely theoretical aspect. This thesis is not correct due to the adoption of the European legal standard of human and civil rights, the role of philosophy of law, the foundations of the theory of state and law in the training of lawyers, the formation of future lawyers of high philosophical and methodological culture.In this article, based on the analysis of the history of philosophy of law and the general theory of state and law and their development, the authors justify as an autonomous status in the jurisprudence of the two disciplines, their relationship and vice versa - differences.To do this, the authors explored the historical excursion of world philosophical and legal thought, grouped scientific and theoretical views on the relationship between philosophy of law and theory of state and law and provided an argument for the close intersection of philosophy of law and theory of state and law, mobility between scientific disciplines.Close contact between philosophy and jurisprudence contributes to the understanding of law not only as a function of the state but also the essence of human spirituality.The authors concluded that the in-depth study of scientific and theoretical aspects of the relationship between philosophy, philosophy of law and theory of state and law is the result of bridging the gap between theory and practice and will further focus on expanding the interaction of philosophy, theory and law results of the functioning of the state and law.Emphasizing the relevance of the topic in terms of bridging the significant gap between theory and practice, between the declarative provisions of laws and their actual implementation, the legal, scientific community is increasingly expanding to enter the plane of the practical application of philosophical - theoretical thought.


2020 ◽  
pp. 221-244
Author(s):  
Paulo Henrique Rodrigues Pereira

RESUMOA Teoria Pura do Direito figura como uma das grandes obras do pensamento jurídico do século XX. Entretanto, pouco se explora a visão do autor sobre a interpretação das normas e dos princípios em sua visão totalizante do direito. O presente artigo busca reconstituir a discussão sobre as limitações da visão de Hans Kelsen sobre a interpretação no direito, focando em sua Teoria Pura. Através da delimitação das críticas feitas a Kelsen, nominalmente sobre incoerência e insuficiência da operação de sua teoria, o autor passará à abordagem do próprio Kelsen sobre a interpretação como resposta a tais críticas, para então produzir um balanço desse debate.PALAVRAS-CHAVEKelsen. Interpretação. Teoria Pura do Direito. Filosofia do Direito. ABSTRACTThe “Pure Theory of Law” occupies a place as one of the most relevant works of legal thinking in the 20th Century. However, little is discussed on Hans Kelsen’s vision on interpretation of norms and principles in his systematic vision of Law. This article seeks to explore the discussion regarding the limitations of his vision on interpretation of Law, focusing on his Pure Theory. Through the delimitation of the criticism to his work, specially of incoherence and insufficiency of the operation of his theory, the author will then pursue Kelsen’s own approach on the interpretation as an answer to such criticism, to then display an overall assessment of this debate.KEYWORDSKelsen. Interpretation. Pure Theory of Law. Philosophy of Law.


Author(s):  
Philipp Reimer

»L’ÉTAT, C’EST LE DROIT!« – SOBRE A ATUALIDADE DA TEORIA DO ESTADO DE HANS KELSEN EM FACE DA METAMORFOSE DO PODER ESTATAL*  »L’ÉTAT, C’EST LE DROIT!« - ZUR AKTUALITÄT DER STAATSLEHRE HANS KELSENS IM ANGESICHT SICH WANDELNDER STAATSGEWALT  »L’ÉTAT, C’EST LE DROIT!« - THE CURRENT IMPORTANCE OF HANS KELSEN'S STATE DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF THE STATE POWER CHANGES   Philipp Reimer**  RESUMO: Confrontada com evidentes mutações na estruturação de instituições e atividades estatais, a teoria do direito pode nos dizer que aspectos deste processo de metamorfose devem ser considerados pelos estudos jurídicos – bem como quais aspectos não precisam ser levados em conta. Fazendo uso de uma abordagem kelseniana, este artigo demonstra como a teoria do direito (compreendida como disciplina normativa) não enfrenta quaisquer dificuldades ao lidar com fenômenos da ordem do dia tais quais „soft law“, „governo de múltiplos níveis“ ou „pluralismo jurídico“. A distinção entre normativo e empírico é a chave interpretativa, aqui, de tal forma que a investigação desta última esfera pertence ao domínio das ciências sociais e não da teoria do direito. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Identidade entre Estado e direito. Hans Kelsen. Teoria pura do direito. Teoria normativa. Pluralismo jurídico. ABSTRACT: When facing eminent change of the way government institutions and activities are structured, legal theory can tell us in what respects legal scholarship needs to take account of such change - and also, in what respects is does not. Using a Kelsenian approach, this paper shows how legal theory (understood as a normative discipline) has no difficulty in coping with modern-day phenomena such as "soft law", "multi-level government", and "legal pluralism". The distinction of the normative and the empirical is key here, where the study of the latter falls into the domain of the social sciences, not legal theory. KEYWORDS: Identity of legal order and state. Hans Kelsen. Pure theory of law. Normative theory. Legal pluralism. SUMÁRIO: 1 Transformação do Estado – de que Estado? 1.1 Um Estado, duas dimensões, três elementos? 1.2 Diferenciação dos conceitos de Estado. 1.3 Conceito teórico-jurídico de Estado e transformação do Estado. 2 Transformações do conteúdo do direito. 2.1 Autorregulação. 2.2 »Soft law«. 3 Transformação da estrutura do direito: Substituição do Estado. 3.1 »Sistemas de múltiplos níveis« e »pluralismo jurídico« como (aparente) desafio a um teoria do direito centrada no Estado. 3.1.1 »Sistemas de múltiplos níveis«. 3.1.2 »Pluralismo jurídico«. 3.2 Substituição, não transformação do Estado. 3.2.1 A antiquada teoria do direito centrada no Estado como quimera. 3.2.2 A necessária unidade da perspectiva jurídica da ciência normativa. 3.2.2.1 Derrogação apenas internamente a uma ordem jurídica. 3.2.2.2 Construção do direito internacional público e do direito europeu. 3.2.3 O caráter arbitrário da escolha do ponto de partida da abordagem jurídica. Conclusão – perspectivas científico-normativas e científico-sociais sobre a “transformação do Estado”. Referências Bibliográficas. * Publicação original: REIMER, Philipp. »L’État, c’est le droit!« - Zur Aktualität der Staatslehre Hans Kelsens im Angesicht sich wandelnder Staatsgewalt. In: HESCHL, Lisa et seq (Eds.). L'État, c'est quoi? Staatsgewalt im Wandel. 54. Assistententagung Öffentliches Recht. Graz: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2014, p. 37-57. Traduzido por Rodrigo Garcia Cadore, doutorando em Teoria do Direito e Direito Público pela Universidade de Freiburg (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg), Alemanha, com autorização do autor.** Livre-docente em Direito Público e Teoria do Direito pela Universidade de Freiburg (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg), Alemanha. Professor Privatdozent na Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Mainz (Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz), Alemanha.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelik Wardiono ◽  
Khudzaifah Dimyati

Based on the philosophical approach, it is known basic assumptions of rational paradigm as seen in Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law that consists of: human assumptions based on the quasi-transcendental along with its characters and aurea aetas; ontological assumptions based on empirical reality and equating sein reality with sollen, and normativity created as logico transcendental conditions; epistemological assumption that underlying the science of law as cognitive science, creating the rule of law as a whole object, and reconstructing legal norm as the relation between non-causal and non-metaphysical facts; axiological assumption that reconstructs norm as the object of legal science and equating the basic norms with natural laws.Key words: basic assumptions, rational paradigm, the theory pure of law, jurisprudance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 45-53
Author(s):  
Evgeni A. Apolski ◽  
Andrei Yu. Mordovtsev ◽  
Aleksei Yu. Mamychev

The article considers the Soviet dissertation theoretical and legal doctrines as a scientific category with a set of specific features. The author draws attention to the fact that the massive layer of legal theoretical knowledge known as Soviet jurisprudence and the legal teachings reflecting the evolution of Soviet law are insufficiently studied in ontological and epistemological terms. In specific, the role, place, and significance of Soviet dissertation legal theoretical teachings are lacking in the literature. Moreover, the Marxist methodology of legal knowledge, which should be used in modern educational and scientific space, lacks clear assessment. The author analyzes the most important thesis on the theory of law, which reflect the ontological and methodological foundations of the Soviet law and legal theory presented in the theses. This article lays the basis and the vector of further development of Soviet jurisprudence. These dissertation doctrines are analyzed to further use them in the scientific research of laws and trends in the development of Soviet legal thought. The results of these analyses are crucial for the history of political and legal doctrines, general theory of law, and philosophy of law and can be used in other areas of legal (including industry) science, considering their interdisciplinary heuristic potential.


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